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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) represent one of the most formal and 
commonly used instruments for managing intergovernmental relations within federal 
systems.  Through an analysis of the Belgian and Canadian cases, this thesis was designed 
to test the following hypothesis: while IGAs apparently play similar functions in different 
federal regimes, the public law systems of different federations treat these negotiated 
instruments in a radically distinct fashion.  While the first branch of the hypothesis is largely 
confirmed, the second branch requires more by way of nuance. 
 
 In both federations, IGAs are indeed used to articulate the exercise of exclusive but 
interconnected competences, to allocate responsibilities, share resources or channel funds 
from one order of government to another. They are used to create joint organs and outline 
processes for information-sharing, consultation and dispute resolution.  But IGAs also 
perform less overt functions.  They help redesign federal structures on the margins of 
constitutional norms.  They are used to circumvent the formal distribution of powers and to 
introduce asymmetrical arrangements. They act as substitutes for constitutional reform or 
serve to by-pass constitutional amendment procedures.  They can have a strong symbolic 
value as a matter of federal realpolitik.   
 
 The divergence in the legal character of IGAs was assessed in the face of this 
convergence of functions.  The issue of legal status is tackled from three distinct angles.  
First, intergovernmental agreements are examined as contractual instruments between 
federal partners.  From this perspective, the differences are more a matter of contrary 
presumptions than of radically different legal status.  Indicia for locating IGAs on either side 
of the threshold of juridicity, taking these presumptions into consideration, as well as 
limitations germane to the respective public law systems, are identified.   
 
 Differences in legal status are more notable when IGAs are considered as normative 
instruments, that is as mechanisms for affecting the rights and obligations of third parties.  In 
Canada, very few of the dozens of IGAs concluded each year are formally given the force of 
law through the proper technique of statutory incorporation.  In Belgium, by contrast, 
cooperation agreements are mainly conceived as a novel – if ill defined – type of negotiated 
norm of public law.  Legislative assent is frequently granted, which confers on Belgian IGAs 
legal force erga omnes in the legal orders of every party to them.     
   
 Finally, the main difference between the two systems may lie in the place which IGAs 
occupy in the hierarchy of norms.  In Canada, federal partners may legislate in contradiction 
with an IGA.  While the issue remains unresolved in Belgium, doctrinal arguments have been 
advanced to seek to protect cooperation agreements from unilateral repudiation. These 
differences concerning the hierarchy of norms reflect a distinct way of resolving the tension 
that exists between democratic freedom – including the power of assemblies to change their 
mind – and the stability of intergovernmental relations within a federal regime.  
 
    
*** 
 
This dissertation is my own work and contains nothing which is the outcome of work done in 
collaboration with others, except as specified in the text and Acknowledgments. 
 
This dissertation, including footnotes, does not exceed the permitted length. 
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 1 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.  Why study intergovernmental agreements? 
 
 Policy-making in multi-layered constitutional systems requires a substantial degree of 
information sharing, coordination, articulation, and even joint-action between various public 
actors.  This is clearly the case of federal regimes.  All modern federations have had to 
develop tools to coordinate the exercise of powers distributed amongst various decision-
making entities.1  Cooperation may not be an essential condition for the existence of a 
federal regime, but it may well be essential to an effective one.2    
 
Harmonisation, co-ordination and dispute resolution may take different forms.  
“Cooperation” (the expression used in Belgium, Switzerland, Germany or Spain) and 
“intergovernmental relations” (an expression more frequently used in Canada, Australia and 
the United States) involve a wide range of institutional processes of various degrees of 
formality.  They include phone calls between civil servants, interministerial meetings, the 
creation of joint bodies, interdelegation of regulatory power meant to circumvent the 
constitutional distribution of powers, negotiations within a political party apparatus active in 
different orders of government, as well as a variety of consultation processes.  Such federal 
diplomacy can be vertical (between the central government and the federated entities) and 
horizontal (between those entities).3  It can be bilateral or multilateral.  It ranges from the 
informal (meetings between decision-makers) to the conclusion of solemn agreements.  
 
 Intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) represent one of the most formal mechanisms 
of infra-state co-operation. IGAs are “ubiquitous”4 instruments of policy-making in 
federations, whether these systems are described as co-operative, collaborative, 
                                                
1 LECLERCQ, Claude, L’État fédéral, (Paris: Dalloz, 1997) 62. 
2 BERNIER, Ivan, International Legal Aspects of Federalism (London: Longman, 1973) 5 ff. For 
BERNIER, four conditions for the existence of a federal regime: 1) a division of powers between 
central and federated governments; 2) a degree of independence between them; 3) direct action on 
the people by both central and federated entities; 4) some means of protecting the distribution of 
powers.   For some authors, cooperation is an inherent element of federalism: DELPÉRÉE, Francis, 
DEPRÉ, Sébastien, Le système constitutionnel de la Belgique, (Brussels: Larcier, 1998) 281-283; 
WILDE D'ESMAEL, Tanguy (de), “Les accords de coopération comme mécanisme de prévention et de 
solution des conflits : présentation de la nouveauté institutionnelle”  in ALEN, André et al. (eds.) Les 
conflits d'intérêts; quelle solution pour la Belgique de demain? (Namur: La Charte, 1990) 90-122, 122. 
3 SIMEON, Richard, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: the Making of Recent Policy in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1972). 
4 SWINTON, Katherine, “Law, Politics and the Enforcement of the Agreement on Internal Trade” in 
TREBILCOCK, M.J., and SCHWANEN, D. (eds.), Getting There: The Agreement on Internal Trade 
(Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute,1995) 196-210, 196. 
 2 
competitive, executive, or even “confrontational”.5 Their purpose varies from the mundane 
(an arrangement to co-finance the maintenance of a bridge), to the nearly-constitutional 
(when they are used to develop or counter formal constitutional norms). 
 
 The number of IGAs is very large in long-standing federations.  Hundreds of interstate 
compacts have been concluded in the United States since 1783.6  There are nearly 1500 
federal-provincial agreements currently in force in Canada, and the number of interprovincial 
agreements is also significant.  IGAs are also very common in emerging federations.  Hence, 
in Spain, over 500 convenios are concluded every year between Madrid and the autonomous 
communities.7  Of course, these numbers must be put in perspective.  In Belgium, at least 
200 “cooperation agreements” have been concluded since 1989, to which a significant 
number of non-binding protocols must be added.   There has generally been an explosion of 
normative production (regulations, legislation) in the post-war period. Arguably, the increase 
in the number of agreements follows a similar trend.8  It could also be argued that in some 
federal countries, IGAs are substitutes for more traditional types of norms of public law.   
Whether recourse to agreements parallels the exponential recourse to other normative 
instruments or not, their quantitative importance is undeniable. 
 
 So is their qualitative significance.  Over the last few years, there has been a renewed 
interest in intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) in older federations and concern about this 
institution in emerging ones.  Hence, Swiss public authorities resort to inter-cantonal 
agreements as shields against centralisation, and have developed techniques to enhance 
democratic participation concerning their elaboration.9  Agreements have been blamed for 
the centralisation process in Australia and the United States.10  The transformation of Spain 
from a unitary State into a quasi-federation rests largely on an impressive practice of 
intergovernmental agreements. Even before the reinstatement of the Scottish Parliament, 
                                                
5 DELPÉRÉE, Francis, “Le fédéralisme de confrontation” in DELWIT, Pascal, and al., (eds.), 
Gouverner la Belgique : clivages et compromis dans une société complexe (Paris: PUF, 1999) 53-69. 
6 FLORESTANO, Patricia, “Past and Present Utilization of Interstate Compacts in the United States”, 
(1994) 24: 4 Publius 13-25. 
7 This includes, however, a number of similarly-framed bilateral agreements between Madrid and the 
17 entities:  ALBERTÍ, ROVIRA, Enoch, “Relaciones de colaboracion con las comunidades 
autonomas “, in Informe Comunidades Autonomas 2000 (Barcelona : Instituto de derecho publico, 
2001)  58-70. 
8 GERMANN, Raimund E., Administration publique en Suisse, vol. 1: L’appareil étatique et le 
gouvernement (Berne/Stuttgart/Vienne: Haupt,  1996) 10 ff.   
9 ABDERHALDEN, Ursula, “La participation des parlements cantonaux à la conclusion de concordats 
intercantonaux “, (1999) 2 Bulletin de législation, Institut du fédéralisme de l’Université de Fribourg, 
pp. xxiii-xxix ; BOEGLI, Laurence, Les concordats intercantonaux : Quels enjeux pour la démocratie, 
(Lausanne : Institut de Hautes études en administration publique, 1998). 
10 PAINTER, Martin, Collaborative Federalism : Economic Reform in Australia in the 1990s 
(Cambridge-NY-Melbourne: Cambridge U. Press, 1998) 101 ; Zimmerman, Joseph F., Contemporary 
American Federalism:  the growth of national power (Leicester: Leceister U. Press, 1992) 139-146 and 
Interstate Relations: the neglected dimension of federalism (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1996) 34-58. 
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architects of the devolution process in the United Kingdom elaborated a number of 
“concordats” to be signed by the Whitehall government and the new executives.11   
 
Similarly, since the “regionalisation” of the Italian State, central authorities have 
concluded a number of agreements with certain regions, on the margins of the traditional 
political process.12   The failure of the various partners to respect cooperative agreements 
has been blamed for the Argentinian economic crisis of 2001-2002.13  The status of 
agreements between Moscow and the Republics or between the Republics themselves is 
particularly contentious.14  In Canada, “administrative agreements” are hailed as the 
alternative to unattainable constitutional reform.15  Until recently, Belgian “cooperative 
agreements” were considered essential tools for counter-balancing the effect of a very rapid 
constitutional decentralisation process.  Now these routine vehicles of inter-federal relations 
are being vilified as weapons in the arsenal of those who promote a “confederal” vision of the 
country.16   
 
In spite of their significance in federal regimes, IGAs have given rise to a very limited 
number of comparative studies.17  In fact, in some federations, they have hardly been studied 
at all.  Public law textbooks in Switzerland, Spain, Belgium, the United States or Germany do 
discuss – often very briefly - the institution of intergovernmental agreements.   By contrast, 
Canadian constitutional law treatises barely mention them.18  Their “justiciability” is 
                                                
11 RAWLINGS, Richard, “Concordats of the Constitution”, (2000) 16 L.Q.R. 257-286; POIRIER, 
Johanne, “ The Functions of Intergovernmental Agreements : Post-Devolution Concordats from a 
Comparative Perspective ” (2001) Public Law 134-157 [POIRIER, Concordats] 
12 Consiglio di Stato, Sezione Consultativa per gli Atti Normativi, 335/2005, 10.02.03. 
13 “Acuerdo sobre la relación financiera”, CLARIN. 19.11.02: www.clarin.com. 
14 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Directorate General of Political Affairs, Working paper on Federalism in 
Russia Programme, Segment A : Legal Aspects of Federalism, Group VIII : “Division of competences 
and responsibilities by treaties and agreements”,  26.02.2002, updated 23.05.2002.  
15 SIMMONS, Julie, “Securing the Threads of Cooperation in the Tapestry of Intergovernmental 
Relations: Does the Institutionalization of Federal-Provincial Territorial Ministerial Conferences 
Matter?” in INSTITUTE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, The State of the Federation 2002-
2003 (Kingston: IIGR, forthcoming) 7.  
16 Commission de révision de la Constitution et de la réforme des institutions sur la loi spéciale de 
transfert de diverses compétences aux régions et aux communautés,  Senate, Doc Parl, Senate, 
Report, SO 2000/2001, 2-709/7,   32 (VISEUR) ; DUMONT, Hugues, "Droit public, droit négocié 
et para-légalité" in GÉRARD, Philippe, OST, François, VAN DE KERCHOVE, Michel (eds.), 
Droit négocié, droit imposé?, (Brussels: Facultés Universitaires St-Louis, 1996) 457-489, 
486. 
17 The notable exception is GARCIA MORALES, Maria Jesus, Convenios de colaboraciòn en los 
sistemas federales europeos : estudios comparativo de Alemania, Suiza, Austria y Bélgica, (Madrid: 
McGraw Hill, Madrid, 1998).   
18  They are often mentioned in the context of a policy analysis: agreements in the field of social 
protection or fiscal federalism, for instance.  But the legal analysis of these agreements is extremely 
limited in Canada.  The exceptions are: BANKES, Nigel, "Co-operative Federalism: Third Parties and 
Intergovernmental Agreements and Arrangements in Canada and Australia", (1991) 29 Alberta L.R 792-
838 and “Constitutionalized Intergovernmental Agreements and Third Parties: Canada and Australia, 
(1992) 30 Alberta LR 524-554; ELLIOT, Robin, “Rethinking Manner and Form: From Parliamentary 
Sovereignty to Constitutional Values” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall LJ 215-251; FRIEDLANDER, Lara, 
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questioned and their fragility in the face of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is 
asserted.19 This generally takes a few lines, sometimes a few paragraphs.  Hence, an 
omnipresent and crucial tool of federal governance largely escapes legal analysis.  
 
The apparent disinterest of legal scholars in such a widespread device of public policy 
is puzzling. It may be partly explained by the relative opacity of the instrument.  Agreements 
are negotiated and concluded by executives: in fact, they are instruments par excellence of 
cooperative federalism.  Until recently they were rarely made public and even more rarely 
discussed in the media.20  In other words, the significance of IGAs may have been under-
estimated because they were not easily accessible and considered to be highly technical.    
  
Even in countries where they have been the object of substantial academic analysis, 
a number of questions concerning their legal status and their relation to other types of norms 
remain unresolved or controversial.  This is particularly true in Belgium, where 
constitutionalists tend to assert rather than demonstrate the legally binding nature of 
agreements.  The legal character of the instrument is asserted as if any alternative were 
simply inconceivable. 
 
Despite the desire of government parties to agreements to shield them as much as 
possible from parliamentary, media and judicial scrutiny, IGAs are increasingly coming 
before courts.  Citizens seek to challenge the impact of governments’ re-ordering their 
constitutional responsibilities on the margin of the Constitution.  At present, judges appear 
bewildered by these instruments and the case law often seems result-oriented.  In this 
context, the clarification of their legal status may be useful even if we admit that Courts are 
not necessarily the best forums to approach policy-making instruments. 
  
2.   The hypothesis 
 
Based on a general exposure to the constitutional culture of both the Belgian and 
Canadian federal regimes, I initially had the sense that IGAs played very similar functions yet 
were treated in remarkably different ways by the public law regime of those federations.  
                                                                                                                                                   
“Constitutionalizing Intergovernmental Agreements” (1993) 4 NJCL 153-167; WILTSHIRE, Kenneth, 
"Working with intergovernmental agreements -The Canadian and Australian experience" (1980) 23 Can 
Public Admin  353-379; KENNET, Steven A., “Hard Law, Soft Law and Diplomacy : the Emerging 
Paradigm for Intergovernmental Cooperation in Environmental Assessment” (1993) 31 Alberta LR 
644-661; BLACKMAN, Susan, Intergovernmental Agreements in the Canadian Administrative 
Process, Technical Report (Calgary/Ottawa: Canadian Institute of Resource Law, University of 
Calgary and Department of Justice of Canada, 1993), unpublished. 
19 For instance: MAGNET, Joseph Eliot, “Constitutional Law of Canada: Cases, Notes and Materials”, 
7th ed., (Edmonton: Juriliber, 1998) 113-118.  
20 This is particularly true in Canada.  In Belgium, some agreements have been published from the 
inception of the institution in 1988-89: infra, Chapter 2. 
 5 
Basically, they seemed to be regarded as legal instruments in Belgium, and as merely 
political agreements in Canada.  In the end, the first branch of the hypothesis, concerning the 
similarity of functions, is largely confirmed.   
 
The fate of the second branch is more complex, and what I had first understood as a 
legally-binding/non-legally binding dichotomy requires a more subtle exposition.  The first 
qualifier is that the dominant conception of the institution differs.  Some see it as a contract, 
others as a means of – jointly – regulating particular matters. The latter conception is more 
clearly “normative” in the classic sense of the adoption of rules of general application.21  
Hence, the problem is not that IGAs are more or less binding, it is they are not seen as the 
same kinds of instruments.  When these two facets are taken into consideration, as I will 
argue they should be, the characterisation of IGAs in both federations does not differ as 
much as I had originally surmised.  With some significant nuances which are explored in this 
thesis, some IGAs will pass muster as legal instruments, others will not, whether they are 
examined from a contractual perspective or from a “normative” one.  The main difference 
may lie in the place which agreements occupy in the hierarchy of norms, that is their  
potential protection against unilateral repudiation by a party, notably through recourse to 
legislation.22    
 
In brief, then, this thesis will first outline the role and functions played by IGAs in the 
Belgian and Canadian federal systems, and then reflect on the legal status they enjoy in 
each.  The conclusion will suggest some explanations for the differences that remain in this 
regard and will reflect on the role of law in intergovernmental relations. 
 
3.  The value of comparing Belgium and Canada  
 
 While I did study intergovernmental agreements in other federal and quasi-federal 
systems (Switzerland, Spain, the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent Australia and the 
United States),23 in the end, an effective and sufficiently detailed analysis of more than two 
federal experiences seemed unachievable within the confines of this thesis.  This is in part 
because an exploration of the status of intergovernmental agreements implies the 
deciphering of a number of issues, such as the court system, the law of standing, 
fundamental administrative and constitutional law concepts, political history, the particular 
relation which each country entertains between the domestic and international legal orders, 
and so on. Doing justice to more than two countries in this context seemed unrealistic, and 
carried the risk of a kind of superficial “legal tourism”.  I thus decided to limit the present 
                                                
21 CORNU, Gérard, Vocaculaire juridique (Paris: PUF, 1987) 560. 
22 I use the term “potential” because the question is still unresolved in Belgium. 
23 POIRIER, Johanne, Les accords de cooperation belges au regard du droit comparé, Rapport 
présenté à la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, 30.11.2001 [POIRIER, Rapport 2001]. 
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dissertation to an exploration of the experience of intergovernmental agreements in Canada 
and Belgium, with the intention of developing analytical approaches which could facilitate the 
study of the same phenomena in other federations.  
 
  The choice of Canada and Belgium as case studies was based on a number of 
criteria.  On the one hand, these two countries share a number of similarities: 
  
1. They are both full-fledged federal systems; 
 
2. They share similar democratic and socio-economic characteristics, which imply a 
fairly high level of state intervention.  In a federal system, interventionism implies a 
recourse to agreements to sort out the respective actions of various orders of 
government; 
 
3. Because they are both multinational federations, a certain number of comparative 
studies have been undertaken, although they mainly tend to focus on aspects of 
accommodation of differences and minorities and not on technical issues such as the 
one I am interested in.  Nevertheless, these comparisons provide an helpful 
background from which to launch my enquiries; 
 
4. In theory, in neither country is there an official hierarchy between the various 
orders of government.  In other words, the rule that “federal law trumps the law of 
federated entities” does not apply either to Canada or Belgium.  It seemed reasonable 
to assume that consensual arrangements would be more developed in a system 
where one order of government cannot impose its will on another one through a direct 
legislative process;24 
 
5. As a correlative, only exceptionally are Belgian and Canadian federated entities 
“agents” of the centre.25  In other words, by contrast with Switzerland and Germany, 
where cantons and Länder implement federal legislation, in Canada and Belgium 
each order of government has its own administration.  It seemed reasonable to 
presume that this “independence” of each order of government could lead to a rich 
practice of agreements (as opposed to framework legislation to be completed by 
legislation or regulation of the federated entities, for instance); 
                                                
24 This, of course, is another over-simplification, since in Germany for instance, the Lander participate 
directly, through the Bundesrat, at the elaboration of federal legislation which then “trumps” their own 
normative instruments. The imposition from “above” is thus partly consensual: s.83 Fundamental Law; 
For Switzerland: s.49, Constitution of 1999. 
25 LAUVAUX, Philippe, Les grandes démocraties contemporaines, (Paris: PUF, 1998) 599-603; 
GERMANN (1996) 32 ff.; CURRIE, David, “Separation of Powers in the Federal Republic of 
Germany”, (1993) 41 AJCL 201-260. 
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6. Neither federation has a proper “federal” second chamber, allowing agreements 
between various orders to be transformed into more truly federal legislation (as 
opposed to legislation by central authorities).  This could conceivably lead to a greater 
practice of IGAs; 
 
7. Finally, Canada and Belgium are amongst the most decentralised western 
federations.  One might expect an enhanced use of intergovernmental agreements in 
decentralised, as opposed to more centralised federations. 
 
On the other hand, the choice of these two case studies was also guided by a number 
of distinctions with potential explanatory power with regards to the status of 
intergovernmental agreements:26  
 
1. The principal reason for choosing Belgium and Canada lies in the fact that – a 
priori – they are emblematic of the two distinct relations entertained between law and 
intergovernmental agreements.  Preliminary readings revealed that in Belgium, IGAs 
are principally portrayed as legal instruments protected from unilateral denunciation 
by one of the parties.  In Canada, by contrast, serious doubt is expressed concerning 
the nature of these agreements, and they are understood as particularly vulnerable to 
contrary unilateral action by one of the parties; 
 
2. Belgium offers a contemporary example of a federal regime that proceeded from 
“dissociation”, while Canada results mostly from the union of various provinces in 
1867.27  The Belgian process of constitutional decentralisation was accompanied by 
the introduction of explicit mechanisms to ensure a certain degree of co-operation 
between the newly autonomous components of the State.  Canada, as an older 
federation, developed cooperative mechanisms in a haphazard manner, through 
decades of intergovernmental diplomacy.   Again, it seemed reasonable to assume 
that law could play a distinct role in regulating a centrifugal federal experience by 
opposition to a centripetal one; 
 
3. Similarly, Canada is one of the oldest federations, while Belgium only officially 
became a federation in 1993.  It seemed useful to reflect on the possibility that the 
                                                
26 Obviously, a number of differences between the two countries cannot be fully addressed or taken 
into account. This is the case, for instance, of their respective political party structure and culture, or 
their electoral system, although these could admittedly have an indirect impact on the practice of 
IGAs.   
27 These descriptions are conceptual short cuts: as the Canadian federation involved the union of 
three provinces, and the scission of one into two (the unified province of Canada which includes much 
of today’s Ontario and Quebec).  Nevertheless, the general trend in the two countries illustrates a 
classic distinction drawn in the literature on federalism. 
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later adoption of a federal structure could explain the greater recourse to legal 
instruments in the conduct of intergovernmental relations; 
 
4. In Belgium, all legislative powers are deemed to be distributed on an exclusive 
basis between the various orders of government,  while the Canadian federal system 
includes a fairly important number of concurrent powers, alongside lists of exclusive 
competences.  I thought it could be revealing to examine whether this gives rise to a 
different practice regarding intergovernmental agreements; 
 
5. The Belgian court system is still unified and under federal jurisdiction.  The 
situation is more complex in Canada, where each province has its own judicial 
structure and where traditional rules of interjurisdictional immunity between the 
various orders of government were strictly applied until recently.28  The “justiciability” 
of cooperative mechanisms faces a number of technical problems in a “dual” court 
system.  In other words, it seemed useful to explore the possibility that the nature of 
judicial institutions could partly explain the reluctance to consider agreements to be of 
a legal nature; 
 
6. The Belgian federal system developed within the civilian or “continental” legal 
tradition.  In Canada, the rules of public law lie in the common law tradition.  The 
potential impact of the legal culture in which the federal regimes evolved on the 
characterisation of IGAs deserved some consideration.29  Moreover, developing their 
own original brand of federalism, and IGAs in particular, Belgian institutionalists were 
largely inspired by the theory and practice of Switzerland, and to a lesser extent 
Germany.  By contrast, Canadian constitutionalists and courts have generally used 
other Commonwealth federations as sources of inspiration.   Consequently, 
comparing Canada and Belgium provides an insight into the “continental divide” on 
either side of which these various federations as well.   
                                                
28 Once more, this is an oversimplification.  A summary of each judicial system is provided in Chapter 
1. 
29 This being said, the Canadian case is more complex, since private law is also governed by the 
common law in every province, except Québec, which is a civilian jurisdiction. Hence, the bi-juridical 
nature of Canada offers its own partial “continental divide”.    
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4.  Methodology and Sources  
  
• The diversity of classic legal sources   
 
One of the first challenges of the attempted comparison lies with the differences in the 
nature and scope of available sources.  In Canada, concern for IGAs is limited to a sort of 
political empirism, as opposed to any interest in the theory underlying them.  Legislation 
pertaining to IGAs is rare and very general in nature.  Consistent with the common law 
tradition, the few rules applicable to IGAs were developed over decades by courts faced with 
specific problems in specific historical contexts.  Given this case-by-case approach and the 
relatively limited number of judicial decisions rendered on the subject since the inception of 
the federal system in 1867, the portrait that emerges is particularly hazy.  Moreover, as was 
noted earlier, the legal literature on IGAs is also extremely limited.  Consequently, the 
traditional theoretical component of the research on IGAs in Canada required a particular 
effort of systematisation. 
 
By contrast, Belgian “cooperative agreements” were an explicit and deliberate 
addition to the arsenal of cooperative techniques elaborated in the wake of the massive 
constitutional decentralisation which the country has undergone over the last thirty years.  
They are the object of an impressive – if incomplete and sometimes ambiguous - legislative 
framework.  When it was first introduced, the institution generated a certain degree of 
academic interest.  Since then, the academic literature on agreements has tended to be 
repetitive and descriptive rather than analytical.  Cooperation agreements have been the 
subject of a limited number of constitutional and administrative law cases, and of a 
substantial number of legal opinions by the Council of State.  Some of these provide basic 
guidelines to the institutions, but overall, these sources are now essentially particular 
applications of rules elaborated in the early years.  Consequently, the theory concerning 
cooperation agreements in Belgium is characterised by an apparently greater degree of 
coherence.   This theory, however, does not always correspond to the actual practice. The 
classical, theoretical, approach thus had to be substantially completed by empirical research.    
 
• The agreements selected30 
 
In both countries, I was authorised to consult registries and archives of the Federal 
Chancery in Belgium,31 the Privy Council Office in Ottawa32 and the Secretariat for Canadian 
                                                
30 See lists, Appendix B and C. 
31 The Chancery acts as the Secretariat for the multilateral Concertation Committee (infra, Chapter 2) 
and is in charge of monitoring and archiving agreements (Circular on Interministerial Conferences of 
15.03.2000, unpublished).  In theory, its registry should contain every cooperation agreement. In 
practice, it centralises agreements to which federal authorities are party.  Agreements between 
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Intergovernmental Affairs (SAIC) in Québec City.33   This gave me access to unpublished 
material as well as to agreements which are technically accessible, but for which specific 
access to information procedure would normally be required.34 
 
Initially, I thought it would be useful to select agreements pertaining to one specific 
policy area in order to assess the practice of IGAs and confront it with the theory. The 
research turned out to be more dialectical than I had anticipated.  Reading agreements 
modified my theoretical perspective and led to questions to which only the consideration of a 
wider spectrum of agreements could provide answers.  I therefore broadened the research 
and chose agreements based on o a variety of criteria.  In the case of Belgium, the “raw 
material” (somewhere around 200 agreements and protocols) is manageable and reading 
them gave me an opportunity to assess the scope of the practice.   
 
Such a systematic assessment is impossible in Canada given the number of IGAs 
and the lack of complete archives.  I therefore selected agreements from the Québec and the 
PCO Registries based on a number of criteria, notably those known to include explicit 
dispute resolution clauses, or agreements which, from a summary of their content, seemed 
more likely to fall either within the “binding” or the “non-binding” category.  In other words, I 
read upwards of 500 Canadian agreements, from lists totalling around 1500, and selected 
them from a combination of “semi-directed” criteria and “hunches”.  The approach followed in 
selecting the agreements was thus both inductive and deductive. 
 
  IGAs selected for the present comparative analysis are formal, written agreements 
concluded between federal authorities and those of federated units.  I have thus excluded 
agreements concluded by federal or federated authorities with other public entities, such as 
municipalities, or with private parties. Exceptionally, agreements to which government 
agencies, that is semi-autonomous bodies under the authority of a Minister, were also 
                                                                                                                                                   
federated entities are not systematically transmitted to the Secretariat.  The registry is thus incomplete. 
The Registry is basically a computerised list of agreements, with certain data (date of signature, 
governmental approval, publication etc.).  Paper copies are archived.  Agreements published in the 
Moniteur belge (MB: Official Gazette) are now available on line.   Not all agreements are published, 
however. 
32 The PCO Registry is a full-text catalogue, which allows sophisticated computer searches (but 
containing no information relating to legal character, legislative authority and so on).  It was started in 
1998 and contains about 1300 agreements (05.2003).  The collection of agreements depended on the 
collaboration of various Departments, and it is admitted that the Registry is far from complete. This is 
particularly true of older agreements, not longer thought to be in force. 
33 Though it only formally set up in 1991, the Québec Registry is far more complete in terms of 
agreements to which the province is party because the SAIC had centralised IGAs from earlier times.    
At the end of 2001, this registry contained over 1600 agreements, 534 of which were considered to be 
in force.  Catalogued a produced, with summaries of all agreements. They are not in full-text however: 
paper copies are archived.  
34 Given that in Canada, the only province in which I conducted systematic research in Québec, there 
is a clear Québec bias in the material consulted.      
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included.35  Likewise, I did not consider agreements concluded between First Nations and 
various Canadian authorities.  This is because s.35 Constitution Act 1982 has entrenched 
Treaty rights, including existing or future agreements related to territorial claims. In addition, 
the theoretical and historical issues related to agreements between Canadian authorities and 
the First Nations would have required a detailed and specific analysis of a vast body of cases 
and doctrine on aboriginal law, which is beyond the scope of the present research.   
 
This is not to deny, however, that the status of agreements with other public 
authorities, private parties, or aboriginal groups, is unrelated to the present topic.  The 
following chapters include occasional examinations of judicial decisions involving “non-
federal” actors, when the principles founding the decisions provide a certain illumination on 
the status of agreements between governments within a federation.  Furthermore, it may be 
that some of the findings of the present thesis could make a modest contribution to the 
reflection concerning the complex interaction between the legal and judicial system with 
regards to such agreements.      
 
• Interviews conducted   
 
 In addition to the study of actual agreements, the theoretical analysis was enriched by 
some sixty semi-structured interviews.36  In Belgium, I had the privilege of discussing the 
institution with persons who actually “invented” it and were responsible for its introduction in 
the legal order.  In both Canada and Belgium, I also interviewed civil servants and political 
staff who negotiate agreements, and some judges who had ruled on their status or had 
rendered administrative decisions related to them.  Interviews were also conducted with 
archivists and administrative staff who are charged with the collection, classification, 
publication and follow-up of agreements.  Finally, given the limited scope of academic writing 
on IGAs in both federations, I also conducted interviews with a number of constitutionalists.   
 
 The interviews were aimed at assessing the scope of the practice, locating 
agreements, as well as understanding the legal and political culture that leads to their 
general – a priori - conception as legal instruments in Belgium or as essentially political 
devices in Canada.  Discussions also allowed me to assess the actual practice of 
agreements, which is often in striking contradiction with the positive law literature on the 
subject.  Consequently, these interviews allowed me to evaluate the theory of agreements 
from a practical perspective.  In addition, interviews conducted in other federations, in the 
                                                
35 This is the case, for instance, of IGAs relating to the marketing of agricultural products which federal 
and provincial authorities have largely delegated to various Boards.  Actors themselves consider such 
agreements as “intergovernmental”: Agreement on All Milk Pooling, 01.08.1997 (PE-MB-NB-NE-ON-
QC) (CA01708), Appendix B. 
36 Appendix A, a few names were withheld at the request of interlocutor. 
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context of another study (POIRIER, Report 2001), were extremely helpful to identify the 
issues at play in Belgium and in Canada.37 
 
5.  Theoretical framework  
  
 This thesis is essentially an exercise in comparative public law.  It aims at describing   
and contrasting how IGAs are understood and treated by the positive law of two distinct 
federal regimes.  The functional approach chosen is obviously directed at the principal object 
of the thesis, that is, intergovernmental agreements.38  It is also used to identify functional 
equivalents of a number of relevant legal doctrines and institutions in both systems (such a 
legitimate expectations, constitutional conventions, good faith, federal loyalty, and so on) and 
the absence of equivalence (parliamentary sovereignty).  The objective is also to compare 
the underlying logic of various legal rules, doctrines or principles invoked in the analysis of 
the status of agreements.  Not only was the functional approach useful to identify equivalent 
and divergent rules, it was also helpful in understanding that analysts of IGAs in both 
federations did not share the same underlying conception of the IGAs.  A constant search for 
the equivalent discourse of actors, judges and authors in the two systems lead to this basic 
but fundamental distinction, around which Part II of the thesis is constructed. 
 
I had originally – and ambitiously – planned to explore the status of IGAs from a 
number of theoretical perspectives, notably that of the sociology of law, legal pluralism, as 
well as from the “network” paradigm of legal norms, rather than the traditional pyramidal one. 
I still believe these various angles would deepen the understanding of the role played by 
IGAs in federal regimes.  The scope of this thesis does not allow for such a mutli-faceted 
enquiry.  In fact, the very identification of the positive law applicable to IGAs in the two 
federations turned out to be far more complex than I had anticipated.  The present thesis can 
therefore be understood as part of a larger research agenda.   
 
Some of the findings relating to this thesis have been published elsewhere, and 
justifies in part the decision to leave out of the present text a number of aspects concerning 
the legal status of IGAs.39  Hence, unless they have a direct bearing on the characterisation 
of IGAs as legal instruments, I will not address technical problems presented by the judicial 
systems in dealing with them.40  I have also largely left out the analysis of the “continental 
                                                
37 The most significant ones are also included in Appendix A. 
38 The functional approach seeks to compare rules/institutions/principles, which play similar functions 
in different legal systems: ZWEIGERT, Konrad, KÖTZ, Hein, Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 34 ff. 
39 See bibliography.  
40 This means issues of standing, inter-jurisdictional immunity and so on.  On this, see : POIRIER, 
Johanne,  “Intergovernmental Agreements in Canada: at the cross-roads between law and politics” in 
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divide” on the status of IGAs, that is, the potential impact of the civilian vs. common law 
conception of contracts or good faith, for instance, on the status of IGAs.41  These issues 
have however informed my research. 
 
Despite the focus on positive law, the following analysis nevertheless borrows from 
the sociology of law and the theory of legal cultures in three distinct ways.  First, IGAs are by-
and-large respected by all actors, who rarely appeal to the legal system.  In fact, compliance 
with IGAs is high even when IGAs actually contradict rules of positive law. 42  Secondly, their 
para-constitutional functions help shape constitutional practice, on the margins of the 
respective federal constitutions.  The concept of “para-constitutionality” is adapted from the 
notion of “para-legalité”, that is rules that develop on the margin of official ones, often in 
contradiction with them, and yet that gradually become incorporated into positive law.43  
Thirdly, in attempting to explain the different treatment – under positive law – which each 
federation reserves to IGAs, I will borrow from the theory of legal cultures.44  Here, the 
hypothesis is that the predominant conception of IGAs as legal or political instruments flows 
from a number of factors which pre-condition the way relevant observers, legal scholars and 
judges, interpret them.45 
 
6.  Structure of the thesis 
 
 The thesis is divided into two major parts, corresponding to the two branches of the 
hypothesis.  After presenting the major characteristics of each federal system, the existing 
legal framework regarding IGAs in both Belgium and Canada and describing the practice of 
IGAs, Part I surveys the functions they actually play in each federal regime.   
  
 Part II explores the status of IGAs within the public law systems of both federations, 
from a variety of angles. IGAs are successively considered as contractual instruments 
between the executives who conclude them and as normative instruments erga omnes, that 
                                                                                                                                                   
INSTITUTE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, The State of the Federation 2001-2002 
(Kingston: IIGR, forthcoming) [POIRIER, Cross-roads] 
41 For partial findings on this question, see: POIRIER, Johanne, “Les ententes intergouvernementales 
et la gouvernance fédérale: aux confins du droit et du non-droit” in GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS, Jean-
François and GÉLINAS, Fabien (dir.), L'avenir du fédéralisme: Méthodologie, gouvernance et identité 
(Montréal/Brussels: Yvon Blais/Bruylant, forthcoming 2004) [POIRIER, Confins]. 
42 ROCHER, Guy, “L’effectivité du droit “ in LAJOIE, Andrée, ed., Théories et émergence du droit : 
pluralisme, surdétermination et effectivité, (Paris/Brussels : Thémis/Bruylant, 1998) 135-149 ; 
MOCKLE, Daniel, “Gouverner sans le droit : mutation des normes et nouveaux modes de régulation”, 
(2002) 43 C de D 141-210. 
43 DUMONT, Droit négocié; DUMONT, Hugues, Le pluralisme idéologique et l’autonomie culturelle en 
droit public belge, vol. 1  (Brussels: Bruylant, 1996) 43-51.  
44 NELKEN, David, “Comparing Legal Cultures: An Introduction “ in NELKEN, David (ed.), Comparing 
Legal Cultures, (Dartmouth: Aldershot,1997) 1-9.       
45 “[T]he law lives in a profound-way within a culture-specific – and therefore contingent – discourse”: 
LEGRAND, Pierre, “The impossibility of legal transplants”, (1997) 4 MJ 111-124, 124. 
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is, as instruments capable of creating rights and obligations of a general character. An 
analysis of the place they occupy in the hierarchy of legal norms in each of the federal 
regimes follows.     
 
 The final chapter summarises the major similarities and differences in the legal status 
enjoyed by IGAs in the two federations. It then offers a reflection on the relevance of the  
classic positive law paradigms through which the analysis was conducted: the threshold of 
juridicity and the hierarchy of norms. 
 
Through the examination of the phenomenon of IGAs in two federations, my objective 
is: 
• To provide a critical assessment of the functions which IGAs actually play in 
federal regimes; 
 
• To identify indicia of legal status for determining whether a particular agreement is 
binding (under positive law) on the parties who sign them, as well as their effect on 
third parties;   
 
• To reflect on the competing values which underlie the tension concerning the 
status of IGAs with regards to other types of norms, notably legislation; 
 
• To suggest explanations for the apparently divergent status reserved to IGAs in 
different federal systems. 
 
 
More generally, the purpose of the thesis is to reflect on the phenomenon of 
comparative federalism through the prism of a technical instrument of intergovernmental 
relations.  While the object is a “microcomparison” (the examination of one institution), some 
of the findings can hopefully contribute to the “macro” analysis of the diversity of federal 
experience.46   
 
 
                                                
46 On the difference between “micro” and “macro” comparison: ZWEIGERT, Konrad, KÖTZ, Hein, 
Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 4-5. 
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7. Preliminary remarks on terminology 
 
 Comparing an institution in two very different legal systems requires a degree of 
decoding, and harmonisation of technical terms.  Here are the major lexical compromises 
used throughout this text. 
 
• Intergovernmental agreements (IGAs): The agreements analysed in this thesis are 
formal, written agreements, concluded by the executives of federal authorities, as well as 
those of federated units.  While all federal regimes apparently rely on such agreements, they 
go under a vast number of names.47  I have chosen to use the term “intergovernmental 
agreements” as a generic term which covers Swiss “intercantonal conventions”, British 
“concordats”, American “interstate compacts” or Spanish “convenios” and Belgian 
“cooperation agreements”, although in this last case, the specific term “cooperation 
agreement” will generally be used.  
 
• Orders of government: I prefer the expression “order of government” to “level of 
government” because it does not imply a formal hierarchy between constitutive units and the 
central/federal government.  While this absence of hierarchy does not characterise every 
federal regime, it describes the official constitutional conceptions of the Canadian and 
Belgian federal structures. 
  
• State, government, Crown, administration, public authorities:  In Canada, the terms 
“State”, “government” or “Crown” are used interchangeably.48  They refer to the executive 
branch, whether federal of the constitutive units.  In Belgium, the term “State” tends to refer 
to the federal order (both the legislative and executive branches), while “administration” is 
commonly used to refer to the executive branch of any order.  In this thesis, I use 
“government”, “executive” or “public authorities” to refer to the executive or administrative 
branch of both federal and federated orders.  
 
 
                                                
47 Only in Canada, I have identified over 40 different designations in French and in English, ranging 
from “lettre d’entente” to “contrat de concession” and from “cooperative action framework” to “loan 
agreement”. 
48 HOGG, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1998) 268; LORDON, Paul, 
OLSON, Heather, RHÉAUME, Jean, “Le statut juridique et constitutionnel de la Couronne au Canada” 
in MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE DU CANADA, La Couronne en droit canadien (Cowansvielle: Yvon 
Blais, 1992) 1-31, 6.  In fact, the French title of the federal Crown Liability Act  is Loi sur la 
responsabilité de l’État :  RSC 1985, c. C-50.  
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• Courts, judiciary, judicial system, judicial review: I use the terms “courts” and 
“judiciary” to refer to non-political dispute resolution fora.49  Hence, the Belgian Council of 
State, which is responsible for the judicial review of administrative action, is considered, 
somewhat heretically, as a judicial organ.  I do not distinguish between courts and tribunals, 
except in the case of arbitration tribunals.  In the Belgian context, “ordinary courts” refers to 
judicial institutions apart from the Court of Arbitration, the Council of State and cooperation 
tribunals.  
 
• Legislation, legislative instruments, statutes: Texts voted by Belgian federated 
entities are called “decrees” or “ordinances”, although they have the same legal force as 
federal “loi”.  In Canada, the term legislation includes, in some cases, subsidiary legislation, 
that is, regulations.  Because the distinction between norms adopted by the legislative and 
the executive branches is relevant to IGAs, I will use “legislation”, “legislative instrument”, 
“Acts” or “statutes” to refer to the former and “regulation” or “regulatory instruments” to refer 
to the latter.  
 
• Juridicity: One the principal objects of this thesis is to identify if and how IGAs can move 
from the moral/political sphere to the legal one, that is when they cross the “threshold of 
juridicity”.  I do not use the term “legality” in this context because it ambiguously also refer to 
validity of an instrument.  Something is “juridical” if it is capable of having legal effect, 
whether or not it has them.50  An IGA that has crossed that threshold will be deemed to have 
a  “legal character”.51 
 
• Justiciability, enforceability: An issue will generally be deemed “justiciable” if it is 
“capable of” and “suitable” or “appropriate” for judicial determination.52  While the question of 
the legal enforceability of agreements partakes of the enquiry of their justiciability, those two 
notions are not coterminous.  A court may make a judicial declaration regarding an IGA,53 or 
rule on a number of issues relating to an IGA (its constitutionality, its validity, the validity of 
administrative decisions taken pursuant to it) without actually forcing a party to respect the 
undertakings contained therein.   
                                                
49 In Belgian law, tribunals are low-level courts: D’HOOGHE, D. and PEETERS, P., “The Judiciary” in 
CRAENEN, G. (eds.) The Institutions of Federal Belgium: an Introduction to Belgian Public Law  
(Leuven: Acco, 1996) 109-130, 111. 
50 “Charactère de ce qui relève du droit": CORNU (1987) 477.   MERRYMAN talks of a “juridical 
order”: MERRYMAN, John Henry, “Comparative Law Scholarship”, (1998) 21 Hastings ICLR  771-784, 
775.   
51 Arguably, it may be more logical to use the expression “juridical character”, although “legal 
character” is the common usage, from which I see no need to depart. 
52 SOSSIN, Lorne, Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada, (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1999) 2 ff. 
53 PARÉ, Marie, GRENIER, Danièle, La requête en jugement déclaratoire, 2nd ed. (Cowansville: Yvon 
Blais, 1999). 
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PART I 
 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS IN BELGIUM AND CANADA: 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK, PRACTICE AND FUNCTIONS 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 This first part of the thesis introduces the institution of intergovernmental agreements 
(IGAs) in the two federal systems and aims at testing the first branch of my hypothesis: that 
such agreements a large number of similar functions in federal regimes.  It is divided into 
three chapters.  Chapter 1 presents the constitutional and political backdrop to the practice of 
IGAs in each federation.   Chapter 2 surveys that practice of IGAs (what they are, who 
concludes them, how, in what field).  It notably outlines the legislative framework within which 
this practice develops.  Chapter 3 then explores what IGAs are actually for.  Despite 
differences in constitutional, legislative and political background, IGAs they play remarkably 
convergent functions in the two federal regimes.   
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CHAPTER 1: THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL        
FOUNDATIONS OF IGAS   
 
 
Introduction 
 
Federal systems are “package deals”: isolating one aspect of government policy or 
administration from another or one institution from another may lead to distorting 
simplifications.1  It is therefore important to set the practice and theory of intergovernmental 
agreements in their political, legal, historical and cultural context.  While the scope of this 
thesis does not allow for a detailed exposition of the complexities of the Belgian and 
Canadian federal regimes, the present chapter maps out the principal characteristics which 
have some bearing on the need for IGAs, the way in which they are used, and the status 
they enjoy.  It then briefly describes the respective court systems as well as the principal 
mechanisms of inter-federal cooperation.  
 
1.1 The constitutional and political foundations of cooperative agreements 
in Belgium2 
 
1.1.1 Major characteristics of the Belgian federation 
   
After centuries of Spanish, Austrian, French and Dutch domination, Belgium gained 
its independence in 1830.  Despite the fact that a large portion of the population spoke Dutch 
dialects, the 1831 Constitution created a unitary French-speaking State apparatus.   The 
history of the last hundred and seventy years has been a complex one of peaceful co-
existence, political tension, and cultural affirmation which has gradually been translated into 
political claims for increased autonomy by the different language groups.3    
 
Over the last thirty years, Belgium has thus gradually been transformed from a unitary 
state into a federation.  The first traces of the territorial divisions of the country, based on 
linguistic lines, go back to 1963.   The federal system was installed gradually, through five 
stages of institutional reforms, starting in 1970.  The most recent (and likely not the last) one 
dates from 2001.  It was only at the fourth stage, in 1993, that the Belgian Constitution 
                                                
1 JACKSON, Vicki C., “Comparative Constitutional Federalism: its Strengths and Limits”, in 
GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS, Jean-François and GÉLINAS,  Fabien (dir.),  L'avenir du fédéralisme: 
Méthodologie, gouvernance et identité, (Montréal/Brussels: Yvon Blais/Bruylant, forthcoming 2004). 
2 Significant portions of the analysis of Cooperative federalism in general, and of cooperative 
agreements in particular, have been published in POIRIER, Johanne, “Formal Mechanisms of 
Intergovernmental Relations in Belgium”, (2002) 12: 3 RFS 24-54 [POIRIER, Formal]. 
3 The linguistic divide is super-imposed on two other cleavages which were of even greater importance 
until the second part of the 20th century: class and religious/philosophical (ie catholic vs. secular):  
MABILLE, Xavier, Histoire politique de la Belgique: Facteurs et acteurs de changement, 2nd ed. 
(Brussels: CRISP, 1997). 
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explicitly described the country as a federation.4  The gradual and incremental 
decentralisation of a once unitary state required compromises that have resulted in 
particularly complex institutional arrangements.5    
 
In the context of a discussion of intergovernmental relations, five major characteristics 
of Belgian federalism should be underlined.  First, it is centrifugal and the process towards 
more devolution is probably not complete.  This implies that previously unitary policy areas 
need to be disentangled without, as far as possible, disrupting service delivery.  Secondly, it 
is bipolar since the successive reforms were responses to conflicts between the two major 
language groups: the Dutch who form nearly 59% of the population, and the French-
speakers, who represent around 39%.   Several of the cooperative measures I examined 
respond to this bipolarity.  Thirdly, and paradoxically, it is also multipolar, since the bipolar 
nature of the conflicts did not generate a clear territorial division of the country into two 
entities, mostly because of Brussels.  This now overwhelmingly francophone city is enclaved 
in Flanders, and could therefore not be attributed either to the Flemish or the Francophone 
entity.  Moreover, Belgium has a small German-speaking community (80,000) which also 
inherited autonomous political institutions.  In short, while the logic of Belgian federalism is 
bipolar, several solutions designed to respond to different tensions are multipolar.    
 
Fourthly, and this is surely the most original aspect of the Belgian federal system, 
there are two types of overlapping federated entities, with distinct constitutional powers: the 
Regions and the Communities.  For reasons which cannot be detailed here, these were 
responses to distinct demands by the two major cultural/linguistic groups in the country.    
The three Regions (Flanders, Wallonia and the Region of Brussels-Capital (RBC)) are quite 
typical territorial constitutive units, much like provinces, cantons or Länder.  They have 
competences over aspects linked to territory: land use, agriculture, environment, 
transportation, economic policy, administrative control over municipalities.  Communities are 
somewhat more complex: they are an incarnation of “personal federalism”, but with a 
significant nuance.  While their competences related to persons (education, social 
assistance), they do not reach to all persons who speak French or Flemish anywhere in 
Belgium.  This “personal federalism” has been partially territorialised.  To give a concrete 
example: the French Community cannot open a cultural centre for Francophones on the 
                                                
4 Constitution, s.1.   
5 See:   DELPÉRÉE, Francis, Le droit constitutionnel de la Belgique (Brussels/Paris : Bruylant/LGDJ, 
2000); CRAENEN, G., ed., The Institutions of Federal Belgium : an Introduction to Belgian Public Law, 
(Leuven: Acco, 1996); FITZMAURICE, John, The Politics of Belgium : a Unique Federalism  (London: 
Hurst and co., 1996);  LAGASSE, Charles-Etienne, Les nouvelles institutions politiques de la Belgique 
et de l’Europe, 2nd ed. (Namur: Artel, 1999); UYTTENDAELE, Marc, Précis de droit constitutionnel 
belge: Regards sur un système institutionnel paradoxal  (Brussels:  Bruylant, 2001). 
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territory of Flanders: its “personal competencies ” only apply on the territory of Wallonia and 
Brussels.6       
 
Fifthly, the Belgian federation is asymmetrical.  While powers are technically devolved 
in a similar fashion to similar entities, those entities may - and do - organise their institutions 
differently.  The most important distinction is the decision by the Flemish authorities to merge 
their Community and Regional institutions, while such a fusion has not taken place on the 
French side of the country.  This has led to different patterns of cooperation in the North and 
the South of the country.  Finally, as the foregoing discussion suggested, the Belgian federal 
architecture is extremely intricate,7 veiled in ambiguity and build on a number of “agreements 
to disagree”.  The different conceptions of the Belgian system within the Belgian political and 
constitutional circles are such that there is no agreement even on the actual number of 
federated entities! 8 
 
1.1.2 The formal distribution of competences 
  
Given the overlapping Regions and Communities, the formal distribution of 
competences is extremely complex.  It is provided for in the Constitution, some “ordinary” 
legislation9 and some “special” or “Double Majority Acts” (DMAs), that is legislation voted by 
a two-thirds overall majority, and by a simple majority in each of the French and Dutch-
speaking groups in the federal Parliament. 10   While those are federal statutes, they are of a 
constitutional nature: other legislative instruments (both federal and of the federated entities) 
must conform to them.11 
  
 In theory at least, all legislative powers are exclusive.   The drafters of the successive 
constitutional arrangements opted for exclusive as opposed to concurrent powers in the hope 
of avoiding conflicts of jurisdiction.  In fact, constitutional litigation to determine the 
boundaries of these exclusive competences is still frequent.  The detailed distribution of 
powers implies that a particular policy area may be covered by several distinct constitutional 
powers, thus making co-ordination essential.   As was mentioned above, Regions have 
competences over transportation, agriculture, environmnent, tourism and segments of 
                                                
6 CA54/1996; CA30/2000.     
7 This is particularly true of Brussels, which is both a regional entity, but has three “commissions” 
constituted of sub-groups of the regional parliament, in charge of “community affairs” (the COCOF, 
COCOM, COCON).  None of these three commissions has identical authority of functions.      
8 The contest is always about the COCOF (the French Community Commission of Brussels) which 
Francophones consider a full-fledged federated entities, a view generally resisted by Flemish officials. 
9 Hereinafter: “Ordinary Acts” (OA).  The most important ones are the 1980 and 1983 and the 1989 OA 
(details in bibliography). 
10 Hereinafter “Double Majority Act” (DMA).   The most important ones are the 1980 and the three 
1989 DMA (see bibliography). 
11 UYTTENDAELE refers to them as laws of the “global state” (2001) 118-120.   
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economic affairs.  Communities are competent in matters of education and culture.  
Meanwhile, federal authorities have retained competences over defense, justice, the police, 
social security, civil, commercial and labour law and a number of detailed exceptions to 
otherwise transferred competences, as well as residual powers.12   
 
The following examples, amongst many, should give an indication of the importance 
of cooperation, lest policy-making and public administration be completely paralysed: 
 
• Preventive health is a community matter, while health care insurance is federal; 
• Unemployment insurance is federal, but the placement of unemployed people is regional, 
while professional training is a community matter;    
• Education is a community matter, but the recognition of professional qualifications is 
federal, while the organisation of school transport is regional. 
• Transportation policy is regional, with the exception of the railway system, which has 
remained federal.  Personal access programmes for people with reduced mobility, 
however, are essentially a community matter. 
 
This triad of orders of government (federal, regional, community) implies that some 
policy areas will require cooperation between two orders of powers, others between all three.  
The variety of permutations in terms of cooperation is thus greater in Belgium than in other 
federal systems based on a single type of territorial entities.    
 
Foreign affairs represent another area in which cooperation is essential.  In 1993, 
federated entities were granted wide powers over foreign relations. This includes the power 
to conclude treaties and to be full members of international organisations involved in matters 
falling within their legislative powers.13  There is thus a correspondence between the 
domestic distribution of powers and powers to conduct foreign relations.  However, the 
preservation of a certain degree of coherence in the overall Belgian foreign relations requires 
a fair amount of cooperation between the different orders of government.  Moreover, 
international activities or treaties often involve different aspects that - in Belgium - fall within 
the legislative competence of various orders of government.  A number of cooperative 
measures have been instituted to articulate joint positions or interconnected action, including 
formal cooperation agreements.14  
                                                
12 S.35 of the Constitution actually anticipates the transfer of residual powers to federated entities, but 
does not specify which ones.  This section requires a DMA which has never been adopted.     
13 S.167, Constitution. 
14 Notably, formal cooperation agreements: infra, Chapter 3.   
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1.1.3 An overview of the Belgian court system 
 
Such a complex system is bound to generate tensions, some of which can be 
addressed by judicial organs.  The following sketch is required to sort out the case law 
regarding IGAs, as well as contradictions between assertions of legal character and 
occasional lack of legal forum for dispute resolution.    
 
In Belgium, conflicts concerning the constitutional distribution of powers are settled by 
three different federal judicial institutions.  First, the legislation division of the Council of State 
(CSLD) provides a legal opinion on the constitutionality and legality of all proposed legislative 
measures, whether they emanate from the federal Parliament or the federated legislatures.15  
As its advice is not binding, it is regularly ignored.    
 
Secondly, the Court of Arbitration controls the conformity – a posteriori - of legislative 
measures with the distribution of powers and some enumerated fundamental rights.16 It 
cannot rule on the constitutionality of regulations.17  That is the role of the administrative 
division of the federal Council of State (CSAD). The latter is also responsible for what a 
common law system would consider judicial review of administrative action.18    
 
All “ordinary” courts and tribunals19 must refuse to apply orders and regulations (but 
not legislation) that are contrary to law.20  This enables all of them to review – indirectly -- the 
constitutionality of regulatory instruments.  Review of the constitutionality of legislative 
provisions can – and sometimes must - be referred to the Court of Arbitration as a question 
“préjudicielle”, if the question arises in the course of judicial proceedings.21   
  
“Ordinary courts” have jurisdiction over civil, criminal (and some so-called “political”) 
rights.  Final appeals in these matters lie with the Cour de Cassation.  In other words, there 
are three final courts: the Court of Arbitration, for constitutional matters, the Council of State, 
                                                
15 Ss 160-161, Constitution; s. 26, Coordinated Act concerning the Council of State (CACS). A private 
member’s bill may also be referred for a legal opinion if one third of the assembly requests it: s.2(2) 
CACS. 
16 Ss. 10, 11, 24, Constitutiont. (equality, protection against discrimination and education rights); 1989 
DMA on the Court of Arbitration (1989 DMA on CA) s.1.  Note that the Court has extended its own 
jurisdiction by protecting other rights (such as the right of association) through the prism of the right to 
equality: see for instance: CA18/90. 
17 CA7/90. 
18 “Substantive formalities” (that is, particularly significant ones) or formalities provided for “sous peine 
de nullité”: CACS, s.14. 
19 Under Belgian law, tribunals are lower-level judicial courts: D’HOOGHE, D. and PEETERS, Patrick, 
“The Judiciary” in CRAENEN, G. (ed.) The Institutions of Federal Belgium: an Introduction to Belgian 
Public Law  (Leuven: Acco, 1996) 109-130, 111.  Courts apart from the Court of Arbitration and the 
Council of State are regularly referred to as “tribunaux judiciaires”.  In will refer to them as “ordinary 
courts”. 
20 S.159, Constitution. 
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for administrative matters and the Cour de Cassation for civil, commercial and criminal 
matters.  In view of what follows, it bears pointing out that “ordinary courts”, not the Council 
of State is competent over government contracts.22     
 
1.1.4 Cooperative federalism in Belgium  
 
Belgium has been profoundly restructured over the last thirty years.  As in the case of 
Spain or the United Kingdom, constitutional decentralisation occurred in the context of a 
highly interventionist state apparatus.  This has led to a particular concern with methods of 
cooperation to ensure continuity in service delivery and open channels of communication 
between administrations that used to be unified.  While older federations have developed 
cooperative mechanisms in a haphazard manner, through decades of intra-state diplomacy, 
Belgium exemplifies the deliberate attempt to elaborate cooperative processes concurrently 
with the decentralisation process.  
 
Moreover, the “federalisation” of Belgium results from considerable tensions between 
the two major linguistic communities. Consequently, many feared that cooperation would not 
occur spontaneously in this new federalism of “dissociation”.  This, it was argued, required 
the provision of explicit cooperative mechanisms.23  In Belgium, co-operation is thus 
perceived as the necessary counterpart to the increased autonomy of the federated 
entities24.   It is seen as a pragmatic tool for the political and legal coordination of the exercise of 
a very complex distribution of powers.  Cooperation also plays a role in the promotion of 
dialogue in a country faced with serious centrifugal tendencies. 
 
The particularly antagonistic nature of Belgian politics, and a strong preference for 
legal instruments as opposed to mere political agreements,25 explains why many forms of 
intergovernmental relations have a statutory foundation and are - at least in theory - 
justiciable in Belgium, when they do not necessarily enjoy the same degree of formality in 
                                                                                                                                                   
21 Ss.26-30, 1989 DMA on the CA.     
22 By contrast with the situation in France: It must be noted, however, that some contracts concluded 
by public authorities in France are not governed by the special regime reserved to “administrative 
contracts” (sale, lease, insurance).  There are therefore, in France, two categories of contracts 
concluded by the administration: administrative contracts, and contracts governed by the droit 
commun :  CHAPUT, René, Droit administratif général, 12th ed.,  Tome I (Paris: Montchrestien, 1998) 
505-522.  
23 WILDE D'ESMAEL, Tanguy (de), “Les accords de coopération comme mécanisme de prévention et 
de solution des conflits : présentation de la nouveauté institutionnelle”  in ALEN, André and al. (eds.) 
Les conflits d'intérêts; quelle solution pour la Belgique de demain? (Namur : La Charte, 1990) 90-122, 
98 [de WILDE] 
24 CEREXHE, Étienne, “Les mécanismes de coopération dans un État fédéral” in Présence du droit 
public et des droits de l’homme - Mélanges offerts à Jacques Velu, Volume II (Brussels: Bruylant, 
1992) 1019-1035, 1020 ff; de WILDE (1990) 91; KLEIN, Pierre, Un aspect du fédéralisme coopératif 
horizontal: les accords de coopération entre entités fédérées  (Brussels: Centre d'études sur le 
fédéralisme, 1990) 1. 
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other systems.26  In short, the lack of trust, combined with a sophisticated public law process, 
has led to the statutory and constitutional entrenchment of various cooperative techniques, 
which, in other federations, evolved in a less deliberate and formal manner, as the need arose.    
 
1.1.4.1 Institutionalised cooperation 
 
The Belgian legal order comprises an impressive number of formal cooperative 
mechanisms.  Some are built in to the institutions themselves.  For instance, half of the 
members of the Council of State and of the Court of Arbitration are Dutch-speaking, while the 
other half are French-speaking.  Similarly, the federal Cabinet must be constituted of an 
equal number of French and Dutch-speakers.27  This form of bipolar collaboration between 
the two main linguistic groups is the raison d’être of the particular architecture of federal 
institutions.28        
  
1.1.4.2 Cooperation through committees and conferences 
 
The major political organ of cooperation between the various orders of government is 
the “Concertation Committee”, a multilateral body composed of the federal Prime Minister, 
five federal ministers, and six members of federated governments (on the multipolar 
model).29  This Committee is equally divided between French and Dutch-speakers (on the 
bipolar model).30   Its role is to solve so-called “conflicts of interests”, that is actions by one 
order of government in the federation that can have an adverse impact on another order.  Its 
role is thus largely political.  Yet, governments or legislative assemblies may refer an 
initiative by another order of government to the Committee. This can have the effect of 
freezing the adoption of a bill for up to four months, while a compromise is sought.31    
                                                                                                                                                   
25 On the “legalist” Belgian tradition: infra, General Conclusions. 
26 This is not to deny the importance of a substantial degree of informal relations between 
administrations, mostly through the medium of relations within a single political party active in different 
orders of government.  
27 S.99, Constitution. 
28 To the extent that federated entities (as opposed to the two main sociological linguistic 
communities) are not directly represented in those institutions, the latter do not reflect the multipolar 
character the Belgian federation.  Indeed, paradoxically, these parity-based institutions, which require 
constant cooperation, reinforce the bipolar nature of Belgium, which can itself be a source of tension.   
In this context, DELPÉRÉE (2000, 4390) talks of “federalism of confrontation”:   
29 This Committee was instituted in the second stage of constitutional reform in 1980: s.31, 1980 OA; 
DELPÉRÉE and DEPRÉ (1998) 303-311.  
30 In fact, a representative of the German-speaking Community also participates when matters of 
concern to the Community are involved: s. 67(3) 1983 OA; Internal regulations of the Concertation 
Committee, 1992, unpublished. 
31 S.32(1)(4), 1980 OA.  In the case of the Brussels-Region, there must be a majority vote in each of 
the linguistic groups, as well: s. 32(1)(3), 1980 OA.  Another original protection mechanism is the 
“Alarm bell system”, pursuant to which ¾ of a linguistic group in the national Parliament can suspend 
the adoption of a bill which threatens relations between to two Communities: s.56, Constitution.  This 
procedure only applies within the Federal Parliament concerning federal legislation, although there is a 
similar procedure in the legislative Assembly of the Brussels Region: s.31 1989    DMA on Brussels. 
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Apart from the Concertation Committee, some fifteen sectorial “interministerial 
conferences” are also responsible for coordinating policies and sharing information between 
the various orders of government. 32  Inspired by the German and Canadian model,33 each 
such conference is composed of members of the federal government, as well as 
representatives of the executives of the relevant federated entities.  They regulate 
intergovernmental relations in a wide variety of domains such as foreign relations, 
agriculture, finance, communications, scientific research, civil service, employment, health, 
education.   They are both the main locus for intergovernmental cooperation and an obvious 
seat of negotiation in cases of disrespect for various cooperation arrangements. These 
conferences increasingly adopt “protocols”, in parallel to the more formal CAgs, which 
require formal government approval. 
 
Similarly, a number of intergovernmental organs have also been set up to coordinate 
the elaboration and execution of public policy between various orders of government.  This is 
notably the case on the French-speaking side of the country, with its complex and numerous 
institutions.34  An astonishing number of working groups and committees have also been 
established to coordinate actions between the Brussels-Capital Region and the federal 
authorities to promote Brussels as a multiple capital (of the country, the French Community, 
Flanders, the Region and Europe) and its role as an international city.35  All these organs are 
obvious fora for non-judicial resolution of conflicts concerning intergovernmental 
arrangements and formal measures.  
 
1.1.4.3 Non-contractual forms of cooperation 
 
 The purpose of the present section is not to examine the range of “non-contractual” 
cooperative techniques in any detail.36   An overview nevertheless shows the degree to which 
cooperative arrangements have been formally outlined and legislated in Belgium.  For a 
                                                
32 The only one provided by law is the Conference on Foreign Policy: s.31bis, DMA 1980.  On the 
rules governing these various Conferences, see the Circular concerning interministerial conferences 
(MB  23.6.1992), and unpublished 1995 and 1999 versions.   
33 CEREXHE (1992) 1033. 
34 DUMONT, Hugues, “Les matières communautaires à Bruxelles du point de vue francophone” in 
WITTE, Else, et al., (eds.) Bruxelles et son statut  (Brussels: Larcier, 1999) 557-594.  This leads to a 
greater number of cooperation agreements between the French-speaking entities than between the 
Flemish and French-speaking entities.  
35 POIRIER, Johanne, “La coopération à Bruxelles : la dimension fédérale-régionale” in CATTOIR, 
Philippe et al., Autonomie, solidarité et coopération : Quelques enjeux du fédéralisme belge au 21e 
siècle (Brussels: Larcier, 2002) 489-524, 508-513.    
36 For a detail of what he calls “classic cooperation”: MOERENHOUT, Roger, “De samenwerking 
tussen de federal Staat, de gemeenschappen en de gewesten“ (1996-2000)”, (2001) 9 TBP 595-623, 
603-609. 
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number of reasons cooperation in Belgium is characterised by an impressive degree of 
formalism, or “legicentrism”, by which I mean recourse to legislative forms and instruments.37     
 
Most of the non-contractual cooperative mechanisms are of a procedural nature: that 
is, they are meant to regulate behaviour between members of the federation and to introduce 
information sharing, consultative or co-decision proceedings.  They constitute various forms 
of intervention by one order of government in the decision-making process of another order.  
There are literally dozens of legislated obligations to cooperate in one form or another.  In an 
approximate order of increasing formality, the various techniques include information-
sharing, non-binding consultation, “concertation” (a more active form of consultation), 
association of another entity in the drafting of legal norms, vetos, joint-decision-making, and 
representation of federal partners in organs created by another one.38  
 
The practical differences between these various forms of cooperative techniques are 
not always obvious.39  A non-binding Protocol concluded between the Federal government 
and all the federated entities elaborates upon those techniques of cooperation. It specifies, 
for instance, which techniques require actual discussion and which can be accomplished 
writing.40    
 
 The particularity of this web of legislated cooperative techniques is power given to 
courts to enforce them.  Hence, the Court of Arbitration was given explicit jurisdiction to 
invalidate legislative instruments adopted without due respect for them, 41 while the Council 
of State can similarly annul regulations adopted in violation of such compulsory cooperative 
devices.42  This, as we shall see, contrasts with the limited and often confusing jurisdiction of 
these Courts with regards to formal cooperation agreements.43      
 
1.1.5 A detailed legislative framework concerning IGAs in Belgium 
 
The fear that no “spontaneous” collaboration would develop in the antagonistic 
federalisation process explains the plethora of cooperative mechanisms just described.     
                                                
37 On “legicentrism”: DIEUX, Xavier, Le respect dû aux anticipations légitimes d’autrui: Essai sur la 
genèse d’un principe général de droit, (Brussels/Paris: Bruylant/LGDJ, 1995) 47, 59, 76-77;  LAJOIE, 
Andrée, Quand les minorités font la loi (Paris: PUF, 2002) 188 and 199; POIRIER, Confins, fn 76. 
38 For instance, ss. 5(2), 6(3) or 87(4), 1980 DMA. 
39 On the difficulties to distinguish between them: Senate Report (1999) Annex 12, 1014; LAGASSE 
(1999) 341-349. 
40 Protocol governing various forms of collaboration between the Federal government and the 
governments of Communities and Regions (27.10.1999) (unpublished), replacing 1995 published 
version (MB 5.10.1995). 
41 S.124bis, 1989 DMA on the CA.  Between 1996 and 2000, the CA annulled ten legislative 
instruments which were adopted in violation of compulsory cooperative measures.   
42 S.14bis, CACS.       
43 Infra: Part II. 
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The perceived need for structured cooperation as a counter-balance for legislative 
decentralisation was even more pronounced with regard to formal cooperative agreements.44  
Those instruments are seen as logical, rational and legal constructs, essential to counter-
balance the decentralisation process.45  The extremely fragmented distribution of powers 
requires technical and often financial cooperation in order to maintain a degree of efficiency 
in policy-delivery.  In many situations, consulting, “associating” with other members of the 
federation, or even involving them in decision-making or actual organs created by another 
member may not be sufficient.  Coordinated legislative and executive action on matters of 
substance must also be ensured.    
 
The formal mechanism of cooperation agreements was first introduced in the Belgian 
legal order in 1983 with the creation of the German-speaking Community.46  This power was 
extended to the other federated entities and to the federal government in 1988-89, concurrently 
with the introduction of the formidable arsenal of cooperative techniques discussed above.47  
Section 92bis was inserted in 1980 DMA at this occasion.  (This key provision will be 
henceforth be referred to as “s.92bis”).  A few months later, the federal Parliament adopted 
an ordinary statute detailing the membership and procedures before so-called “cooperation 
tribunals”, original institutions meant to resolve disputes concerning the interpretation and 
implementation of formal cooperation agreements.48  S.92bis expands with each new stage 
of constitutional reform.   Despite these detailed statutory provisions, significant zones of 
uncertainty remain, notably with regards to the legal status of cooperation agreements.  As 
we shall see, the existence of a detailed statutory framework concerning cooperative 
agreements contrasts sharply with the situation in Canada. 
 
1.2 The constitutional, legislative and political foundations of IGAs in 
Canada 
 
1.2.1 Major characteristics of the Canadian federation 
 
  The Canadian federation was instituted in 1867, by the coming together of three 
British colonies: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and the “province of Canada” which sub-
divided at this point to form the provinces of Québec and Ontario.  Over the following 
century, six other provinces joined the federation, or were carved out of territory that still 
                                                
44 WILDE d’ESTMAEL (de) (1990) 98. 
45 COENRAETS, Philippe, “Les accords de coopération dans la Belgique fédérale”, (1992) 16 Adm 
publ 158-202, 158. 
46 S.55, 1983 OA.    
47 The 1989 DMA inserted s.92bis to the 1980 DMA with regards to the central government and the 
federated entities, with the exception of the Brussels-Capital Region, which obtained this power through 
s.66, 1989 DMA on Brussels.  In the rest of this thesis “s.92bis” will be taken to include the equivalent 
provisions applicable to the GC and the BCR. 
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belonged to the British Crown.49  Today, Canada is composed of ten provinces and three 
northern territories, whose competences largely follow those enjoyed by provinces.50   
 
  The federal system set out in 1867 was rather centralised.  Some of the features of 
the formal 1867 Constitution are so “un-federal” that in his classic work, Wheare actually 
disqualified Canada as a federation.  Over time, several of the centralising features, such as 
the power of federal authorities to “disallow” provincial legislation, have fallen into desuetude 
and are unlikely to ever be used again.51   
 
  As a result, Canada is now one of the most decentralised federations.52  Four main 
factors explain this transformation:53 judicial interpretation which, in the early days of the 
federation, was favourable to the provinces; the lack of proper regional representation in 
central institutions which has resulted in the strengthening of provincial powers, particularly in 
the richer provinces and in Québec; the fact that the areas of provincial responsibility 
(discussed below) which were secondary at the origins of the federation, have become the 
most important areas of public policy in the late 20th century (health, education, for instance); 
and finally, the nationalist movement in Québec which developed in the post-war era and has 
led to demands for decentralisation from which other provinces have benefited indirectly.   
Fiscal imbalance between federal and federated orders has a definite centralising effect, 
notably through the use of the federal spending power.54   
 
 By opposition to the incessant constitutional reforms that Belgium has undergone in 
the last thirty years, Canada’s constitutional arrangements are particularly resistant to major 
                                                                                                                                                   
48 Ordinary Act on the Tribunals mentioned in s.92bis (5)(6) and 94(3)of the 1980 DMA, 1989, MB  
24.01.1989 [“1989 OA on cooperation tribunal”].     
49 Or private corporations!  Manitoba joined in 1870, British Columbia in 1871, Prince-Edward Island in 
1873, Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905 and Newfoundland in 1949.  The remaining land is divided 
between three federal territories with substantial autonomy: the Yukon, Nunavut and the North West 
Territories. On processes of adhesion: WOEHRLING, José, “L’évolution constitutionnelle du Canada 
et du Québec de 1867 à nos jours” in MORIN, Jacques-Yvan, WOEHRLING, José, Les Constitutions 
du Canada du Régime français à nos jours, Tome 1, 2e ed. (Montréal: Thémis, 1994) 123-600, 400-
408.  TREMBLAY, André, Droit constitutionnel canadien et québécois, Documents (Montréal: Thémis, 
1999) 239-560. 
50 The major distinction between provinces and territories lie in their “constitutive autonomy”. The 
competences of the latter are not constitutionally protected: they are outlined in federal legislation, 
which could be altered unilaterally (s.54, Constitution Act 1871). Territories are not included either in 
the required provincial consent for major constitutional amendment.  
51 This power was last used in 1943: HOGG (1998) 118 ; see also: TREMBLAY, André, Droit 
constitutionnel : principes, 2nd ed., (Montréal: Thémis, 2000) 219-221. 
52 Although in some cases Canada remains particularly centralised (foreign affairs, for instance).  
Placing federations on such a continuum is perilous, given the lack of specific index: WATTS, Ronald, 
Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd ed., (Kingston: IIGR, 1999) 71-72.    
53 CAMERON, David R., “Canada “, in Forum of Federations, Handbook of Federal Countries  
(Montréal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002) 106-119. 
54 On fiscal imbalance: CONFERENCE BOARD OF CANADA, Fiscal Prospects for the Federal and 
Provincial/Territorial Governments (01.08.2002): www.conferenceboard.ca. For examples of IGAs 
used as tools of the spending power: infra: Chapter 3. 
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change.  This is in spite of the constitutional debates and negotiations that have consumed a 
significant portion of political energy since the 1960s.  In fact, Canada and Belgium share a 
similar “constitutional industry”, but one which produces quite distinct results, or lack of them.  
One momentous reform took place in 1982, when the Canadian Constitution was 
“repatriated”: the Constitution is no longer an Act of the Westminster Parliament but a 
Canadian document.  In addition to including “Canadian based” amending formulas,55 the 
1982 Constitution Act also enshrined a Charter of Rights, recognised aboriginal rights, some 
minority language rights and the multi-cultural character of Canada.  Remarkably, the 1982 
did not modify or modernise the fundamental federal structure, which is still contained in the 
1867 Constitution Act, nor did it recognise any special place or status for Québec.   
 
  Eight major characteristics of the Canadian federal system provide a useful 
background to the analysis of IGAs.  First, as the previous sub-section suggested, Canada is 
the result both an unification process (provinces coming together originally, or joining an 
existing federation), and of dissociation (the division of the province of Canada into two 
federated units as well as the carving out of provinces and territories out of larger entities).  
This double process is often underestimated, particularly in Europe, where Canada is often 
generally presented as a typical example of a “federalism of union”.  In fact, the union and 
dissociation origins of the current structure explain the second major characteristic of the 
Canadian federal system, its co-existing centrifugal and centripetal tendencies.    
 
We have seen that the logic of the Belgian federal system is largely bipolar, while the 
institutions are multipolar.  The Canadian federation is less easily defined.  It is certainly 
largely influenced by the linguistic duality of the descendants of the original European 
settlers.  Nearly a quarter of the 31 million Canadian citizens are French-speaking (although 
that proportion is diminishing); and 60% have English as a first language.  Yet, Canada being 
a land of immigration, the remainder have a vast number of languages as mother tongues.56  
Hence, while the history of Canada is largely bi-cultural, its contemporary composition rests 
of multiple centres. This is particularly the case since greater attention and respect have 
been given to the Canadian First Nations.  Hence, and this is the third major characteristic: 
                                                
55 There are five different amendment procedures, requiring different types of provincial consent: ss. 
41-45, Constitution Act, 1982.  
56 CAMERON (2002) 107. 
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the bipolar logic (French – English)57 is thus constantly challenged by a weaker multipolar 
one, in which the domination of the English language is undeniable.58   
 
 Fourthly, despite this bi- or multicultural dimension, the fundamental federal structure 
is classically territorial.  While the rights of some minorities have received a significant 
degree of constitutional and legislative protection, the system does not include anything 
similar to the overlapping Communities and regional institutions of Belgium.  In this sense, 
the institutions are clearly multipolar in that there are thirteen distinct political entities which – 
for our purposes – have the potential for cooperating between themselves, or with the central 
authorities.  
 
 Fifthly, the so-called “bi-juridical” nature of Canada is relevant to this study.59  Indeed, 
for historical reasons, Québec has retained a civil-law based private law regime, while the 
common law applies in other provinces and territories.  There is very litte “federal” common 
law.60  Consequently, a contract to which the federal government is party will normally be 
governed by the law of the province in which it is concluded.61    
  
 The foregoing is but one illustration of the asymmetrical nature of Canadian 
federalism. This sixth characteristic defies the almost fanatical opposition to any further 
official recognition of asymmetry in dominant Canadian political circles, in which it is 
understood as “preferential treatment” and a contradiction to the so-called “equality of 
provinces”.  Other asymmetrical features include New Brunswick’s status as the only officially 
bilingual province in the country and the various conditions of “entry” of different provinces 
into the Canadian federation which reflected historical reality and the power relations of the 
period.62   As we shall see, IGAs represent a useful tool for setting up asymmetrical 
arrangements in a less visible manner. 
  
 The seventh characteristic lies in the strength of central authorities, particularly by 
contrast to the Belgian situation.  Indeed, the ever-decentralising nature of the Belgian 
                                                
57 Formally, some recognition was given to the French-English polarity in the Constitution: both 
languages can be spoken in Parliament and all federal legislation is adopted in both languages (ss. 
17-18, Constitution Act, 1982).  Informally, custom, the “French fact” has been taken into account in 
federal institutions: some, as a non-binding custom, the Prime Minister of Canada is at least bilingual, 
three members of the Supreme Court originate from Québec  and there is generally an alternance 
between a French and an English speaking judge as Chief Justice: TREMBLAY (2000) 18-19. 
58 MORIN argues that the 1867 Constitution was both a multilateral agreement between 3 or 4 
provinces and a bilateral one between two peoples, in MORIN and WOEHRLING (1994) 153-154. 
59 “Le bijuridisme (c’est-à-dire l’expression simultanée d’une norme dans deux traditions juridiques) 
peut conduire au dialogue entre les traditions […]”; JUTRAS, Daniel, “Énoncer l’indicible : le droit entre 
langues et traditions”, (2000) 4 RIDC 781-796, 781. 
60 Québec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific, [1977] 2 SCR 1054; McNamara Construction v. 
The Queen, [1977] 2 SCR 654. 
61 Or be determined by some other criteria of conflict of laws.   
62 Those were introduced through “constitutionalised” agreements: infra, 2.2.3.2. 
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constitutional reforms and the parity-based institutions signify that the center is always 
dependant on a large consensus between the major components of the federation.  Not so in 
Canada, where, despite an informal regional representation in cabinet – and a particularly 
weak regional representation in Parliament due to the electoral system – the center has its 
own dynamic.  With very important fiscal power, a centralising ideology and a strong 
bureaucracy, “Ottawa” is not the sum of the parts, but a distinct partner.  It stands at arm’s 
length from the provinces.63  This is particularly the case since the Senate is a Chamber of 
federal patronage, which does not represent the interest of the provinces or territories. 
 
Finally, the financial and political power of certain provinces, and the almost 
autonomous nature of the federal institutions (as opposed to some sort of representation of 
the constitutive units) generate a competitive edge to federal governance in Canada.   
Provinces compete for private investment in a way that is inconceivable in Belgium. They vie 
for qualified personnel (in health care, for instance). The federal government and the 
provinces seem to be in regular struggle to occupy politically profitable field of public policy, 
such as social protection.  IGAs represent one way to harness this competition.64 
 
1.2.2 The formal distribution of competences 
 
In Belgium, Communities and Regions have enumerated powers, the federal 
government having (for the time being) maintained residual powers.  The Canadian 
constitution uses a different method of distributing powers: both the federal and the provincial 
powers are enumerated in distinct lists, with a third – short – list of concurrent 
competences.65  When a matter is not explicitly listed, courts will first verify whether it can be 
reattached to the provincial competence over “property and civil rights” or “local affairs” in the 
province.  If not, it will be considered to be federal.  In this sense, there are two levels of 
residual powers.66    
 
Classically, the federal government has exclusive competence in matters of defence, 
nationality, currency, postal service, and Indian affairs.  It also has exclusive competence 
over banking, inter-provincial transport and trade, aeronautics, telecommunications and 
unemployment insurance.  Provinces have exclusive competence over education (subject to 
some minority protection rights), municipalities, real property, private law and natural 
resources.    
 
                                                
63 PAINTER, Martin, “Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: an Institutional Analysis” (1991) 24 Can 
J Pol Sci 269-287, 284. 
64 IGAs concerning the marketing of agricultural products, for instance: infra, Chapter 5. 
65 Ss 91-95, Constitution Act, 1867. 
66  HOGG (1998) 378. 
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Despite the limited list of concurrent powers, and the existence of two fairly long lists 
of exclusive federal and provincial powers, significant domains of public policy are shared 
between the two orders, to the extent that each can intervene using their respective 
competences.67  IGAs are increasingly being used to sort out responsibilities in such cases of 
jurisdictional overlapping. 
 
 As mentioned above, each order of government has its own administration in charge 
of implementing its own legislation. The one exception is criminal law, the substance of which 
is federal (the determination of the actual offences), but which is administered by the 
provinces.  Justice is somewhat intermingled also, the administration of justice being 
essentially provincial, although the Superior Court and Court of Appeal judges are 
designated by the federal government.     
 
   As in the case of Belgium – and many other federations – the power over 
international relations is particularly contentious.  The power to conclude and ratify treaties 
lies with the federal executive.  However, the power to implement a treaty in the domestic 
legal order follows the internal distribution of powers.  Concretely, this signifies that, by 
contrast with the situation in Belgium, the federal government can conclude a treaty in on any 
matter whether federal or provincial.  However, it will not be able to transform its international 
obligations into legislation, if the matter at stake falls within the provincial sphere of 
competences.68 Cooperation during the negotiation stage is thus essential to secure 
provincial consent to treaty obligations that only they have the power of implementing.  By 
contrast with the Belgian situation, this cooperation is largely informal. 
 
1.2.3 An overview of the Canadian court system 
 
By opposition to Belgium, which has three distinct judicial orders (constitutional, 
administrative and the civil/criminal), the Canadian judicial system is essentially unified 
ratione materiae.  It is however, divided along territorial lines. This creates particular 
problems in the context of IGAs.    
 
In addition to provincial courts, each province has a Superior Court with inherent 
jurisdiction and a Court of Appeal, whose judges are appointed by the federal government.  
The Supreme Court, whose nine judges are also appointed by the federal government, 
reigns in final appeal over all of them.  The Supreme Court thus has the combined 
jurisdictions of the Belgian Court of Arbitration, Council of State and Court of Cassation. 
                                                
67 Concurrency implies that in case of conflict, the norms of one order will take precedence (generally, 
the federal, although concurrency is in favour of provinces in the case of pensions: s.94A, Constitution 
Act, 19820.    
68 Canada v.  Ontario, (1937) A.C. 326 (the Labour Convention’s case).     
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 This simple pyramidal structure basically applies to any matter falling within provincial 
powers.  Hence, Superior Courts can review the constitutionality of provincial legislative and 
regulatory instruments.  They are the main locus of judicial review of the legality of provincial 
regulatory instruments and administrative acts.69  They have the main competence in matters 
of criminal, commercial and private law.    
 
 The situation is more complex in the case of matters of federal competence.  The 
determination of the jurisdictional border between the Federal Court (which has limited 
powers) and the Superior Courts of the provinces (which are courts of general jurisdiction) 
has been the object of momentous rulings, and a number of grey areas remain.   As Courts 
of general jurisdiction, provincial Superior Courts can rule on the constitutionality of federal 
acts and regulations.  However, the Federal Court of Canada, whose mandate is to 
implement federal legislation and review the legality of federal administrative action, can also 
rule on the constitutionality of federal law, if the matter arises incidentally in the course of 
proceedings.   
 
 As we will see, these grey areas affect IGAs because provincial governments may not 
be sued in Federal Court and as a rule not in the courts of other provinces either.70   The 
problem is even more acute in the case of judicial review of administrative action taken 
pursuant to IGAs, since the Federal Court is responsible for reviewing the legality of federal 
officials, while Superior Courts oversee provincial ones.  Which court has jurisdiction when 
the act in question is presumably a joint one?   The dual character of the Canadian judicial 
system is particularly ill-adapted to cooperative federalism.    
 
1.2.4 Cooperative federalism in Canada  
 
The expression “cooperative federalism” was generally used to describe 
intergovernmental relations in the 1960s.  It referred to intense degree of consultation 
between the federal and provincial governments and the establishment of major co-financed 
programmes, notably in the area of social assistance, health care or further education.71    
“Cooperative federalism” or “flexible federalism” has nevertheless been associated with 
federal dominance in intergovernmental relations, notably through the use of the spending 
                                                
69 Provinces can establish specialised administrative law courts, but appeal must lie with the Superior 
Court.   
70 S.19 of the Federal Court Act provides a partial solution, although serious doubts have been raised 
regarding its constitutionality: infra, chapter 5.  
71 SIMEON (1972); DYCK, Rand, “The Canada Assistance Plan: The Ultimate in Cooperative 
Federalism” (1976) 19 Can Public Admin 587-602, 587-88.   
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power.72  Over the last decade the literature in the field of public policy and political science 
has often substituted the phrase “collaborative federalism” in an attempt to capture the reality 
of less hierarchical forms of “cooperation”.73 As we shall see, however, the change of label is 
more a matter of wishful thinking than the description of a changing reality.  
 
 Whatever the expressions actually used, and the evaluation that is made of the 
impact of the interaction between orders of government on democratic governance and the 
basic premise of federalism, the Canadian system is replete with various techniques of   
intergovernmental relations.  They enable federal partners to act jointly, transfer the exercise 
of certain powers to one another, share information, consult and resolve disputes.  
Intergovernmental agreements are one of the most formal means to do so, but they are 
weaved through a rich spectrum of other techniques.  These techniques have been 
developed on an ad hoc basis and are more diffuse than in the Belgian context. There is no 
repertoire of their use in various domains.  The following provides a cursory description of the 
principal ones. 
 
1.2.4.1 Institutionalised cooperation 
 
In Belgium, “institutionalised cooperation” refers essentially to the means through 
which the two major cultural groups are represented in federal institutions.  Again, nothing is 
quite as systematic in Canada.  By tradition, there is some regional representation in the 
Senate (whose members are all appointed by the federal government) and in the federal 
Cabinet.  While they bring their own concerns and sensibility to institutions in Ottawa, 
“regional” Senators or Cabinet members do not speak for constitutive units and are often at 
odds with governments of their province of origin.   In brief, intergovernmental relations in 
Canada are largely informal and there is no equivalent to the various parity rules that have a 
constitutional or quasi-constitutional basis in Belgium.  
 
1.2.4.2 Committees and Conferences 
 
The practice of intergovernmental conferences dates back to the 19th century in 
Canada.  They developed informally, as political crisis and public policy required and power 
relations allowed.74  Literally hundreds of intergovernmental meetings take place each year, 
                                                
72 YUDIN, David W.S., “The Federal Spending Power in Canada, Australia and the United States “, 
(2002) 13 NJCL 437-484, 473-480. 
73 LAZAR, Harvey, “Non-constitutional Renewal: Towards a New Equilibrium in the Federation” in The 
State of the Federation 1997 (Kingston: IIGR, 1998) 3-35.  For a denunciation of the power play 
behind so-called cooperative federalism:   
74 The only legal provision concerning these Conferences is found in s.37(1), Constitution Act 1982, 
which provided that First Ministers Conference would be held three and five years following its 
adoption.  This was presumably to seek to rally Québec which had refused to sign the new 
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at the ministerial level and at various levels of the bureaucracy.75  The logistics of a vast 
number of them is provided by the Secretariat for Canadian Intergovernmental 
Conferences.76  They play a number of roles: from information sharing to actual joint-decision 
making.  They are used to develop policies, decide on methods of implementation and report 
on results.   They are the prime locus for negotiating and finalising formal agreements.   
 
1.2.4.3 Conditional legislation and legislation by reference 
 
 A number of legislative techniques have been developed over the years to bring 
some flexibility to the “dual” character of the Canadian system in which each order has its 
own legislative and executive branch, as well as to allow for coherent policy-making in areas 
of interlocking competences.  None of these techniques have a textual foundation, as formal 
cooperative techniques do in Belgium.  The result is a lack of transparency about their use.  
Courts are remarkably tolerant of these schemes, which often end up blurring the formal 
distribution of competences.  The only limit strictly imposed is that one legislative assembly 
may not delegate its powers to another.77  Courts have shown deference to alternative routes 
for attaining similar results.     
 
One is to subject the coming into force of legislation to an action by another order of 
government.78   For instance, pursuant to an intergovernmental scheme, federal statutory 
provisions pursuant to which the central government agreed to finance half of the social 
assistance cost incurred by a province were conditioned on the existence of provincial 
legislation. Amendment to federal regulations was also made conditional of provincial 
consent.79  This is thus a form of coordinated action, although it formally uses unilateral 
legislative techniques.   
 
Another is for a legislative assembly to “incorporate” the legislation of another.  
Legislation by reference is always revocable: the legislature having simply to abrogate the 
statute that incorporated the legislation of the other order.  If the incorporation of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Constitution, and possibly Aboriginal leaders, who were left out of the constitutional process 
altogether.  
75 SIMMONS, Julie, “Securing the Threads of Cooperation in the Tapestry of Intergovernmental 
Relations: Does the Institutionalization of Federal-Provincial Territorial Ministerial Conferences 
Matter?” in INSTITUTE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, The State of the Federation 2001-
2002 (Kingston: IIGR, 2003 forthcoming). 
76 www.scics.gc.ca. 
77 AG Nova Scotia v. AG Canada, [1951] SCR 31; R. v. Furtney, [1991] 3 SCR 89, 102-03; MAGNET, 
Joseph Eliot, Constitutional Law of Canada : Cases, Notes and Materials, 7th ed. (Edmonton: Juriliber, 
1998) 85-107; ISSALYS, Pierre, LEMIEUX, Denis, L’action gouvernementale (Cowansville: Yvon 
Blais,  1997) 19. 
78 Lord’s Day Alliance of Canada v. A.G. B.C., [1959] SCR 497. 
79 Re Canada Assistance Plan, [1991] 2 SCR 525 (the “CAP Reference”).  Federal legislative action 
was not curbed, however, which gave rise to a major federal-provincial dispute examined in Part II. 
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legislation of the other order of government refers to legislation as it evolves, the process is 
almost undistinguishable from inter-parliamentary legislation.  Yet, for the Supreme Court of 
Canada, this does not amount to a delegation of law-making power, but rather to “the 
adoption by Parliament, in the exercise of its exclusive power, of the legislation of another 
body as it may from time to time exist”.80   
 
1.2.4.4 Interdelegation  
  
If the express delegation of legislative power from one order of government to another 
is unconstitutional, there are no obstacles to the delegation of regulatory power or 
administrative functions to another order of government.  In other words, a provincial statute 
can provide that its detailed application will be outlined through regulatory instruments 
elaborated by the federal government (although the reverse proposition seems more 
frequent).  For instance, the (federal) Criminal Code prohibits certain forms of lottery.  An 
exemption is provided however, in the case of charitable organisations that have a provincial 
license, which is granted on the basis of provincial regulation. This is permissible, to the 
extent that the “delegate” remains subordinate and the delegation is subject to revocation.81  
Similarly, the federal government has delegated to various provincial administrations the 
responsibility for issuing contraventions for violations of some federal statutes, and 
prosecuting these violations.82      
  
Such delegations enhance the flexibility of government, and have the potential for 
reducing overlapping and streamlining public services.  They do raise a number of issues, 
however in terms of accountability, Ministerial responsibility, civil liability and judicial review.   
If a provincial police officer commits a tort in the process of issuing or prosecuting a 
contravention to a federal statute, which of the provincial or federal Crown is liable?   Does 
the Superior Court or the Federal Court have jurisdiction to assess the legality of 
adminstrative actions of such delegated arrangements? These issues are of particular 
concern in the present context, given the role played by IGAs in these schemes.83    
 
1.2.5 A limited normative framework concerning IGAs in Canada 
 
By contrast to the detailed legislative framework governing cooperation agreements in 
Belgium, there are hardly any rules of general application concerning IGAs in Canada.  
Some provinces (such as Québec, Newfoundland or Alberta) provide basic statutory rules 
                                                
80 Coughlin v. Ontario Highway Transport Board, [1968] SCR 569, 575. 
81 R. v. Furtney, [1991] 3 SCR 89. 
82 Contravention Act, SC 1992, c. 47: infra, Chapters 3 and 5.  See also Re Agricultural Products 
Marketing, [1978] 2 SCR 1198. 
83 Infra, Chapter 5.   
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concerning the authority to conclude such agreements, and the role of intergovernmental 
relations Departments in keeping copies of them.   There are no such federal legislative 
rules.84  This makes the appraisal of the positive law regarding IGAs a more complex 
exercise than in the case of Belgium.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Both Belgium and Canada are complex federal regimes, with closely interconnected 
or overlapping competences.  Effective policy-making has led to the development of a vast 
array of cooperative techniques.  In Belgium, this was done in an explicit manner, generally 
through quasi-constitutional legislation, as a counterpart to the transformation of the unitary 
State into a federation.  By contrast, cooperative federalism in Canada developed in a 
haphazard manner, which renders the various techniques used more opaque.  The judicial 
system of each federation presents challenges in the context of inter-federal relations, which 
will become apparent in Part II of the thesis. The next chapter examines more specifically the 
legislative framework and the practice of IGAs in both federal regimes.   
  
 
                                                
84 Apart from specific authorisations given to Ministers to conclude IGAs, but this is done in very 
general terms.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE OF IGAs    
 
Introduction 
 
 The present chapter sketches the practice of intergovernmental agreements in the 
Belgian and Canadian federations, as well as the principal – in the Canadian context, the few 
- legislative provisions relating to IGAs.    The purpose is to give a sense of the range of 
policy areas affected by IGAs, as well as to introduce some key concepts and classifications 
that will be referred to throughout the remainder of the thesis.    
 
 2.1 Typology of IGAs 
 
 Faced with the magnitude of the practice of intergovernmental agreements, analysts 
have proposed a number of classification schemes.  Beyond their descriptive, heuristic or 
pedagogical interest, some classifications have – at least in the Belgian legal order - 
constitutional and legal significance.   
 
2.1.1 Typology based on the object or subject matter 
  
It is of course possible to classify IGAs according to their content and purpose.  
Chapter 3, which examines the various functions played by IGAs, is a variation of this theme.  
Similarly, IGAs can be classified pursuant to the public policy area covered. This is a difficult 
exercise to do in a “wholesale” manner, because registries generally organise agreements 
pursuant to the Departments who conclude them and not to a specific field of public action.  
Indeed, classifying agreements pursuant to the domain covered requires a detailed reading 
of each agreement.  An agreement concluded between two departments of agriculture, for 
instance, could certainly touch land use, environmental protection, employment measures 
and so on.  This can be a useful exercise for the analysis of the impact of IGAs in a certain 
policy domain, but one that could not be systematically undertook in the present context.  
 
This being said, the following provides an indication of the spectrum of policy areas covered 
by IGAs.  
   
Section 92 bis of the 1980 DMA (s.92bis) explicitly authorises the Regions, the 
Communities and the central authorities to conclude agreements between themselves, 
“notably in view of the creation and common management of common services and 
institutions, the joint exercise of competences or the development of joint ventures”.1  As this 
list is not exhaustive, agreements can - and do - cover a large array of topics.  The scope 
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has been very wide both in terms of policy areas and in terms of style.  Agreements have 
been used to create common organs and regulate the transfer of civil servants following the 
successive stages of devolution.2  Some are technical and detailed, some simply amount to a 
”declaration of intent”.  According to the registry kept by the Secretariat to the Concertation 
Committee, the distribution is roughly the following: 3 
  
• General = 5  
• Economy and Energy  = 8 
• Communication, infrastructure and telecommunications = 334 
• Research = 9 
• Foreign Policy = 12 
• Finances = 17 
• Home Affairs  = 5 
• Employment (including professional training) = 28 
• Agriculture and Small and Medium Size Businesses = 3 
• Public Health = 17  
• Environment = 18 
• Education = 7 
• Youth Protection = 5  
• Social Protection = 8 
 
TOTAL : 175  
 
 In Canada perhaps even more than in Belgium, very few policy areas are free from 
intergovernmental agreements.  They deal with the environment, health, education, service 
delivery to aboriginal communities, transport, natural resources, water management, the 
promotion of official languages, support to immigrant populations, labour market, road 
constructions.  They are particularly common as tools for channelling federal funds for 
programmes managed by the provinces.    
 
 To give an indication of the extensive use of IGAs by Canadian authorities, the 
following is a breakdown of the various federal Departments and Agencies identified as 
responsible for the conclusion of IGAs:5 
 
• Foreign Affairs and International Trade = 11 
• Indian and Northern Affairs = 55 
• Canadian International Development Agency = 2 
                                                                                                                                                   
1 S.92bis.  My translation.    
2 AC relatif à la gestion administrative des charges du passé en matière d'enseignement (FED + Fr C 
+ Fl C), 07.08.89 (05.10.89); AC relatif au personnel du Fonds national de garantie des bâtiments 
scolaires (FED + 3C), 07.08.89 (05.10.89). 
3 To date: 01.10.03. This classification is based on the various interministerial conferences to which 
the federal order of government is always associated.  Inter-regional and inter-Community IGAs are 
under-estimated. 
4 Including the 8 codicils (“Avenants » to the Federal-regional Agreement on Brussels of 1993. 
5 Federal Registry: 15.02.2003. 
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• Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency = 11 
• Parks Canada  = 28 
• Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada = 84 
• Veterans Affairs Canada = 11 
• Privy Council Office = 2 
• Citizenship and Immigration = 27 
• Treasury Board  = 14 
• National Defence = 13 
• Human Resources Development Canada = 106 
• Canada Economic Development for Quebec Regions = 6 
• Western Economic Diversification Canada = 4 
• Environment Canada = 66 
• Finance Canada = 30 
• Industry Canada = 18 
• Justice Canada = 58 
• Canadian Heritage (culture) = 46 
• Fisheries and Oceans = 27 
• Natural Resources = 25 
• Health Canada = 41 
• Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation = 36 
• Solicitor General of Canada = 1 
• Statistics Canada = 14 
• Transport  = 47 
• Public Works and Government Services = 16 
 
• TOTAL  = 799  
 
2.2.2 Typology based on actors  
  
Agreements are either bilateral, multilateral, or “omnilateral”,6 that is, agreements to 
which all members of a federation are party.  Sometimes the federal government will 
conclude a series of identical bilateral agreements with different federated entities, rather 
than a major omnilateral one. This strategy is often pragmatic.  Such arrangements are more 
easily negotiated and eventually modified than agreements requiring every party’s approval.  
The distinction does not have substantial consequences, and the terms are more descriptive 
than normative. 
 
 Even when federal-provincial agreements have similar objectives, it is not uncommon 
for the federal government to negotiate bilateral agreements with each province individually. 
This is notably the case of Framework agreements that are completed by province-specific 
ones (“stand alones”).7   To give an idea, of the 880 federal-provincial agreements found in 
the PCO registry:  
 
• 604    are “stand-alone” bilateral agreements 
                                                
6 GARCIA MORALES (1998) 42. 
7 BLACKMAN (1993) 5-6. 
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• 112    are bilateral agreements which complete framework agreements 
•      4   are regional (with the Western or Atlantic provinces)  
•   25    are multilateral   
•   12    are “Canada-wide”, that is with all provinces and territories  (“omnilateral”) 
• 123    include third parties as signatories: aboriginal groups or municipalities, for instance. 
 
The terms “vertical” and “horizontal” are regularly used to describe agreements 
between the federal order of government and federated entities, or between entities 
themselves, and this is how I use them in this thesis.8   It should be noted, however, that the 
adjective “vertical” suggests a kind of subordination which does not reflect the formal 
constitutional relationship between the federal order and federated entities in Belgium or 
Canada.  In other words, I use the term in a descriptive, not a normative, manner.   
 
2.2.3 Typology based on legal criteria  
 
Classifying agreements pursuant to legal criteria anticipates somewhat on the core     
of this thesis, which is to assess the status of IGAs.  Yet, a number of distinctions flow from 
the legislative framework applicable to Belgian cooperation agreements and should be 
invoked in the context of a presentation of that framework.  Their eventual significance in 
terms of legal status will be discussed in Part II.  The following is thus mainly descriptive.  It 
is meant as an introduction to the several issues analysed in the following chapters.   
 
2.2.3.1 Typology based on legal criteria in Belgium 
 
The formal insertion of cooperation agreements in the Belgian legal order in 1988-89 
was accompanied by a number of dichotomous distinctions: compulsory vs. optional; 
“legislative” or not; formal cooperation agreement vs. “mere” protocol.     
 
• “Compulsory” and optional agreements 
 
S.92bis of the 1980 DMA grants a substantial degree of freedom to the various 
components of the Belgian federation concerning matters over which they can conclude 
cooperation agreements, so long as their respective constitutional powers are respected.9  
Such  “optional” agreements correspond to the institution of intergovernmental agreements in 
other federal regimes.  With regards to policy areas that seemed particularly vulnerable to 
constitutional decentralisation, however, the 1980 DMA as amended introduced an original 
                                                
8 This is notably the case of the Swiss, Spanish and Belgian legal writing.  
9 Infra, Chapter 4. 
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instrument, the so-called “compulsory” cooperative agreement.10 This apparent oxymoron 
can only be understood in the political context in which this original institution arose.   
 
In some cases, negotiators of constitutional reforms only consented to decentralise 
particularly sensitive constitutional powers on the condition that the field would be subject to 
formal and legally binding agreements between the newly responsible entities.  Hence, the 
1988-89 phase of “federalisation” – which saw the formal introduction of cooperative 
agreements in the Belgian legal order – led to the regionalisation of powers concerning major 
infrastructures, including roads, waterworks and telecommunications.11  “Compulsory 
agreements” were introduced in the 1980 DMA at that point, so that a number of technical 
issues were settled before the transfer of competences to regions became effective.  To give 
a concrete example, the Flemish Region was concerned that the regionalisation of 
waterworks could mean that the failure of the Walloon authorities in the South to properly 
maintain rivers or dams could have detrimental effects in the Northern part of the country, 
through which the rivers flow to reach the North Sea.  The transfer to competence was thus 
conditioned on an agreement between Regions.    
 
The term “compulsory” here is something of a misnomer.  Identified parties to such 
agreements do not actually have an obligation to conclude the agreement.  However, until a 
particular issue has been the object of an agreement identified as “compulsory”, the status 
quo ante is maintained, despite the transfer of competences actually recognised in the 
double-majority legislative instruments.12  Concretely, this generally means that federal 
authorities retain full jurisdiction over a policy area that has been constitutionally transferred 
to federated entities, until compulsory agreements over this area have been concluded.13  In 
other words, until the conclusion of a “compulsory agreement”, the transfer of competence 
agreed upon – and even inserted in the quasi-constitutional legislation – remains   
contingent.    
 
From a legal perspective, it is important to distinguish agreements that are officially 
required before a constitutional transfer of competence becomes effective, from those which 
parties must conclude for reasons of effective public management, including those required 
in order to ensure a coherent transposition of European directives into the Belgian legal 
                                                
10 The Austrian federal system also has a version of compulsory IGAs: GARCIA MORALES (1998) 88. 
11 And the actual transfer of competences over education to Communities, which had formally taken 
place in 1980.    
12 S.94(2)(3), 1980 DMA.   
13 The status quo does not only favour federal authorities, however.  Hence, the transfer, in 1994, of 
certain competences from the French Community to the Walloon Region and to French Community 
Commission of the Brussels Region was also made conditional on the conclusion of compulsory 
cooperative agreements between the three parties: LAGASSE, Charles-Etienne, Les nouvelles 
institutions politiques de la Belgique et de l’Europe, 2nd ed. (Namur: Artel, 1999) 351. 
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order.14  In the remainder of this thesis, the expression “compulsory agreement” is used to 
designate agreements that must be concluded pursuant to s.92bis of the 1980 DMA, the 
absence of which has the effect of suspending a constitutional transfer of competences.   
 
 Optional and compulsory agreements thus play different roles in federal Belgium.  
The first are instruments allowing for cooperation between orders of government that are 
exercising their own constitutional competences.  The second are undeniable instruments of 
the “federalisation” process.  Each new round of reform carries its own generation of  
“compulsory agreements”, which are added to the list contained in s.92bis.    
  
• Agreements requiring legislative assent 
 
All agreements are concluded by members of the various Executives.15  However, 
s.92bis  specifies that legislative assent is required in the case of all agreements which: 
 
*   have financial implications for the signatories; 
*   create obligations for individuals; or  
*   deal with matters that may only be governed by legislative (as opposed to 
regulatory) instruments. 
 
In fact, until 1993, those criteria were used to distinguished international treaties 
requiring legislative approval from those that did not.   In the 1993 round of constitutional 
reforms, those criteria were transposed to cooperative agreements.   Oddly, at the same time, 
the rules were changed so that henceforth, all treaties must officially receive parliamentary 
assent prior to its coming into force within the Belgian legal order.16  The previous uncertainty 
concerning the necessity of obtaining parliamentary assent with regards to treaties now 
affects the role of legislative assemblies with regard to cooperative agreements.  Some 
suggest that the transposition of the rules previously applicable to treaties to cooperative 
agreements had been requested by Flemish nationalists, in an effort to assimilate federated 
entities to sovereign States as much as possible.17  Hence, measures meant to ensure 
                                                
14 AC concernant la maîtrise des dangers liés aux accidents majeurs impliquant des substances 
dangereuses (FED + 3R), 21.06.99 (12.10.00, 16.06.01): JANS, Theo Maarten, TOMBEUR, Herbert, 
“Living Apart Together : The Belgian Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Domains of Environment 
and Economy” in BRAUN, Dietmar (ed.) Public Policy and Federalism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) 142-
176. 
15 Infra, 2.4.1. 
16 Compare new s.167 with previous s.68 of the Constitution.    On this: SALMON and DAVID (2001) 
85 ff.  Given the correspondence between domestic and international competences, treaties which 
deal with matters falling within the competences of federated entities must receive the assent of the 
legislative assemblies of those entities: s.167(3), Constitution. 
17 Information obtained in the course of confidential interviews.  
 44 
greater parliamentary control and transparency were, in fact, introduced for their symbolic 
value.18   
 
Because a significant number of cooperative agreements have financial implications, 
these new rules have led to a multiplication of agreements requiring assent.  This, in turn, 
has generated delays and ambiguity concerning the status of agreements which have 
received legislative assent by one party but not yet by another.19  The third criterion also 
creates a degree of uncertainty, since the border between norms which must be approved by 
legislative instruments - as opposed to regulatory ones - is a fluid and controversial one, 
even outside the context of cooperative agreements.20    
 
 To avoid any confusion, a Circular relative to the entry into force and to the monitoring 
of cooperative agreements, adopted by the Concertation Committee in 1999,21 specifies that 
any agreement requiring legislative approval should contain a clause to that effect.  This is 
rarely the case.22  Senior civil servants hold that since 1993, executives have acted with 
prudence and require parliamentary approval of far too many agreements.  In the 1988-1993 
period, 15% of cooperative agreements were subject to parliamentary assent.23  From 1996 
to 2001, this rate had reached two-thirds of agreements.24  Even then, a number of 
agreements that should receive legislative assent, do not.25  Securing multiple parliamentary 
assents creates delays, paperwork, and a degree of transparency that governments often 
prefer to avoid.  This is true even if the risk of refusal of legislative assent is extremely low, 
given that all governments are constituted of coalitions that govern a majority in the 
legislative assembly.   
 
 The distinction between agreements requiring assent and others entail legal 
consequences in terms of their status inter partes, their potential legal force erga omnes, 
their place in the hierarchy of norms, as well as the courts of competent jurisdiction to, 
notably, rule on their constitutionality. I return to these issues in Part II of the thesis.     
                                                
18 A parallel between the two that is maintained, however, is that assent to agreements requiring it, 
and to all treaties, must be obtained from both Chambers of Parliament when the federal order is a 
party: s.7, Constitution. 
19 Infra, Chapter 4.   
20 Several persons interviewed noted the increased trend towards “executive democracy” in Belgium in 
which an increasing number of issues are relegated to regulations rather than legislation.  On this 
phenomenon, more generally: QUERTAINMONT, Philippe, “Le déclin de l’État de droit”, (1984) JT 
273-280, 276-277; MOCKLE, Daniel, “Gouverner sans le droit: mutation des normes et nouveaux 
modes de régulation”, (2002) 43 C de D 141-210, 208. 
21 Circulaire relative à l’entrée en vigueur et au suivi des accords de coopération of 27.10.1999, 
preamble.     
22 For an exception: AC portant création d'un Comité consultatif de bioéthique (FED + 3C), 15.01.93 
(15.06.95). 
23 JANS and TOMBEUR (2000) 149.    
24 MOERENHOUT (2001) 618. 
25 Infra, Chapter 5. 
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• Political protocols 
 
Prior to the introduction of formal cooperation agreements, “pre-federal” partners 
concluded protocols, which were generally considered not to be legally binding.  In recent 
years, federal partners have increasingly resorted to agreements between executives that do 
not follow the official route of cooperation agreements: they are not officially described as 
cooperation agreements and do not refer to s.92bis in their preamble.26  This is likely in order 
to circumvent the formalism associated with the conclusion of cooperation agreements, as 
well as the various forms of parliamentary and/or judicial control to which the latter are 
subject.  Some are adopted by the Concertation Committee or Ministerial Conferences, and 
do not seem to be submitted to the entire cabinets of each order of government.  Some are 
published (notably the protocols) but by no means all of them.27  Occasionally, an addendum 
to a cooperation agreement is called “protocol”.  If the main agreement requires legislative 
assent, so would this supplementary agreement, regardless of its official designation.28 
  
Some “gentlemen’s agreements” are even more opaque.  A striking example lies in a 
consensual agreement of a multilateral working group on “mixed treaties” (that is, treaties 
which affect the competences of several orders of government) and approved by the 
Interministerial conference of External Affairs.29  By derogation to the Constitution and a 
formal cooperation agreement on “mixed treaties”, it provides that when a treaty only touches 
upon the competences of an order of government in a “marginal” way, it is to be considered 
to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the order of governments primarily affected.30     
Unsurprisingly, this agreement was not published.31  It has been applied, however.32 
  
Chapter 4 examines the status of these protocols and suggests that their official 
designation does not necessarily shield them from the characterisation as legal instruments. 
                                                
26 Protocole financier à l’accord de coopération du 05.04.95  relatif à la politique internationale de 
l’environnement (FED + 3R), 28.04.00,  (16.10.03).   
27 Protocole relatif à la politique de santé à l’endroit des personnes âgée (FED + 3C + COCOF), 
09.06.97 (30.07.97). 
28 Décret portant assentiment au protocole financier du 04.10.2002 à l ‘accord de coopération du 
05.04.1995 relatif à la politique internationale de l’environnement. (FED + 3R) (M.B. 16.10.03).   
29 Minutes of Working Group on Mixed Treaties, 17.06.1998, Minutes of Interministerial Conference on 
External Affairs of 24.06.1998  (Confidential, on file with author).    
30 The rule of thumb that “marginal” means about 10% was only uttered orally. 
31 It is highly probable that the parties concluded such an opaque instrument because they were 
aware of the legal fragility of the rule.  It is consequently unlikely that they could have intended to 
create legal relations through that instrument.    
32 At least one treaty has been adopted pursuant to this derogatory  procedure: an international 
cooperation agreement on astrophysics and a number of addenda, despite the opinion of the Council 
of State that it was a mixed treaty: Décret d’assentiment CF: (MB 27.11.1999).  The ratification 
required another protocol between the Flemish and French scientific research foundations in Belgium: 
email from Flemish Treaty service (01.09.2003).    
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2.2.3.2 Typology based on legal criteria in Canada 
 
Unlike in Belgium, the typology in Canada does not flow from a - non-existent - 
legislative framework.  The typology that follows is thus largely dependent on the legal status 
of the IGAs in question, which is not predetermined, but requires a significant degree of 
“inductive” analysis which is the object of Part II of the thesis.  What follows is thus a cursory 
exploration of categories which stem essentially from the case law analysed in Part II and 
from rules of government contracts which apply to IGAs. 
  
• “Constitutionalised” IGAs 
 
The associative and dissociative origins of the Canadian federal regime were noted 
earlier.  The process of association led to the conclusion of agreements between the existing 
State and the other British colonies meant to join it, or with provinces “carved out” of existing 
larger federal territory.33  The first ones are referred to as “Terms of Entry” and the second as 
“Natural Resource Transfer Agreements” (NRTA).34  All were endorsed by the Westminster 
Parliament,35 and are now scheduled to the Constitution Act 1982.   They are therefore 
constitutionally entrenched. 
 
• IGAs and parliamentary endorsement   
 
The vast majority of IGAs concluded nowadays in Canada are considered to be 
“administrative agreements”. Their conclusion is occasionally contemplated by a particular 
statute, but this is not always the case.  Most are never introduced in one form or another 
before legislative assemblies.  Unlike the situation in Belgium, there is no specific 
requirement that agreements of a particular type receive some form of parliamentary 
approval, although their legal status erga omnes requires a particular type of parliamentary 
endorsement.36 
   
                                                
33 MORIN, Jacques-Yvan et WOEHRLING, José, Les constitutions du Canada et du Québec : du 
Régime français à nos jours, 2 volumes, (Montréal: Thémis, 1994 and TREMBLAY, André, Droit 
constitutionnel canadien et québécois, Documents (Montréal: Thémis, 1999). 
34 The 1897 and 1871 Constitution Acts gave the Dominion the power to determine the conditions of 
Entry of provinces created on what was then Rupert’s Land and the North West Territories, to be 
approved by a British Order in Council. The 1905 Saskatchewan and Alberta Acts reserved the natural 
resources of those provinces to the federal government: Re Transfer of the Natural Resources to the 
Province of Saskatchewan, [1931] SCR 262.  This anomaly (other provinces having control over their 
natural resources) was corrected by the NRTAs of 1930; Alberta v. West Canadian Collieries Ltd., 
[1953] AC 453 (PC). 
35 S. 146, Constitution Act, 1867 provided that British order-in-council would have power of statute in 
this context.  The process was slighlty different in the case of Newfoundland :Re Bowater’s 
Newfoundland Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd, [1950] S.C.R. 608, 649 and 659; Hogan v. A.G. 
Newfoundland, (2000) 183 DLR 4th 225 (NFCA). 
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• Political protocols   
 
As was mentioned earlier, IGAs in Canada come under a wide variety of 
designations.  Unlike the situation in Belgium, the designation does not, a priori, bear on their 
legal characterisation.       
 
2.2 The conclusion, modification and termination of IGAs    
 
2.2.1 The conclusion of cooperative agreements in Belgium 
  
2.2.1.1 Parties, signature and coming into force 
 
Despite the silence of article 92bis of the 1980 DMA on the subject, agreements are 
always concluded by the respective executives.37  They may be negotiated by civil servants, 
members of ministerial cabinets or a combination of both.   Ministers responsible for a 
particular policy area may be directly involved in the case of particularly sensitive 
agreements.   In any event, Ministers are always directly involved in the final stages and they 
are always the official signatories, sometimes in conjunction with a Deputy-Prime Minister 
(for federal authorities) or a Minister-President (in the case of a federated entity).    
 
An agreement does not enter into force without the formal endorsement of the 
complete Executive (cabinet), although there is no clear legislative provision to that effect.  
Logically, one would expect that this endorsement would be given prior to the official 
signature by the Ministers.  For practical reasons, it appears that most agreements are 
signed before receiving the formal imprimatur of the respective Executives.38  Occasionally, 
several signed versions circulate simultaneously between civil servants and ministerial 
cabinets, prior to receiving the formal and final endorsement of the Executive.   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
36 Infra, Chapter 4. 
37 In fact, s.92bis only specifies that agreements are concluded by Regions, Communities and the 
State (sometimes designated as “national” or “federal authority”).  Thus, the DMA does not explicitly 
exclude the possibility that agreements could be concluded by legislative assemblies, although this 
has never occurred.  By contrast, the prerogative of concluding international treaties is expressly 
reserved to the Executives.  COENRATS argues that the conclusion of agreements by assemblies 
would affect the democratic process. The basis of his objection is unclear  COENRAETS, Philippe, 
“Les accords de coopération dans la Belgique fédérale”, (1992) 16 Adm publ 158-202, 188,  fn 235.   
38 One must assume that a Minister will have the informal consent of his or her colleagues before 
signing an agreement, although no strict rule governs that process.  In some cases, it can be 
presented as a fait accompli to the members of an Executive which are from a different political party 
than the Minister in question (the proportional electoral system always leads to coalition governments.   
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According to the Concertation Committee Secretariat (CCS), the formal date of the 
agreement must be the date at which the last formal governmental endorsement is given, 
and not the date at which the agreement is actually signed.39    
 
2.2.1.2 Formalities and drafting style  
 
Parliamentary assent of agreements of a legislative nature follows regular legislative 
procedures.  In the case of agreements of an administrative nature, however, the required 
formalities are less obvious.  By analogy with private contracts, COENRAETS posits that a 
simple exchange of will by the parties is sufficient to create a binding agreement, and thus 
that cooperative agreements could theoretically be concluded orally.40  Be that as it may, this 
seems highly unlikely, and in practice, Belgian cooperative agreements are always written, 
and generally follow a very precise and strict format.  Their preamble always refers to 
s.92bis, thus confirming the nature of the agreement as a formal cooperation agreement, as 
opposed to a protocol, for instance.41   
 
2.2.1.3 Official Languages   
 
 The complex arsenal of linguistic legislation in Belgium does not deal specifically with 
the language of IGAs.  Rules of general application should therefore be of application.  In 
brief, this means that:    
 
• A bilateral agreement between the federal government and a federated entity will 
be in the language(s) of the latter: French for the French Community and Wallonia, 
German for the German-speaking Community, Dutch for the Flemish 
Community/Region and French and Dutch in the case of the Brussels-Region; 
• An agreement between Communities or between Regions will be drafted in the 
language(s) of the parties; 
• An agreement to which the Walloon Region is a party should always have a 
German version, since the German-speaking Community is located within the 
Walloon Region; 
 
 When an agreement is published in the Moniteur belge (the Official Gazette) there will 
always be a French and a Dutch version.42    
                                                
39 S.II(1), Circulaire relative à l’entrée en vigueur et au suivi des accords de coopération du 
27.10.1999, unpublished.     
40 COENRAETS (1992) 164.  
41 Principes légistiques en matière d’accords de coopération, 27.10.1999, unpublished. 
42 The Moniteur belge publishes official documents of the federal authorities, as well as those of the 
federated entities: www.moniteur.be.  Rules governing the language of publication of legislative and 
regulatory norms are applied by analogy to cooperative agreements: s.4, Loi du 31 mai 1961 relative à 
l’emploi des langues en matière législative, à la présentation, à la publication et à l’entrée en vigueur 
des textes légaux et réglementaires (MB 21.06.1961).     
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2.2.1.4 The role of legislative assemblies  
 
An agreement of a “legislative” nature will obviously require legislative assent, 
pursuant to the rules applicable to the relevant assemblies. The assent takes the form of a 
legislative instrument, although the exact status of this instrument (a real statute with 
statutory force or not) is a matter of controversy. That issue relates to the debate surrounding 
the place that cooperative agreements occupy in the hierarchy of norms. 
 
Parties to an agreement may not, through a framework legislative agreement, exempt 
subsequent implementation agreements from specific legislative approval, if the latter also 
burden public authorities or individuals.43   In other words, there cannot be legislative 
approval by anticipation: an agreement can only be approved once its precise content is 
known. 
 
Since agreements are negotiated and drafted by representatives of the respective 
Executives, the latter have the prerogative of determining if a particular agreement requires 
legislative assent.  If the Executives are of the opinion that no legislative approval is required, 
no proposed legislative norm of approbation will - by definition - be submitted to the 
legislative section of the Council of State for an advisory opinion on the issue.    
  
 When an agreement is submitted to a legislative assembly, the latter’s input is limited: 
it may accept or refuse its assent, but it cannot amend the agreement.44  By refusing, it would 
send the parties back to the negotiating table.  This has not yet occurred in Belgium.  In this 
sense, despite the formal role played by legislative assemblies, cooperative agreements 
clearly remain instruments of executive federalism.  Parliamentarians have deplored their 
essentially rubber-stamping role.45    
 
2.2.1.5 Publication    
 
Legislative instruments approving agreements of a legislative nature will be published 
in the Moniteur belge but there is no obligation to publish the agreements themselves.  In 
practice, however, the agreement is scheduled to the instrument giving assent to it.  This can 
give rise to repeated publication of the same agreement. Despite the lack of legal obligation, 
                                                
43 CSLS 24.479, Doc CRW, 1995/96, 162.  Note that this rule is different from the rules relative to 
international treaties, which may receive “anticipatory” legislative approval: CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, 
Rapport public pour l’année judiciaire 1995-1996 (1999) 12  Chron. Droit public 1-2.      
44 LAGASSE (1999) 350. 
45 For ex:  Conseil de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, Compte-rendu intégral (08.05.1998)  776-778.  
In late December 2002, the Walloon government even had an agreement published in the M.B. before 
submitting it to its legislative assembly (agreement on International Trade Agency).   
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a significant number of cooperative agreements of an “administrative” nature are also 
published.   
  
 In theory, all agreements which impose obligations on citizens should receive 
legislative assent, which is necessarily followed by publication.  This is not always the case, 
however.  Publication is even more haphazard in the case of “protocols” and other types of 
agreements between executives.  While cooperative agreements are not specifically 
mentioned in article 190 of the Constitution, pursuant to which all legislative or regulatory 
instruments must be published, MORENHOUT and SMETS argue that it would be consistent 
with the spirit of that article that the obligation extend to agreements, particularly to 
agreements which create rights for third parties.46  This seems logical.  From a perspective of 
transparency and for simplicity’s sake, it seems desirable that all agreements be published, 
irrespective of their direct impact on third parties, should be published.  This would allow for a 
greater political and public control over acts of the executive, and reflect a concern with 
transparency in public management. 
 
 It bears mentioning that agreements that are not published in the Moniteur belge are 
not accessible to the public.  In the absence of clear legislative rules, access to those 
agreements is a matter of political discretion on the part of the Executive.    
 
2.2.2 The conclusion of IGAs in Canada 
  
2.2.2.1 Parties, signature and coming into force  
 
 As a general rule, agreements are negotiated by the civil servants responsible for a 
particular policy area.  Only agreements with a strong symbolic value, which involve 
significant sums of money, or are politically sensitive, will also involve central agencies.47       
 
 The level of signatories varies greatly, depending on the strategic significance of the 
agreement.  Some are signed by the Prime Minister and Premiers, others by Ministers 
responsible for the sector at issue, others by senior civil servants. Some agreements are not 
actually signed, and in a surprisingly number of cases, the original signed copy cannot be 
located.48  
                                                
46 MOERENHOUT and SMETS, (1994) 163-164. 
47 Hence, while the formal agreement was concluded between the Quebec Department of Education 
and the Millennium Foundation, a new Agency fully financed by the federal government, the 
agreement is accompanied by a very extensive exchange of letters between Ministers: Administrative 
Agreement on the Millennium Scholarships between the Canadian Foundation for Millennium 
Scholarships and the government of Quebec (21.12.1999) SAIC 2000-001 and the 19 letters annexed. 
48 Puzzled, a Federal Court judge described a written but unsigned agreement between the Ontario 
and federal governments as an “oral” or “draft” agreement: Commissioner of Official Languages v. 
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Some provincial statutes condition the validity of IGAs to the signature of the Minister 
responsible for Intergovernmental Affairs (possibly in addition to the Minister responsible for 
the policy sector, or even the Premier).49  In some cases, an IGA must also be approved by 
the entire Cabinet.   No equivalent statutory restrictions apply to federal authorities, although 
specific statutes can authorise a Minister to conclude an agreement, subject to cabinet 
approval. 
  
2.2.2.2 Formalities and drafting style 
 
  There are no guidelines on the drafting of IGAs. They range from informal joint 
declarations, resembling press releases,50 to complex agreements with hundreds of articles 
and resembling international treaties.51  The degree of formality and the wording chosen may 
impact on the binding character of an agreement.  Otherwise, the absence of standards 
concerning drafting techniques reflects – once more - the haphazard and pragmatic practice 
of IGAs.    
 
2.2.2.3 Official Languages   
 
The lack of legislative or constitutional framework makes it difficult to set out the rules 
governing the language in which agreements are drafted with precision.  Pursuant to the 
Federal Official Languages Act (OLA): “[a]ny instrument made in the execution of a 
legislative power [or] with the approval of the Governor in Council or one or more ministers of 
the Crown […] shall be made in both official languages […].52  This would appear to cover a 
large number of IGAs. Yet, this has never been the practice.53  Often, for political rather than 
legal reasons, the federal government would not make an agreement public (by putting it on 
a website, for instance), unless it is available in both languages.  When an agreement is not 
published, the public may seek access by virtue of the Access to Information Act.  The 
claimant can then request that the IGA be translated by federal authorities, who have a 
                                                                                                                                                   
Canada (Department of Justice), FCTD, T-2170-98, 23.03.2001, par. 68 and 193 [the “Contravention 
case”].  
49 This is the case of Québec: An Act Respecting the Ministère du Conseil Exécutif, SQ, ch. M-30S, 
ss.3.8-3.9); Alberta: Government Organization Act, RSA 2000, ch. G-10, Schedule 6; and 
Newfoundland: Intergovernmental Affairs Act, RSNL 1990, ch. I-13, s. 7; Even in the absence of such 
statutory obligation, it is the “policy” of some provinces to have the Department of Intergovernmental 
Affairs oversee all agreements: email exchange with B.C. authorities (03.08.03). 
50 National Child Benefit: involving $ 350 million of federal investments was never framed in a written 
and signed agreement: POIRIER, Johanne “Federalism, Social Policy and Competing Visions of the 
Canadian Social Union”, (2002) 13 NJCL 355-435, 405-409. 
51 Internal Trade Agreement, 01.07.1994 (CA01093). 
52 Official Languages Act, RSC, ch. 31 (4th Suppl.).      
53 A 1985 internal circular seems to be the only text governing the language of IGAs: GOVERNMENT 
OF CANADA, Treasury Board, Circular 1985-33 on Official Languages. 
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certain discretionary power to accede to the demand.  In practice, major IGAs, particularly 
multilateral ones, are always available in both languages.       
 
Provinces may conclude agreements in their official language.  Obviously, an 
agreement relative to a language minority (concerning the financing of minority language 
schools, for instance) will also be written in that language.        
   
2.2.2.4 The role of legislative assemblies 
  
 Even when they have authorised their conclusion, legislative assemblies are not 
systematically informed of the negotiations and signature of IGAs,54 although Commissions 
overseeing expenditures will receive a list of agreements which involve public expenses.   
This, of course, is quite different from the situation in Belgium, where agreements of a 
“legislative nature” must be approved by the various parliaments.  
 
 A recent in Quebec statute requires that all major international agreements touching 
upon provincial powers be approved by the Quebec National Assembly.55  This initiative does 
not extend to IGAs concluded with other orders of government in Canada.  Of course, a 
government may seek a parliamentary approval or the ratification of a particular IGA even 
when it is not formally required to do so.56  However, governments rarely opt for such 
parliamentary scrutiny if they can avoid it, especially when the issue is by definition political, 
as are all intergovernmental relations.  
 
 Even when they are called upon to approve or ratify an agreement, legislative 
assemblies are essentially reduced to rubber-stamping a text negotiated by their respective 
executives.  They cannot modify the result of fragile and/or complex intergovernmental 
political bargaining.  The situation is thus essentially the same as the one which is 
denounced in Belgium. 
 
2.2.2.5 Publication   
 
 As a general rule, there is no obligation to publish IGAs in Canada.  An agreement 
that is implemented through a legislative instrument may be scheduled to it in official 
publications, but this is not always the case.  Similarly, an order-in-council approving an IGA 
                                                
54 Exceptionally, certain Acts require that IGAs be transmitted to the assembly: Council of Maritimes 
Premiers Act, S.N.B., ch. 29, s.8. 
55 An Act respecting the Ministère des Relations internationales and other legislative provisions, 
R.S.Q. M-25.1.1, s.2.2. 
56 The federal government did so in January 2003 concerning the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.   
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is published, but the IGA itself rarely is.57  An unpublished IGA is subject to Access to 
information legislation.  Access may, however, be restricted if it threatens intergovernmental 
relations.58  Given the importance of agreements in the conduct of public administration, 
subjecting public access to this type of procedure raises concerns of democratic 
accountability.  Neither the federal nor the Québec registry are directly accessible to the 
public.  This being said, it is obvious that the internet phenomenon has had an impact here 
as well and a number of IGAs are now found on Departmental websites. This is far from 
systematic, however.  Recently, the Québec government has started to list the IGAs to which 
the province is party, but not the agreements themselves.59   
 
2.3  The modification and termination of IGAs 
 
2.3.1  The modification and termination of IGAs in Belgium 
   
Agreements often stipulate modalities of termination.  Some are for a fixed duration, 
frequently with a possibility of a tacit renewal.  The majority, however, have no specified 
duration.  They generally provide that their content can be modified or terminated by mutual 
consent, failing which they can be denounced by one party at the end of a specified formal 
notice period.  Some observers have argued that rules of termination applicable to the law of 
contracts or international treaties should apply by analogy to cooperation agreements.60  This 
would include rules such as impossibility to execute in civil law (or frustration in the common 
law), the exception of non-performance, etc.    
 
It is conceivable that a multilateral agreement could be modified only with regards to 
one party.  In that case, the modification would constitute a codicil or protocol to the original 
agreement.  In fact, all parties may decide to conclude agreements that modify aspects of an 
earlier one, rather than abrogating the original one and adopting a complete modified 
version.61  If the original agreement required legislative approval, modifications to this 
agreement should also be submitted to legislative assemblies.62 
 
                                                
57 S.11.1, Executive Power Act, RSQ, ch. E-18. 
58 S.14, Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. A-1 (federal); s. 19 Act Respecting Access to 
Documents Held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information, RSQ, ch.A-2.1 
(Québec).    For decision to withhold for such a reason in Nova Scotia: Report in the Matter of the 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (03.04.1998), no FI-98-20: 
www.canlii.org/ns/cas/nsfoipop/1998/html. 
59 www.mce.gouv.qc.ca/e/publications/ententes_inter.pdf. 
60 KLEIN (1990) 12.     
61 See multiple “Avenants” to the 1993 federal-RBC agreement on the promotion of Brussels as a 
capital and international city. 
62 MOERENHOUT and SMETS (1994) 169, fn 826.    
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Interestingly, none of the authors analyses in any detail the possibility of unilateral 
denunciation by the legislative assembly, which, as we shall see, is fundamental in the 
Canadian context.  They generally simply assert that co-operative agreements are 
consensual and thus cannot be revoked unilaterally, including by a legislature.63  
 
2.3.2  The modification and termination of IGAs in Canada 
  
As is the case with Belgian cooperation agreements, some IGAs contain clauses 
relative to their termination.  Some are for a fixed period, frequently with a possibility of a tacit 
renewal.  A number, however, have no specified duration.  Whether this implies that they can 
be denounced at any time obviously depends on their legal status.  Generally, they can be 
modified or terminated by mutual consent.  Unilateral termination is possible after a specified 
formal notice period.   
 
   As Part II of this thesis will show, even when they are legally binding, all IGAs 
except for those with constitutional value are susceptible to unilateral repudiation by 
legislative assemblies.  In other words, what is apparently inconceivable in Belgium, is 
undeniable in Canada.    
 
Conclusions 
 
IGAs are concluded in vast numbers in both Belgium and in Canada.  The practice is 
relatively similar, although the degree of formalism is apparently greater in Belgium.  The 
caveat flows from the lack of formal text relating to IGAs, which both reflects and explains 
the lack of consistency in format, drafting techniques, official designation.  One major 
difference reflects the constitutional history of each federation.  Canadian “constitutionalised” 
agreements and Belgian “compulsory” agreements were both essential to the federalisation 
process.   The historical context in which the former were concluded has not lead to the 
elaboration of a legislative framework concerning IGAs, of whatever type.  By contrast, the 
insertion of “compulsory agreements” in the Belgian legal order in 1988-89 brought in its 
wake a detailed legislative scheme, including specific provisions for parliamentary 
involvement.  It is plausible that the existence of this framework has contributed to the 
conception of IGAs as legal instruments, and to a contrary conception in the Canadian 
context.  This will be assessed in Part II of the thesis.   
 
Before turning to the status of IGAs, however, the following chapter surveys the range 
of functions performed by IGAs in the two federal regimes.   
                                                
63  This is explored in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 3:  THE FUNCTIONS OF IGAs  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the introduction to the thesis, I explained that its topic was kindled by an initial 
observation and a “hunch”.  On the one hand, intergovernmental agreements seemed to play 
similar roles in a variety of federal regimes.  On the other hand, they appeared to enjoy a 
distinct legal status in different federations.  Apparently, law played a surprisingly different 
role in the management of the similar mechanisms of intergovernmental relations.  I found 
this paradox puzzling.  The present chapter deals with the first branch of the original intuition.  
It explores the various roles – the “functions” – which IGAs play in federal regimes.  
 
In my view, the functions played by intergovernmental agreements fall into two main - 
although not mutually exclusive - categories.  “Explicit functions” include substantive policy 
co-ordination or harmonisation, as well as procedural and organic co-operation (the creation 
of joint organisations).1  Agreements falling in this category apparently fulfil the objectives 
explicitly identified by the signatories (3.1).  The second category includes “latent” or “implicit” 
functions, mostly para-constitutional and symbolic ones.  Through this category, the following 
analysis seeks to go beyond the description of the overt purpose of agreements, to 
investigate some of their less obvious and transparent roles (3.2).  Of course, agreements 
which play implicit functions will always have an explicit one as well: their latent role hides 
behind their official raison d’être.2   The following illustrates the range of roles played by IGAs 
in federal regimes with a limited number of examples, where, often, hundreds could be 
provided.3 
 
3.1 The explicit functions of IGAs   
 
3.1.1   Substantive cooperation 
  
As we have seen, intergovernmental agreements are central to most areas of public 
activity in Belgium and in Canada, as in most other federal regimes.  IGAs are numerous in 
                                                
1 This distinction parallels the one discussed by GARCIA VILLEGAS, but is used in a different way. I 
am not concerned with the effectiveness of law per se, but on the purpose, stated or otherwise, of 
particular instruments: GARCIA VILLEGAS, Mauricio, “Efficacité symbolique et pouvoir du droit”,  
(1995) 36 Rev. interdisciplinaire d'études juridiques 155-178, 158-159.  I first developed this distinction 
in POIRIER, Concordats.   
2 I use the term “function” to signify the role or the purpose played by IGAs.  By contrast, 
FLORESTANO (1994) uses the expressions “functions” and “subject matters” interchangeably.  The 
functions identified by GARCIA MORALES (1998) 54-68 fall exclusively in the “explicit” category.   
3 The examples are drawn from Belgian and Canadian IGAs listed in Appendices B and C.  
References are more complete in those Appendices. 
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the field of environmental protection, health care delivery, family policy, agriculture, 
employment measures, the co-ordination of fiscal policy, the management of inter-regional 
infrastructures which extend over the territory of one federated entity.  IGAs are used to 
rationalise the exercise of their respective competences in order to minimise duplication and 
over-lapping or to finance or co-finance projects of common interest.  Federal partners 
principally resort to IGAs in order to coordinate their respective actions in fields of exclusive 
competences, or to sort out their respective interventions in cases of shared or concurrent 
competences.   IGAs thus delineate the parameters of action of each order of government.  
The following pages review some of the “material” or practical uses of IGAs in federal 
governance.  The main questions which IGAs address in this context are  “who does what?” 
or “who pays for what?”  
 
3.1.1.1 The articulation of exclusive competences 
 
IGAs often serve to articulate the exercise of exclusive - but closely connected – 
competences in order to co-ordinate policy initiatives.  This is necessary when a policy area  
does not follow constitutional fault-lines.   
 
For instance, in Canada, the federal government has constitutional jurisdiction over 
unemployment insurance, whereas professional training is a provincial matter.   Legislative 
authority in terms of active labour measures is unclear and controversial.   In the post-war 
period, the federal government financed and managed training programs for the 
unemployed.4  Provinces, and principally Québec, have claimed a greater role (with 
corresponding financial means) to intervene in the area of active labour measures.  The 
responsibility over this aspect of unemployment policy has now largely been conferred to 
provinces through a series of agreements which articulates the respective roles and 
responsibilities.5   
 
The need for substantive coordination is possibly even more acute in Belgium, where 
the process of federalisation followed the development of a sophisticated welfare state.     
Continuity of service requires a certain degree of co-ordination between entities endowed 
with new legislative and administrative powers. As in the Canadian case, a number of IGAs 
have been concluded to seek to articulate distinct competences in the employment sector, 
given that unemployment insurance has remained federal, labour training is a Community 
                                                
4 Often by “purchasing” places for the unemployed in regular schooling and professional training 
programs, developed under the jurisdiction of the provinces. 
5 For example: Canada-Alberta Agreement on Labour Market Development, 06.12.1996 (AB01525).  
All those IGAs are reproduced on: www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca. 
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matter, while the placement of unemployed persons has been “regionalised”.6  A number of 
agreements deal with the articulation of these obviously interconnected, albeit exclusive, 
powers.7 
 
Another example is provided in the field of justice and social services.  It will be recalled 
that the federal government has exclusive competence over criminal law and the police, while 
the Communities have the constitutional responsibility for social assistance and mental health.8  
In the aftermath of a major paedophilia scandal, a parliamentary Commission deplored the 
fragmentation of competences and the lack of coordination between orders of government.9  A 
number of agreements have since been concluded with the avowed purpose of avoiding 
duplication and limiting gaps in intervention of public authorities.  Some articulate the respective 
roles of the police and social assistants in their dealings with victims of crime.10  Others concern 
the monitoring and guidance of sexual offenders.11   
 
3.1.1.2 The disentanglement of shared competences 
 
While agreements are useful tools for articulating the exercise of exclusive but closely 
connected competences, they can also serve to sort out responsibilities, in order to avoid 
duplication, in areas of concurrent or shared legislative competences.  The fashionable term 
in Canada to designate this process is to “disentangle” responsibilities.12  Hence, a number of 
IGAs have been concluded in the area of environmental protection, notably to avoid 
duplication over environmental impact assessment.13  Some also aim at defining common 
standards, and then to “disentangle” which government will assume responsibility for 
implementing them. 14   
 
                                                
6 In fact, this distribution is even more complex, because the exercise of powers on a variety of issues, 
including labour training, has been transferred from the French Community to the WR and the 
COCOF. While this explains the multiplication of IGAs, this is not relevant for present purposes.    
7 For ex.: AC concernant l’insertion des demandeurs d’emploi vers la convention de premier emploi 
(FED + 3C + 3R), 30.03.00 (09.12.00). 
8 Again, in the French side of the country, part of that competence is exercised by the WR and the 
COCOF.     
9 “Enquête parlementaire sur la manière dont l’enquête, sans ses volets policiers et judiciaires, a été 
menée dans “l’affaire Dutroux-Nihoul et consorts”, Doc Parl, Ch, SO 1996-1997, 713. 
10 AC en matière d'assistance aux victimes (FED + Fl C), 07.04.98 (13.07.99). 
11 AC concernant la guidance et le traitement d'auteurs d'infractions à caractère sexuel (FED + 
COCOM + COCOF), 13.04.99 (26.07.00, 15.11.00, 23.01.01).  The constitutionality of this agreement 
was creatively confirmed by the Court of Arbitration: infra, 6.1.1.1.    
12 SIMMONS (2003) 15.   
12 Canada-wide Standards Sub-Agreement : cited in SIMMONS (2003) 15. 
13 Canada-British Columbia Agreement for Environmental Assessment Cooperation, 16.04.1997 (BC 
01670).    
14 Canada-wide Standards Sub-Agreement; HARRISON, Kathryn, “Federal-Provincial Relations and 
the Environment: Unilateralism, Collaboration, Rationalization” in Van NIJNATTEN, Debora L., 
BOARDMAN, Robert (eds.) Canadian Environmental Policy: Context and Cases, 2nd ed., (Toronto: 
OUP, 2002) 123-144.   
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Given the official principle of exclusivity of legislative powers between the Belgian 
orders of government, there are technically very few concurrent powers.  This being said, the 
degree of detail in the actual distribution of powers - with long lists of exceptions in favour of 
the federal government even in fields which have been transferred to Communities or 
Regions, for instance – is such that in practice many policy areas are governed by an 
intricate web of interlocking competences.   This is the case of health care, for instance.  In 
principle, all preventive care as well as the fundamental competence over public health have 
been “communitarised”.  However, health care insurance – which occupies around 98% of 
the total health care budget – has remained under federal jurisdiction.  The current 
distribution of powers in this area is mind-boggling.  A Senatorial Commission reviewed the 
distribution of powers in the field of health care and deplored the numerous areas of 
overlapping and uncertainty as to constitutional competences.15  Its only suggestion to clarify 
the situation was that cooperation agreements – including compulsory ones – be negotiated 
to limit duplication.16 
 
3.1.1.3 Joint programmes and co-financing 
 
In larger federations, agreements are regularly concluded to address matters of 
interest to several federated entities, such as the co-financing of programmes or 
infrastructures.  Some are purely horizontal, others are vertical but concluded with only a 
limited number of federated entities.  Hence, IGAs serve to pool resources or develop joint 
programmes.  For instance, the relatively small Atlantic provinces collaborate of matters of 
education and tourism.17   
 
Given the strong “dissociative” trend of Belgium federalism, the co-management of 
programmes is not common, particularly across the linguistic border.  There are examples of 
inter-regional agreements, however, concerning the maintenance of inter-regional roads,18 
the co-financing of research institutes which fall within the competences of both federal and 
Community authorities19 as well as a the running of a closed-centre for young offenders.20 
 
Co-financing or co-management raises no constitutional difficulty when the project or 
joint organ involves competences falling within the sphere of each participating entity.  The 
situation is much more complex when an IGA serves as an instrument of the spending power 
                                                
15 Commission des affaires institutionnelles du Sénat, Évaluation du fonctionnement des nouvelles 
structures fédérales, Rapport 30.03.1999, 1-1331/1, sections 3.1.1.2 ff., and Annexes 11 and 12.  
16 This is an area in which a number of “protocols” have been concluded: supra, 2.2.3.1.  
17 Atlantic Canada Agreement on Tourism, 01.04.1997 (CA 01634). 
18 AC concernant les routes dépassant les limites d'une Région (3R), 17.06.91 (09.01.92). 
19 AC sur le financement, le fonctionnement et la gestion de l'Institut d'hygiène et d'épidémiologie 
(Pasteur) (FED + 3C + 3R), 22.03.90, 18.05.95, 30.03.01 (19.05.90, 06.09.95). 
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through which one order of government funds activities over which it does not have 
legislative competence.  This is extremely frequent in Canada, and is gradually finding its 
way in Belgium, despite strong judicial pronouncements against this practice.  Examples are 
examined below, in the section on the implicit “regulating by contract” function of IGAs. 
 
3.1.1.4  The purchase of services and extension of benefits to 
citizens of another order 
 
In Canada, the federal government has concluded IGAs with several provinces 
pursuant to which the latter are responsible for issuing contravention notices and for 
prosecuting violations of certain federal statutes.  In exchange, provinces are entitled to keep 
half the proceeds of the fines collected.21  The actual arrangements are a mixture of federal 
and provincial statutes, as well as IGAs setting out modalities of payment.    Some provinces 
have also agreed to perceive the V.A.T. on their territory on behalf of federal authorities.22    
  
Agreements also provide for the purchase of services on behalf of one’s population 
from another other of government.  Hence, Quebec and New Brunswick have concluded an 
agreement through which the former guarantees a number of places in medical and 
agricultural faculties to students of the latter.  In exchange, the latter undertakes to reimburse 
75% of the average cost per student.23  Likewise, the federal government regularly 
“purchase” social services from provinces, for population over which it has constitutional 
responsibility, such as war veterans or aboriginals.24     
  
 Similarly, in Belgium, a cooperation agreement was concluded to allow the placement 
of young offenders from the German-speaking Community to be placed in institutions of the 
French Community.  Given its given its limited size, the German-speaking Community does 
not have its own institutions.  Provisions are made for cost-recovery.25 
  
A number of agreements serve to circumvent the rigidity of the territorial divisions 
inherent to federal regimes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
20 AC relatif au centre fermé pour le placement provisoire de mineurs ayant commis un fait qualifié 
d’infraction (FED + 3C), 30.04.02. 
21 Accord relatif à la loi sur les contraventions, 31.03.2001 (FED + QC) (SAIC 2000-036). 
22 Agreement concerning the perception of the Goods and Services Tax, 26.04.1991 (FED + QC) 
(SAIC 1991-15 and 1997-038). 
23 While it is not specified, the intention is clearly to offer educational opportunities to Acadians: 
Protocole d’entente concernant un programme d’échanges et de coopération dans le domaine de 
l’enseignement supérieur, 31.05.1991 (QC-NB). 
24 Agreement Regarding Delivery of Health Care and Treatment Services to Veterans, 08.06.1990 
(BC00545); Tuberculosis Memorandum of Agreement, 01.04.1997 (BC 01622). 
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3.1.1.5 Setting or circumventing territorial boundaries     
 
In some federations, IGAs have been used to settle border disputes between 
federated entities.26 In Canada, borders between provinces require constitutional 
amendment.27  In the early days of the Canadian federation, however, some “provisional 
boundary agreements” were negotiated until a clarification was obtained through 
arbitration.28  British Columbia and Ottawa also identified “public harbours” around 
Vancouver in an agreement embodied in two parallels orders-in-council.29  Public harbours 
are a federal matter.  The agreement thus had the effect of transferring legislative jurisdiction 
from the province to the federal order.     
 
Given the complex and fragile compromises between linguistic and cultural groups 
that have given rise to the federalisation process, borders are particularly unassailable, even 
if they can technically be modified by a DMA.30  This being said, in 1993, the Brabant 
province was split into two (the Walloon and the Flemish Brabant!).  The scission was 
conditioned on the adoption of a “compulsory” agreement to resolve issues relating to the 
transfer of staff and property.31  That agreement did not set the new border but facilitated its 
implementation.32 
 
 While IGAs are rarely used to actually modify borders between federated entities, 
they frequently serve to lessen the impact of these borders, regarding particular policy 
issues.  Hence, IGAs are commonly used to lower existing restrictions on mobility or trade 
barriers. 
 
Hence, in 1994, all Canadian provinces as well as the federal government signed an 
Internal Trade Agreement (ITA) – based on international models - in order to increase 
mobility and lower intra-federal barriers in the commercial or economic sector.33   Adjacent 
                                                                                                                                                   
25 AC relatif au centre fermé pour le placement provisoire de mineurs ayant commis un fait qualifié 
d’infraction (FED + 3C), 30.04.02. 
26 USA: FLORESTANO (1994) 16; Germany: s. 29.7 Fundamental Law (when less than 50,000 
persons affected); GARCIA MORALES (1998) 69, fn 66; s. 53(4) Swiss Constitution of 1999. 
27 S. 43a, Constitution Act 1982. 
28 Canada v. Ontario, [1910] A.C. 637 (PC), aff. (1908), 42 SCR 1.    
29 A.G. Canada v. Higbie, [1945] SCR 385.  Technically, the case turns on whether the agreement had 
to be ratified by legislation, or whether their approval through regulatory instruments was sufficient.    
30 S.4, Constitution. 
31 S. 92bis(4quater). 
32 AC pour le transfert […] du personnel et des biens, droits et obligations de la province de Brabant 
[…] (FED + 3R + FL C + Fr C), 30.05.94, 28.10.94, 23.12.94, 16.03.95 (17.06.94, 02.12.94, 05.07.95, 
20.05.95). 
33 Internal Trade Agreement, 01.07 1994 (CA01093): MAGNET, Joseph Eliot, “Federalism and its 
Discontents“, in BEAUDOIN, Gérald-A.and al., Le fédéralisme de demain : réformes essentielles  
(Montréal: Wilson Lafleur,  1998) 77-107, 84-86. 
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provinces have also concluded regional agreements to the same effect.34  In theory, such an 
agreement is not necessary in Belgium where a monetary and economic union precludes 
trade barriers between regions.35  A recent increase in the fiscal autonomy of Regions is 
however, conditioned on the adoption of an inter-regional agreement meant to limit the risk of 
“delocalisation” of businesses affected by particularly mobile taxes.36  Such arrangements 
are particularly important in a country with such a small territory.  
 
  In a sense, extending services to the population of another entity through horizontal 
agreement implies exceptions to rules of territoriality.  The fragile equilibrium and multiple 
trade-offs that ground the Belgium system, including the sensitive issue of “linguistic 
borders”, lead to a much greater concern over territorial jurisdiction than is the case in 
Canada.  Competences are distributed on an exclusive basis, and their territorial application 
is restricted.  Consequently, a French-speaking entity may not sponsor services in 
Flanders.37  The solution is to assist certain French-speakers from that Region to travel to the 
French-side of the country to obtain services in their language.  While commonsensical, such 
arrangements are politically extremely difficult to obtain, particularly between the North and 
the South of the country.  An example is an agreement allowing handicapped persons to 
obtain services in another linguistic region.38  An arrangement that also alters borders, but 
not necessarily so as to respond to linguistic needs of the population is the placement of 
young offenders from the German-speaking Community (which is too small to have sufficient 
services) in Wallonia.39  
 
3.1.2   Procedural co-operation 
 
While a very large number of IGAs deal with substantive policy issues, others outline 
procedural mechanisms of co-operation.  The purpose is to agree not on specific 
interventions but on the way in which competences are to be exercised.  In other words, the 
question is not “Who does what? Who pays for what?” but rather, “How do we exercise our 
respective competencies? How do we share information, consult, communicate and resolve 
our disputes?” 
 
                                                
34Agreement on Labour Mobility in the Construction Industry, 24.12.1993 (QC-ON). 
35  S.6(I)1(VI), 1980 DMA. 
36 S.92bis(2(f); relative to “car leasing” companies.  Agreement not adopted as of 15.10.03.     
37 CA 54/1996, CA 30/2000; CA 56/2000. 
38 AC relatif à la prise en charge des frais de placement et d’intégration sociale et professionnelle des 
personnes handicapées (Fl C + WR), 07.04.95;  POIRIER, Johanne, “Intergovernmental aspects of 
policies towards persons with disabilities in Belgium”, in CAMERON, DAVID, VALENTINE, FRASER, 
Disability and Federalism : Comparing Different Approaches to Full Participation (Montréal/Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s Press, 2001) 97-149.   
39 Accord sectoriel en matière d’aide à la jeunesse (Fr C + GC), 27.04.01 (21.09.01).    
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Broadly framed agreements, which provide for the conclusion of subsequent detailed 
ones, often define processes for reaching subsequent agreements.  So-called “framework” 
agreements generally contain few substantive undertakings.  They mainly perform 
procedural functions: the Accord on Environmental Harmonization is a prime example of an 
IGA which sets out general principles of cooperation meant to guide governments in the 
elaboration of more precise arrangements.40  In Belgium, separate framework agreements 
have been concluded between the GC on the one hand, and the FrC, the FlC and the WR on 
the other.41  While not identical, they all aim at encouraging exchange of information, 
consultation on matters of common interest.  Some anticipate the subsequent conclusion of 
more specific agreements on a number of enumerated issues. 
 
Of course, many agreements involve both substantive and procedural aspects.  
Hence, a number of IGAs aiming at policy coordination, include provisions on information-
sharing, or set up management committees and dispute resolution mechanisms.42  To give 
one example amongst hundreds, the Canadian Internal Trade Agreement includes a section 
on dispute settlement.43   
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, in Belgium, double majority acts (DMA) already provide for a 
large number of compulsory cooperation mechanisms which take the form of consultation, 
concertation, association, joint-decision making and so on.  In fact, agreements often result 
from these legislated rules of procedural cooperation, as opposed to being the source of 
them. This being said, a number of agreements also contain procedural cooperation clauses: 
they include clauses on information sharing, consultation processes or non-judicial dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  For instance, the agreement on assistance to victims discussed 
earlier contains clauses pursuant to which Community social workers are to give feedback to 
the police officers who refer victims of crime to their services.44 
 
One of the most striking areas in which procedural agreements have been reached in 
Belgium is international relations and the implementation of European integration.  Here, the 
depth of formal cooperation differs significantly between the two federal regimes.  Federated 
entities are understandably concerned that international obligations may have a centralising 
effect, if federal authorities are the sole external interlocutors.  Belgian constitutional law now 
grants federated entities the right to intervene directly in international or supra-national fora, 
                                                
40 Accord on Environmental Harmonization, 29.01.1998 (CA 01739). 
41 AC global entre la RW et la CG + GC, 26.11.98 (21.08.99). 
42  Hence, of the approximate 1300 IGAs contained in the PCO registry, 240 contain explicit “dispute 
resolution” clauses, the vast majority of which refer to management committees or other non-judicial 
organs.   
43  Internal Trade Agreement, ss.1600-1723. 
44 AC en matière d'assistance aux victimes (FED + Fl C), 07.04.98 (13.07.99): supra, 3.1.1.2. 
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as well as treaty-making power.45 The actual operation of such powers rests on a number 
cooperation agreements, which aim to ensure a degree of coherence in Belgian foreign 
affairs. 
 
For instance, an agreement governs the representation of Belgium in European 
institutions.46  The agreement provides notably for a rotation system, pursuant to which 
Regions and Communities take turns speaking of behalf of Belgium, in areas falling within 
their sphere of competence.47  It also outlines procedures in case consensus cannot be 
reached between federal partners concerning a common position.  Another agreement 
governs procedures relative to “mixed treaties”, that is international agreements which affect 
competences which on the domestic front affect federal and federated competences.48  It 
outlines the process for determining the nature of a treaty, as well as procedures for 
consultation, representation or registration of such treaties.49    
 
 In addition to their potential role in the “ascending” phase, in which foreign policy is 
developed or international obligations contracted, IGAs can also be concluded in respect of 
the “descending” phase, that is, with respect to the implementation of international 
obligations in the domestic legal order.50  In the exercise of their autonomous powers of 
implementation, orders of government in Belgium have also concluded agreements to 
harmonise the way in which they implement European directives in the domestic legal 
order.51   
                                                
45 S.167(3), Constitution. 
46 AC relatif à la représentation de la Belgique au sein du Conseil des Ministres de l'UE (FED + 3R + 
3C), 08.03.94 (17.11.94) ; am. 13.02.03 (25.02.03).  All these agreements have a parallel one with the 
COCOM, which is never published. This is not relevant for present purposes.  The determination of 
who speaks for whom has been a contentious issue: MOERENHOUT (2001) 615. 
47 Paradoxically, in the wake of further “regionalisation” of agriculture through the 2001 round of 
constitutional reform which lead to the abolition of the federal Department of Agriculture, the 1994 
agreement was amended to remove the rotation system in that area, so that a federal Minister speaks 
of behalf of Regions at the European Council! : POIRIER, Johanne, “Les accords de coopération dans 
le processus de réformes institutionnelles: instruments d’exécution ou d’ingénierie constitutionnelle?” 
in CENTRE DE DROIT PUBLIC, Les accords du Lambermont et du Lombart: Approfondissement du 
fédéralisme ou erreur d’aiguillage? (Brussels: Bruylant, 2003) 78 and 93 [POIRIER, Lambermont]. 
48 S.92bis(4bis)(2).  
49 AC relatif aux modalités de conclusion des traités mixtes (FED + 3C + 3R), 08.03.94 (17.12.96).  As 
we saw (supra, 2.2.3.1) an informal – but applied – gentlemen’s agreement discussed modifies this 
formal agreement (as it deviates from the Constitution) and provides that if an issue only affects one 
order of government marginally (assessed at 10%), it will not be considered a mixed treaty and is 
immune from the complex cooperative scheme.    
50 GARCIA MORALES, Maria Jesus, “La cooperacion en los federalismos europeos : significado de la 
experiencia comparada para el Estado autonomico” (2002) 1 Revista de estudios autonomicos 103-
124, 110.    
51 AC sur la prévention et la gestion des déchets d’emballages (3R), 30.05.96 (05.03.97); 
COENRAETS, Philippe, “La coopération dans la prévention de la gestion des déchets d’emballage”, 
(1998) Aménagement-Environnement 89-98.  MOERENHOUT (2001) 617 estimates that the majority 
of agreements published in the MB between 1996 and 2000 were adopted in order to implement 
European law in matters of transportation, environment and agriculture.  Cooperation agreements can 
also follow a ruling by the Luxemburg Court that Belgium has violated some European norm. See, for 
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 In Canada, there is no parallelism between domestic and external competences in the 
ascending phase: only federal authorities may contract international obligations in the 
international legal order.52  However, such a parallel applies to the “descending” phase and 
powers of implementation in the domestic legal order follow the formal distribution of 
legislative competences.53  In other words, in the international legal order, the federal 
government has the exclusive competence to conclude treaties on any subject.  However, it 
cannot legislate to introduce treaties on education or social security into the Canadian legal 
order.  In the case of shared competences, such as environmental protection, federal and 
provincial authorities can only implement the portion of a treaty over which it has legislative 
competence.   To guarantee the willingness of provinces to execute a treaty which falls within 
their sphere of competences, federal authorities generally hold prior intergovernmental 
consultations.54  These give rise to the occasional IGA, although the process is generally 
much less formal.   
 
One such exception is an IGA concluded in the wake of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement and sub-agreement, such as the North American Agreement on Labour 
Cooperation (NAALC).  While federal authorities could conclude those treaties, it could not 
implement them in the Canadian legal order, as labour law is principally a provincial matter.  
A procedural IGA was reached providing for exchange information concerning the NAALC, 
as well as for the preparation of answers raised by authorities responsible for the 
implementation of that international agreement.55   
 
 3.1.3   Organic co-operation 
 
 The “organic” function is closely related to the two previous ones.  Indeed, 
agreements can also serve to establish inter-jurisdictional bodies of varying degrees of 
formality, political significance or legal status and capacity.  Their composition and mandates 
vary significantly.  Some essentially offer secretarial support.  Some are set-up to evaluate 
common or related policies.  Others still co-manage specific projects or have a number of 
                                                                                                                                                   
example: AC relatif au respect des obligations de la Belgique envers les écoles européennes, et à leur 
financement (FED + 3C), 30.11.90 (20.02.91). 
52 This is contested by Québec officials and a number of legal analysts, for ex. MORIN, Jacques-Yvan, 
“La personnalité internationale du Québec”, (1984) 1 RQDI 163.  
53 Canada  v. Ontario, (1937) A.C. 326 (the Labour Convention’s case).     
54 SCHAUS, Annemie, L’exécution des obligations internationales dans l’État fédéral, Doctoral thesis, 
vol. I (Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2001) 102-105. 
55 IGA Regarding the North-American Agreement on Labour Cooperation, 31.05.1995, impl. 
01.01.1998, (CA01721).   
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delegated administrative functions.  Some agreements establish multilateral committees with 
very significant influence in policy-making.56     
  
The number of consultative or management committees set up through IGAs is 
staggering.  Of the 880 IGAs available on-line through the PCO registry, nearly 70% 
contained “management committee” clauses.57   Some agreements give rise to a number of 
distinct organs. The Canadian Intergovernmental Agreement regarding the NAALC sets out 
five distinct committees.  This multiplication of committees is common in Belgium as well.  
Hence, the 1993 Cooperative Agreement for the Promotion of Brussels as a Capital and 
International City, and its numerous codicils, has set out a remarkable web of federal-
regional committees, of varying levels of formality, essentially to co-manage urban 
renovation projects.58    
   
 The process of inter-delegation of regulatory and administrative responsibilities, has 
led to the creation of a number of boards and agencies with various degrees of normative 
authority.59  Sometimes the agency is set up by statute by one order of government, and 
other orders delegate powers to it, again by statute.60  Depending on the type of delegation, 
the agency can adopt rules which are binding on third parties, although this whole issue is 
extremely opaque and muddled.61  Sometimes partners will create a private non-for-profit 
organisation to accomplish a particular task.  For instance, the federal government and all 
federated entities except Québec did so to elaborate tools for sharing electronic information 
in the field of health care. The corporation was created by Ottawa, but its members are the 
Deputy-Ministers of Health from every participating federal partners.62    
  
 In Belgium, a few agreements have organs endowed with legal personality.  One was 
at the heart of the first ruling on the constitutionality of a cooperation agreement by the Court 
of Arbitration.63 Another, the International Trade Agency, was introduced following the 2001 
constitutional reform which increased regional powers in that area.64    
 
 
                                                
56 AC portant création d'un Comité consultatif de bioéthique (FED + 3C), 15.01.93 (15.06.95); AC 
relatif à la coordination des activités liées à l’énergie (FED + Fl R), 18.12.91 (26.02.92); VELAERS, 
Jan, De Grondwet en de Raad van State : Afdeling wetgeving (Antwerp: Maklu,  1999) 877. 
57 595 out of the 880 IGAs accessible in full-text. 
58 POIRIER, Johanne “Les relations fédérales-régionales relatives à Bruxelles : contrôle et 
coopération”, (1999) 4 RBDC  351-370. 
59 On interdelegation: supra, 1.2.4.4 
60 Ex. of such statutory delegation: Farm Products Agencies Act, RSC (1985) ch. F-4, s.31. 
61 Infra, 5.3.2. 
62 Health Infoway, 2002 Annual Report, www.canadahealthinfoway.ca. and email exchanges 
(08.04.2003)  
63 CA17/94. 
64 Its powers are, however, extremely limited: POIRIER, Lambermont, 77. 
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3.2 The implicit functions of IGAs     
 
  Over and beyond the obvious policy co-ordination and the development of 
mechanisms of consultation, information-sharing or joint management, IGAs play a number 
of less transparent roles.  Sometimes those “implicit” functions are deliberate, or at least 
clearly understood by the signatories, although not announced publicly.  Occasionally, 
agreements even play functions which the parties did not intend from the beginning.     
 
 3.2.1 Para-constitutional engineering  
 
  3.2.1.1 Circumventing and blurring constitutional boundaries 
 
 As we shall see in Part II, governments cannot officially modify the formal distribution 
of powers through an IGA.  In other words, federated entities cannot, individually or 
collectively, transfer jurisdiction over education, health or intra-provincial transportation to the 
federal government.65  However, agreements can enable governments to delegate functions 
to one another, thus modifying the exercise of constitutional competences.66  The line 
between the two can be extremely thin, and is easily walked by federal partners. 
 
 The most remarkable way in which an IGA can be used to circumvent constitutional 
boundaries, is when one party undertakes not to exercise one of its constitutional 
competence in favour of another one.   Even if temporary, and revocable, such commitments 
are obviously aimed at dodging the formal distribution of competences.   For instance, in 
1942, as part of war effort, Canadian provinces agreed to “loan” their taxation powers to the 
federal government.67  In exchange, they were to receive certain block grants.  These loans 
were contained in a series of IGAs.  The legal nature of these agreements and their 
justiciability is examined in Part II of this thesis.  At this point, I simply want to underline the 
obvious para-constitutional function played by these agreements: they amounted to 
undertakings by provinces not to exercise their constitutional power to perceive taxes.   
 
Delegating functions to another order of government is another means of 
circumventing a formal federal architecture.  We have seen that in both the Canadian and 
Belgian federations, every order of government normally has its own administrative structure 
to implement the legislative and regulatory norms adopted by that order.  Nevertheless, in 
some cases, partners have found it expedient to mandate another order with the 
                                                
65 In this context, the Supreme Court of Canada concerning the Vancouver public harbours is an 
anomaly: supra, 3.1.1.5.    
66 While the delegation of legislative function is unconstitutional law, this is not the case of delegation 
of administrative responsibilities from one order of government to another: MAGNET (1998) 85-107. 
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implementation of one’s legislation.  This is the case of the Contravention arrangement 
mentioned earlier, pursuant to which provinces agree to prosecute violations to federal 
statutes in exchange for a portion of the fines perceived.68  While not unconstitutional, this 
type of arrangement implies a degree of constitutional remodelling.  It transforms – even 
partially – a dual federal system into an administrative one.   
  
A recent example illustrates how parties can make creative use of agreements for 
constitutional engineering purposes, when the formal distribution of powers is a hindrance to 
their public policy objectives.  It will be recalled that in Belgium, education is a Community 
matter, while policies for reducing unemployment is a regional one.69  Prior to the 2001 
reforms concerning the financing of Communities, a cooperation agreement was concluded 
between the French Community and the Walloon Region, pursuant to which the former would, 
amongst other things, subsidise the purchase of computers for schools.   The bills purporting 
to give assent to the agreement were assessed by the Legislative section of the Council of 
State (CSLS).70     
 
Before the CSLS, the Walloon Region ingeniously argued that better training (over 
which the Region has no direct competence) would, in the medium term, reduce 
unemployment (an area over which it does have legislative competence). The CSLS rejected 
the submission, considering the link too tenuous.  Permitting this type of intervention would 
generate confusion over constitutional responsibilities, which are very largely distributed on 
an exclusive basis.  In other words, the Council of State denied that an order of government 
could conclude cooperative agreements to finance a policy initiative over which it does not 
have legislative competence.   The bills purporting to give assent to the agreement were 
therefore – in the view of the Council of State - unconstitutional.    
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, a legal opinion by the CSLS is not binding on governments. 
In response to the criticism, the Walloon Region and the French Community simply modified 
the title of the agreement – to mask the mere financial arrangement at stake – and adopted 
the agreement without altering its content.71  Technically, such an agreement could be the 
                                                                                                                                                   
67 Re Taxation Agreement Between the Government of Saskatchewan and the Government of 
Canada, (1946)  1 WWR 257 (arbitration tribunal).    
68 Supra, 3.1.1.4. 
69 Moreover, unemployment insurance falls within federal competences, but that is not relevant for the 
present purposes.  
70 CSLS 30.037-2 (28.06. 2000) Doc Parl, 92 CCF,1999/2000, 17 and CSLS 30.102/2, (24.05.2000) 
Doc Parl, CRW 124 (1999-2000) 18.   
71 From an agreement “relative to the refinancing of the French Community by the Walloon Region” 
became an agreement relative to the “financing of cooperation in the context of interlocking policies” 
(“politiques croisées”): The “exposé des motifs” is particularly candid on this.  Noting the Council’s 
opposition to modification of rules of fiscal federalism by agreement, the government of the French 
Community states “Il convient, pour éviter toute confusion sur le plan des principes juridiques, de 
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object of an a posteriori constitutional challenge before the Court of Arbitration.  However, it 
is unlikely that the parties would ever subject to that Court an agreement they have 
concluded.  Affected third parties (schools of the French Community in the Brussels Region, 
for instance?) would face a number of procedural (standing rules are more stringent in 
Belgium than in Canada) and financial hurdles.   
 
 Through these creative schemes, federal partners can blur constitutional boundaries.  
In some cases, ambiguity may be a key to reaching an agreement.  For instance, the federal 
government and Québec interpret differently a major bilateral agreement on labour market 
policies.  Ottawa maintains that the agreement serves to implement the federal Employment 
Act.  With one minor exception, Québec disagrees and posits that the policy areas covered 
are not founded on the federal power relative to unemployment, but on the provincial powers 
over education and labour policy for which Québec receives federal funds grounded on the 
federal spending power.  Despite their disagreements over principles, the two parties 
reached an agreement in order to consolidate a particular policy objective. It is likely that 
without this grey zone regarding constitutional competences in the IGA, it simply could not 
have concluded.  The flexibility of IGAs allows for this “double-reading” phenomenon.  
 
 Cooperative agreements can be useful tools of “good governance”.  To take an 
example discussed above, it is better to have computers in schools and local sports facilities, 
regardless of who pays for them.  However, agreements of this nature are instruments 
though which federal partners stretch the federal architecture, outside the strict rules of 
constitutional amendments in the Canadian case, and outside the exacting system of double 
majority legislation in Belgium.  Such agreements are thus tools of constitutional engineering, 
on the margins of constitutional rules.    
 
  3.2.1.2 IGAs as an alternative to constitutional reform  
 
Given their flexibility and the limited degree of parliamentary and public scrutiny to 
which they are subjected, IGAs are often called to play another “para-constitutional” function: 
that of alternatives to constitutional reform.    
 
By contrast to the incessant institutional reordering that characterises Belgian political 
life, constitutional reforms are extremely rare in Canada, particularly with regards to the 
distribution of powers.72  Since the 1982 constitutional patriation, which Québec never 
                                                                                                                                                   
modifier l’intitulé de l’accord, même si, sur le plan politique, les termes employés étaient 
particulièrement importants”: Doc Parl, CCF, 95 1999/2000, 3.   
72 The constitution was modified in favour of the central government in 1945 and 1964 (unemployment 
insurance and pensions, with provincial supremacy in the latter case, ss. 91.2A and 94A, Constitution 
Act, 1867).  In 1982, provincial competences over natural resources were specified (s. 92A).   
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endorsed, and the subsequent failures of the Meech Lake and the Charlottetown Accords, 
constitutional reforms have been widely considered beyond reach.  In that context, IGAs 
cannot serve as an alternative to a genuine threat of constitutional amendment.73  They can, 
however, be used to obviate the need for such reform.  In other words, IGAs enable 
governments to structure their relations so as to bypass hard constitutional issues, or to find 
pragmatic solutions that would be unattainable in the context of more visible and politically 
charged negotiations.  The very existence of IGAs may, in fact, contribute to the belief that 
constitutional reforms are both impossible and unnecessary.  From that perspective, IGAs do 
not only serve as a substitute to constitutional reform, but also as a pretext for avoiding them. 
 
For example, since the mid-1990s, a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements 
have been concluded between Ottawa and the provinces, to show that federalism could be 
renewed through “non-constitutional” means.  Most of them were concluded under the 
umbrella of the so-called “Social Union Framework Agreement” (SUFA) a loosely worded 
agreement between Ottawa and all provinces and territories (except Québec) which was 
originally designed to clarify respective roles and responsibilities, but which ended up 
legitimising federal incursion into areas of provincial responsibilities in the field  of social 
protection.74 
 
“Post-SUFA” agreements are presented as “non-constitutional solutions” to 
constitutional problems.75  For SIMMONS, they “have become synonymous with the non-
constitutional rebalancing approach”.76  While I agree with the diagnosis, I would not term this 
trend as “non-constitutional” an expression which suggests that constitutional norms are 
irrelevant or that the process in neutral from a constitutional perspective.  IGAs used to 
circumvent the formal distribution of competences or to avert constitutional reforms are 
anything but constitutionally neutral.  They are tools of constitutional engineering on the 
margins of the Constitution.77     
 
In remarkable contrast to the Canadian situation, Belgians politics are based on 
constant constitutional reforms.  Yet, cooperation agreements also play an avoidance role.  
Indeed, constitutional negotiators sometimes postpone the resolution of a controversial 
                                                
73 In Switzerland, intercantonal conventions are often understood as a “shield” against centralisation. 
See for instance, the creation of the Conférence Universitaire Suisse, seen as a protection against the 
potential transfer of competence over university placement from the cantons to the federal order: 
POIRIER, Report, 52-53. 
74 GAGNON, Alain G., SEGAL, Hugh, The Canadian Social Union Without Québec: 8 critical analysis  
(Montreal : Institute for Research in Public Policy,  2000).    
75 LAZAR (1998).   
76 SIMMONS (2003) 7.  
77 POIRIER, Johanne,  “Intergovernmental Agreements in Canada: at the cross-roads between law 
and politics” in INSTITUTE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, The State of the Federation 
2001-2002 (Kingston: IIGR, forthcoming) [POIRIER, Cross-roads]. 
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issue, by agreeing that it will be resolved at a later stage through a “compulsory” agreement.  
This trend was particularly notable in the 2001 round of reforms.78   
 
Amendments to the Belgian Constitution require a qualified majority in both 
Chambers of the federal Parliament.79  Modification of a DMA is even more exacting.80   
While this is demanding – and it theory should provide a certain stability to constitutional 
texts! – only federal parliamentarians are involved in this process.  In other words, 
constitutional reforms are the sole prerogative of central authorities.81  When aspects of a 
reform are “teleported” to compulsory cooperation agreements, to be concluded by federated 
entities, with or without federal authorities, the impact is to grant those entities a direct say in 
constitutional reforms from which they are officially excluded.  The result is not an avoidance 
of constitutional reform, but a dodging of formal constitutional procedure. 
 
  3.2.1.3 IGAs  to render constitutional reform effective   
 
 In Belgium, IGAs are not only a means of circumventing formal constitutional 
procedure. They also serve to render them effective.82   In fact,  “compulsory” agreements 
are built-in the federalisation process.  In Chapter 2, we saw that the very introduction of 
cooperative agreements in the Belgian legal order in 1988-89 coincided with the 
regionalisation of matters that required a fair degree of coordination.  Conditioning the 
effective transfer of competences to the conclusion of these agreements was a political 
trade-off.  Parties agreed, in principle, to the constitutional transfer, but also agreed that the 
status quo would be maintained until the agreements were indeed concluded.   
 
 The 1993 and 2001 constitutional reforms also involved the insertion of a number of 
“compulsory” agreements in s.92bis.  In 1993, the transfer of significant competences over 
international affairs to federated entities was partly conditioned on the conclusion of 
agreements on the representation of Belgium in international and European institutions.  
Their jus tractati was also conditioned on the adoption of an agreement relative to “mixed 
treaties”.83  The scission of the province of Brabant in the wake of the 1993 reform was also 
                                                
78 POIRIER, Lambermont 75-83. 
79 A majority of two-thirds in the House of Representatives and the Senate, with a quorum of two-thirds 
of members present. 
80 It requires the same qualified majority overall, plus a single majority in each of the French and 
Dutch-speaking groups in each assembly.   
81 This startling state of affair is partly alleviated by a very limited presence of representatives of the 
Communities in the Senate (but not of the Regions), the rest of the Senators, being elected directly.    
82 This function may therefore not be as “implicit” as the other one, but it bears to be examined in the 
context of other para-constitutional functions.  
83 In fact, alternative, cooperative measures were put in place until the “compulsory” agreements were 
concluded, which arguably had the effect of speeding up their adoption: by partial derogation to the 
situation of other such “compulsory agreements” (supra, 2.2.3.1), the status quo ante had already 
changed: s.92bis (4bis)(2) and (4ter)(2).   
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conditioned on the conclusion of a compulsory agreement.  In 2001, nine compulsory 
agreements constituted an integral part of the process of increasing regional fiscal autonomy 
and the transfer of certain competences to federated entities.84  Four of five “optional” 
agreements were also negotiated concurrently with the constitutional reforms.  In all these 
cases, the texts amending the DMAs at issue (on financing and the distribution of 
competences) were drafted alongside the IGAs.  The role of IGAs in the process is 
undeniable. 
  
  3.2.1.4 Adoption of asymmetrical arrangements  
 
IGAs are particularly well adapted to respond to asymmetrical constitutional 
structures, whether those are officially recognised or not.  For instance, in Belgium, where 
the institutions of the Flemish Community and Region have been merged, there is no need 
for formal cooperation between them: co-operation is, in a sense, integrated in the 
functioning of the institutions.  This institutional fusion has not occurred on the French-
speaking side of the country, thus increasing the need for policy coordination of very 
dispersed legislative and executive powers between the French Community and the Walloon 
Region, for instance.  This leads to a greater number of formal horizontal agreements 
between the French-speaking entities, than between the Flemish ones, or between the 
former and the latter.  The funding of computers in schools of the French Community located 
in Wallonia is good examples.85  The particular situation of the Brussels-Capital Region, as 
both a region and the capital of Belgium, has led to the adoption of an agreement through 
which federal authorities intervene both financially and in priority-setting in matters which are, 
a priori, regional.86  There is no similar federal intervention in the other Regions. 
 
In Canada, where asymmetry is political anathema in many official circles,87 bilateral 
agreements between the federal government and the provinces allow for an adaptation to 
local needs and distinct political situations, in what appears to be an innocuous way.   Hence, 
provinces were allowed to opt for one of three models of labour-training IGAs with Ottawa, 
with varying degree of decentralisation.88   Still, today, Ottawa collects income tax on behalf 
of a majority of provinces, but not all of them, through a number of distinct Tax collection 
                                                
84 POIRIER, Lambermont. 
85 So is an IGA giving an organ of the French Community competences which the latter had earlier 
transferred to the Commission communautaire française: AC relatif aux modalités d'exercice des 
relations internationales de la COCOF (Fr C + COCOF), 30.04.98 (21.08.98, 02.12.98). 
86 AC relatif à certaines initiatives destinées à promouvoir le rôle international et la fonction de capitale 
de Bruxelles (FED + RBC), 15.09.93 (30.11.93). See numerous codicils in Appendix B. 
87 MAGNET, Discontent (1998) 90. 
88 KLASSEN, Thomas R., “The Federal-Provincial Labour Market Development Agreements” in 
McINTOSH, Tom (ed.) Federalism, Democracy and Labour Market Policy in Canada (Montreal-
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000)158-203,176 ff.   
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agreements.89  Similarly, given Québec’s concern with preserving its dominant French-
speaking character, particular vertical agreements have been concluded in the field of 
immigration, which is a concurrent head of power.90  Federal authorities determine the total 
rate of immigration and is still responsible for other aspects of the selection, such as security 
or health criteria.91  Québec, can grant higher priority to the actual or potential knowledge of 
French in the immigrant selection process than is the case in the rest of Canada.92  
 
 It is highly unlikely that such arrangements could have been established through 
official constitutional reforms. IGAs have an opacity and an apparent temporary nature which 
enable governments to actually do what they cannot officially endorse.  Moreover, this can 
be accomplished without much public or parliamentary scrutiny.  In fact, it is possible 
precisely because of this limited scrutiny. 
 
 3.2.2 “Regulating by contract”: IGAs as tools of realpolitik93 
 
In her 1984 study of administrative contracts in Canada, LAJOIE adapted the 
“regulating by contract” formula introduced by DAINTITH to denounce intergovernmental 
agreements as tools of centralisation, concluded under the guise of compromise and 
consensus.94   
 
 The paradigm example provided by DAINTITH is of a public authority with the power 
to legislate over a certain matter, but opts for a contractual solution instead.95 The choice of 
contract in such a scenario is believed to favour compliance by the other party and to give an 
appearance of a more balanced power base between the public authority and the other 
party.96  The ultimate threat of legislation or regulation is always implicit and this can 
significantly alter the content of the contract or agreement.  Such contracts can thus be used 
as forms of indirect regulation, since one of the parties always has the option of replacing the 
                                                
89 HOGG (1998) 144-145. 
90 S.95, Constitution Act, 1867.    
91 The first one was signed in 1971.  The most recent is the Accord Relating to Immigration and 
Temporary Admission of Aliens, 05.02.1991 (QC00563).  
92 José WOEHRLING argues that the federal government has often insisted on concluding 
agreements with other provinces, in order to minimise the recognition of a special status for Québec : 
“Les droits et libertés dans la construction de la citoyenneté au Canada et au Québec”, in COUTU, 
Michel et al. (dir.), Droits fondamentaux et citoyenneté : une citoyenneté fragmentée, limitée, illusoire? 
(Montréal: Thémis, 1999) 269-302, 277-279.    
93 Par. 2-5 of this section are from POIRIER, Concordats 142-143. 
94 LAJOIE (1984) 144 ff.; DAINTITH, Terence, “Regulating by Contract” (1979) 32 Current Legal 
Problems 41 
95 DAINTITH has used the imperium/dominium label to distinguish between the use of legal and non-
legal techniques by government to further policy objectives: DAINTITH, Terence, “The Techniques of 
Government” in JOWELL, Jeffrey, OLIVER, Dawn, (eds) The Changing Constitution, 3d ed., (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press,1994) 209-236, 213 ff. 
96 LAJOIE (1984) 5. 
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consensual approach by a direct regulatory or legislative solution.  Contract is thus used as a 
mode of social control, as an alternative to the exercise of unilateral normative power, but 
with a similar objective, and, in many respects, effect.97 
 
LAJOIE applies DAINTITH’s analysis both to contracts between two public authorities 
and to intergovernmental agreements.98 She argues that in both cases, the choice of a 
conventional solution is strategic.  It is preferable to bring a partner - including a partner in a 
multi-layered State with whom one necessarily has long standing relations - to agree, rather 
than to impose its will through the unilateral legislative measures. 
 
 This use of IGAs to further “regulatory” purposes can arise in two distinct situations.  
First, it can indeed replace a unilateral legislative solution. This is possible when the central 
government has the constitutional power to make legislation binding on federated entities.99   
Even when the legislative route is available, it may be more expedient, or politically 
acceptable, for central authorities to negotiate an agreement, rather than to impose its will 
unilaterally.  Compliance and cooperation are more likely to be forthcoming if the other party 
participates in the elaboration of the new norms.  In the end, however, the threat of 
legislation is always there, possibly affecting the liberty of the federated entities.  This is very 
similar to the choice of new public management strategies with semi-autonomous bodies, or 
even the private sector.100  
  
 Secondly, IGAs can be instruments of “regulation by contract” when central 
authorities do not have the power to impose their will on the constitutive units by legislation, 
but “make them an offer they cannot refuse”.  In other words, in a federation in which the 
federated entities are not in a subsidiary position to the central government, as is the case in 
Belgium and in Canada, the regular normative route is not available.  “Contract” is not merely 
the preferred option, but often the only one available.101  Accepting the terms of an 
agreement may be the only way for a constitutive unit to obtain financial contributions from 
(ex hypothesi) wealthier central authorities.  Refusing to sign such agreements could result in 
depriving the population of services, which is neither good public administration, nor good 
electoral politics.    
                                                
97 HARLOW, Carol, RAWLINGS, Richard, Law and Administration (London: Butterworths, 1997) 211; 
QUERTAINMONT, Philippe, “Les nouveaux instruments contractuels utilisés par l’Administration et la 
compétence du juge administratif”, (2000) 1 TPB 39-52.  
98 LAJOIE (1984) 144 ff. 
99 As is the case in the United States, for instance, where the conclusion of compacts has been 
described as an alternative to preemptive legislation by Congress, although this trend may have 
slowed down given difficulties associated with the creation of formally binding compacts: 
ZIMMERMAN (1992) 55-81, 146 and 194 ff. 
100 In Belgian context: QUERTAINMONT (2000). 
101 I put “contract” in brackets, of course, because this begs the question of whether intergovernmental 
agreements can be considered contracts. 
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  In Canada, IGAs are the prime instrument through which the federal government 
funds programmes over which it does not have legislative competence.  For instance, 
through vertical IGAs, federal authorities assist (and encourage) provinces to provide 
educational services in minority official languages.102  While the federal government has 
legislative authority over the promotion of official languages in federal matters and 
institutions, it does not have this competence in matters of education, which is an exclusive 
provincial matter.  Agreements are thus a financial conduit, where direct normative action 
would not be possible.   Similarly, with a few exceptions, health-care is a provincial matter.  
The federal government transfers hundreds of millions of dollars to provinces annually so 
that they may fulfil their constitutional responsibilities in matters of health care.  These 
transfers are essentially founded on the federal spending power, although the 2003 
agreement also included inter-provincial undertakings to coordinate policy initiatives, develop 
comparable measures of quality, develop pharmaceutical care and so on.103   
 
Given the permissive attitude of Courts regarding the federal spending power in 
Canada,104 and given the needs of their population, provinces find it hard to resist a federal 
incursion into their sphere of jurisdiction when it is accompanied by significant financial 
contributions.   The threat of the spending power acts as an incentive for provinces to reach 
agreements.  From that perspective, IGAs reflect actual imbalances in the federation. They 
can also exacerbate such imbalances.  These questions are of course banal to students of 
fiscal federalism.  The point I wish to underline is that the inequality of the parties may be 
masked by the use of apparently consensual IGAs.105 
 
On the other hand, even when the federal government can “go it alone”, it may find 
that politically, it is preferable to reach an agreement with a province.  This would appear to 
be the case of the agreement between Québec and Ottawa regarding the Millennium 
Scholarships.  Even if the Québec government objected to the Scholarships scheme, it 
probably could not have stopped the federal government from actually putting  it into place 
independently, in parallel to its own bursary programme.  Politically, however, both parties felt 
that an agreement was preferable.  In the end, Québec managed to avoid most direct 
                                                
102 Special Agreement for the Implementation of Francophone School Governance, 01.04.1997 (NF 
01636). 
103 Agreement on Health Care Renewal, 2003.  It is very likely that Québec did not take part in this 
(unsigned) agreement, because of the first function – an instrument of the spending power – rather 
than the second.      
104 Over the years, courts have established only one condition: the spending by one order of 
government must not “in its essence” amount to regulation of a matter falling within the competency of 
the other order: YMCA v. Brown, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1532, 1549. See also Eldridge v. BC, [1997] 3 SCR 
624, 647: YUDIN, David W.S., “The Federal Spending Power in Canada, Australia and the United 
States“ (2002) 13 NJCL 437-484, 462. 
105 As can be the case with private contracts or government contracts, of course. IGAs governing 
conditional grants have been assimilated to “standard form contracts” (“contrats d’adhésion”) LAJOIE 
(1984) 155.   
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transfers to individuals and to ensure that the federal funds were used to complement its own 
means-tested system. 
 
 In other words, power relations depend on power, and in complex political systems, 
power is not necessarily a one way-street.  This is particularly true in Belgium, where power 
games are played between federated entities, and between the later and the federal 
government. The games do not always end in the latter’s favour.  Several cooperative 
agreements examined earlier illustrate the role they can play in federal realpolitik.  Given the 
double-layer of federated entities, this does not only happen between federal and federated 
authorities, but between the latter as well. 
 
 For instance, in the early 1990s, the Walloon Region managed to secure a role in the 
conduct of certain Community affairs through a joint regional-Community organ. The French 
Community could not resist, as it was in desperate need of funds.106  In fact, that agreement    
paved the way for the official transfer of competences from the French Community to the 
Walloon Region in 1993-94.107  Similarly, the agreement concerning the purchase by the 
Walloon Region of computers for schools under the jurisdiction of the French Community, 
reflect the power imbalance between those two entities.108  
 
 Realpolitik also lead to an invasion of federal competences by powerful federated 
entities.  This is the case, for instance, of a 2002 agreement concerning the funding of the 
rail service, which is still officially an exclusively federal matter.  There is, however, strong 
pressures from the North of the country to have the responsibility for the railway system 
transferred to Regions, that are in charge of other means of transportation.  In the meantime, 
any substantial public investment in rail transportation requires the consent of the federal 
government, which is, off course, made up of an equal number of Flemish and of French-
speaking Ministers.   
 
 Certain Flemish Ministers blocked any deal to refinance the national railway 
company, unless the deal took the form of a cooperation agreement involving the Regions, 
which have no constitutional competence in the matter!  It allows Regions to invest in 
railways on their own territory.  This increased the visibility of federated entities, and possibly 
paved the way for an eventual “regionalisation” of railways.  The legislative section of the 
                                                
106 CA 17/94; COENRAETS, Philippe, “Réflexions sur le contrôle de constitutionnalité des accords de 
coopération”, (1995) 19 Adm publ 216-227.     
107 This transfer took the form of six distinct legislative instruments, by three federated entities (WR, 
FrC, COCOF), all published: MB 10.09.1993.  Since this transfer can only be revoked with consent of 
the recipient, it amount to a true transfer of competences:  LEROY, Michel, SCHAUS, Annemie, “Les 
relations internationals” in CENTRE DE DROIT PUBLIC, Les réformes institutionnelles de 1993, Vers 
un fédéralisme achevé (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994) 25-70, 41(n49).     
108 Supra, 3.2.1.1. 
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Council of State judged the agreement unconstitutional, but its non-binding opinion was 
disregarded.109  This agreement partakes of what certain analysts denounce as the 
“confederal” drifting of Belgian politics. 
 
 3.2.3 Symbolic functions 
 
The previous example indicates the strong symbolic meaning that governments can 
attach to IGAs.  Rumour has it that in the 2001 round of negotiations, some Flemish 
nationalists insisted on the conclusion of a fixed number of cooperative agreements, 
regardless of their actual policy significance.  Symbolically, they wanted to see Flemish 
authorities as an integral part of the process.  Agreements are assimilated to treaties, and 
their conclusion is a token of greater sovereignty.  They are symbols of a growing distancing 
from central institutions.    
 
On a related note, it will be recalled that in 1993, new rules concerning parliamentary 
assent to cooperation agreements were introduced.  They replicated the rules that applied, 
until then, to international treaties.  Some deny that this insistence on parliamentary 
involvement was grounded on concerns for democratic control over instruments of executive 
federalism.  They suggest, rather, that modelling rules concerning cooperation agreements 
on those relative to treaties increased the prestige – and autonomy - of parties to the 
agreements.110       
 
 Interestingly, the refusal to conclude IGAs may also be a symbolic act.  The Quebec 
constitutionalist F.R. Scott suggested that Québec’s insistence on levying its own income 
taxes in 1954, rather than allowing Ottawa to do it on its behalf was a matter of “honour”.  In 
his view, the war-time taxation agreements “became mixed up with feelings of status and 
prestige” so that “income tax itself, became in a sense, a symbol of cultural identity”.111   
 
 Agreements negotiated in Canada in the 1990s, in the wake of the Social Union, 
provide a good illustration.  Since Québec generally up-holds a strict dualist conception of 
the Canadian federation and a maximalist interpretation of provincial powers, it is reluctant to 
conclude agreements that seem to legitimise the role of the federal government in spheres of 
                                                
109 CSLS 32.367, Doc Parl Vl R (2001-2002) 269, no.1, 30.10.2001; AC relatif au plan 
d’investissement pluriannuel 2001-2012 de la SNCB (FED + 3R), 11.10.01 (27.11.02 ; 26.03.02). 
110 Paradoxically, of course, the rules governing parliamentary assent to treaties were also being 
modified, as we saw in Chapter 2.  I could not find any explanation for the insistence on the application 
of the old rules to cooperation agreements, rather than a parallel to those applicable to treaties.  It 
would appear that the distinction was overlooked in the heat of the negotiations! 
111 SCOTT, F.R., “The constitutional background of taxation agreements”, (1955) 2 McGill LJ 1-10, 10.  
It bears pointing out that Québec was insisting on perceiving taxes which it can, pursuant to the 
Constitution Act 1867, perceive.  The “honour” was symbolic, but also was tied up with the “original 
deal”. 
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provincial competences.  While it often shares the policy objectives of other members of the 
federation, and participates actively in intergovernmental discussions, it regularly refuses to 
sign formal agreements that result from those discussions.  In many cases, the impact in 
terms of policy is negligible.112  When it is not, Québec authorities will make an exception, but 
may insist on some other mark of distinctiveness.  For instance, as was mentioned earlier, 
the Ottawa-Québec labour market agreement does not expressly refer to the federal 
Unemployment Insurance Act, while all the other bilateral agreements do so.  Québec also 
insisted on a distinct dispute resolution process.   
 
 The multiple footnotes to the multilateral agreements which attest to Québec’s refusal 
to join are, however, highly symbolic.113  These footnotes can be interpreted either as the 
proof of Québec’s alienation from the rest of Canada, or as a testimony that asymmetry is 
alive and well, despite official discourse. 
 
 Conclusions   
 
 IGAs play a variety of functions in the Belgian and Canadian federal systems.  Many 
aim at articulating exclusive but interconnected competences, or at sorting out respective 
responsibilities, when competences overlap.  The focus changes slightly whether 
competences are distributed on an exclusive basis, are concurrent or shared, but the 
fundamental purpose is the same: it is to determine who does what, and who pays for what.  
A substantial number of IGAs also play a range of procedural functions: they introduce 
communication mechanisms, set up dispute resolution mechanisms, or establish joint 
organs.   
 
 IGAs also fulfil a number of less transparent roles in inter-federal relations.  They are 
used to circumvent inconvenient constitutional boundaries and introduce asymmetrical 
arrangements.  While in Canada, IGAs tend to be used to palliate the impossibility of 
constitutional reform, a Belgian particularity is the recourse to IGAs as an integral part of the 
federalisation “by dissociation” process.  In this context, however, agreements are used as a 
means of involving federated entities in the process of constitutional transformation from 
which they are officially excluded.  Given fiscal imbalance in the Canadian federation, and 
judicial tolerance for the use of the federal “spending power” in areas of provincial 
competence, IGAs are indirect tools of regulating by contract.  Despite stricter judicial 
scrutiny, there may be a developing trend towards such uses of IGAs in Belgium also.  While 
in Canada this use of IGAs is almost exclusively vertical (federal to provinces), in Belgium, 
the power games are much more complex. Given the double-strata of federated entities, 
                                                
112 KLASSEN (2000) 167. 
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IGAs can also serve as tools of horizontal “regulating by contract”.  Morevoer, the strength of 
certain federated entities (the joined Flemish Region and Community) faced with the inherent 
bipolarity of central authorities has enabled the former to use IGAs as a means of intervening 
in federal matters.  
                                                                                                                                                   
113 NOËL, Alain, “Without Quebec: Collaborative Federalism with a Footnote”, Working Paper 
(Montréal: IRPP, 2000). 
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CONCLUSIONS TO PART I 
 
 
 IGAs intervene in just about every area of public policy in both Belgium and Canada.  
They are surrounded by a greater degree of formalism in the former, where their conclusion 
is notably authorised through a quasi-constitutional provision.  This is consistent with other 
aspects of Belgian cooperative federalism in Belgium, which are also the object of explicit 
legislative provisions.  Whether this legislative grounding actually affects the status of IGAs is 
examined in Part II of the thesis.  Despite the absence of an equivalent legislative framework 
in Canada, methods of negotiations, conclusion, implementation and even denunciation of 
IGAs are relatively similar in both systems.    
 
 IGAs play a wide variety of roles in federal regimes.  In Belgium, federal partners 
conclude agreements to articulate the exercise of exclusive but closely connected 
competences, while in Canada, IGAs serve to sort out responsibilities in cases of overlap.  
IGAs are used to pool resources, create joint bodies, outline communication processes.  But 
IGAs are also tools of para-constitutional engineering and instruments of power games 
between components of federations. This is notably the case when they are used as conduits 
for the spending of funds by one order of government in a field over which it has no official 
constitutional competence. 
  
 Notwithstanding certain differences largely due to the historical foundations of each 
federation, and a distinct method of distributing competences between orders of government, 
in practice, intergovernmental agreements play a number of similar functions in the two 
federations.  The first branch of my working hypothesis is thus largely confirmed.  In Part II, 
we turn to the second branch of that hypothesis pursuant to which despite this similarity of 
functions, IGAs are apprehended in radically different manner by the Belgian and Canadian 
public law systems.  
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PART II 
 
THE LEGAL STATUS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS IN 
BELGIUM AND CANADA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Having drawn a general picture of the practice of intergovernmental agreements in 
Belgium and Canada and examined the various functions these instruments play in those 
federal regimes, this second part of the thesis tackles the more difficult problem of their 
intersection with the legal and judicial systems. 
 
Over the past few decades, public authorities have resorted to instruments with the 
appearance of contracts in their dealings with the private or para-governmental sectors.1   
These instruments share characteristics with contracts: they are negotiated and rest on the 
(at least apparent) parties’ consent.   Yet, because of the inherent power of state authorities 
to impose rules in a unilateral form, these instruments are not divorced from the traditional 
unilateral regulatory process. The regulatory objective is similar, but the method differs.2 The 
legal character of these hybrid instruments defies traditional classifications in domestic legal 
orders.  A Belgian author described his attempt at pinning down the legal nature of these 
new instruments as “seeking the undiscoverable”.3     
 
IGAs are one aspect of this phenomenon of the contractualisation of law and of 
political relations and are just as difficult to characterise pursuant to classic legal categories.  
IGAs have both regulatory and contractual characteristics.   This “confusion des genres” 
poses an obvious challenge to the determination of their legal status, since the legal systems 
of both federations have traditionally distinguished between legal norms of unilateral origin 
and those of a contractual origin. While legal philosophers have underlined the 
interdependence between those two categories,4 legal systems have not adapted to 
incorporate these odd instruments that potentially embrace both sources of normativity.   
Hence, observers in both Belgium and Canada are perplexed by the nature of the odd – if 
ubiquitous – tools of federal governance that are negotiated as contracts between 
executives, but that can hardly be understood has having no normative impact on the 
citizens of the orders of government involved. 
 
                                                
1 “Contrats de gestion” with state agencies, for instance: QUERTAINMONT (2000).    
2 ISSALYS and LEMIEUX (1997) 145-150 ; MOCKLE, Daniel, “Gouverner sans le droit : mutation des 
normes et nouveaux modes de régulation”, (2002) 43 C de D 141-210, 155 ff. 
3 DeROY, David, “La nature juridique des contrats de gestion d’entreprises publiques: à la recherché 
de l’introuvable” (2002) JT 393-401.   In the end, the author describes them as “sui generis” (401). 
4 OST, François, “Les lois conventionnellement formées tiennent lieu de conventions à ceux qui les 
ont faites”, in GÉRARD, Philippe et al. Droit négocié, droit imposé?, (Brussels: Publications des 
Facultés universitaires St-Louis, 1996) 17-107, 106. 
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 Given the existence of a relatively detailed legislative framework concerning IGAs in 
Belgium, as well as a certain doctrinal interest in Belgian cooperation agreements, one might 
assume that the question of their legal character would be well established, at least by 
contrast with the opaque and ad hoc Canadian practice.  In fact, the status of IGAS is 
shrouded in uncertainty in both federations, although not always for the same reasons or with 
regards to the same issues.   
 
My working hypothesis was that IGAs were considered to be legally binding 
instruments in Belgium, while their legal status was much less secure in Canada.  As will 
become apparent, this hypothesis is only partially confirmed.  There is an undeniable 
presumption that IGAs are legal instruments in Belgium, while the contrary presumption 
arguably prevails in Canada.  But mostly, it is the very conception of the nature of the 
instrument that differs between the two federations.   
 
Belgian analysts have from the inception of formal cooperation agreements in 1988-
89, described them as a new type of “norm” of public law.  The consensual origins of 
cooperation agreements are acknowledged, but the emphasis is almost exclusively on the 
“normative” character of the instrument, in the more classical sense of state-generated 
(traditionally unilateral) norms.  In Canada, by contrast, IGAs are almost exclusively analysed 
through contractual lenses.  Not only is the consensual origin of the instrument emphasised, 
but its potential legal force is analysed through the prism of government contracts, which are, 
in turn, largely treated as a variation of private contracts.5  Belgian public lawyers show 
disbelief at the suggestion that instruments so clearly determinative of the management of 
public affairs in a federal regime, and which almost inevitably impact on citizens, can be 
analysed as mere contracts. 
  
In view of these major differences, it could have been easier to analyse the status of 
IGAs in the two federations separately.  However, in order to challenge what appears as 
“evidences” on the part of the courts and in literature in each federation, I have sought to 
examine IGAs both as contractual and as “normative instruments”, in both federations.6  This 
approach sheds some light on facets of IGAs which analysts within each system tend to 
downplay.   
 
As a point of lexical clarification, it should be pointed out that while contractual 
instruments obviously undeniable source of law,7 and are therefore normative, in the 
remainder of the thesis, the qualifier “normative” (as in “normative instrument”) will be used in 
its "erga omnes" sense.  In other words, the question is whether IGAs, which all contractual 
foundations, can be the source of law of a general character, and not only of rights and 
obligations to their signatories. 
 
 Part II is divided into three chapters.  Chapters 4 and 5 respectively explore the 
status of IGAs as contractual instruments inter partes and as normative instruments erga 
omnes. Chapter 6 deals with the localisation of agreements in the hierarchy of legal norms, 
the main issue being whether an agreement concluded between several parties can be 
unilaterally repudiated by one of them, notably through legislative means.   
  
                                                
5 Infra, chapter 5.  
6 Swiss law distinguished between IGAs that are “purement obligationnelles” and those which are 
“normatives”.  The latter can either be directly normative – if they are self-executing – and impose 
obligations or grant rights to third parties, or indirectly self-executing if they call for modification of the 
domestic legal orders of the parties to the convention.  See report, pp. 64 ff. ABDERHALDEN, 1999b. 
7 Although it is admitted that contractual instruments are also a normative instrument inter partes: 
HOULE, France, Les règles administratives et le droit public: aux confins de la régulation juridique 
(Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 2001) 3.  
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CHAPTER 4: IGAs AS CONTRACTUAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 All IGAs have consensual foundations, that is, they result from negotiations; they are 
bargains which give rise to more or less precise undertakings.  Chapter 5 will examine 
scenarios in which these negotiated instruments obtain a particular legal force erga omnes 
through the intervention of an external norm (constitution, legislative instrument) or 
potentially through assimilation with regulations.  The present chapter seeks to assess when 
an instrument with consensual foundations is legally binding inter partes.    
 
 Defining a contract in one particular legal system is already a challenge, let alone in 
a comparative perspective.  For the present purposes, the following working definition will be 
used: an IGA as a contractual instrument is a text1 through which at least two governments 
agree that at least one of them will do or refrain from doing something that is licit and 
possible.  This, however, is not sufficient.  For this agreement to be considered as a 
contractual instrument, it has to cross the threshold that distinguishes political undertakings, 
from legal ones.   It has to generate obligations of a juridical character. 
 
Tests for delineating the threshold of juridicity, that is, the point at which an 
agreement moves from the moral or political sphere to the legal one, have been developed in 
every areas of law in which agreements are made.2  The reasoning is often surprisingly 
similar in all these contexts, as is the perplexity of jurists confronted with “gentlemen’s 
agreements”.  When does a binding contract, as opposed to a moral agreement, arise 
between private parties? When do States or constitutive units of federations conclude 
international treaties, by contrast to non-binding political agreements?  The status of IGAs 
raises similar questions.  When does an agreement which necessarily has political 
foundations IGA become a legally binding one inter partes, without the intervention of an 
outside norm which confers a specific value on it?3  
  
                                                
1 Unwritten IGAs are certainly possible, but were excluded from the present study: supra, General 
Introduction.  
2 See definition provided in General Introduction. 
3 Since all IGAs are bound to have political underpinnings, the expression “purely political” will be used 
to designate agreements that remain within the political sphere.  It is borrowed from INSTITUT DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL,  “La distinction entre textes internationaux ayant une portée juridique dans 
les relations mutuelles entre leurs auteurs et textes qui en sont dépourvus“, Annuaire de l’Institut de 
droit international, Session de Cambridge, vol. 60, Tome I and II, (Paris: Pedone, 1984), Rapport 
définitif, T.I, 341-345 and ss.4-6 of Final Resolution, T.II, 285 [Rapport Virally]. 
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Pursuant to classic voluntarist conceptions, a contract is the “law of the parties”. 
Those parties are “free to contract” or not, and consequently, free to conclude agreements 
which do not constitute legally binding contracts, i.e. contracts that the law would enforce. 
From this perspective, the status of IGAs therefore largely depends on the parties’ intention 
to create legal relations.  In other words, it is a contract if the parties meant to conclude a 
contract.4 
 
This voluntarist conception has known so many exceptions that doctrine in both the 
civil and the common law has sought alternative theories to explain the basis of contractual 
obligation.5  This thesis cannot do justice to the variety and richness of this doctrine, a fortiori 
from a comparative perspective.  It is generally admitted that “objective” legal rules pose 
certain limits to the freedom of the parties and that “le droit” and contracts are mutually 
interdependent.6  This, I would argue, is particularly true of IGAs.  As consensual 
instruments, IGAs must of course rest on the consent of the governments party to them.  But 
this consent does not determine legal status.  Other rules of law intervene and may have an 
impact on the status of IGAs, whatever the parties’ intention.  The key is thus both to identify 
indicators of the parties’ intention, and rules which may affect to the legal character of an 
agreement regardless of that intention.  This is the main purpose of this Chapter, which is 
divided into four sections. 
 
 The first two deal with the characterisation of IGAs as contractual instruments in 
Canada and in Belgium.  In each case, analogies with other types of contractual instruments 
and potential public law impediments to legal characterisation are assessed.  Given the 
scattered cases on the contractual character of IGAs in Canada, and the near absence of 
cases on this issue in Belgium, the focus of each section is somewhat different, as is their 
length.  In the Belgian context, I focus mostly on the literature and inferences that can be 
drawn from the existing legislative framework concerning cooperation agreements.  Contrary 
to my original hypothesis, the difference between the two systems is more likely a matter of 
                                                
4 Many specialists of contract law have commented on the circularity of any definition of contracts 
since to know what courts will enforce, requires an examination of what courts actually do: 
WADDAMS, S.M., The Law of Contracts, 4th ed., (Toronto: Canada Law Books, 1999) 11 and 17; 
BAUDOUIN, Jean-Louis, JOBIN, Pierre-Gabriel, Les obligations, 5th ed. (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1998) 
102; COIPEL, Michel, Éléments de théorie générale des contrats (Diegem: Story Scientia, 1999) 3. 
5  WADDAMS (1999) 54 notes that lip service is still paid to the bargain theory of contracts, but that in 
practice, courts increasingly enforce promises by reason of reliance.  Similarly, in the Belgian context, 
DIEUX argues that the obligatory force of a contract does not actually flow from intentions, but from 
the reliance created in the other party: DIEUX, Xavier, Le respect dû aux anticipations légitimes 
d’autrui: Essai sur la genèse d’un principe général de droit, (Paris/Brussels: Bruylant/LGDJ, 1995).  
Van OMMESLAGHE, Pierre, “La bonne foi, principe général du droit?”, (1987) RGDC  101-110, 103. 
6 OST, François, “Les lois conventionnellement formées tiennent lieu de conventions à ceux qui les 
ont faites”, in GÉRARD, Philippe et al., Droit négocié, droit imposé? (Brussels: Publications des 
Facultés universitaires St-Louis, 1996) 17-107, 106.  
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contrary presumptions than a clear dichotomy between a federation in which IGAs are legally 
binding inter partes (Belgium) and one in which they are not (Canada).    
 
 The third section seeks to unpack these presumptions through an analogy with the 
literature relative to the law of treaties.  It then proposes a series of indicia meant to assist in 
the characterisation of IGAs as contractual instruments in both Belgium and Canada.   The 
fourth and final section reflects on the legal effect that IGAs can have, even when they lack 
sufficient indicia to cross the threshold from the political to the legal sphere.    
 
Two preliminary remarks are in order. First, as was mentioned in the general 
introduction, technical questions concerning courts of competent jurisdiction to resolve 
disputes concerning IGAs are not addressed in the present thesis, despite their obvious 
relevance to the subject.  If no court can “enforce” an IGA, one may well wonder about the 
interest of establishing their juridical character.  While undeniable difficulties arise in Canada, 
with its judicial system largely divided along federal lines, there would always be a court of 
competent jurisdiction to enforce an agreement, once it crosses the line of juridicity.7   The 
issue of judicial dispute resolution may be more relevant to characterisation in the Belgian 
context, and it is accordingly addressed in somewhat greater detail.     
 
Secondly, the length of this chapter is partly justified by the introduction of a number 
of legal issues that will be relevant to the rest of Part II, but which did not deserve a distinct 
chapter.  This is notably the case of some public law impediments (discussed in sections 
4.1.2 and 4.2.3), and of certain doctrines pursuant to which even non-legally binding IGAs 
could have some legal effect (section 4.4).  Both of these aspects will be revisited, in 
appropriately summarised form, in Chapter 5.    
 
  4.1. The characterisation of IGAs as contractual instruments in Canada     
 
In Canada, whenever they are considered as legal instruments, IGAs are assimilated 
to a form of government contract.  The following section explores this characterisation 
(4.1.1), as well as some of the public law impediments applicable to government contracts 
that should normally affect IGAs if the analogy is sound (4.1.2).  A survey of the case law 
relative to IGAs then provides an illustration of the inconsistent approach to IGAs as 
contractual instruments (4.1.3) before summary conclusions are provided (4.1.4).   
 
It should be pointed out from the outset, however, that the following discussion does 
not relate to “constitutionalised” agreements, that is essentially the Terms of Entry of certain 
                                                
7 In other words, problems of inter-jurisdictional immunity are complex but not an obstacle to either 
legal characterisation or ultimately to judicial resolution:  POIRIER, Cross-roads. 
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provinces into the Canadian federation, as well as some agreements concerning natural 
resources in Prairie Provinces.8  Those are constitutionally entrenched and any modification 
now requires a formal constitutional amendment.9 For instance, the Terms of Entry of Prince 
Edward Island into the Canadian federation, provided that a permanent ferry service would 
be assured by the central government.  In 1993, a constitutional amendment was secured to 
allow the ferry to be replaced by a bridge!10   
 
The characterisation of “constitutionalised” agreements is not problematic per se: no 
one would deny they are legal instruments.  Still, they have been the object of a large 
number of complex and often contradictory judicial rulings11 and a number of unresolved 
legal issues remain.  First, while they undeniably create binding obligations (and 
corresponding rights) on governments, their impact on third parties is erratic.  This is 
examined in Chapter 5.   
 
Secondly, there can be intense disagreement about the scope of those rights and 
obligations.  Does an undertaking to build a railway imply the obligation to run it?12  Does a 
grant in land involve the underground resources, notably gold?13   Is the federal government 
responsible for an interruption in ferry service caused by strike action?14  This is more a 
matter of interpretation of the IGA than of characterisation, and the substantial, complex and 
often contradictory case law on the subject will only be examined when it can shed light on 
the characterisation of IGA which are not “constitutionalised”.   
 
A third set of legal issues arise from agreements concluded in the wake of Terms of 
Entry, and which were intended to modify them, or implement them.  The difficulty is often 
that those subsequent IGAs did not follow the proper procedure for “constitutionalisation”, 
notably endorsement by British authorities.  Are those to be characterised as 
constitutionalised as well?  And if not, what is their status?  This particular problem is 
relevant to the present discussion and it is addressed below in the section devoted to the 
case law concerning IGAs. 
                                                
8 Supra, 2.2.3.2. 
9 They are scheduled to the Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52(2).  Amendments require proclamations by 
federal and provincial legislative assemblies, when the amendment does not affect other provinces: 
s.43, Constitution Act, 1982.  In some cases, if the Terms only relate to the provincial “constitution”, 
they could arguably be amended by the province, without federal concurrence: s.45, Constitution Act, 
1982; Hogan v. A.G. Newfoundland, (2000) 183 DLR 4th 225 (NFCA). 
10 Proclamation of 1993, (1993) 127 Can Gaz, II, 1588. 
11 Only for BC: BC v. Canada (1889), 14 AC 295 (C.P.), rev’g (1887) 14 SCR 345 [the “Precious 
Metals case”]; Esquimalt and Nanaimo Ry v. Treat, [1919] 3 WWR 356 (PC); BC v. Esquimalt and 
Nanaimo Railway Co, [1950] AC 87 (PC), rev’g [1948] SCR 403 and the Canada v. AG for BC [1994] 
2 SCR 41  [1994 BC Railway case]; BANKES (1992) 540.     
12 1994 BC Railway case. 
13 Precious Metal case. 
14 PEI  v. Canada, [1978] 1 FC 533 (FCA) [PEI Ferry case]. 
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4.1.1. IGAs as government contracts 
  
Agreements which are not “constitutionalised” are either characterised as political 
instruments, or assimilated to government contracts, the uncertainty concerning their 
characterisation being particularly striking.15  It may seem incongruous to use a body of law 
in which parties are not an equal legal footing to govern agreements between federal 
partners, who are not in a legally subordinate situation.16  We will see that this is the main 
objection raised in Belgium against the characterisation of IGAs as administrative contracts.      
In fact, the apparent tension created by the inherent inequality of parties to ordinary 
government contracts is partly resolved by the fact that all parties to IGAs are public 
authorities, which enjoy similar privileges, but are also constrained by similar rules of public 
law.  With this precision, the analogy does not assault the de jure equality of parties. 
  
Pursuant to the common law tradition, Canada does not have distinct institutions of 
“administrative contracts” subject to a specific body of law and special administrative 
courts.17  One consequence of the rule of law as understood in “Anglo-Canadian” law, is that 
the qualification of a “legal relationship having all the characteristics of a contract” must rest 
on concepts and rules of “ordinary law, unless statute or prerogative require otherwise”.18    
Government contracts in Canada thus sit uncomfortably between the private law of 
contracts,19 from which the fundamental rules are derived, and a number of public law 
exceptions.20   
 
Glossing over nuances between the civil and the common law, a contract in private 
law requires parties that are capable to consenting, actual consent, a licit and possible 
                                                
15 For example, the political platform of the current Québec government puts substantial emphasis on 
IGAs as means of resolving a number of contentious issues with Ottawa.  Yet, their status is 
essentially presented as a series of questions: PARTI LIBÉRAL DU QUÉBEC, Un projet pour le 
Québec : affirmation, autonomie et leadership, Rapport final,  2001, 83.  Academics have admitted 
they can give rise to binding obligations, although the contours of the institution remain uncertain: 
TOWNSEND, Lynda J., “Les contrats administratifs” in MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE DU CANADA, La 
Couronne en droit canadien (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1992) 321-356, 334-335; BLACKMAN (1993) 
61-62; KENNET (1993) 654 ff.  A particularly ambiguous statement to that effect is found in ISSALYS, 
Pierre, LEMIEUX, Denis, L’action gouvernementale (Cowansville: Yvon Blais,  1997) 1132.  
16 LAJOIE (1984) 141-182.  Considering vertical agreements concluded pursuant to the federal 
spending power, in which there is a de facto, if not a de jure, inequality of parties, LAJOIE describes 
them as an “aberrant form of administrative contracts”: at 142.  
17 The expression “administrative contracts” is used by some authors in Québec (including in the 
English translation), but the commonly used expression in English Canada is “government contracts” 
or “contracts by the Crown”.   
18 AG (QC) v. Labrecque et al., [1980] 2 SCR 1057, 1081-82, per Beetz J., for the Court.  In the case, 
“ordinary law” is translated by “droit commun”.    
19 Meaning the civil law in Québec, and the private law in the rest of Canada: Laurentide Motel v. Ville 
de Beauport, [1989] 1 SCR 705, 722 and 737; Just v. BC, [1989] 2 SCR 1228.   There is (with very 
limited exceptions) no federal “private common law” in Canada: Québec North Shore Paper Co. v. 
Canadian Pacific, [1977] 2 SCR 1054; McNamara Construction v. The Queen, [1977] 2 SCR 654. 
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object, and (here the difference cannot be avoided) the metaphysical “cause” or 
consideration.21   Transposed in the context of IGAs, capacity and object take a public law 
coloration.  In fact, the question is whether there are public law rules concerning the parties’ 
capacity to bind their respective orders of government, and subject matters which can never 
be the object of legally binding commitments.  
  
Defending a voluntarist conception of IGAs as contracts, DUSSAULT and BORGEAT 
propose the following test for establishing the existence of a legally binding IGA : 
 
“si les parties, d’après le contexte et la nature de l’entente, ont 
entendu conclure un véritable contrat donnant naissance à des 
droits et obligations réciproques, il faut considérer cette entente 
comme un contrat”.22 
 
In other words, it is a contract if the parties want it to be a contract.   The situation 
may not be as simple, and the law of government contracts, and by transposition, the rules 
pertaining to IGAs, require a consideration of what I will refer to as public law impediments. 
They include issues of capacity and authorisation to conclude, rules of statutory 
appropriation (legislative authorisation to spend), as well as limits ratione materiae.  Some of 
these issues go to the validity of contracts (or IGAs) rather than their characterisation as 
legal instruments.  However, validity and legal character are closely related.  It is therefore 
useful to consider them together, making appropriate distinctions when required.  
 
4.1.2. Public law impediments 
  
4.1.2.1  Capacity and authorisation 
 
 In Canada, governments can bind themselves in contract without specific statutory 
authorisation.23  Problems related to the (in)divisibility of the Crown, which so preoccupied 
British analysts, was set aside by the Supreme Court of Canada, so that governments can 
undoubtedly contract with one another.24  A priori, therefore, there is no requirement for 
specific legislative authorisation to conclude a binding IGA.  It is not because there is no 
                                                                                                                                                   
20 Public law rules are of common law origin, even in Québec: AG (QC) v. Labrecque et al., [1980] 2 
SCR 1057. 
21 BAUDOUIN and JOBIN (1998).  “Cause” and “consideration” are briefly discussed infra, 4.3.3.1.   
22 DUSSAULT, René, BORGEAT, Louis, Traité de droit administratif, 2nd ed., T.I (Québec: Presses de 
l’Université Laval, 1984) 606, emphasis added. 
23 In AG Québec v. Labrecque, [1980] 2 SCR 1057; Furthermore, while there were traditional bars 
against suits in torts against the Crown (which have now been removed by statute) there were never 
any such restrictions for suits in contract: Bank of Montreal v. A.G. (Que), [1979] 1 SCR 565, 574.  
ARROWSMITH, Sue, Government Procurement and Judicial Review (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 109-
117.    
24 DUSSAULT and BORGEAT (1984) 609-614; ARROWSMITH (1988) 110-124.   
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statute authorising the conclusion of an agreement that it cannot be characterised as a legal 
instrument. 
 
The inherent capacity of governments to bind themselves in law must be 
distinguished, however, from the authority of particular signatories to bind their own 
government.  This is a matter of validity, rather than characterisation per se.  There is a huge 
case law concerning the validity of contracts concluded by public authorities, often 
subordinate bodies such as municipalities, in violation of their statutory authority.  This case 
law is arguably of limited interest in the case of IGAs, given that executives have inherent, 
not statutory powers to contract.   
 
Older case law gives confusing indication as to the need for statutory authorisation in 
the case of agreements concluded by individual Ministers, without the explicit endorsement 
of cabinet.  Hence, 1930 Troops in Cape Breton Reference, the Supreme Court held invalid a 
written undertaking by a Nova Scotia Minister that the province would reimburse the federal 
government for the cost incurred by sending troops to quash labour unrest.25  No order-in-
council approved the request.  Moreover, statutory authorisation for these types of 
arrangements had been abrogated the year before and the provincial legislative assembly 
refused to vote the necessary credits.  The Court ruled in favour of the province, focusing 
mostly on the impact of the absence of parliamentary appropriation of funds.   The majority 
however, also noted the lack of authority of the Minister to bind the government.    
 
Since then, the Supreme Court has held the Crown to be bound by an agent holding 
an “ostensible” mandate.26  Whether this ruling actually overturned the 1930 one is unclear.  
Possibly as a matter of tradition, or for a measure of security, it is common for legislative 
instruments to authorise specific Ministers to conclude IGAs with other governments.27  This 
authorisation does not, however, confer immediate legal force upon IGAs.  It simply 
conditions their validity as commitments by the executives.   
 
While executives have an inherent power to contract, this power may be curbed by 
statute.  In some provinces, the authority of Ministers (or others) to conclude binding 
agreements is somewhat altered by legislative provisions conditioning the coming into force 
on a signature by the Minister responsible for intergovernmental affairs, and in some cases 
on cabinet approval.28  Hence a Newfoundland Act provides explicitly that “notwithstanding 
another Act or law” an IGA which is not submitted and signed by the Minister responsible for 
                                                
25 Re Troops in Cape Breton, [1930] SCR 554. 
26 Verreault & Fils v. AG Québec, [1977] 1 SCR 41, 47. 
27  For ex.: Federal-Provincial Farm Assistance Act, RSA, ch. F-10, s.1.     
28 Supra, 2.2.2.1.    
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governmental affairs, as well as the sectoral Minister “is not binding on the province or 
agency or official of the province”.29   
 
Similar statutory formalities in the case of “regular” government contracts are 
generally analysed as public order requirements, the non-respect of which necessarily 
deprives a contract of binding force.30  However, much of this case law deals with contracts 
between private parties and public authorities that only have express contractual powers, by 
contrast with the executive’s inherent power to contract.  Moreover, these cases arose within 
a single legal order.  Apart from the Cape Breton decision, there is no case law on the impact 
of failure to obtain governmental consent in the context of IGAs.    
 
It is arguable that failure to respect formalities should not excuse governments in their 
dealings with one another.  This scenario may have more in common with the situation of 
sovereign States concluding treaties than with administrative contracts.31  Hence, the lack of 
signature by the Québec Minister responsible for intergovernmental relations may deprive an 
IGA of validity within the Québec legal order.  This does not necessarily entail that the IGA 
could not bind the province with regards to other governments parties.  It may depend on 
whether the signatory held an “ostensible mandate” to conclude the agreement.  This could 
be the case of solemn agreements concluded by Deputy Ministers, for instance, or civil 
servants with statutory authority to conclude binding contracts.  
 
In brief, governments can bind themselves through IGAs without specific statutory 
authorisation, although such authorisation is often provided.  When this is the case, no issue 
of lack of authority would arise, except, arguably, if the particular legal order also has 
provisions requiring that IGAs be co-signed by a particular Minister (generally the Minister 
for intergovernmental affairs), or a requirement of cabinet approval. Whether such failure to 
comply with such domestic formalities could be opposed to another government is unclear.  
In any event, lack of proper authority would not affect the potential characterisation of an 
agreement as a “legal instrument” (assuming other criteria are met), although it could be 
found invalid.32 
                                                
29 Intergovernmental Affairs Act, RSNF, 1990, ch. I-13, s.7.   
30 TOWNSEND (1992) 324 ; Hôpital de l’Enfant-Jésus v. Université Laval, 200-05-004129-925 
(21.01.1993);  Abehsera v. St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, 755-05-000177-954 (03.09.1999) (CSQ). 
31 As is the case of art.46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
32 The distinction is clearer in French: the agreement could be “juridique” but “ invalide ou illégal”.  The 
expression “legal” in English is a potential source of confusion.  See definition of juridicity in General 
Introduction. 
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4.1.2.2 Limits ratione materiae 
 
For a variety of historical and political reasons, certain federal constitutions prohibit 
federated entities from concluding agreements of “political” alliance, or condition the 
conclusion of agreements between those constitutive units to a degree of control by federal 
authorities.33  The Canadian Constitution, which does not even contemplate IGAs is 
correspondingly silent on the issue.   There are, however, three potential restrictions ratione 
materiae applicable to IGAs.  The first relates to constitutional competences, the second to 
the capacity of the executive to tie its own discretion through contract and the third to the 
capacity of executive to contract to maintain, adopt or repeal legislation. 
 
The third one is easily dealt with.  There is no doubt that an IGA purporting to alter 
legislation, or bind a legislative assembly in any fashion, could never be understood as 
giving rise to legal obligations.”34  This is a reflection of the separation of powers between 
the executive and the legislative, and more particularly, on the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty.35  The first and the second limitations ratione materiae require more attention.  
 
• Constitutional limitations   
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the direct transfer of legislative authority from one assembly 
to another is prohibited in Canada, whereas the transfer of administrative/executive authority 
is permissible.  Courts have interpreted the delegation of legislative authority, even on a 
revocable basis, as an abdication of legislative power and an alteration of the formal 
distribution of competences.36  This primary prohibition signals a judicial concern that IGAs 
should not be used to formally modify the federal structure of the country.    
 
I have not seen any evidence of IGAs used to explicitly transfer legislative power.  
Such IGAs would undeniably be unconstitutional.  Given the Court’s lenience concerning 
delegation of administrative functions from one order of government to another, however, 
IGAs concluded for that purpose are likely to pass constitutional muster.  In other words, 
using IGAs to alter the exercise of constitutional competences and thus circumvent 
constitutional boundaries, has been held admissible.  It must be underlined, however, that 
interdelegation arrangements, always involve statutes and often regulations, so that the 
                                                
33 Art. I, sect 10 (3) of the American Constitution provides that interstate compacts may not be 
concluded without consent of the Congress.  It has received restrictive interpretation:  ZIMMERMAN 
(1996) 37; S 145 (1)(2) 1978 Spanish Constitution. This was also the case in Switzerland until 1999 
(s.7 of the 1848 Constitution).   
34 West Lakes Ltd. v. South Australia (1980), 25 SASR 389, 390, cited with approval in Re Canada 
Assistance Plan, [1991] 2 SCR 525, 560  [the CAP Reference] 560; Re Bowater’s Newfoundland Pulp 
and Paper Mills Ltd, [1950] SCR  608, 640; BLACKMAN (1993) 55-57.   
35 Infra, 6.2.2.2.      
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contractual foundation of the arrangement is often difficult to sort out from the other legal 
sources.37 
 
The constitutional fate of IGAs used as instruments of the spending power is more 
uncertain.  Surprisingly for a country where clarifying the distribution of competences has 
been a traditional national sport, the capacity of federal partners to conclude valid contracts 
in matters over which they do not have legislative competence is unresolved.  On the one 
hand, HOGG and MONAHAN maintain that since contracts are voluntary acts, it should be 
possible for the members of the federation to contract in any domain.38  Predictably, some 
Québec academics take the opposite position.  Hence, for LAJOIE, the fact that in Canada 
executive powers follow legislative powers implies that in principle, components of the 
federation may not contract concerning matters over which they have no legislative 
competence, although it could have an incidental impact on those competences.39  However, 
LAJOIE convincingly argues that IGAs enabling one order of government to impose 
conditions on another one in the exclusive sphere of competence of the latter are 
unconstitutional.40   
 
 This is not the place to attempt a resolution of the continuing debate on the legality 
and legitimacy of the spending power.   While it was given the opportunity of doing so on a 
number of occasions, the Supreme Court has neither clearly condemned nor confirmed its 
constitutionality.41  Whether an IGA used as an instrument of the spending power could ever 
cross the threshold of juridicity is accordingly unresolved.  This, as we shall see, is in stark 
contrast with Belgium, where, in positive law at least, cooperation agreements may not be 
used to circumvent the formal distribution of competences of any kind.  They cannot serve to 
funnel funds by one order of government towards a project or institution over which that order 
of government does not have any legislative competence.   
 
• The "rule against fettering of executive discretion" 
 
The other limit ratione materiae that could preclude the legal characterisation of an 
IGA is the so-called “rule against fettering of discretion” or “rule of executive necessity”.  In 
common law systems, the executive branch may not abdicate its discretion to act in the 
public interest by binding itself for the future.  This rule is generally traced back to a 1921 
                                                                                                                                                   
36 AG Nova Scotia v. AG Canada, [1951] SCR 31. 
37 Infra: 5.3.2. 
38 HOGG and MONAHAN (2000) 222-223.  
39 Liquidators of the Maritime Bank v. Receiver General of New Brunswick [1892] AC 437; LAJOIE 
(1984) 95-96. 
40 By definition, when a competence is concurrent or shared, the spending is done in one’s own 
sphere of comptence and the constitutional conundrum simply does not arise. 
41 Supra, 3.2.2. 
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English decision of first instance, concerning inter-State relations in a context of war.42  
Despite this idiosyncratic origin, and the fact that is has rarely been applied in Canada,43 this 
decision is frequently invoked in the context of government contracts in general,44 and by 
authors discussing the status of IGAs in particular.45  Until recently, however, it had not been 
explicitly invoked by courts in that context.46  This somehow attests to the persuasive power 
of its underlying principle, that is, that the executive must be free to make decisions in the 
public interest, even when this implies going back on its word.   
 
While the principle is generally accepted, the scope of the rule, potential exemptions 
to it, and its specific applications are controversial.  One important caveat to the rule against 
fettering of executive discretion is that it does not apply to government contracts having a 
commercial character, or which bear close resemblance to the types of contractual 
arrangements which private parties can engage in.47  In other terms, the rule should only 
preclude a government party from binding itself concerning “governmental” or “executive” 
powers.  Faced with an instrument that derogates too much from a private contract, courts 
may simply disqualify it as a legal instrument.  In the case of IGAs, this could lead to a 
characterisation as a political agreement.48 
 
Distinguishing between contracts of a commercial and of a “governmental” nature is 
tricky since policy concerns will nearly always lie behind a decision to conclude, perform or 
denounce a government contract, even when it has “commercial” connotations.  Is the 
decision to contract for the purchase of defence helicopters a commercial contract or a 
“government” undertaking?  The frontier between those two categories is not clear-cut and 
the case law distinguishing commercial-type government contracts from agreements that 
                                                
42 Rederiaktiebalaget Amphitrite v. R., [1921] 2 KB 500. 
43 A recent exception is Martinoff v. Canada, [1994] 3 FC 33 (FCA) in which the Court, sitting in judicial 
review (i.e. not in a "contractual" case between governments) held that an IGA could not have the 
effect of curbing the statutory discretionary power of a fedeal official.  See also Perry v. Ontario, 
(1997) 33 OR (3d) 705 (CAO), which did not relate to an IGA, however, but to the withdrawal of an 
internal directive, which was supposed to remain in place until legislation or a negotiated solution had 
been found with an aboriginal group. 
44 ARROWSMITH (1998) 125-130; HOGG and MONAHAN (2000) 227-233; WADDAMS (1999) 475; 
GARANT (1996) 488-89. 
45 BLACKMAN (1993) 57-59; LAJOIE (1984) 97; MOORE, W. Harrisson, "The Federation and Suits 
Between Governments", (1935) 17  J. of Comp. Legisl. 163-209, 185. 
46 Arbitration between Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia concerning portions of the limits 
of their offshore areas, Award of the Tribunal in the First Phase, Ottawa, 17.05.2001 ; Second Phase 
26.03.2002 : www.boundary-dispute.ca [NS-NF Arbitration; unless otherwise indicated, reference is to 
first phase].  For an older obligation in the context of a government contract: R. v. Dominion of Can. 
Postage Stamp Vending Co., [1930] SCR  500 (a license granted “in perpetuity” held invalid).    
47 The caveat was mentioned in the Amphitrite decision itself.  See also South Australia v. 
Commonwealth (1962) 108 CLR 130 (HCA) 154 [the Railway Standardisation case], infra; 
ARROWSMITH (1988) 126-130. 
48   Railway Standardisation case.    It bears pointing out that Australian Courts may be more resistant 
to the characterisation of IGAs as legally binding than is the case in Canada: infra, conclusions to this 
section.  
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courts will not enforce is inconsistent.49  Hence, the rule has come under heavy criticism.  For 
HOGG and MONAHAN, it is “intolerably vague […] overly broad and unsound in principle”.50   
 
This rule must be understood in connection with the lack of capacity of executives to 
terminate a contract, unless they have explicit statutory power to do so.51  This is in contrast 
to the situation in Belgium (or in France) where public authorities may vary a contract, in 
certain circumstances, subject to compensation.52  It is arguable that given stricter rules 
concerning the immutability of government contracts, courts are less willing to characterise 
an agreement as a legally binding instrument, when it appears to be in the public interest to 
allow a government to renege on its commitments.    
 
The rule against fettering of discretion was developed in the context of opposition 
between private and public interests.53  Its actual impact in the context of IGAs is uncertain.    
When two orders of government are involved in an apparent contractual relationship, the 
identification of the “public” whose interests must be considered is problematic.  In the case 
of horizontal IGAs, the interests of two distinct publics are at stake: one represented, ex 
hypothesi, by the party denying that a commitment is legally binding, the other holding the 
opposite.  In the case of vertical IGAs, two distinct visions of the interest of the same public 
could be in opposition.54 
  
To summarise, the rule against fettering of executive discretion is a potential 
impediment to the legally binding character of IGAs, although its precise contours remain 
vague.  Undertakings to legislate or even to propose legislative measures on the part of 
governments are unlawful and would prevent the characterisation of an IGA as a legal 
instrument.  Contracting to fetter executive action in the context of an IGA that can be 
assimilated to “commercial” or “private” contracts is probably permissible.  Contracting so as 
to limit government action should technically be prohibited, although, as the case law to 
which we turn illustrates, courts have generally shown a great deal of tolerance of 
government schemes which imply (temporary) loss of discretion.    
                                                
49  Commissioners of Crown Lands v. Page, [1960] 2 QB 274, 287-88; ARROWSMITH (1988) 126-
130. 
50 HOGG and MONAHAN (2000) 228 and 231. 
51 ISSALYS and LEMIEUX (1997) 527.  Otherwise, this requires direct legislative action : Wells v. 
Newfoundland, [1999] 3 SCR 199; Cité d’Outremont v. Commission de Transport de Montréal, [1955] 
QB 753.     
52 Infra, 4.2.1.      
53  ARROWSMITH (1988) 125.  This was the case in the Amphitrite, Commissioner of Crown Lands  v. 
Page, and the Postage Stamp Vending Co. cases.  In Perry v. Ontario, (1997) 33 OR (3d) 705 (CAO), 
the opposition was with an aboriginal community, which cannot be characterised as defending private 
interests.  The case did not relate to a contract per se. However, its application in this context as 
recently as 1997 suggests that it is still relevant. 
54 BLACKMAN (1993) 59 argues that a strict application of the rule against fettering in the context of 
IGAs can have the effect of paralysing cooperation. 
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4.1.2.3 Parliamentary approval and appropriation 
 
It is at least arguable that submitting an agreement to legislative approval indicates an 
intention on the part of the executive party to an IGA of creating legal relations. As will be 
seen below, courts called upon to characterise agreements do not seem to consider this 
factor relevant, however.55   Put another way, the status of an agreement inter partes is to be 
assessed irrespective of its being approved by legislative assemblies.  It must be 
emphasised, however, that the situation would be different if the IGA were “incorporated” 
through legislation.56  
 
Some controversial Australian authority also suggests that parliamentary approval 
has the effect of lifting the rule against fettering of discretion.57  In other words, while statutory 
approbation would not automatically make the agreement legally binding, it could neutralise 
another bar to enforceability.  In Canada, the impact of statutory approbation on an eventual 
application of the fettering rule is inconclusive.  As we shall see, Canadian courts and  
arbitration tribunals have treated as legally binding agreements which clearly violated the rule 
against fettering.58  In the first case, the agreement was not even ratified by legislation, but 
only by orders-in-council.  In neither case was the rule against fettering actually mentioned.      
  
Legislative assemblies must approve public expenditures whether engaged through 
an IGA or not.59  However, such authorisation to spend does not have any effect on the legal 
character of the IGA itself.  Legislation concerning appropriation is drafted in general terms: 
Parliament approves spending by programme, and will cover all contracts concluded in the 
context of such a programme.  Furthermore, funds can always be voted subsequently in the 
case of an oversight.  Consequently, lack of appropriation rarely occurs in practice and the 
courts are not generally very demanding regarding specific appropriations.60    
                                                
55 Hence, in its 1994 BC Railway decision, discussed below, the Court did not even invoke this 
possibility, while in the Railway Standardisation case, also examined infra, this was not considered 
relevant.  In both cases, agreements in dispute had been approved or ratified by legislation. 
56 This would transform it into a normative instrument erga omnes (with the force of a statute). As long 
as the statutory incorporation remains in place, the IGA would bind parties as they would bind citizens 
within their respective legal orders.   The distinction is explored infra, 5.2.2.3.      
57 Place Development Ltd. v. Commonwealth, (1969), 121 CLR 353 (HCA; Windeyer J, diss.) 166, 
cited by BANKES (1991) 822, fn 142.  In a 1977 decision involving a number of government 
agreements with private airlines, two judges suggested that parliamentary approval had this effect: 
Ansett Transport Industries v. Commonwealth, (1977) 139 CLR 54  (HCA) 61 and 113; WARNICK, 
Leigh, “State Agreements - The Legal Effect of Statutory Endorsement”, (1982) 4 Australian Mining 
and Petroleum J. 1-54, 25, BANKES (1991) 826. 
58 Re Taxation Agreement Between the Government of Saskatchewan and the Government of 
Canada, (1946) 1 WWR  257 [the Tax Rental Agreement case] and administrative law cases: infra, 
4.1.3.  See also AG Canada v. Higbie, [1945] SCR 385 (determination of Vancouver’s public harbours 
binding, even though embodied in orders-in-council only). 
59 HOGG and MONAHAN (2000) 220-223.  This rule has been confirmed by statute: for instance: 
Financial Administration Act, RSC F-11.     
60 ARROWSMITH (1988) 53; contra: Re Troops in Cape Breton, [1930] SCR 554.    
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It will be recalled that in the Troops Cape Breton Reference, the Supreme Court of 
Canada denied that an undertaking by the Nova Scotia Minister of Justice to reimburse 
Ottawa for the cost of sending troops to the province bound the province.  The ruling is 
based on a mixture of lack of authority to bind on the part of the Minister, and of lack of 
statutory authorisation for payment.  Since then, however, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
the absence of budgetary appropriation does not affect the validity of a government contract, 
but rather the capacity of the other party to enforce it.61  If credits are voted later, the IGA can 
be enforced, assuming it is otherwise legally binding.62    
 
4.1.3 Assessing the case law relative to IGAs 
 
It is against this background of potential limits to legal characterisation that the 
Canadian case law can be analysed.   As we shall see, the binding character of IGAs inter 
partes has never actually been the direct object of judicial or arbitral decisions.  More 
commonly, the possibility that IGAs may be binding, in the absence of any external norm 
conferring it this status, is admitted, obiter, or is simply taken for granted as the dispute 
focuses on another issue.  In the absence of a direct enquiry as to the contractual character 
of IGAs, judicial reasoning on this issue is often opaque and a general trend is more difficult 
to discern than is suggested by the doctrinal analogy with government contracts.   
 
Given the political and constitutional contexts in which legal problems relating to IGAs 
generally arise, the cases tend to be intricate. Technical aspects of private law - which is 
occasionally referred to as the applicable law, or simply applied - add another layer of 
complexity.  It is also common for a number of judges to advance a variety of legal reasons 
for their rulings in the same decision, mixing private and public law reasoning.  This 
comparative exercise does not allow for a detailed exposition of these subtleties.  Despite the 
length of this section, what follows thus contains major simplifications.  The intention behind 
the following survey is to extract either judicial pronouncements on the contractual character 
of IGAs, or judicial presumptions to that effect.  This is particularly delicate since, in most 
cases, judges avoid calling into question the binding character of an IGA, regardless of its 
internal flaws, if the issue has not been argued before them.     
 
                                                
61 Verreault & Fils v. AG Québec, [1977] 1 SCR 41, 47.   
62 Note, that in the absence of the required appropriation, questions relative to the intention to create 
legal relations may be raised. While this has given rise to litigation in Australia, it is apparently not the 
case in Canada: Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd. v. The Commonwealth, (1954) 92 CLR 424; 
SEDDON, N.C., ELLINGHAUS, M.P., Cheshire and Fifouut’s Law of Contract, 7th Australian ed. 
(Sydney: Butterworths, 1997) 207. 
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• The 1883 British-Columbia Railway Agreement    
 
An agreement concluded in 1873 between B.C. and federal authorities has received a 
number of contradictory characterisations, with very little guidance as to applicable criteria.   
This agreement is intimately related to the 1871 B.C. Terms of Entry in which Ottawa 
undertook to build, within ten years of B.C. joining Canada, a rail link from the centre of the 
country to the coast of B.C., in exchange, notably to some land concessions.  Delays on 
construction generated a lot of tension and some Parliamentarians were even calling for B.C. 
to withdraw from the federation.63  A new constitutional settlement was reached in 1883. 
 
It involved a federal-provincial agreement incorporated by parallel legislation, as well 
as a federal agreement concluded with a private railway consortium, and “ratified and 
confirmed” by a federal Act.64  They were negotiated concurrently and signed on the same 
day.   Neither was confirmed by British authorities, as were the 1871 original deal which they 
altered, or at least completed.  The vertical IGA contained specific land grants made by B.C., 
while Ottawa agreed to invest $750,000 for the construction of specific railway lines.  For its 
part, the company agreed to “operate in good faith and continuously” particular lines.   
 
These two 1883 agreements were heavily litigated and their status has given rise to a 
bewildering range of characterisations.  Hence, in the late 19th century, two judges of the 
Supreme Court described the federal-provincial IGA as a “treaty” and as a “constitutional 
compact”, so that the 1883 land conveyance was assimilated to a transfer between 
independent Crowns.  The Privy Council disagreed, and qualified the arrangement as a 
statutory arrangement embodying a “commercial transaction”.65      
 
A century later, in a dispute concerning the decision by Ottawa to close unprofitable 
railway lines subject to the companion 1883 agreement, the Supreme Court first denied that 
it had created obligations of a constitutional character. In the absence of Westminster 
involvement, the 1883 agreements could not have altered the 1871 deal.   Any other solution 
would suggest that B.C. and Ottawa could have proceeded with a constitutional amendment 
by consent, circumventing the formal process.   
 
While the Court admitted in passing that the deal between the private company and 
the federal government could qualify as a commercial arrangement, it offered yet a new 
reading on the 1883 federal-provincial agreement.  On the one hand, it held that the land 
                                                
63 1994 BC Railway case, par. 108. 
64 1994 BC Railway case, par. 40. 
65 The “Precious Metal case”: BC v. Canada (1889), 14 AC 295, 304 (PC); rev’g (1887) 14 SCR 345, 
357-358.  The practical consequence was that in the first case, subsoil would have passed along with 
 97 
conveyance had been made in implementation of the Terms of Entry, they were therefore of 
a constitutional character (in other words, the Court held that though more detailed, the 1883 
did not add anything new to the Terms of Entry).  This was not the case, however, of the 
financial commitments by Ottawa, which had not been contemplated in 1871.  They could not 
be of a constitutional character since this would imply an amendment without Westminster.  
Without truly considering another possible legal characterisation, the Court simply described 
this part of the deal as “political”.66  There is no suggestion that the agreement – which was 
qualified as a commercial transaction in 1889 – had contractual value.67   
 
In other words, the same IGA has been described as a treaty, a constitutional 
compact, a commercial deal and a political undertaking.  The analysis in each case is 
convoluted and criteria are difficult to discern for each of those characterisation.  In 1889, the 
Privy Council was concerned with establishing the deal as a “private” conveyance, as 
opposed to one between independent countries, not with distinguishing it from a non-legally 
binding agreement.  In 1994, the Supreme Court obviously sought to distance itself from the 
undignified description of such a significant arrangement in the life of the federation as a 
mere “commercial undertaking”.68   While the court of first instance had characterised the 
deal as constitutional, it nevertheless mentioned that the province had carried out its part of 
the deal which bound the federal government to carry out its own--typically contractual 
language.  There is no such language in the Supreme Court’s decision.  The issue is simply 
avoided.69  Instead, the Court emphasises the importance of “political” agreements in the 
federal system.70 
 
The 1883 agreement, which spans over a century of judicial interest, illustrates the 
spectrum of possible characterisations of IGAs in Canada, all accomplished without much 
care for specific criteria.  As the following cases will illustrate, there may be an evolution in 
Canada away from the consideration of IGAs as similar to private contracts, which the Privy 
Council decision epitomises, towards an approach less prone to characterising them as legal 
instrument.   These developments are far from straight-forward, however. 
  
                                                                                                                                                   
the conveyance, as in an annexion.  Characterised as a commercial deal, the transfer only cover 
surface rights.   Gold had been found in the subsoil.   
66 1994 BC Railway case, par. 112-113. 
67  In that 1994 decision, the Court does characterise the federal-railway company deal as contractual, 
however.  Admittedly, the dispute did not specifically require the characterisation of the IGA and   
problems of prescriptions would likely have arisen.    
68 The Court below had described the Privy Council analysis as a “serious misapprehension of 
Canadian history”: Canada  v. AG for BC (1991) 59 BCLR (2d) 280 (BCCA), 302. 
69 To its possible defence, the issue before the Court was whether constitutional obligations arose 
from the 1883 arrangement.  It was not asked to characterise the agreement otherwise.  The 
contractual question was apparently never argued.   
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• Other pre-war IGAs 
 
Two other pre-war cases illustrate the predominant contractual approach to IGAs that 
the Privy Council had advocated in the Precious Metal case.  In one, an IGA between 
Ontario and Ottawa was simply assumed to be binding, despite the fact that it clearly dealt 
with public law issues, such as obligations towards aboriginal peoples.71  In the second, the 
Supreme Court apparently endorsed the conclusion that an implied contract existed 
concerning the interest rate Ottawa owed regarding funds it held on behalf of Ontario.72    
 
It will also be recalled that in the 1930 Reference concerning Troops in Cape 
Breton,73 the Supreme Court did not deny that a promise made in writing by a Minister that 
the province would reimburse federal authorities for the cost of sending troops to quash 
labour unrest in the province could be legally enforceable.  The particular problem in that 
case was the lack of proper authorisation, or more likely the absence of parliamentary 
appropriation for the payment.   
 
In other words, until the war, IGAs tended to be understood as binding contracts, 
despite the constitutional context in which they were concluded and despite the arguably 
public law nature of the undertakings they contained.  No concern with anything resembling 
the rule against fettering of discretion is discernible.74  Conveyance of land, interest rates and 
even the rental of army services were assimilated, without detailed analysis, to private law 
contracts.    
 
• The Tax Rental Agreements  
 
As a means of financing the war effort, a number of vertical agreements were 
concluded through which provinces “rented” their powers to collect personal and company 
income taxes to Ottawa, in exchange for financial compensation.  In 1945, Ottawa refused to 
give Saskatchewan a particular instalment, arguing the latter owed it money under another 
                                                                                                                                                   
70 Citing, obiter, federal-provincial Tax collection agreements as examples, but  without providing any 
criteria for this characterisation : 1994 BC Railway case, par. 113.  
71 In Canada v. Ontario, [1910] AC 637 (PC), aff. (1908), 42 SCR 1 [Objibway case], a 1884 Ontario-
Ottawa agreement, concluded in the wake of the attribution of lands to the province, affected promises 
made to Ojibway people. 
72  AG Ontario v. AG Canada, (1907) 39 SCR 14, conf. (1906) 10 Ex CR 292 [the Interest Rate case].  
An arbitral tribunal had confirmed that interest rate to be applied until the scission between Ontario 
and Québec was completed, which it assumed would be the case by 1896.  By 1904, this issue was 
still unsettled and Ottawa decided to unilaterally reduce the rate of interest to 4%.  The precise 
grounds of the decision are difficult to ascertain, but the Court apparently endorsed the contractual 
analysis of the court below.  
73 Re Troops in Cape Breton, [1930] SCR 554; supra, 4.1.2.1.   
74 The Amphitrite decision, rendered in 1921, predates these decisions.  It is not invoked in the 1994   
BC Railway case. 
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IGA.75  The case was submitted to an arbitration tribunal, as provided in the Tax Rental 
Agreement.76  Saskatchewan insisted that the two IGAs were distinct and could not be 
applied one against the other.  This submission was rejected by two of the three arbitrators 
who applied the private law doctrine of set-off (“compensation”) to justify the latter’s 
withholding of funds.77  Their reasoning is steeped in the common law of contracts.  The 
majority actually relied on the Privy Council’s finding that the 1883 B.C.-Ottawa agreement   
was similar to a private deal, as opposed to a jure regia one.78   In other words, they drew on 
an analogy between an agreement not to tax and a “commercial transaction”. 
 
In a strong dissent, the constitutionalist Frank SCOTT focused on certain public law 
aspects of the case.  First, he asserted that the Terms of Reference of the Tribunal excluded 
any consideration of IGAs other than the Tax Rental one.  He maintained that set-off could 
not be used against a Crown unless provided by statute.  Finally, although the IGA had only 
been authorised by statute rather than incorporated, he contented that Ottawa had a 
statutory –rather than contractual - duty to pay the installment to Saskatchewan pursuant to 
the Tax Rental Agreement.    
 
He shied away, from denying any binding status to the IGA on grounds that it violated 
the distribution of powers, or fettered executive discretion.  The IGA directed that any dispute 
be resolved by arbitration, and legal solutions were therefore sought.  In an article published 
a few years later, however, he described these agreements as “gentlemen’s agreements”, 
without specifying why he thought them to be deprived of legal character.79  In fact, in the 
1994 B.C. Railway case, the majority of the Supreme Court briefly referred to the various tax 
collection agreements as “very stable political arrangements” even though lacking in 
constitutional status.80 No consideration was given to the possibility of some intermediate 
legal character, such as contract. 
   
                                                
75 Pursuant to the “seed agreement”, Ottawa undertook to guarantee provincial borrowing to purchase 
seeds.  The province had defaulted on the loans and Ottawa was re-claiming compensation for the 
guaranteed sums. 
76 Re Taxation Agreement Between the Government of Saskatchewan and the Government of 
Canada, (1946) 1 WWR  257 [the Tax Rental Agreement case]. 
77 Set-off is the common law equivalent to compensation. 
78 That is, dealing with matters of the Crown, such as land conveyance following a Peace Treaty.  In 
the context of the Tax Rental agreements, the reference to jure regia suggests governmental 
functions.  PC in the Precious Metal case, 304, cited at 277 of Tax Rental Agreement case. 
79 SCOTT, Frank, ”The Constitutional Background of Taxation Agreements” (1955-56) 2 McGill LJ 1, 5, 
adding that […] even to a constitutional lawyer it would seem that gentlemen’s agreements ought to be 
carried out in a gentlemanly way, and that where strict law ends good faith must continue”. 
80 1994 BC Railway case, par. 113, citing LAFOREST, Gérard V., The Allocation of Taxing Power 
Under the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: the Canadian Tax Foundation, 1967) 28. There is a 
technical difference between Tax Rental and Tax Collection agreements which need not retain us 
here: HOGG (1998) 143-145.  
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 It is unlikely, indeed that a regular court of law could enforce agreements through 
which orders of government so clearly abdicate – even temporarily – the exercise of a 
constitutional prerogatives.81  Ratione materiae limitations would appear to deprive such 
IGAs of legally binding status inter partes.   As it turned out, the case was submitted to an 
arbitration tribunal which applied legal principles to resolve the dispute, without having to 
formally decide on the legal character – or the validity – of the agreement.  This suggests that 
the choice of forum for resolving a dispute is relevant to its characterisation, or at least to 
avoidance of certain hard issues concerning this characterisation. 
 
• The Railway Standardisation case: An Australian 
intrusion 
 
None of the cases discussed so far provide a substantial analysis of the legal 
character of IGAs.  A 1962 Australian decision does.82  While it has never been applied in 
Canada,83 the analysis it provides, so lacking in the Canadian case law, makes the case 
noteworthy.    
 
In 1949, the Australian Government and South Australia concluded an IGA regarding 
the building of railroads and the standardization of railway gauges in the latter’s territory.   
Each party was to undertake a portion of the project.  In addition, the Commonwealth agreed 
to finance the works with the State agreeing to repay 30% upon completion.  The 
agreements provided that further agreements on specific issues such as the timing of works 
would follow.  Failure to agree on order and timing were to be resolved through government 
negotiations, and, failing that, by the federal Minister of Transport.  The agreement was 
approved by respective statutes. 
 
South Australia initiated an action against the Commonwealth for failing to carry out 
its portion of the work.  The latter objected that the case did not raise any legal or justiciable 
question.  The High Court agreed and the action was dismissed at a preliminary stage.  None 
of the five judges who wrote concurring judgements found the IGA to be legally binding.  
                                                
81 This is not to suggest that a court could not find some form of unjust enrichement, if Ottawa were to 
withold collected taxes without compensating the province: infra, 4.4. 
82 The Railway Standardisation case.  This reference to Australia is not merely interesting from a 
comparative law perspective.  As long as the Privy Council was the final Court of Appeal in Canada 
(1949), Commonwealth cases were not considered foreign law (the Amphitrite is a good example).  
The tradition of considering Australian case law has continued, although, as will be pointed out, care 
should be used in the context of IGAs.     
83 It was distinguished in two decisions relating to “constitutionalised agreements”: PEI Ferry case, 
587;  Hogan v. AG Newfoundland, (2000) 183 DLR 4th 225 (NFCA) 253.  Note that in that last case, 
the Newfoundland Court of Appeal suggests - erroneously – that the High Court of Australia had 
denied that IGAs could be more than political instruments.  The Railway Standardisation case is not 
mentioned in the CAP Reference or the 1994 BC Railway case.   It is mentioned in passing in the NS-
NF arbitration, par. 3.8-3.9.   
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Objections drawn from the private law of contracts as well as public law are intertwined, 
although a clear majority founded their decision on ratione materiae limitations, sometimes 
hidden behind private law terminology. 
 
Several judges recognised that an agreement between governments could give rise 
to obligations enforceable at law, when they are similar in nature to those that could arise 
between individuals.   Dixon C.J. underlined, however, that: 
 
“[I]t is one thing to find legislative authority for applying the law as between 
subject and subject to a cause concerning the rights and obligations of 
governments : it is another thing to say how and with what effect the principles 
of that law do apply in substance.  For the subject matters of private and 
public law are necessarily different.  What is in question here is an agreement 
assuming to affect matters which are governmental and by nature are subject 
to considerations to which private law is not directed.  That is particularly true 
of financial provisions, the fulfilment of which in constitutional theory at least 
must be subject to parliamentary control.”84 
 
For Windeyer J., the IGA was of the “sort that are outside the realm of contracts 
altogether”, as is often the case of “political” promises by governments to their citizens or to 
other citizens which are “not enforceable by processes of law”.  In other words, the Court 
generally considered the plans to construct railways as matters of governmental policy, 
requiring further executive and parliamentary action.  The promises contained in the 
agreements are therefore of a “political” character.   
 
For Windeyer J. “(a)n agreement deliberately entered into and by which both parties 
intend themselves to be bound may yet not be an agreement that the courts will enforce”.85  
Then, as if to expiate this deviation from the sanctity of the parties’ intention, he adds “(t)he 
circumstances may show that they did not, or cannot be regarded as having intended, to 
subject their agreements to the adjudication of the courts”.  In other words, courts may simply 
wish to leave certain matters outside the Court house, as a matter of judicial policy, rather 
than as a reflection of the parties’ actual intentions (but they may seek to hide these 
considerations behind a constructed intention).   Along the same lines, for McTiernan J.:      
 
“ [T]he real basis of [South Australia’s argument] can be summed up in 
the “Pacta sunt servanda”. A two-sided act such as an agreement 
between the Commonwealth and a State could be a contract and 
produce obligations binding on both of them according to its tenor. But 
the point to be decided in this case is whether or not the intention of 
                                                
84 Railway Standardization case, 140, per Dixon CJ, emphasis added.  
85 Citing (at 153-154) Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 KB 571, 579.   Interestingly, after noting that IGAs 
that share characteristics with agreements concluded by private parties could be legally binding, the 
judge relied on a case where a court refused to enforce a “private” agreement between husband and 
wife.   
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either agreement is to create obligations enforceable in a court [...] I 
cannot think that in entering into these agreements the parties 
contemplated that they were entering into obligations cognizable in a 
court of law.”86 
 
Several judges underlined the fact that failure to agree on timing and order of works 
was to be resolved by agreement through political negotiations.  Hope that failure to agree 
between governments may be resolved by agreements between Ministers is oddly optimistic.  
Such clauses do not necessarily oust judicial intervention, however.87  In any event, this is 
not how the High Court interpreted the clauses.   
 
Finally, the IGA was found to be inchoate: it lacked specificity and amounted to an 
agreement to make further agreements.    In my view, this is the most convincing obstacle to 
the legally binding character of that particular IGA.  This is not, however, the reason of the 
case’s reputation, notably in Canada.  
 
 With little or no analysis, the Court rejected the submission legislative approval 
rendered the Agreement binding on the parties.  Hence, for Windeyer J., the question is 
whether the agreement “without more, create contractual rights and duties”.88  Apparently, 
the approving legislation did not amount to the required “something more”, which could 
transform the political commitment into a legal obligation.    
 
 Three of the judges noted that even without being formally binding, the agreement 
could give rise to legal obligations, if it had been relied upon or partly performed by one 
party.89  As it was, South Australia had not carried out works for which it was seeking 
financial compensation, but was awaiting federal investment.    
 
 For the High Court, legally binding agreements between federal partners are not 
excluded but would require very clear indications that the parties intend to be bound at law, 
and might be restricted to fields in which a parallel with contract between private parties can 
be drawn.  In other words, in this decision, the exception ratione materiae outlined earlier, 
are determinative, notably something which looks like the rule against fettering of discretion, 
although the expression is not actually used.  And, as we saw, the statutory ratification of the 
IGA was deemed inconsequential to the status of the IGA inter partes.  The contrast with the 
Tax Rental Agreements could not be greater. 
 
                                                
86 Railway Standardisation case, 148-149. 
87 Secunda Marine Services Ltd v. Canada, 2003 NSSC 2 (canlii). 
88 Railway Standardisation case, 152.  Along same line: 143, 150 and 155. 
89 On detrimental reliance, estoppel etc. : infra, sections 4.4.2.3 and 4.5.  
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 The Railway Standardisation case has put a damper on the understanding that IGAs 
can create binding obligations between federal partners, beyond what the facts and the ruling 
actually warrant.  Yet, its general message, that IGAs are essentially political until proven 
otherwise, and only if they contain undertakings of a “private character”, seems to exert a 
certain influence on more recent thinking concerning the status of IGAs in Canada, even 
when the case is not actually referred to.90  This influence is of course difficult to demonstrate 
in the absence of direct reference to the case.91  But it is similar to the influence the 
Amphitrite decision concerning the fettering of discretion.  The case is never applied, but the 
principle it embodies remains in the background of analysis of IGAs.  As the following 
demonstrates, however, the idea that IGAs are political until proven otherwise, and mostly 
unless they can be compared to private law arrangements, is not consistently held in judicial 
circles in Canada. 
 
• The Lofstrom and Finlay decisions 
 
The contractual character of IGAs is sometimes implicit in decisions denying third 
party rights on grounds that bear close resemblance to privity of contracts.92  This, of course, 
reinforces the contractual model through which IGAs are analysed.  For instance, in 1971, a 
citizen argued that Saskatchewan authorities were violating the Canada Assistance Plan 
(“the CAP”), a federal-provincial scheme involving an IGA, pursuant to which federal 
authorities conditionally reimbursed half the cost of certain provincial health and social 
services.93  This case mainly raises hierarchy of norms issues, notably the relation between 
unilateral regulations and an IGA.94  It is nevertheless of interest because of the Court’s 
understanding that any violation of the CAP the “would be a matter entirely between the 
Governments, affecting only the respective obligations and rights under the agreement.”95  
The Court did not analyse the status of the CAP agreement per se.  However, its statement 
reveals a contractual understanding of the instrument, at least when its implementation is 
challenged by third parties.  To put it bluntly, contractual analysis is useful to deprive citizens 
of a voice in intergovernmental affairs.  
 
                                                
90 For ex. 1994 BC Railway case. 
91 As was mentioned above, it was distinguished in two cases dealing with constitutionalised 
agreements (PEI Ferry case and Hogan).  It was, however, referred to in the NS-NF arbitration, 
although this was not essential for disposing of the issue.    
92 The privity of contract is the common law equivalent of the relativity of contract in the civil law.  
93 Re Lofstrom and Murphy et al., (1971) 22 DLR (3d) 120 (SKCA).  See also the third party analysis in 
the 1908 Objibway case, in which on the one hand the interests of aboriginals were considered foreign 
to the 1894 Ottawa-Ontario agreement, while Ontario was also deemed foreign to the original 1873 
Objibway-Ottawa agreement. In other words, those cases endorse a traditional privity of contract 
approach. 
94 Infra, 6.2.3.  
95 Re Lofstrom,122. 
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Such a narrow understanding of the impact of IGAs on third parties has gradually 
been set aside through an expansion of “public interest standing” to challenge the 
implementation of IGAs in the first Finlay decision.96  With this solution, the Supreme Court 
implicitly admitted that government parties to an IGA were unlikely to challenge in court the 
way in which each of them was interpreting the arrangement.   While this is not articulated 
very clearly, this evolution signals an indirect recognition of the inadequacy of conceiving 
IGAs as purely contractual instruments, at least when third parties are involved.   The next 
case, however, illustrates that when a case is not brought before courts by third parties, the 
classic contractual approach persists. 
 
• The Canada-Alberta agreement of 1973 
 
Indeed, in 1973, Alberta and Canada concluded an IGA through which the latter 
transferred an irrigation project to the former.97  The IGA provided that any dispute that could 
not be settled by Ministers would be submitted to the Federal Court.  A dispute arose 
concerning the scope of the transfer.  In a brief decision, that Court analysed the terms of the 
IGA as a contract.  It held its terms to be clear and ruled that the minerals were transferred 
along with the surface rights.  The Court admitted that an IGA was a means of transferring 
property between orders of government.98  It did not raise any doubts about the binding 
character of the IGA.  It did not draw any explicit analogies with private conveyances, nor did 
it broach the “jure regia” question that had been at the center of the Precious Metal case a 
century earlier.99  The Court’s only statement on the issue of status relates to the fact that the 
IGA was binding on every federal Department, including those which had not taken parts in 
the negotiations.100    The ruling is concise, resolves the disputes, and simply assumes the 
contractual character of the agreement it is asked to interpret. 
                                                
96 Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1986] 2 SCR 607.  This is part of a string of decisions: infra, 
6.2.4. 
97 Canada had previously purchased this land from private parties: Re Interpretation of a Certain 
Agreement Entered into between Canada and Alberta on March 29, 1973, [1983] 1 FC 567 (TD). 
98 It is unclear whether this supports or counters earlier rulings where the transfer of property was 
effected through parallel orders-in-council (AG Canada v. Higbie, [1945] SCR 385; Sunday v. St-
Lawrence Seaway Authority, [1977] 2 FC 3 (TD); Re Arising out of the Transfer of the Natural 
Ressources to the Province of Saskatchewan, [1931] SCR 262).  The 1983 decision does not refer to 
these cases, and does not even mention orders-in-council which may have been passed to endorse 
the Agreement. The latter is truly analysed as a stand-alone contract. 
99 The solution is distinct from the Precious Metal case, because of the very terms of the IGA. 
100 The case leaves the impression that the Court challenge was aimed at resolving an internal dispute 
in the federal administration at least as much as to the resolution of a federal-provincial one. 
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• The Canada Assistance Plan Reference 
 
The 1991 Canada Assistance Plan Reference turned on the federal Executive’s ability 
to introduce a bill into Parliament that had the effect of countering a long-standing 
cooperative scheme comprised of IGAs, as well as federal and provincial Acts and 
regulations.  The case mostly raises issues of hierarchy of norms and is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6.  It is invoked here however, because Canadian policy makers, and sometimes 
courts refer to it to deny the legally binding character of IGAs, as opposed to their 
vulnerability to contrary legislative action.101  As with the Australian Railway case, the scope 
of the Supreme Court’s opinion is often exaggerated.  It does, however, suggest an unease 
with the simplistic contractual analysis of IGAs. 
 
Before the BC Court of Appeal, the federal government had conceded that it could 
only limit its obligations under the federal-provincial arrangement through legislation.102  It did 
not pursue its original argument that it could unilaterally modify its obligations on the basis of 
the prerogative or of principles of government contracts.  If it wanted out of its obligations, the 
executive had to enrol Parliament.  This was an admission that it was bound by the IGA.  In 
its advisory opinion, the Supreme Court did not squarely deal with the legal status of the IGA 
inter partes.   The resolution of the case did not require it.  The Court nevertheless curtly 
dismissed the submission that the IGA was “enforceable as a private law agreement [...] 
subject to the applicable constitutional principle”, adding that IGAs are not “ordinary 
contracts”.103 For the Court, the only principle at play was that of parliamentary 
sovereignty.104   
  
 It did not explore whether IGAs could be enforceable otherwise that by a narrow 
analogy with a private law arrangement. The Court denied that IGAs could limit the 
sovereignty of legislative assemblies to adopt norms which contradict them.  This obviously 
renders IGAs somewhat fragile, but no more than other forms of government contract.  Yet, 
while made in passing, these statements that IGAs are no “ordinary contract” seem to 
deviate from the contractual interpretation implicitly endorsed in the previous case law.  This 
attitude is somewhat conforted by the finding, three years later, that financial undertakings in 
the 1883 BC-Ottawa agreement was of a “political” character.105  The statements are made 
obiter, but leave an impression that the Court is reluctant to admit the legally binding 
character of IGAs inter partes.  It may, but this is still a matter of speculation, share the 
Australian High Court’s position that IGAs are political until proven otherwise. 
                                                
101 For ex.: Ontario (Chicken Producer’s Marketing Board) v. Canada (Chicken Marketing Agency), 
[1993] 1 FC 116 (FCTD) par. 27.   
102 Re Canada Assistance Plan, (1990) 46 BCLR (2d) 273 (BCCA) 287. 
103 CAP Reference, 553-54.  
104 This is examined in detail infra, 6.2.2.2.   
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• The Alameda Dam decision 
 
At issue in this case was an agreement pursuant to which the federal government 
agreed to give one million dollars per month to a Saskatchewan Crown corporation, acting 
explicitly as an “agent of the Crown”, in exchange for a temporary suspension of works on a 
major dam project to allow the federal Minister of the Environment to implement 
recommendations made by an environmental panel.106  Frustrated with the delays 
concerning this implementation, the provincial Premier announced that the project would 
proceed. The federal government sought an injunction to enforce the agreement.  While the 
other party was a Crown corporation, its actions were obviously controlled by the executive.   
 
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal did not characterise the agreement per se, but 
reproduced it in full.  It contains clear obligations and typical common law contractual 
terminology such as “in consideration of […] ceasing construction […] the minister agrees to 
the payment of one million […]”.  The Court rejected the provincial submission that the 
agreement was not binding because it lacked specific governmental approval by order-in-
council as required under the federal Department of the Environment Act.107  The Court was 
obviously incensed at the attempt to deny legal character to an agreement through which the 
Corporation had already received over 8 million dollars.108  In other words, public law 
impediments (both in terms of authority and potential ratione materiae limitations) were set 
aside.109  The injunction was granted, which suggests that without saying it, the Court 
concluded the agreement to be binding.110     
 
• The Contravention Act case 
 
 In the late 1990s, the federal government mandated consenting provinces with the 
issuance of contraventions and prosecution of violations of certain federal Acts.  In 
exchange, the provinces are entitled to part of the fines collected.  The validity and 
constitutionality of the arrangement was challenged, on grounds that it violated quasi-
constitutional language rights. This issue is explored in Chapter 6.   
 
There is one point of interest for our purposes, however.  The IGA that clearly 
governed the parties’ behaviour was unsigned. The two governments explained they had 
                                                                                                                                                   
105 The 1994 BC Railway case, par. 112. 
106 Canada v. Saskatchewan Water Corp., [1992] 4 WWR 712 (SKCA) [the "Alameda Dam" case); 
KENNETT (1993) 655-656. 
107 RSC 1985, ch. E-10.  The Court denied the dam was a “programme” for which cabinet approval 
was required. 
108 Regardless of the fact that the money received covered past delays…  
109 Apparently, no argument based on the rule against fettering was raised.  
 107 
wanted to test-drive the arrangement prior to formally endorsing it.  The Federal Court was 
clearly puzzled by the status of the IGA, which it described it as an “oral” or a “draft” 
agreement.111  Without directly ruling on its legal character, the Court concluded that the IGA 
would become void, if it were not amended within a year to take minority language rights into 
consideration.  The Court was unwilling to denying any value to an agreement that parties 
were relying upon, and that clearly affected third parties.       
 
• The Nova-Scotia and Newfoundland Maritime boundary 
arbitration 
 
In 2000, an arbitration tribunal was set up to resolve a long-standing dispute   
regarding the line that divides respective offshores of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.  In the 
first Phase, the tribunal had to determine whether the provinces had previously concluded a 
binding agreement concerning this boundary.112  If this was not the case, the tribunal was to 
draw the boundary in a second phase.  It did so, having concluded that no formal binding 
agreement had been reached by the provinces on the issue.113  The award is significant, for it 
contains a review of criteria for the existence of a binding agreement between federal 
partners.  Interestingly, however, the tribunal was directed to apply – by analogy – rules of 
public international law, with necessary modifications.114   
 
In arguing that the line had previously been agreed upon, Nova Scotia relied on a 
1964 joint statement and a 1972 Communiqué, as well as subsequent practice by the two 
provinces.  Newfoundland principally argued that no such agreement had ever been reached 
since any proposal was always understood to require the concurrence of the federal 
government, who, in the end, has the constitutional power to set the boundary.115   
For the tribunal, the essential question was whether the Premiers who issued the 
1964 and 1972 statements “intended to make an immediate good faith commitment as to 
                                                                                                                                                   
110 Whether an action in restitution (unjust enrichment) could have succeeded in uncertain since the 
work was suspended for a number of months, for which payment was provided.   
111 Commissioner of Official Languages v. Canada (Department of Justice), FCTD, T-2170-98, 
23.03.2001. 
112 NS-NF arbitration; unless otherwise indicated, reference is to first phase. 
113 Second Phase 26.03.2002 : www.boundary-dispute.ca. 
114 This direction was found both in the two federal Acts implementing offshore Agreements with Nova-
Scotia and Newfoundland, as well as in the Terms of Reference. While the Supreme Court has 
suggested the analogy with the way in which international treaties are incorporated into domestic law 
(Anti-Inflation Reference, infra, 5.2.2.3), the application of international law to resolve disputes 
concerning agreements had been rejected before: Tax Rental Agreement arbitration: SCOTT, diss. ( 
at 282).  The majority waltzed between private and public law, but did not consider public international 
law as a potential solution.  Similarly, in Canada v. Ontario, [1910] AC 637 (PC), the Privy Council 
refused to use rules of public international law as applicable law to an intergovernmental dispute; 
MOORE (1935) 191-193.    
115 The offshore is federal territory: Re Newfoundland Continental Shelf, [1984] SCR 86; Re Offshore 
Mineral Rights of B.C., [1967] SCR 762.   The practical interest of drawing this boundary flows notably 
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their respective boundaries”.116   This, it noted, was a question of fact, which would arise in 
similar terms whether the issue was examined from the angle of domestic or public 
international law.117    
 
Reviewing relevant decisions of the International Court of Justice, the tribunal noted 
that informal instrument could constitute binding agreements, including unsigned 
communiqués, and minutes of meetings.118  The status of an agreement required an 
evaluation of its “actual terms”, the circumstances in which it was drawn up and the potential 
dependence of some external condition or procedure.  Signature and language used are also 
relevant. Mostly, what is determinative is whether there is a shared understanding that the 
agreement “is to be embodied in some later formal document or is to be subject to some 
subsequent process of implementation in order to become binding”.119  
 
Turning its attention to Canadian public law, the tribunal stated that executives cannot 
conclude binding agreements concerning matters requiring legislative action.120  It also 
invoked the rule against fettering executive action, without, however, specifying how this 
could have precluded the conclusion of an agreement in this particular case.121  Subject 
matter limitations were obviously not the arbitrator’s main concerns.  The decision hinges on 
the understood need for further federal action for any agreement to be binding.122  Here, not 
only was subsequent legislative action essential, but federal legislation was required for any 
boundary to be effective.  Until this was secured, the tribunal reasoned that provinces could 
not have intended to make a final and binding agreement.    
 
The Tribunal analysed the parties’ subsequent practice including meetings, letters, 
parallel agreements and negotiations with other provinces.  While relevant, this practice was 
of a limited probative value, since it can be explained by a number of factors.  Particularly 
telling, however, was the fact that none of the participants ever referred to the 1964 text as 
                                                                                                                                                   
from other IGAs pursuant to which the federal government agrees to co-manage the area with the 
respective provinces, and, more significantly, to share resource revenues with them. 
116 NS-NF arbitration, par. 3.29.  While the “intention” criteria is recurrent throughout the award, the 
tribunal nevertheless admits, in a footnote, that “[i]nternational law applies to the relations of states 
irrespective of their intent, and [that] it is sufficient for a treaty that the Parties entered into immediate 
commitments which were to be fulfilled in good faith”: fn 45. 
117 NS-NF arbitration, par. 3.28. 
118 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1978] ICJ Rep 3 (par. 96); Case 
concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain) (Jurisdiction), [1994] ICJ 
Rep.112, paras. 22-41, discussed at par. 3.16-3.20 of arbitration. 
119 NS-NF arbitration, par. 3.18. 
120 Referring to BC v. Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Co, [1950] AC 87 (PC) and the CAP 
Reference. 
121 At par. 3.8, the tribunal cites the Amphitrite, the Commissionner of Land v. Page, as well as the 
Perry decisions: infra, 4.1.2.2.  
122  Par. 7.2-7.3.  The Court notably assimilated the impact of this external requirement with treaties 
subject to ratification that has not yet been obtained: par. 3.13.    
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being binding, or protested when it was not respected.123  Finally, the tribunal also observed 
that on certain key issues, the boundary discussed in the 1964 statement lacked the 
precision that would be expected of a final agreement.     
 
In the end, the tribunal held that the terms of the 1964 Joint statement were “more 
consistent with a political, provisional or tentative agreement, which may lead to a formal 
agreement but which it not itself that agreement”.124   
 
This decision is of interest for a number of reasons.  First, as mentioned, it provides a 
more detailed approach to the characterisation of IGAs than any other Canadian case.  
Second, the tribunal was directed to apply international law by analogy.  This made sense, 
given that the dispute related to a maritime boundary, a matter over which international 
courts and tribunals have developed an expertise and methodology.  The choice of law could 
also reflect the lack of clear criteria relating to IGAs in the Canadian legal literature.  Third, 
the tribunal nevertheless insisted on the fact that the findings would have been the same had 
domestic law applied (whatever this may be).  This suggests that the indicia used in public 
international law to determine whether States have reached a binding agreement are either 
transposable or identical to those which would apply to IGAs.   
 
Fourth, the tribunal made a laconic reference to the rule against fettering, cited both 
the Amphitrite and the Railway Standardisation cases, without specifying how this could have 
been relevant to the existence of an agreement.125  The inference is clearly that there may 
have been a ratione materiae limitation to this type of agreement, anyhow.  In other words, 
what may have been suggested is that in Canadian domestic law (by contrast to international 
law, though the tribunal never says so), an agreement concerning a border can only ever be 
of a non-legal character.126  Unfortunately, by not detailing these limitations, the award may 
give the impression that there are more obstacles to the legally binding character of IGAs 
than is warranted.    
                                                
123 NS-NF arbitration, par. 7.6. 
124 NS-NF arbitration, par. 7.3. 
125 The reference to those foreign cases is worth mentioning because they are so rarely invoked in 
Canada, as was seen earlier.    
126 This would make sense, given s.43a, Constitution Act, 1982, which subjects alteration of inter-
provincial borders to constitutional amendment.  Of course, here, the boundary is not truly inter-
provincial.  It is more “administrative”, drawn for purposes of a federal-provincial scheme. The 
reasoning is nevertheless apposite.  
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• Administrative law cases  
 
With the previous exception, the status of IGAs as contractual instruments has hardly 
been confronted head-on in Canada.  It must often be inferred from rulings which are 
directed at other issues.  This is notably the case of administrative law cases in which third 
parties either challenge the ways in which IGAs are concluded, or are implemented.    
Hence, in a number of cases, agricultural producers challenged the imposition of 
quotas determined through federal provincial agreements, combined with legislative and 
regulatory measures.  Courts almost invariably uphold such cooperative schemes and their 
application to third parties.127  Hence, the Superior Court of Québec recently recognised that 
the province had renounced to exercise certain of its constitutional powers, “in a spirit of 
collaboration” so as to harmonise the commercialisation of chicken production across 
Canada.  It then asserted that the government “does not have the right to derogate from the 
agreement it has concluded”.128  In other words, the Court assumed the province to be bound 
by the agreement, even though it was clearly “fettering” its constitutional powers through the 
cooperative scheme. This potential legal obstacle is not even invoked. 
  
In another case, an interest group sought a declaration that IGAs on environmental 
assessment were of no force and effect, because through them the federal Environment 
Minister was “fettering” her statutory authority.129  In certain clauses of the IGA, the federal 
government had agreed to limit the exercise of its own competences in favour of the 
provinces, so as to avoid duplication in environmental assessments.  The Court carefully 
scrutinised the wording of the IGAs.  It ruled that the general nature of the undertakings, and 
the fact that they all provided for further implementation agreements, precluded a conclusion 
that a “fettering of discretion” had actually taken place.  In other words, the IGAs were 
inchoate.130  While the Court does not explicitly characterise the IGAs, their lack of specificity 
would apparently leave them on the political side of the threshold.  Paradoxically, if 
undertakings contained in the IGAs had been sufficiently precise to ground a conclusion that 
they created legal obligations for the signatories, they could have been held to violate the 
rule against the fettering of discretion. 
 
 Neither decision contains a careful characterisation of IGAs as contractual 
instruments.  They exemplify, however, judicial tolerance for complex intergovernmental 
                                                
127 Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Monette, 505-05-002793-963 (20.02.1997) 
(SCQ); Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, 705-05-004614-007 
(01.11.2001) (SCQ): Infra, s.5.3.2. 
128 Pelland, par. 90  (my translation). 
129 Pursuant to the Environmental Protection Act; SC 1999, ch.33:  Canadian Environmental Law 
Association v. Minister of the Environment, FCTD, T-337-98 [the CELA decision]. These IGAs were 
discussed supra: 3.1.1.2.  
130 As the IGA in the Railway Standardisation case, to which the decision does not, however, refer.  
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schemes.131  When the issue of contractual character of an IGA is not directly challenged by 
government parties, courts are not likely to doubt their legal character. 
 
4.1.4 Summary conclusions 
 
Inferring general principles from this sparse case law – rendered over a century - is a 
perilous exercise.  The rulings are clearly fact-dependent, often appear result-oriented, and - 
with the exception of the Railway Standardisation case and the Nova-Scotia Newfoundland 
arbitration - rarely deal with the issue directly.  The following lessons may nevertheless be 
risked.    
 
 First, Canadian courts have obviously endorsed a contractual conception of IGAs 
and enforced them, or implicitly found them to be binding as such, i.e. when they covered a 
matter capable of being regulated by contract and when an intention to create legal relations 
could be discerned.  This was notably the case in the late 19th century and early part of the 
20th.  But not exclusively.  In the first Anti-Inflation Reference of 1976 the Supreme Court 
recognised, obiter, that an IGA could bind executives.   And the Federal Court clearly 
interpreted an Alberta-Ottawa agreement as a contract in 1983.     
 
Secondly, agreements that can be assimilated to private contracts appear more likely 
to be qualified as legally binding IGAs.  This has sometimes led to stretched 
interpretations.132  However, when the binding status of the agreement is not challenged by 
one of the parties, this criterion seems to carry far less weight.  In other words, when the 
status of IGAs lies in the background of a case that turns on other legal issues, courts are 
very tolerant of IGAs, even those which clearly curb governmental discretion.    
 
Thirdly, when called upon by government parties to interpret an IGA, arbitration 
tribunals or the Federal Court as an arbitrator133 generally do not concern themselves with 
public law impediments to the binding character of IGAs.134  The Tax Rental Agreement 
sentence is a good illustration.  In other words, when parties submit their dispute to outside 
arbitrators, and do not raise the lack of binding character of an IGA, the fact that it may 
violate the formal distribution of competences, or the rule against the fettering of executive 
action, will not be addressed.  This confers a binding character on an IGA which a more 
classic contractual analysis would be less likely to recognise. At least, it obviates the need to 
                                                
131 See also, infra, 5.3.2. 
132 The Privy Council’s description of the 1883 B.C.-Ottawa IGA as a “commercial transaction” for 
instance. 
133 Pursuant to s.19 of the Federal Court Act. RSC, 1985, ch. F-7. 
134 Although the situation could be different when the tribunal must determine whether an agreement 
actually exists: NS-NF arbitration, par. 3.7. 
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resolve the issue as squarely as the Australian High Court had to do in the Railway  
Standardisation case.   
 
In fact, and this is the fourth lesson, although that decision of the Australian High 
Court is invoked in the analysis of IGAs, it has never actually been applied in Canada.  
Speaking about government contracts in general, ARROWSMITH warns that Australian case 
law ought to be considered with care.135  For instance, Australian authors suggest that the 
intention to enter binding agreements may be more difficult to demonstrate in the case of 
government action,136 while the Supreme Court of Canada has rejected the application of a 
distinct test for contracts by public entities.137    It is thus arguable that Australian courts are 
more reluctant to qualify government contracts in general, and by extension IGAs in 
particular, as legally binding, than is the case of their Canadian counterparts.138 
 
Fifthly, however, the underlying analysis of the Australian High Court may explain 
statements made by the Supreme Court in the 1991 CAP Reference and the 1994 BC 
Railway decision.  In the first, the analogy of IGAs with private contract was curtly dismissed, 
while in the second the segment of a federal-provincial agreement that had been debunked 
as a constitutional instrument was qualified as “political”. These assertions could be 
dismissed as obiter dicta, waiting for yet another finessed judicial re-interpretation.  Yet, they 
possibly reveal a discomfort with the traditional conception of IGAs as contracts.  Whether 
this is because of the nature of transactions between governments, or because of the impact 
on third parties which the contractual approach minimises, is difficult to assess.     
  
Sixthly, the fact that an IGA has been authorised, approved or ratified by a statute 
does not seem to consolidate its status inter partes.  As we shall see, the situation is different 
when an IGA is actually incorporated (along the same lines as international obligations). This 
confers a binding character erga omes to an IGA, which by necessary implication also binds 
the executives.  But simple parliamentary approval does not have that effect and has not 
even been interpreted as tending to show an intention to enter into a legal relationship. 
 
Finally, part performance by one party could lead to the conclusion that an IGA exists, 
and is of a legal character (this was the case in the Alameda, but not in the 1883 B.C. 
Railway case).  The parties’ subsequent practice, particularly their reference to an IGA as 
                                                
135 ARROWSMITH (1988) 15 ff. 
136 ARONSON, M., WHITMORE, H., Public Torts and Contracts, 1982 (Australia) at 204-05, cited by 
ARROWSMITH (1998) 15.   
137 R. v. CAE Industries Ltd, [1986] 1 FC 129 (CA) leave to appeal refused (1986), 20 DLR (4th) 347n 
(SCC).   
138 While in the CAP Reference, the Supreme Court endorsed another Australian ruling West Lakes 
Ltd. v. South Australia (1980), 25 SASR 389. That case dealt with the invalidity of agreements to 
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binding, would likely be an influential factor in its characterisation (the Contravention case, 
the NS-NF arbitration).  Other criteria would include language, signature, the degree of 
specificity of undertakings, or required external conditions (the NS-NF arbitration).   
  
Decision-makers often dismiss IGAs as political gentlemen’s agreements.139  
Relatively recent obiter dicta by the Supreme Court of Canada suggest a presumption that 
IGAs remain on the political side of the threshold until proven otherwise.  It is unclear, 
however, that this is how the courts in general treat IGAs.  At it is, the Canadian case law 
fluctuates between uneasy analogies with the private law of contracts, inconsistent recourse 
to public law impediments borrowed from the law of government contracts and a benevolent 
tolerance (or voluntary blindness) regarding instruments which occasionally violate rules of 
public law, but which play such a central role in the functioning of the federation.   
 
4.2 The characterisation of IGAs as contractual instruments in Belgium 
  
The previous section illustrated how the conception of IGAs in Canada oscillates 
between binding contract and political instrument.140  In Belgium, very little attention has 
been paid to the contractual aspect of cooperation agreements.  The instrument was 
introduced in relative haste, in the heat of constitutional negotiations on the regionalisation of 
certain competences.141  There had not been a great deal of reflection on the status those 
agreements would enjoy.  Since the insertion of s.92bis in the 1980 DMA in 1988-89, a 
number of cases and opinions of the legislative section of the Council of State (CSLS) have 
been rendered on questions related to those agreements (constitutionality, failure to respect 
some formalities), but apparently only one which indirectly broaches the character inter 
partes.142  Similarly, after limited academic interest for the question in the early 90s, which is 
briefly explored below, the literature has not addressed that question either. The main 
concern remains the place they occupy in the hierarchy of norms (could they be defeated by 
unilateral norms?).143 
 
 This section explores the contractual dimension of cooperation agreements: that is, 
their status between the governments who concluded them.   It is divided in four parts.  The 
first considers certain analogies with other forms of contractual arrangements that have been 
considered or rejected by constitutionalists (4.2.1).  The potential impact of the legislative 
framework on the characterisation of IGAs inter partes is then examined, notably by 
                                                                                                                                                   
legislate, not with the contractual value of IGAs in general.  The NS-NF Arbitration (par. 3.17) also 
referred to the Railway Standardisation Case. 
139 Interviews conducted. 
140 Setting aside the particular case of  “constitutionalised” agreements.    
141 Supra, 2.2.3.1.  
142 CSAS 115.975 (17.02.2003) (Monfils); infra, 4.2.4. 
143 Infra, Chapter 6.  
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considering the pre-1988 situation which it was meant to correct, as well as the particular 
dispute resolution mechanism introduced concurrently with s.92bis (4.2.2).  A number of 
possible public law impediments to the contractual characterisation of IGAs are evaluated 
(4.2.3) before the very limited case law having some bearing on the contractual character of 
IGAs since the inception of s.92bis is surveyed.  Finally, summary conclusions are proposed 
(4.2.4). 
  
4.2.1 Analogies with other forms of consensual agreements 
 
In the early days following the adoption of s.92bis, before the development of any 
substantial practice, a number of public lawyers attempted to demystify this new type of 
instrument.144  Some analogies were suggested.  Hence, COENRAETS referred to the civil 
law to suggest rules applicable to the capacity, formation and performance of agreements.145   
This was done in a rather abstract manner, noting that the consensualism of civil law 
contracts implied that in theory cooperation agreements could even be oral.146  Others have 
assimilated them to “domestic treaties”.147   KLEIN describes them as “half-way between 
contracts and treaties”.148   Both of these sources, of course, reinforce the formal equality of 
parties, while the former strengthens the conception of federal partners as sovereign in their 
sphere of competences. 
 
Given the Canadian analysis of IGAs as a sub-category of government contracts, the 
absence of rapprochement with contracts of the administration in Belgium, is particularly 
puzzling.  The only author who mentions the possible analogy, dismisses it without further 
analysis.149  Academics interviewed instinctively rejected the analogy also, largely because of 
the association of government contracts with the inherent inequality of parties.150  For while 
Belgium does not have a distinct institution of “contrat administratif” along the French 
model,151 public authorities nevertheless enjoy a number of privileges, notably the power of 
unilaterally modifying the conditions of an administrative contract or even revoke it, subject to 
                                                
144 In fact, most of the articles on cooperation agreements were written between 1990 and 1992.  
UYTTENDAELE’s early analysis is largely reproduced in his most recent work. 
145 COENRAETS (1992) 162-168.  
146 This is peculiar, given this author’s assertion that IGAs have, at a minimum, the force of 
regulations: COENRAETS (1992) 165.   
147 MOERENHOUT and SMET (1994) 145-146; UYTTENDAELE and COENRAETS and 
UYTTENDAELE (1991) 15; DELPÉRÉE and DEPRÉ (1998) 313, fn1, questioned the analogy, without 
clearly taking position. 
148 KLEIN (1990) 2. 
149 ERGEC (1987) 349. 
150 MAST, André, ALEN, André, DUJARDIN, Jean, Précis de droit administratif belge (Brussels: Story-
Scientia, 1989) 110-112 [MAST]. 
151  Those contracts are subject to the civil law and enforced by ordinary courts, not the Council of 
State, with the exception of of “actes détachables”, that is administrative decisions related to a 
contract (such as the choice of co-party), which can be challenged before the administrative court: 
LAGASSE, Dominique, “La théorie des actes détachables est-elle dans une impasse? Les actes de 
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compensation.152  In other words, the Belgian law of government contracts is a hybrid: close 
to French law in terms of substance, and to the common law conception of the rule of law 
(including the notion that governments should be subject to the same legal proceedings as 
private citizens) in terms of procedure.  The substantive rules rest on a clear vision of the 
inequality of the parties, an inequality that is openly admitted.    
 
The possibility that IGAs could constitute – as in Canada – a sub-category of 
government contracts, in which both parties are public authorities of equal status, is simply 
not considered.  Seen in this light, recourse to the law of administrative contracts to resolve 
certain issues (relating to authority to conclude, for instance) may be warranted and I would 
argue that the analogy deserves reconsideration. 
 
   The early literature concerning IGA draws analogies with the law of contracts or the 
law of treaties for two distinct purposes.  First, as is the case in Canada, a parallel is drawn 
between the procedure for the integration of treaties into the Belgian legal order on the one 
hand, and the procedure for inserting cooperation agreements into the legal order of the 
various federal partners on the other.  The objective is to argue that cooperation agreements 
are situated above legislation in the hierarchy of norms.153  Secondly, the analogies serve as 
an inspiration to fill lacunae in the legal regime applicable to cooperation agreements. This is 
no doubt useful.154  What is remarkable is the assumption that cooperation agreements are 
necessarily legal instruments, to which legal rules must be applied.  In fact, there is never 
any mention that some private or international agreements may not cross the threshold of 
juridicity.  Hence, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and its corresponding rule concerning 
the binding character of contracts are invoked as applicable “mutatis mutandis to every 
conventional relation, regardless of the legal order in which it takes place”.155  The paradigm 
is clearly of legal instruments, to which a set of legal rules should be applied.    
 
It is as if s.92bis had automatically conferred binding status to formal cooperation 
agreements, as a birthright.156  The actual degree of normative force of such agreements 
may be low, but the limited doctrine that analysed agreements from the contractual 
perspective definitely considered them to be on the legal side of the threshold.  In other 
                                                                                                                                                   
gouvernement renaissent-ils au contraire de leurs cendres? “, (1999) 2 RCJB  5-24.  
152 FLAMME, Maurice-André, Droit administratif, Tome II (Brussels: Bruylant, 1989) 827; PAQUES, 
Michel, De l’acte unilatéral au contrat dans l’action administrative (Brussels: Story-Scientia, 1991) 317-
320.    
153 Infra, Chapter 6.  
154 They discuss rules for denuncing agreements when no procedure is outline therein, for instance. 
155 KLEIN (1990) 24; MOERENHOUT and SMET (1994) 234; LEURQUIN-DE VISSCHER, Françoise, 
“Les règles de droit” in DELPÉRÉE, Francis (ed.), La Belgique fédérale (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994) 
197-224, 224. 
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words, there is an unquestioned assumption that the adoption of s.92bis conferred legal 
character to agreements between executives that was denied to those concluded before its 
adoption.  Those are, as we shall see, infallibly described as (purely) political instruments.157      
  
4.2.2 The impact of legislative framework concerning IGAs 
 
  This conviction that until 1988-89, executive agreements only amounted to political 
protocols requires some exploration.  In theory, in Belgium, the executive branch only has 
explicitly attributed competences, residual powers lying with legislatures.158  A Constitution 
born of a Revolution, even a fairly peaceful and speedy one, does not protect old Crown 
prerogatives.  Interestingly, the executive was never granted the express authority to contract.  
The actual source of the power to contract is not even discussed in administrative law 
textbooks.  In the 19th century liberal conception of the State, it may have seemed normal 
that the executive could contract on the same terms as other legal persons.  Arguably, the 
executive powers which the 1831 sought to harness were unilateral normative powers, not 
contractual arrangements.  With the federalisation process, this power to contract was 
transmitted to federated entities, and is understood as an attribute of their legal 
personality.159  So far, the situation is similar as the Canadian one. 
 
However, while in Canada the executive’s inherent capacity to contract is understood 
to extend to IGAs, no similar transfer occurred in the case of Belgian cooperation 
agreements.  For some, the legislative texts that provided for cooperation between 
executives prior to 1988-89 were “insufficient” to enable the executives to conclude 
“cooperation agreements” (which, in context, is clearly meant to designate legal-type 
instruments).160  The terse affirmation that until s.92bis, agreements were merely political 
protocols suggests that this specific authorisation was required for the transformation of 
agreements into legally binding ones. The reasons for this assertion are not clearly spelled 
out but seem to be based on a number of opinions by the Council of State concerning pre-
1988 agreements which are worth examining.   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
156 See, for instance, KLEIN (1990) 24 for whom, regardless of which body of law is used as analogy, 
pacta sunt servanda would apply.  The assumption is clearly that cooperation agreements are legally 
binding inter partes. 
157 ALEN and PEETERS (1989) 362.  In the late 1980s, ALEN was then Secretary to the Prime 
Minister and clearly had access to a number of protocols which were never published. 
158 S.105, Constitution (for federal order) and s.78, 1980 DMA (for federated authorities); CRAENEN 
(1996) 18, 33; PEETERS, Patrick, “The Executives” in CRAENEN, G. (ed.), The Institutions of Federal 
Belgium: an Introduction to Belgian Public Law  (Leuven: Acco, 1996) 95-107, 104.  See also s.33, 
Constitution, which entrenches the doctrine of national sovereignty, which would appear to preclude 
any inherent executive powers.  The same rule applies to federated entities: ss.78 of 1980 DMA; 38 of 
1989 DMA on Brussels and 51 of 1983 OA on GC. 
159 Ss.3, 1980 DMA; s.3, 1989 DMA on Brussels and s.2 of 1983 OA on GC.  
160 De WILDE (1990) 96; ALEN and PEETERS (1989) 351 ff.; LAGASSE (1999) 348.  
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4.2.2.1  The character of pre-s.92bis agreements 
 
If s.92bis transformed political agreements into legal instruments, pre-1988 judicial 
pronouncements should reveal obstacles to the binding character of executive agreements 
which this provision has now removed.   A number of opinions of the CSLS seem to have 
exerted a particular influence on doctrinal analysis regarding the status of IGAs.   
 
The first relates to agreements concluded between the German-speaking Community 
and the other two Communities at a time when the former had express power to conclude such 
agreements, but before s.92bis extended that power to the latter.161  Those were framed in very 
general terms, as agreements concerning cultural cooperation often are.   Perhaps to ensure a 
degree of solemnity, the parties sought to have the agreement endorsed by their respective 
legislative assemblies.  The CSLS saw no objection with the process, noting simply that the 
executives were thereby curbing their freedom somehow since any modification would require 
legislative action.  There is no discussion of the status of the agreement (called interchangeably 
“convention” and “accord de coopération”) as such.  One cannot conclude from this half-page 
opinion, that no other pre-1988 IGA could be binding inter partes. 
 
The second opinion related to a protocol creating a Housing Depreciation Fund 
following the regionalisation of social housing.162  The CSLS found the arrangement 
unconstitutional because the federal government retained powers concerning the nomination of 
regional representatives, as well as the power to withdraw general grants from the region if they 
failed to properly finance the Fund in question. This was seen as a violation of regional 
autonomy.  The CSLS qualified as a “political agreement” a protocol (not reproduced) previously 
concluded between federal and regional authorities concerning this arrangement.   Again, no 
criteria were given to support this characterisation, apart from an affirmation that the creation of 
a Fund with legal personality would require legislative action on the part of every party to such 
an agreement.  This is not a statement that parties could not bind themselves, but a statement 
that they could not violate the distribution of competences, or create an organ with legal 
personality without parallel legislation.  There is no wholesale incapacity to bind governments, 
but rather, again, obstacles of a ratione materiae character. 
 
The CSLS’s most influential opinion concerning the need for specific authorisation for 
the conclusion of legally binding agreements related to a projected agreement between the 
Walloon Region (in charge of the placement of unemployed workers) and the French 
                                                
161 CSLS 16.11.1984, Doc. CCF, 1984-85, 174/1, 3;  UYTTENDAELE and COENRAETS (1991) 4; 
COENRATS (1992) 159.   
162 CSLS 23.02.1987 (MB 16.04.1987); ALEN and PEETERS (1989) 362.    
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Community (in charge of labour training).163  Prior to the transfer of this competence from the 
federal authorities, policies related to both had been developed and implemented by a single 
body. The French Community and the Walloon Region sought to create a joint organ to succeed 
this national one, on the French side of the country.164 They drafted a “convention” which they 
sought to submit to their respective assemblies.  Called upon to give its opinion on the scheme, 
the CSLS made a number of remarkable statements.165  Unfortunately, this opinion, which is 
quite central to understand the very purpose of s.92bis, was never published.166 
 
First, the CSLS expressly stated that cooperation could only be of a political character, 
unless it were specifically authorised.167  The Council inferred the authorisation to create a joint 
body from clauses authorising cooperation between governments, as well as between 
legislative assemblies.168  The obstacle, however, was in the method chosen to create the joint 
body.  For the CSLS, drafting a joint text, and then simply asking legislatures to approve it, 
deprives parliamentarians of their power to discuss legislative proposals, article by article.  This 
could not be accomplished without specific legislative authorisation.  Similarly, the Council held 
that in the absence of express authorisation, Communities and Regions could not “subordinate” 
their own decision-making power to another order, which the creation of a joint organ would 
imply.169    
 
The CSLS then proposed an alternative solution.  It suggested that parties conclude an 
agreement “which can only have the force of a political protocol”.170  Clearly, this was due to the 
lack of explicit quasi-constitutional authorisation enabling the parties to bind themselves in law.  
Then, one party (for instance, the Walloon Region) could create the public body by statute and 
authorise it to act on behalf of another order of government.  The French Community would then 
legislate to confer missions unto that same body.171  The CSLS underliend that the autonomy 
                                                
163 CSLS 16.444/9 (02.12.85), on proposed joint organ to deal with labour training and the placement 
of unemployed workers, unpublished, on file with author. 
164 Flemish authorities had done so, which was more easily accomplished, given that their institutions 
had partially been “merged”. 
165 Formally, the opinion related to the Walloon bill proposing to endorse the convention. 
166 This is not unusual: governments must seek the Council's opinion on all proposed legislative 
instruments, but have the freedom to publish that opinion in their parliamentary documents or not. In 
this case, the proposed legislation, which the Council denounced, was simply never adopted and no 
document relative to it was ever published. It is obvious, however, that the ruling was very well known 
to constitutional negotiators who introduced s.92bis.  It was, in fact, paraphrased by a number of 
authors, who never explicitly referred to it: for ex. de WILDE (1990) 97.  I was given the opinion in 
confidence. 
167 Ibid., 10. 
168 Ibid., 14. 
169 Ibid., 17. 
170 “[C]celui-ci ne peut avoir que la valeur d’un accord politique”: ibid., 18. 
171 This was done, see subsequent opinion of the LSCS, published, this time: Doc CRW, SO 1987-
1988, 213/1; Doc CCF, 1988-89, 38/1.  See also: Doc CRW, 1996-1997, 268/1 (all on professional 
training).  
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granted to each order of government implies that it can withdraw those missions from the organ 
so created.172  Such arrangements are very similar to those currently concluded in Canada.   
  
In 1989, ALEN and PEETERS discussed a number of other pre-1988 protocols, 
including several unpublished ones, which, in their view, only also amounted to policy 
statements.173  These included an agreement by executives to introduce parallel legislation in 
order to allow federal civil servants to collect taxes on behalf of regions,174 an agreement on 
information sharing in environmental context,175 or a commitment to restrict hospital beds.176       
In some cases, regulations even envisaged their conclusion.177   Clearly, again, this was not 
considered sufficient to remove obstacles to legal characterisation.  
 
  It may be exaggerated to conclude that prior to s.92bis, no executive agreement could 
ever give rise to legally binding obligations.  It is clear, however, that none of the instruments 
which the CSLS was called upon to assess was considered to be of legal character.  It is 
undisputable, however, that the CSLS’ opinions raised a number of obstacles to the legal 
characterisation of those agreements, which negotiators of the 1988 constitutional reform 
sought to overcome.  Section 4.2.2.2 considers the limitations ratione materiae that have 
likely been eliminated by s.92bis, and those which still represent obstacles to the legal 
characterisation of executive agreements today. 
  
 The general understanding that in the absence of an explicit authorisation, no 
cooperation agreement could be of legal character has generated the converse 
understanding.  The literature seems to imply that since the adoption of s.92bis in 1988-89, 
every executive agreement constitutes a legally binding instrument.  In my view, this 
inference is also exaggerated.  The characterisation of a cooperation agreement as a 
contractual instrument, binding governments party to it, requires an analysis in concreto, 
taking notably into consideration public law impediments that may still preclude IGAs from 
binding executives.  Before considering those, however, another aspect of the legislative 
framework surrounding IGAs that may potentially influence their characterisation must be 
considered.   
  
                                                
172 Again, this is consistent with the current Canadian situation. Whether s.92bis actually had the effect of 
modifying this possibility of “unilateral” withdrawal, is uncertain: infra, 6.1.2. 
173 ALEN and PEETERS (1989) 362 ff. 
174 Protocol of 05.03.1985 (14.06.1985) on the purchase of school buildings: ALEN and PEETERS 
(1989) 363. 
175  CSLS, Doc Parl, Ch 1985/86 542/4, 16.   
176 ALEN and PEETERS (1989) 364. 
177 “Arrêtés royaux”. 
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4.2.2.2 The impact of a specific dispute resolution mechanism 
on characterisation 
 
The insertion of formal cooperation agreements in the Belgian legal order in 1988-89 
was accompanied by the creation of original dispute resolution mechanism, so-called 
cooperation tribunals (“juridictions de cooperation”).  The purpose of the present sub-section 
is not to describe how those tribunals would eventually resolve disputes inter partes.  The 
objective here is precisely to examine the potential impact of the creation of a specific 
dispute resolution mechanism on the status of post-1988 agreements.178          
  
S.92bis(4) provides that disputes relative to the interpretation or implementation of 
compulsory agreements must be submitted to ad hoc cooperation tribunals.179  Parties to an 
optional agreement may also submit disputes to such tribunals.180 Third parties are explicitly 
denied standing to do so.181  Each party to an agreement designates a member, otherwise 
they are to be appointed by the President of the Court of Arbitration.182   The President must 
be a professional magistrate and is selected by the designated members of the tribunal, 
failing which s/he will also be appointed by the President of the Court of Arbitration.183  A 
flurry of details govern rules of procedure, majority vote, rights of the defence and so on.184   
Decisions of such tribunals are directly enforceable (“exécutoire”).  This is in derogation to 
the administrative law principle prohibiting execution against the administration.185  These are 
all compatible with an arbitration-type institution. 
  
In fact, cooperation tribunals were originally described as “arbitration colleges” 
(“collèges d’arbitres”), a designation deemed unorthodox by the CSLS because in Belgian 
law public authorities cannot submit to compulsory arbitration.186  Since disputes concerning 
compulsory agreements must be submitted to such tribunals, their designation was simply 
                                                
178 See introduction to this Chapter.  
179 S.92 bis (5) 1980 DMA.   See also 1989 OA on the Tribunal mentioned at art. 92 bis of 1980 DMA 
as amended, MB 24.01.1989  [hereinafter “1989 OA”]. 
180 S.92bis (5)(6); DELPÉRÉE and DEPRÉ (1998) 313; COENRAETS and UYTTENDAELE (1991) 12-
15.  This optional character is confirmed in the Guidelines for drafting cooperation agreements 
27.10.1999. 
181 In at least one instance, parties chose to split the legal recourse between the tribunal and ordinary 
courts, so that third parties could defend their rights under the agreement: Accord de coopération 
relatif à la gestion administrative de l'enseignement en Communauté germanophone, 07.08.89 
(05.10.89). 
182 S.2, 1989 OA. 
183 S.2, 1989 OA. 
184 Notably in the 1989 OA. Specific rules govern the recusal of members, prior optional conciliation, 
timing for filing facta, language of proceedings, etc. 
185 S. 1710 of the Judicial Code.  Note, however, that the case law is evolving in this respect, and 
Courts are more likely to enquire whether execution (such as seizure) would have negative impact on 
public interest: Tetraplegique, 05.05.1986, civil Bruxelles (J. Saisies), (1986) Rev Gén de droit 335.    
186 CSLS 18.806/2, Doc Parl 635/1, 1988-89, 80; Libois et Danheux c. Communauté française, C. 
Cass, 1ère ch., no. 374, Pas.,  (1996) 973. 
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changed to “juridiction organisée par la loi” (court organised pursuant to a federal Act).187  
This designation as a “juridiction”, and the fact that it is organised by an ordinary federal Act 
is compatible with the exclusive federal power in matters of judicial organisation.  They also 
suggest that within the Belgian legal order, they are envisaged as “real” - if quite unusual - 
courts of law.188  Yet, whatever their formal label, cooperation tribunals are clearly designed 
as arbitration panels.  At a loss, the federal Minister in charge of constitutional reform simply 
described them as “sui generis” institutions.189    
 
 The very invention of these cooperation tribunals illustrates the ambivalence of the 
constitutional negotiators concerning the status of IGAs inter partes.   On the one hand, the 
fact that disputes are not simply left in the political arena supports a legal conception.  
Tribunals render final, binding and executory decisions.190  On the other, the federal 
government rejected suggestions that the Court of Arbitration be empowered to interpret and 
enforce them.191  The choice of a new institution potentially composed of a majority of non-
jurists,192 when an existing judicial forum could have fulfilled that function, suggests a 
preference for non judicial dispute resolution.    
 
More problematic, is the fact that parties are free to submit their disputes to ad hoc 
tribunals, or to exclude judicial control altogether.193  In the absence of specific attribution, no 
other court would apparently be competent to resolve this type of dispute.194  For 
UYTTENDAELE, the failure to submit disputes to cooperation tribunal does not alter the 
character of an agreement.195  In earlier writing, he pointed out that in this case, the only 
recourse open to an injured party would be to call upon the Concertation Committee, a 
clearly political organ.196  Is there simply a judicial vacuum concerning a legal instrument 
                                                
187 Doc Parl 635/1, 1988-89, 80; UYTTENDAELE (1991) 13.  It is not clear why the parties chose not 
to amend the Judicial Code.  This could have been a question of timing, as the problem of limits on 
arbitration was only raised by the CSLS in its assessment of the bill implementing the tribunals, which 
was elaborated a few months after the insertion of the institution in the 1980 DMA.  Interestingly, the 
CSLS held that because these were called upon to resolve a new type of disputes, they did not 
constitute “extraordinary courts” prohibited by s. 94 (now 146) of the Constitution.     
188 The CSLS added that as a new type of court, cooperation tribunals had to be instituted by an 
ordinary federal Act, not by a DMA.  Consequently, the details concerning these courts were moved 
from s.92bis of the 1980 DMA to 1980 OA. 
189 Doc Parl, Ch, 1988-89, 635/18, 613. 
190 S.92bis(5) and 1989 OA, s.47.    
191 Debates on amendments to s.92bis, Doc Parl, Ch, SO, 1988-89, 635/18, 611-615; 635/15, 1-2; Doc 
Parl Ch, SE 1988-89, 635/18, 614.     
192 Only the president of each tribunal need be a professional magistrate: s.2, 1989 OA. 
193 S.92bis(4)(5) only discusses compulsory agreements.     
194 For ALEN and PEETERS (1989) 369.  In Belgium, by contrast to Canada, there is no court of 
“inherent” jurisdiction.  In other words, a matter may raise legal issues for which there is no court of 
competent jurisdiction.  It is likely that ordinary courts would have jurisdiction over agreements (or 
specific clauses) that can be analysed as dealing in private law: infra, 4.2.2.2 (on civil law obligations). 
195 UYTTENDAELE (2001) 867. 
196 COENRAETS and UYTTENDAELE (1991) 10. 
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(assuming other criteria are met)? 197  The riddle deepens given that nothing prevents parties 
to an agreement that does not explicitly refer to such tribunals from setting one up at a later 
stage, when a dispute does arise.  Would this late inclusion modify the legal character of the 
agreement?   
   
There is strong evidence that cooperation tribunals were imagined in haste, in order 
to reassure reluctant parties concerned  that compulsory agreements would be left to political 
good-will, which can be in short supply in a process of federalism by dissociation.  The 
solution was simply to blur the issue.  Dispute resolution would not be left simply to the 
political arena, nor would it be handled by existing judicial organs.  It would lie with a hybrid 
institution which, in the commonly used Belgian strategy, allowed for alternative readings: 
some would consider the tribunals as essentially political, others as essentially judicial.  
Moreover, in most cases, the question is left open since optional agreements do not, as a 
rule, provide for such tribunals. 
 
More cynically, it appears that a number of the key decision-makers understood that 
though introduced in the DMA and endowed with a specific Act detailing rules of procedures, 
those tribunals would never actually be established.  The sophisticated construction on paper 
would reassure those concerned with certain aspects of the constitutional decentralisation 
process, but in the end, any dispute concerning the agreements would be resolved politically.    
 
The impact of cooperation tribunals on the legal character of cooperation agreements 
is ambiguous.  After fifteen years, more than 200 agreements, and a particularly antagonistic 
federal system, no dispute has yet been submitted to these elusive tribunals, endowed with a 
very sophisticated organic law.  This does not necessarily mean that no dispute could ever 
be submitted to these peculiar dispute resolution institutions, but it indicates that the will to 
“juridicise” IGAs was relative, or at least, contested.198        
 
*** 
 
The adoption of s.92bis may have facilitated the adoption of legally binding 
agreements inter partes, although it did not automatically transfer every such agreement to 
the legal side of the threshold.  A test for assessing their legal character would therefore 
seem to be apposite, as it is in the Canadian context.  This is the object of the third part of 
                                                
197 This, of course, directly raises the link between legal characterisation and justiciability, which 
common lawyers often take for granted, but which here, is clearly divorced.      
198 Indeed, even in federations with structured dispute resolution mechanisms relative to IGAs, such as 
Switzerland or the United States, disputes are very largely resolved through political channels.  While 
the question of courts of competent jurisdiction is slightly more complicated, it is also the case in 
Canada.  We saw that only a handful of Canadian cases have interpreted or enforced IGAs over a 
century.   
 123 
this chapter.  As in the Canadian case, however, it is worth reflecting on the potential 
application of certain “public law impediments” to the characterisation of IGAs as contractual 
instruments. Again, they include issues of capacity and authority, as well as limitations 
ratione materiae. 
 
4.2.3 Public law impediments  
 
4.2.3.1 Capacity and authorisation 
 
If I am wrong in concluding that even before 1988-89, executives could have the 
capacity to bind themselves through certain forms of agreements inter partes,199 the adoption 
of s.92bis has resolved any lingering doubt.  Two issues remain, however.   One is related to 
the very peculiar entity that is the French Community Commission of Brussels (COCOF).  
This complex institution acts concurrently as a federated entity, and an administrative agency 
of the French Community.200  In its first incarnation, it has the capacity to conclude 
cooperation agreements, in its second it does not. This has led to bizarre arrangements.   
Hence, a cooperation agreement was concluded between the COCOF and the French 
Community on matters over which the former has legislative competences, while a 
“convention”, written in similar terms, was signed between the same parties, for the same 
purpose, over the decentralised competences.201  The first was submitted to legislative 
assemblies, the second was not.  Yet, they are assuredly meant to accomplish the same 
thing.  Such mind-boggling arrangements attest not only to the complexity of the Belgian 
federal system, but also to the effectiveness of most agreements, regardless of formal legal 
characterisation.202 
 
The second issue is fortunately less impenetrable.  It relates to the authority of 
particular signatories to bind their respective legal orders.  Pursuant to s.92bis, cooperation 
agreements are concluded by “competent authorities”.  So far, all formal cooperation 
agreement have been signed by Ministers and approved by their respective governments.  
There seems little doubt that this is sufficient authority to bind federal partners (in law).203 
 
                                                
199 Supra, 4.2.2.1. 
200 As a federated entity, it enjoys legislative powers which were transferred to it in 1994 by the French 
Community, as a decentralised agency, it implements legislation adopted by the same!  
MOERENHOUT (2001) 125. 
201 AC relatif aux modalités d'exercice des relations internationales de la Commission communautaire 
française (Fr C + COCOF), 30.04.98 (21.08.98, 02.12.98); Report to the Council of the CCF: Doc Parl 
CCF, 1997-1998, 239/1 (Walry). 
202 Infra, General Conclusions.  
203 With the exception of agreements requiring legislative assent: infra, 4.2.2.2. On delegation of 
powers to Ministers: MOERENHOUT (2001) 159. 
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This is not necessarily the case, however, of the growing number of IGAs concluded 
on the margins of formal cooperation agreements.  Some, entitled “protocols” are concluded 
by Ministers, notably in the context of interministerial conferences or the Concertation 
Committee, but are not necessarily endorsed by their entire respective governments.  Other 
IGAs are concluded by civil servants or other political staff, notably in working groups or 
various intergovernmental committees.   The extent of this practice is difficult to assess.  
Whether these actors have the authority to conclude IGAs that are binding qua contracts is 
unclear.  As in the Canadian case, their authority would likely depend on rules of public law 
within their respective legal orders, and could raise issues of ostensible mandates and so 
on.204  This is where a potential analogy with ordinary government contracts, which is 
summarily rejected by Belgian analysts,  could be relevant.   
 
4.2.3.2 Limits ratione materiae 
  
There is no prohibition in Belgium concerning the conclusion of cooperation 
agreements of a political nature, any more than there is in Canada.205  S.92bis is drafted in 
permissive terms and allows parties to conclude agreements which “notably” deal with the 
creation and management of joint services or institutions, the joint exercise of respective 
competences (“compétences propres”), or the development of joint initiatives”.  Despite this 
very broad, and non-exhaustive, wording, governments still face certain ratione materiae 
limitations.    
 
• Constitutional limitations   
 
The Belgian Court of Arbitration and the legislative section of the Council of State have 
consistently ruled that federal partners may only conclude cooperation agreements in the 
exercise of their respective constitutional powers.206  Agreements may not be used to transfer, 
trade, cede or accept constitutional competences, even with parliamentary approval.207   These 
limitations are examined in greater detail in Chapter 6, as they essentially rest on the 
subordination of agreements to constitutional and quasi-constitutional norms.  At this stage, 
three examples will illustrate the type of ratione materiae limitations that can preclude the 
characterisation of IGAs as legally-binding instruments inter partes.  
 
In its assessment of a bill meant to implement a European directive on the 
liberalisation of electricity, the CSLS contested the constitutionality of a clause anticipating 
                                                
204 Supra, 4.1.2.1  
205 Supra, 4.1.2.2. 
206 Some of their rulings and opinions are discussed in Chapter 6, as this is essentially a question of 
the subordination of agreements to the Constitution in the hierarchy of norms.   
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the conclusion of a cooperation agreement to clarify grey zones in the distribution of 
competences between federal authorities and Regions.  For the Council, this is not the role 
of s.92bis: federal partners cannot, by consent, alter the distribution of competences.208   The 
CSLS has also strongly denounced the use of agreements as instruments of spending 
power.  An entity can only fund a project over which it has legislative authority.  Hence, the 
CSLS held unconstitutional an agreement enabling Regions to invest in the rail system, an 
exclusively federal matter.209  Respect for the autonomy of components of the federation, 
coupled with the exclusivity of competences, leads to a constitutional bar on the use of 
agreements to impose conditions even on an apparently consenting order of government.210   
   
• Required legislative assent   
 
S.92bis explicitly provides that certain types of agreements require the assent of the 
legislative assembly of each party to a cooperation agreement, including agreements that 
introduce obligations for citizens.211  Put another way, executives cannot legislate by 
contract. This question is addressed in Chapter 5, which considers the status of IGAs as 
normative instruments erga omnes.   
 
S.92bis also requires legislative assent when agreements have financial implications 
for parties, or if the matter can only be resolved through statutes.  These two conditions 
constitute limitations ratione materiae to the legally binding character of agreements inter 
partes.  In other words, regardless of the intention of executives party to an agreement, if 
their undertakings require public funding and is not approved by legislatures, it cannot 
constitute a legally binding instrument.212  This would amount to a violation of a specific 
provision of s.92bis.  This is the equivalent to a norm of public order in civil law, or, to stretch 
the analogy, to a norm of jus cogens in international law.  The same is true of agreements 
that deal with matters that are reserved to the legislative branch, although the frontier 
between the legislative and regulatory fields is extremely imprecise.213 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
207 CA17/94; VELAERS, Jan, De Grondwet en de Raad van State: Afdeling wetgeving (Antwerp: Maklu,  
1999) 876. 
208 CSLS (29.12.1999), Doc Parl Ch, 1998-1999, 1933/1, 51-52.  On other opinions to same effect by 
the CSLS: MOERENHOUT (2001) 609-616. 
209 CSLS 32.367, Doc Parl Vl R (2001-2002) 269, no.1, SNCB. 
210 CSLS Doc Parl  CRW 1998- 1999, 518/1 (WR cannot undertake to spend in GC in matters that fall 
within Walloon competences, as this would amount to tie its exclusive competence in a unilateral 
manner). 
211 “Qui lient les Belges individuellement”.     
212 There are number of agreements – and protocols – containing a repartition of costs concerning a 
particular programme between the various orders of government.  Those are rarely, if ever, submitted 
to legislative assent: Protocole relatif à l'organisation d'une enquête sur la santé, MB 03.06.1997. 
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 The envisaged legislative assent is not the equivalent to parliamentary appropriation 
in Canada, which is accomplished in very general terms.214  While a list of agreements and 
protocols involving public funds is appended to Acts approving budgets, this is not sufficient.  
S.92bis imposes that the agreement itself, and any subsequent agreement modifying it or 
implementing it, be submitted to assemblies.215      
 
Finally, the actual character of the legislative Act giving assent to an IGA is uncertain.  
For some, it is a formal act on parliamentary control over the executive, by contrast to a truly 
normative, legislative action.  Others, maintain that is has the actual force of statute.216    The 
distinction may be relevant to the characterisation of the instrument as a norm erga omnes 
and potentially to its place in the hierarchy of norms.  It is not, however, to the 
characterization of the agreement as a contractual instrument: so long as assemblies 
approve it, this ratione materiae restriction is lifted.      
 
• The "rule against abdicating freedom of executive 
initiative" 
 
When contracting with private parties, executives in Belgium may not bind themselves 
with regards to fundamental “government functions”.  For instance, the Council of State has 
ruled that the Flemish Region could not restrict its regulatory power by concluding 
“environmental conventions” with business association unless the legislation guaranteed that 
the executive could still intervene in the public interests.217  This “rule against abdicating 
freedom of executive initiative”218 is a close cousin to the common law rule against fettering 
of discretion.   
 
Remarkably, this limit ratione materiae has never been invoked in the literature on 
cooperation agreements.  It is as if s.92bis had the effect of relaxing the rule that public 
authorities may not contract regarding government matters. Parties to cooperation 
agreements can bind themselves with regards to their “government functions” to the extent 
that they do not abdicate a constitutional power in favour of another government.   
  
In a federal system in which powers are nearly all distributed on an exclusive basis, 
the line between the abdication of a constitutional power and a permissible commitment to 
                                                                                                                                                   
213 Certain constitutional provisions expressly provide that a matter must be governed by statute (and 
by implication cannot be the object of delegated legislation, for ex. s.63, Constitution (determination of 
political ridings): MAST (1989) 28-29.    
214 As we saw, appropriation only affects the executory character of a contract or an IGA, not its legal 
characterisation per se: supra, 4.1.2.3. 
215 CSLS 24.479, Doc CRW, 1995/96, 162. 
216 Infra, 5.2.1. 
217 CSLS  22.285/8, Doc Parl Fl 1992-1993, 401/1.    
 127 
another order of government may be thin.  For instance, the Council of State held that federal 
undertakings not to extend the application of particular tax amounted to an abandonment of 
constitutional competence in favour of Regions, since the determination of the tax base was 
an exclusive federal competence.219  In exchange, the Regions had also undertaken not to 
exercise certain of their taxing powers.  For the CSLS, this fell outside the purview of s.92bis.  
The Council does not affirm that it is a political instrument, but clearly denies its legal 
character.  In Canada, this would likely have been analysed through the prohibition to 
contract for legislation.220    
 
• The problem of civil law obligations 
 
A notable difference with the Canadian situation relates to IGAs that contain 
undertakings of a civil or commercial nature.  Indeed, we saw that in Canada, contracts that 
are clearly governed by the private law of contracts can be classified as IGAs.  This is the 
case of leases, sales, or security for loans.221  In fact, a strict application of the rule against 
fettering would imply that only such agreements could undoubtedly be legally-binding inter-
partes.  Considering such “private” law contracts as IGAs is not problematic because both 
are subject to the same judicial institutions.222   
 
In theory, the conclusion of civil law arrangements should not be excluded from the 
non-exhaustive list of allowed subject matters included in section 92bis.  The difficulty is not 
truly one of content, but of courts of competent jurisdiction.  “Ordinary” government contracts 
are subject to ordinary courts.223  As we saw, cooperation agreements are subject to special 
cooperation tribunals.224  This has two consequences.  Either, agreements that qualify as civil 
contracts are disqualified as cooperation agreements.225  Or, a sub-category of optional 
agreements, those which share very close resemblance to private contracts, are subject to 
                                                                                                                                                   
218 QUERTAINMONT, Philippe, “Les nouveaux instruments contractuels utilisés par l’Administration et 
la compétence du juge administratif”, (2000) 1 TPB 39-52, 43. 
219 CSLS, Doc Parl, Senate 1997-1998, I-803/1, 13-14 (Eurovignette); MOERENHOUT (2001) 610. 
220 See, however, the arbitration decision on the Tax Rental Agreements which did not comment on 
the potential invalidity of agreements not to tax: supra, 4.1.3. 
221 Some such IGAs are actually included in the federal registry of IGAs: loan agreements, concession, 
etc. 
222 Supra, 1.2.3.   
223 S.145, Constitution.  The Council of State does not have jurisdiction over contracts of the 
administration. 
224 This jurisdiction is compulsory in the case of compulsory agreements, and optional… in the case of 
optional ones, that is, parties may chose to submit them or not.   
225 This is the solution in Switzerland, where only agreements concluded pursuant to the “puissance 
publique” are considered intercantonal conventions (de jure imperii).  Agreements which are founded 
on de jure negocii are ruled by civil law and are considered private law contracts: AUER, Andreas, 
MALINVERNI, Giorgio, HOTTELIER, Michel, Droit constitutionnel suisse, vol. 1: L’État, (Berne: 
Staempli Editions, 2000) 554 and cases cited.  In its opinion on the constitutionality of cooperation 
tribunals, the CSLE noted that they did not contravene s.145 of the Constitution (which reserves the 
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the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, even if the parties chose to submit a dispute to a 
cooperation tribunal.226  In other words, the only category of IGAs which are undeniably 
legally binding in Canada, are either not considered to be IGAs in Belgium at all, or are a 
marginal sub-category of IGAs.   Such agreements would qualify as legal instruments, but not 
as cooperation agreements.   
 
At least one agreement explicitly provided for the resolution of certain types of 
disputes by ordinary courts (those assessing past debts). The agreement also stipulated that 
parties could agree to seize an ordinary court, rather than a cooperation tribunal, of disputes 
relating to administrative questions.227  The agreement was never submitted to legislative 
assemblies. Consequently, the Council of State did not have the opportunity of pronouncing 
on the legality/constitutionality of the clauses (which were apparently never used).  Other 
civil-types of clauses, which could fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of ordinary courts, 
regardless of any explicit provision to that effect, would include those specifying which order 
of government will assume responsibility to pay salaries, or be liable for damages caused by 
employees working in a joint scheme.228    
 
Another potentially relevant factor is that “private” government contracts require the 
equivalent of parliamentary appropriation, but not specific legislative assent.  In other words, 
if clauses in an IGA are considered of a civil law nature, they would not be affected by a 
particularly onerous public law impediment, that is the requirement of legislative assent.  Of 
particular interest in this context would be a number of agreements through which federal 
partners determine respective shares of the cost of common projects.229  While the purpose 
is undeniably of a public law nature, it is at least arguable that the refusal by a party to pay its 
share could be qualified as a civil-type contractual dispute.  A number of such agreements 
have not received legislative assent.    
 
                                                                                                                                                   
resolution of disputes concerning civil rights to ordinary courts) since they did not deal with civil 
matters:  CSLS,  (24.11.1988) Doc Parl Ch 1988-89, 635/1, 80-83.   
226 MOERENHOUT and SMET (1994) 177, admit this possibility.  A cooperation agreement that 
contains both types of clauses would be subject to the jurisdiction of two judicial institutions – neither 
of which having authority over the entire agreement.   
227 AC relatif à la gestion administrative des charges du passé en matière d'enseignement (FED + Fr 
C + Fl C), 07.08.89 (05.10.89). 
228 AC relatif au transport interne (WR – Fr C), 25.05.98 (04.09.99 ; 23.12.99); AC relatif au centre 
fermé pour le placement provisoire de mineurs ayant commis un fait qualifié d’infraction (FED + 3C), 
30.04.02. 
229 AC pour une politique de drogues globale et intégrée (FED + 3C + COCOF + COCON + COCOM + 
3R), 11.05.2003 (02.06.2003) 
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4.2.4 Assessing the case law regarding post-1988 agreements 
 
A number of judicial assessment concerning pre-1988 agreements were reviewed 
earlier.230  Since then, there has been substantial judicial pronouncement concerning the 
validity and constitutionality of agreements (mostly, but not exclusively by the CSLS). 
However, the number of cases concerning the status of agreements themselves is extremely 
limited.  None have dealt with the issue head-on.  Two cases, however, provide some clues 
regarding criteria which, over and beyond public law impediments, may be relevant to the 
characterisation of agreements as binding instruments inter partes.    
 
  The first is an opinion by the CSLS regarding a 1998 cooperation agreement between 
the Walloon Region and the German-speaking Community.  It is framed in lofty terms.231  
The Council held that it did not have jurisdiction to give an opinion on, “a number of clauses 
[that] are deprived of any normative force (“portée”)”.  In other words, regardless of their 
degree of solemnity (this agreement bears the name “cooperation agreement” and received 
legislative assent), most of its content would not appear to be amenable to legal 
characterisation.  Such a statement is, however, at odds with the pervasive conception of 
IGAs as legal instruments. 
 
The second case was rendered by the Council of State, acting in its curative function, 
this time. The convoluted fact pattern flowed from successive constitutional reforms.232  In 
1997, an agreement was concluded between federal authorities and the French Community 
concerning the “loan” of federal civil servants to the former for purposes of collecting a tax 
that had been “communitarised”.  The agreement was neither submitted to legislative 
assemblies, nor published.  In 2001, the same tax was “regionalised”.  The Walloon Region 
did not wish to maintain the arrangement made by the French Community, to which it was 
succeeding.  Affected employees seized the Council of State, which declined to annul the 
decision not to automatically keep them all on payroll.  It ruled that the Region was not a 
party to the 1997 agreement and had no obligation to maintain the arrangement.  This 
consideration of the Walloon Region as a third party clearly suggests an underlying 
contractual analysis.  How the Council would have analysed the situation had the instrument 
been approved by legislation, and thus been transformed into norms erga omnes, is 
unclear.233   
                                                
230 Supra, 4.2.1.1. 
231 As was the case with the pre-1988 version: supra, 4.2.2.1. 
232 CSAS 115.975 (17.02.2003) (Monfils). 
233 The case was clearly not argued as a contract, however (the Council of State may not have been 
competent then). There is no suggestion that the Region could have succeeded the Community in its 
arrangement.  Had the agreement been approved by legislatures, it may be that the Region would 
have been bound by the legislation, until it chose to amend it. This would have squarely raised the 
issue of the possibility of legislating against a cooperation agreement, the key question concerning the 
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4.2.5 Summary conclusions 
 
 The contractual character of Belgian cooperation agreements has given rise to very 
little analysis.  The main purpose for inserting the formal institution in the legal order in 1988-
89 was to remove obstacles to joint action that were derived from the Council of State’s very 
strict interpretation of the impact of the exclusive distribution of competences.  It was also to 
allow the creation of joint organs, and, as we shall see in Chapter 5, the joint adoption of 
norms of general application.  The binding character inter partes was not the main concern, 
and that is still the case.234 
 
 Still, the few authors who have considered this aspect of the institution tend to tacitly 
assume that s.92bis transformed what could only be political protocols into instruments that 
are necessarily of a legal character.  Authority for the first branch of this assumption is not 
altogether convincing (at least with regards to the status inter partes).  As for the second, it 
must be nuanced.  The equivalent to the rule against fettering which still has the potential of 
preventing the characterisation of Canadian IGAs as contractual instruments, has clearly 
been removed in Belgium.235   Despite this facilitation, the status of current cooperation 
agreement still requires an analysis in concreto, taking into consideration a number of indicia 
of legal character.  For instance, agreements with very little “normative content” may fall 
outside the purview of s.92bis. Agreements that fail to meet certain formalities, notably 
legislative assent when required, also.  These indicia of binding character are examined – 
amidst others - in the following section of this Chapter.     
 
4.3  Establishing the contractual status of IGAs 
 
I mentioned earlier that the determination of the legally binding character of IGAs inter 
partes implies the identification of a “threshold of juridicity” between “purely political” 
agreements and those which the legal system will enforce, or at least “recognise”, in the 
sense that some form of third party arbitrator can at least declare that a breach has occurred.   
Placing IGAs on either side of this threshold is a matter of characterisation, which proceeds 
through the use of a number of indicia.  In the following subsection, those will be divided into 
three categories: content, form, and dispute resolution.  The balance between content and 
form is a particularly complex one.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
place of IGAs in the hierarchy of norms (infra: Chapter 6). As it was, the question did not arise.    For 
the record, this famous tax has now been abolished altogether! 
234 Again, the binding character must be distinguished from their place in the hierarchy of norms, 
although if located high in that hierarchy, their status inter partes would of course be particularly well 
protected: infra, Chapter 6.  
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 In the absence of a formal institution of IGAs, the kind of undertakings contained in a 
particular agreement will be very influential in its characterisation as a legal or purely political 
instrument.  IGAs that contain discretionary, woolly or conditional commitments and that are 
framed in exhortatory language (“parties will do their best to ensure X …subject to local 
conditions”) are unlikely to be characterised as legal instruments.  In other words, to adapt a 
metaphor developed by CRAWFORD in a slightly different context, the nature of the “cargo” 
(the types of undertakings) will be highly influential in the characterisation of the “vehicle” (the 
IGA itself).236    
 
The situation is more complicated when a legal order expressly provides for IGAs, as 
is the case in Belgium.  This is simply because the choice of a “formal” instrument, concluded 
pursuant to the “règles de l’art”, by the proper authorities, will carry a strong presumption that 
the instrument is legally binding irrespective of its content.  In that case, an IGA is treated in 
a similar fashion to more classic sources of public law: It may have very little normative 
content, but it is still of legal character.   The question is whether such a presumption is 
rebuttable or not.   
 
 This type of conundrum has generated a substantial debate in the public international 
law literature.  Seeking to distinguish agreements of a legal character from those which are 
“purely political”, internationalists have juggled with these issues of threshold of juridicity, 
relative normativity, and the contest between form and content for a number of years.   
  
Direct transpositions are not warranted, since components of a federation are bound 
by a number of constitutional and other legal obstacles that do not encumber sovereign 
States in the international sphere.  The analogies are nevertheless helpful to attempt to 
decode the prevalent conceptions of the status of IGAs in Belgium and Canada, in spite the 
paucity of the actual analysis of the status of IGAs inter partes in both federations. 
  
4.3.1 A detour through public international law 
 
At international law, treaties are subject to a particular legal regime, notably the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.237  Unfortunately, this Convention contains no 
operative definition to distinguish binding treaties from “purely political” agreements between 
                                                                                                                                                   
235 The term “potential” is meant to convey the apparent tolerance of Canadian courts for limitations of 
executive discretion through cooperative schemes, despite the theoretical position: supra, 4.1.5. 
236 CRAWFORD proposed the metaphor to distinguish rules or treaties which may be multilateral and 
obligations contained therein, which may be bilateral.  CRAWFORD uses the term “ norm ” to refer to 
the rule or treaty.  In this thesis,  “ norm ” refers to the content of an instrument.  It could be a rule, but 
it would not be equivalent to a treaty: a norm would be a rule or obligation contained in the treaty: 6 of 
mimeo. 
237 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1980) 1155 UNTS 354. 
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States.238  The literature and a number of international decisions provide criteria to assist in 
the characterisation of agreements as legally binding.239  Some of these criteria are 
considered below.  At this stage, what is instructive are the distinct attempts at resolving the 
duel between the form of an agreement and the intensity of its normative content.  The 
attempts consist in three distinct presumptions, and of a denial of the very relevance of legal 
characterisation. 
 
First, despite official disclaimers of formalism, some authors adopt a distinctly 
formalist approach.  Hence, for WEIL, any agreement that has the accoutrements of a formal 
treaty must be considered to be of a legal character, regardless of the degree of generality of 
its content.240  Form brings about an “irrebuttable presumption” of legal character, both for 
the instrument and for its content.241  This is somewhat puzzling since treaties need not have 
any particular form.  In practice, however, solemn instruments concluded by Heads of State 
would qualify.  So would, presumably those bearing the official title of treaties as well.  In a 
clearly legal imperialist mode, WEIL seeks to place on the legal side the threshold as many 
instruments as possible.   This conveys a strong belief that law is essential to international 
stability. 
 
FAWCETT takes the opposite view and posits that “there is no presumption that 
States, in concluding an international agreement, intend to create legal relations at all […] 
this intention must be clearly manifested before a legal character is attributed to the 
agreement”.242  The degree of specificity of the undertakings is relevant, but hardly 
determinative. What matters is the explicit – or at least unquestionable – intention to place 
the agreement in the legal sphere.  Paradoxically, FAWCETT then excludes from the domain 
of legally binding agreements those that setting up “joint administrative or technical 
arrangements or providing for cultural co-operation”, without any direct reference to the 
parties’ intention.  In other words, he seems to consider that certain undertakings are simply 
outside the realm of binding agreements and, presumably, that parties could not have 
intended to bind themselves through such instruments.  In any event, the ideological leaning 
                                                
238 A.2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention which defines a treaty as “an international agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law”.  It thus presupposes 
that all instruments to which it applies are of a legally binding character, without providing criteria to 
determine when an agreement “is not governed by international law”; WIDDOWS, Kelvin, “What is an 
agreement in International Law?” (1979) 50 BYIL 117-149, 117; EISEMANN, Pierre-Michel, “ Le 
gentlemen’s agreement comme source du droit international “, (1979) Clunet 326-348, 340-343. 
239 See notably the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1978] ICJ Rep 3 (par. 96; 
joint communiqué can constitute a binding international agreement); Case concerning Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain) (Jurisdiction), [1994] ICJ Rep 112, paras. 22-41 
(signed minutes of a meeting are binding).  Those were invoked in the NS-NF arbitration, supra: 5.13. 
240 WEIL, Prosper, “Towards a relative normativity in international law ?”, (1983) 77 AJIL 413-442, 433. 
241 "Présomption irréfragable": WEIL's comments on Proposed Resolution, VIRALLY Report, T.I, 370. 
242 FAWCETT, J.E., “The Legal Character of International Agreements”, (1953) 30 BYIL 381-400, 385. 
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is clear: States will only be bound if they clearly express their wish to be (and arguably, only 
on certain matters). 
 
Thirdly, the majority of authors take a mid-way position and maintain that agreements 
between States should be considered legally binding, unless the parties’ intention not to bind 
themselves in law is clearly demonstrated.  This is, for instance, the position defended by 
GAUTIER,243 WIDDOWS,244 EISENMANN,245 PELLET,246 MUNCH247 and VIRALLY.248  
There is a clear penchant for a legal characterisation, but an openess to the possibility that 
even with all the trappings of a formal treaty (whatever this may look like), the instrument 
may be of a purely political character.  In any event, if the parties’ intention to shield their 
agreement from the law is explicit, it ought to be respected. 
 
To schematise, authors in the third group consider international agreements to be 
legally binding instruments until proven otherwise.249  FAWCETT presumes that an 
agreement between States is “purely political” until proven otherwise.  As for WEIL, what 
appears to be a treaty must be considered as such.  Form leads to an irrefutable 
presumption.  
 
In addition to these three presumptions, which all aim at placing international 
agreements on the political or the legal side of a threshold, a fourth approach questions the 
very relevance of that threshold.  Hence BAXTER notes that some clearly legal instruments   
are unenforceable because of the nature of their content.  Contrariwise, instruments that 
cannot be characterised as legal instruments because the parties’ intention to maintain them 
in the political sphere is undeniable, may contain clear and precise undertakings and have a 
very high degree of effectiveness simply because parties adhere to their word.  In other 
words, “it is excessively simplistic to divide written norms into those that are binding and 
                                                
243 GAUTIER, Philippe, Essai sur la définition des traités entre États : la pratique de la Belgique aux 
confins du droit des traités, (Brussels: Bruylant, 1993) 322. 
244 WIDDOWS (1979) 139-142.   
245 EISEMANN (1979) 344. 
246 PELLET, Alain, “Le bon grain et l’ivraie : plaidoyer pour l’ivraie (Remarques sur quelques 
problèmes de méthode en droit international du développement) “, in Le droit des peuples à disposer 
d’eux-mêmes : méthodes d’analyse du droit international: Mélanges offerts à Charles Chaumont, 
(Paris: Pedone, 1984) 465-493; DAILLET, Patrick, PELLET, Alain (NGUYEN QUOC DINH), Droit 
international public, 7th ed., (Paris: LGDJ, 2002), 389. 
247 MÜNCH, Fritz, “Étude exploratoire sur la distinction entre textes internationaux de portée juridique 
et des textes internationaux dépourvus de portée juridique“ in VIRALLY Report, T.I, 307-327, 324. 
248 VIRALLY Report, Final Report, T.1, 341 ff. 
249 This seems to be the approach also taken by LEVRAT concerning  trans-border agreements 
concluded between “sub-state” units: LEVRAT, Nicolas, Le droit applicable aux accords de 
coopération transfrontière entre collectivités publiques infra-étatiques, (Paris: PUF, 1994) 272-274. 
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those that are not” [as] there is an “infinite variety of ways in which legal norms may reflect 
different intensities of agreement”.250 
 
This is just another way of recognising the impact of soft law, whether the expression 
refers to the “soft” nature of certain “hard” legal instruments (such as lofty clauses of formal 
treaties) or to the “legal” impact of soft instruments (such as the strongly normative content of 
officially non binding instruments).  We return to the issue of the effectiveness of IGAs, 
regardless of their binding status in the concluding chapter.  At this stage, the 
characterisation of IGAs in positive law implies some form of threshold between the legal and 
political domains.    
 
4.3.2 Presumptions and re-characterisations of IGAs   
 
As was mentioned above, in the absence of a formal institution of IGAs in Canada, no 
particular format carries a presumption of legal character.  Whether there is a general 
presumption that IGAs are political until proven otherwise is uncertain.   
 
My working hypothesis was that there was such a presumption.  A number of relevant 
actors certainly share it.  These include top civil servants and political staff who negotiate 
IGAs.   Whether courts also share it is difficult to assess.  To the extent that older cases 
sought to assimilate IGAs with private law contracts, it is arguable that most agreements 
between governments are suspect until they can be “brought down” to something that looks 
like a private contract.  It is also arguable that in certain obiter dicta dating from the 1990s, 
the Supreme Court leaned towards that presumption.  On the other hand, in 1976, the 
Supreme Court recognised, although again obiter, that governments could bind themselves 
though IGAs.251  Moreover, when not confronted with the issue head-on, courts do not seem 
uncomfortable with the idea that IGAs are binding on governments. 
 
In brief, it is unclear whether a FAWCETT-type presumption applies or not.  The 
determination of the binding character of an IGA inter partes will therefore rest on an analysis 
of indicia, perhaps in view of overturning a presumption against legal characterisation.    
  
The situation is, again, more complicated in Belgium.  The early Belgian doctrine 
assimilated IGAs with contract or treaties without considering issues of threshold.  This 
seemed an implicit assumption that agreements concluded pursuant to the newly adopted 
section 92bis were necessarily of legal character inter partes.   In other words, cooperation 
agreements were considered as a formal legal source.  The normative content did not really 
                                                
250 BAXTER, R.R., “International Law in ‘Her Infinite Variety’ “, (1980) ICLQ 549-566, 565-566.    
251 Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 SCR 373 [Anti-Inflation Reference] 433. 
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matter to their legal characterisation.  This is reminiscent of WEIL’s approach to international 
agreements: if it looks like a treaty (IGA), it is legal in character, and its content is legally 
binding, even if of a very low normative force. 
 
A less radical solution is to treat formal cooperation agreements as the “third group” 
of internationalists treat international agreements: they are legal instruments until proven 
otherwise.  A number of criteria could lead to such recharacterisation so as to counter the 
presumption, including their normative content. 
 
This approach is more compelling.  A presumption of legal character makes sense to 
the extent that section 92bis must have modified something to the situation which prevailed 
until 1988 and in which (pre)federal partners could conclude agreements which were 
considered merely of political value.  This does not imply, however, that every instrument 
concluded pursuant to s. 92bis is necessarily of a legal character.  An in concreto analysis is 
also required.  This analysis can have three effects.   
 
First, it can simply confirm the presumption that the formal cooperation agreement is 
a legal instrument, binding inter partes.  But it can also serve to recharacterise a formal 
agreement as an agreement with very low normative content - because the undertakings are 
conditional, discretionary or formulated in vague terms – as a “purely political” protocol.  
Hence, the Legislative section of the Council of State (CSLS) rendered an opinion on the 
legality of a proposed legislative instrument giving assent to a framework cooperation 
agreement outlining in broad terms the wishes of different governments to cooperate in the 
future.252   For the CSLS, the lack of normative content (“portée juridique”) of some of the 
clauses was such that it considered that it lacked jurisdiction to comment on them. It added 
that this was likely not the type of agreement envisaged by section 92bis.  This was an 
implicit form of re-characterisation “down” of a formal cooperation agreement.253 
 
Conversely, and perhaps more controversially, recourse to indicia of legal status 
should also allow for the recharacterisation of instruments which are not officially entitled 
“cooperation agreements” and which do not contain any reference to section 92bis, but which 
serve similar purposes. 254  Of course, not every protocol is susceptible of re-characterisation 
                                                
252 CSLS, opinion on the 30.11.1998 CA between GC and FC: CSLS Doc CRW 1998-1999, 518/1 and 
MB 08.09.1999, Annexe 2, 11. 
253 Note that the CSLC did not declare itself without jurisdiction over the entire instrument, but only 
with regards to the woolly clauses.     
254 Recharacterisation of other apparently contractual instruments has taken place in Belgium.  In 
section 4.3, we saw that the Council of State had re-characterised collective agreements as 
regulations.  Closer to our concerns, DE ROY has criticised the formalist approach taken to “contrats 
de gestion” by the Council of State and suggested an in concreto analysis, based notably on the 
nature of the undertakings: DE ROY (2002). 
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as legally binding.  It would have to meet a number of indicia of legal status (as analysed 
below).   
 
Obviously, the parties’ intention to situate their agreement in the legal sphere would 
be difficult to demonstrate, if an instrument which carries a strong presumption of legal 
character – as do section 92bis agreements - is set aside in favour of a much more 
indeterminate one.  The question then becomes whether parties are absolutely free to 
conclude agreements that are shielded from the law.   
  
 Given the undeniable para-constitutional functions played by IGAs, I would argue that 
federal partners do not enjoy the unbounded freedom that States have to conclude “purely 
political” international agreements.255  The limits faced by governments within a federation 
may have more in common with the public law limitations imposed on private parties in the 
field of labour or consumer law, than to States.   When a legal system includes mechanisms 
for parliamentary control or judicial review of IGAs, as does the Belgian one, executives 
should not be allowed to circumvent them by using other instruments that have the same 
purpose and effect as those subject to controls.  
 
As was argued in the section on the re-characterisation of IGAs as regulatory 
instruments, this suggests that courts may be entitled to disregard the parties’ intention not to 
be bound in law, when in so doing they are attempting to avoid procedures put in place to 
ensure parliamentary control or judicial review.256   In other words, a court should be able to 
re-characterise an agreement despite the parties’ intention, if it is in the public interest to do 
so.  Ascertaining what is in the public interest is, of course, difficult, particularly in a dispute 
between two governments which each claim to represent it.  But ensuring that an agreement 
is subject to parliamentary or judicial review, as provided by law, is certainly in the public 
interest however conceived, in a State governed by the rule of law. It is, moreover, a proper 
judicial function.   
 
It should be pointed out that if parties conclude a protocol to avoid submitting a formal 
cooperation agreement to legislative assent, a re-characterisation may result in a legal 
instrument rather than a “purely political” one, but one that is invalid for violating section 
                                                
255 By not using anything that looks like a treaty for WEIL, by stating their lack of intention to be bound 
at law for the “third group” and arguably, by doing nothing, for FAWCETT. 
256 See discussion above, section 4.3.3 on the re-characterisation of ministerial circulars as regulatory 
instruments. 
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92bis.257  The practical interest may be limited to the not altogether insignificant message 
that governments are bound by rules of public law, even in their inter partes dealings.258 
 
The foregoing may be somewhat abstract, given the limited likelihood that a party to a 
protocol would even attempt to have it characterised as a binding instrument.  The situation 
is not inconceivable, however.  This could occur, for instance, following a change of 
government.    
  
4.3.3 Indicia of legal status 
 
Assessing the status of IGAs inter partes thus requires an exercise of characterisation 
which can confirm or overturn a presumption. Scattered clues can be gleaned in Canadian 
and Belgian cases, not in any systematic fashion.    
 
 As was mentioned earlier, every body of law in which agreements are concluded has 
sought a test for distinguishing between those with and those without legal character.  The 
following “indicia of legal status”,259 taken in combination, can lead to a conclusion that a 
particular agreement is binding inter partes as a contractual instrument in the Canadian and 
in the Belgian contexts.  This non-exhaustive list is derived from a variety of sources, with 
adjustments that take into account the public law of each federal system.  In addition to the 
limited indicia provided in the Canadian case law, these sources include tests proposed to 
distinguish treaties from international agreements devoid of legal character,260 gentlemen’s 
agreements from binding private contracts,261 and the limited literature on tests to distinguish 
IGAs of a legal character from those that do not cross the threshold of juridicity.262   
 
 Before turning to these indicia, however, the issue of intention must be briefly 
revisited.  Intention or consent to make a commitment is - by definition - essential to the 
concept of agreement.  Whether the “meeting of wills/minds” paradigm ever truly applied in 
                                                
257 Which, it will be recalled, requires that agreements which impose obligations on third parties, 
thread on the domain of the legislative branch, or have financial implications, receive legislative 
assent. 
258 The same is true of the re-characterisation of any instrument – including an IGA – as a regulatory 
one, which is then considered invalid because it was not submitted to the legislative section of the 
Council of State: supra, 4.3.3.2. 
259 The expression is borrowed from KENNETT (1993) 656. 
260 WIDDOWS (1979)137 ff; FAWCETT (1953) 388-91; BAXTER (1980) 552 ff; DAILLET and PELLET  
(2002) 388-389; EISEMANN (1979) 343. 
261 DIRIX, E., “Le ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ dans la théorie du droit et la pratique contemporaine”, 
(1999) 76 RDIDC 224-245 ; LEFEBVRE, Brigitte, “Le ‘gentlemen’s agreement’: aspects théoriques et 
pratiques”, in Association canadienne de droit comparé, Droit contemporain 1998, (Cowansville: Yvon 
Blais, 1999) 91-99 ; ALLEN, David, “The Gentleman’s Agreement in Legal Theory and in Modern 
Practice”, (2000) 29 Anglo-American LR 204-227. 
262 KENNET (1993) 655 ff.; BLACKMAN (1993) 7-19 and 40 ff.; GARCIA MORALES (1998) 111-131.  
The first two in the Canadian context, the last one drawing on Swiss and German case law. 
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private law, and regardless of the supreme role played by the intention of States in the 
consensual international legal order,263 it is clear that federal partners do not enjoy the same 
unbounded freedom to consent to bind themselves in law.   
 
First, as we saw, a number of public law impediments can preclude the legal 
characterisation of an agreement regardless of the parties’ intention.  Secondly, I have also 
questioned whether federal partners were free to conclude “purely political” agreements that 
have the same object as formal cooperation agreements but are meant to be shielded from a 
number of parliamentary or judicial controls.  The re-characterisation of protocols would likely 
counter the parties’ intention.  This is possible in Belgium, where a formal institution of 
cooperation agreement exists, with a number of rules of public law concerning IGAs.  
However desirable such rules may be, they simply do not exist in the Canadian context.  In 
other words, the parties’ intention to conclude “purely political agreements” is less restrained 
under Canadian than under Belgian public law.  It remains a central element in both, 
however. 
  
The parties’ intention not to bind themselves can be expressed in the text, which may 
direct that it is “binding in honour only”.264  Such explicit denial of legal status is exceptional, 
in every field of law.  They are extremely rare in the context of IGAs in Canada, with the 
exception of agreements concerning negotiations regarding self-government with aboriginals, 
for instance.265  I have not seen any such disclaimers in Belgium. 
 
In fact, parties are rarely unequivocal about their intentions to create – or to avoid – 
legal relations.266  For one thing, parties may simply never turn their mind to the question, 
focused on reaching an agreement on a particular policy issue.  They may even have 
deliberately chosen to remain vague in order not to clearly place the instrument in the legal 
or purely political domain.  Reaching an agreement on substance may have been at the cost 
of this vagueness.   
                                                
263 After a variety of fates reserved by various Reports, the criteria of the parties’ intention was 
removed from the clause concerning the scope of the Vienna Convention, notably on grounds that it 
was implicit in the expression “international agreement”: WIDDOWS (1979) 136.  See however, fn 45 
of the NS-NF Arbitration (Phase I), which suggests that the intention to be bound under international 
law may not actually be required for a treaty.  This said, the element of intention is recurrent in the 
sentence: see for instance, par. 4.16, 4.21, 5.1 and 7.3.   It will be recalled that the Arbitration Tribunal 
was directed to assess the existence of an inter-provincial IGA, as if the issue were governed by 
international law.    
264  BLACKMAN (1993, 10, fn16) gives an example of a Statement of Principles relative to an Alberta 
Oil Sands Project which explicitly provided that it “is not intended to and does not create legally 
enforceable rights and obligations”. 
265 Accord politique pour l’examen d’une forme de gouvernement au Nunavik par l’institution d’une 
Commission du Nunavik (FED + QC + Nunavik), 05.11.1999 (SAIC 1999-033). 
266 BLACKMAN (1993) 9.  In Banque nationale du Canada v. C.S.R. de Tilly, 1990 RJQ 1536, 1538 
(CAQ), the Québec Court of Appeal insisted on the importance of assessing the parties’ intention, 
even though it is often “hazy” (“brumeuse”).  
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The parties’ intention thus generally needs to be inferred from some objective factors.  
Reconstructing an allegedly common  “intention” a posteriori can be a hazardous endeavour 
and attributing an intention to collective bodies such as members of a federation poses a 
particular difficulty.  This is, however, a common quandary in the case of international 
treaties or commercial contracts concluded by multinationals.  The parties’ intention is largely 
assessed “objectively”, by looking at what parties wrote and did – when this intention is not 
expressed, courts may simply imply terms that they consider reasonable.267  Finally, courts 
may impute an intention on parties, as a mask for what I described above as factors 
precluding binding status.268   
 
We can now turn to the indicia of contractual character, which revolve around content, 
form, the parties’ behaviour and the impact of dispute resolution mechanisms.  
 
4.3.3.1 Content as indicia 
 
Subject matter: In both federations, there are, as we saw, ratione materiae 
limitations to the conclusion of IGAs of a legal character.  In Belgium, the concern is mostly 
with agreements that would imply an abdication or a transfer of constitutional competences.  
Section 92bis, has, however, apparently lifted limitations against abdicating “freedom of 
executive initiative” to the extent that it does not imply an abdication of competences.  As we 
saw, the line between the permissible and the prohibited is difficult to draw.  In Canada, the 
validity of agreements which derogate from the formal distribution of competences is, as we 
saw, uncertain, to the extent that there is no direct transfer of legislative power.    
 
Concretely, this suggests that in both countries arrangements to co-manage a project 
over which each partner has constitutional competence and which does not imply the 
abandonment of authority – even temporarily – in favour of another party, are more likely to 
                                                
267 MARSCH, P.D., Comparative contract law: England, France, Germany (Aldershot: Gower, 1994) 
22.  In a recent case on tendering, the Supreme Court of Canada opted for a subjective approach, 
noting that the determination of the parties’ intentions must focus on the actual intention of the parties, 
and that a court “must be careful not to slide into determining intention of reasonable parties”.  It then  
concluded that given the facts, it was “reasonable” to imply a particular term and “reasonable” to infer 
that the respondant would only accept compliant tenders.  The subjective test is thus infused with 
objective assessment: M.J.B.  Enterprises Ltd. v. Defence Construction (1951) Ltd, [1999] SCR 619, 
635. 
268 For instance, instead of basing a decision on the rule against fettering, the Privy Council held that it 
was unreasonable to construe a contract between Ottawa, British Columbia and a railway company as 
binding in perpetuity BC v. Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Co, [1950] AC 87 (PC), rev’g [1948] SCR 
403 (the SCC had taken the opposite approach in R. v. Dominion of Can. Postage Stamp Vending 
Co., [1930] SCR 500).  In the Railway Standardisation case supra, 4.1.3, two judges denied that the 
parties could have had the intention of binding themselves in law through the impugned IGA, when, 
fundamentally, their objection rested with the nature of the undertakings, which they did not consider 
proper contractual material: 148-149 (McThiernan J.) and 153-154 (Windeyer J.). 
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be qualified as creating legally binding obligations, than an IGA with clear para-constitutional 
functions.   
 
Agreements with financial implications must be examined through two angles.  As 
channels for spending by one order of government in an area over which it has no 
constitutional competence they would constitute an inadmissible violation of the distribution 
of powers in Belgium, while, as we saw, the impact is uncertain in Canada.269  However, 
funds invested as an exercise of proper constitutional competences would constitute a good 
indicia of legal character.  In Canada, the closer an IGA comes to a commercial 
arrangement, the more likely it will be considered legally binding. In Belgium, such an IGA 
could be re-characterised as a “civil law” contract.270 
  
Precise undertakings:  Agreements couched in exhortatory language, or which are 
conditional on external factors, or even more on factors over which parties themselves have 
a degree of control, are less likely to be qualified as legally binding.   However, in the Belgian 
case the weight of such a factor differs if the undertaking is included in a formal section 92bis 
agreement, or if it is included in a protocol.  In general, framework agreements are less likely 
to give rise to legally binding obligations than specific agreements to which they give rise.271 
This is just an application of the principle that obligations contained in contracts must be 
precise and possible.  
 
Consideration:  Historically, the common law would only enforce promises for which   
something in return was granted.272  While the formalistic requirement concerning 
“consideration” has been loosened over the years, language referring to consideration may 
indicate an intention to create legal relations.273  It seems highly unlikely that a court would 
deny legal character to an IGA on those grounds today, but it cannot be entirely excluded.  
Consideration is of course irrelevant in the Belgian case, or with regards to IGAs concluded 
between Ottawa and Québec. 274     
                                                
269 Supra, 4.2.1.2. and 4.2.2.2. 
270 Or remain an IGA, but fall under the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, as do civil contracts: supra, 
4.2.2.2. 
271 BLACKMAN (1993) 13.  
272 ATIYAH, P.S., An introduction to the Law of Contract, 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 117.  
273 Of all authors writing on IGAs in Canada, only CULAT lists it amongst conditions of validity of IGAs, 
but notes that a seal could serve the purpose.  Such formalities are extremely rare in practice (if ever 
used): CULAT, Didier, Les ententes intergouvernementales: nature juridique, considérations 
constitutionnelles et règlement des différents, étude préparée pour le Secrétariat aux affaires 
intergouvernementales canadiennes, Québec, 1990, 33-34.   
274 Unless one were to assume that an IGA, because of its “public” nature, is governed, even in 
Québec, by the common law and not the civil law.  Such an assumption seems quite improbable, 
notably because it is unclear which common law would apply in this case, since there is no “federal 
common law” in Canada.  The esoteric civilian “cause” (which goes to purpose rather than bargain) 
could theoretically be used to defeat some violation of public law rules, although its use to defeat the 
parties’ intention is extremely rare: MARSCH (1994) 103-104.  
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Specific clauses:  “Coming into force” clauses would appear to be neutral, unless 
they indicate a date at which a specific legal situation is to change.  By contrast, termination 
clauses, which underline that parties can alter the agreement by consent, or failing which 
after a specified notice period signal that parties agree not to renege on their undertakings 
unilaterally.   
 
Particular clauses can also provide clues to the status of an IGA.  For instance, a 
clause providing that the annulment or non-application of a part of the agreement does not 
affect the remainder is a good indication that it is meant to bind the parties.275  Similarly, 
undertakings by a party to indemnify another one for services rendered, or in case of 
damages, are suggestive of legal character.276 
 
4.3.3.2 Form as indicia 
 
Title:  In Belgium, the “cooperation agreement” label probably has the same impact 
as the use of “treaty” in public international law.277  It is not determinative, but creates a 
stronger presumption of legal character than terms such as “protocol”.  The term 
“convention” is particularly ambivalent, as it refers both to a civil law contract, and to what 
parties obviously consider as a non-legally binding agreement.  In Canada, nearly forty 
different labels have been given to IGAs in both French and English.  In the absence of one 
formal term that carries a presumption of legal character, the designation of an IGA in 
Canada is not a strong indicia of status, although, again, a “loan agreement”  is more 
suggestive of legal character than a “letter of cooperation”.      
 
 Language used:  There are no standard rules of drafting IGAs, or even guidelines 
for civil servants, most of whom have no legal training. Consequently, drafting style must be 
used with caution as an indicator of legal status.  As a general rule, the use of the verb “shall” 
- by opposition to “will” - connotes a legal undertaking.  In French, this distinction is reflected 
in the use of the present as opposed to the future tense.278   This, however, is only a rough 
                                                
275  Agreement Respecting Legal Aid in Criminal Law Matters and in Matters Relating to the Young 
Offenders Act (FED + AB) 01.04.1996, s.21(2). 
276 Entente entre le gouvernement du Québec et le gouvernement du Canada concernant la présence 
d’une représentation économique en République populaire de Chine au sein de la mission 
diplomatique canadienne à Beijing, 01.08.1998 (SAIC 1998-023); Accord de coopération relatif à la 
problématique des transports scolaires entre le Gouvernement de la Communauté française et le 
Gouvernement de la Région Wallonne (Fr C + WR), 25.05.98 (15.07.99).   
277 According to art.1(a) of theVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the formal designation that 
parties have chosen for an instrument is irrelevant to its formal status.    
278 Interestingly, GAUTIER (1993) 365, 469, discusses the “shall/will” distinction, but does not mention 
the equivalent distinction in French (present/futur), which suggests that this distinction is not generally 
seen as relevant in Belgium.  Nor does he mention the potential distinction in Dutch. 
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guideline.279  It is not rare, for instance, for the terms “shall” and “will” both to be translated 
into the present tense in the French version of an IGA.  Legal jargon such as indemnification, 
responsibility are – logically – also indicative of legal undertakings. 
 
Signature:  A signature is no clear indication that parties intend to be bound in law.  
The absence of signature, however, could signal a lack on intention to bind.  But it may also 
simply result from bureaucratic error.   It is not unusual for government to be unable to locate 
a properly signed copy of an IGA.  Again, this is the type of indicia that can only be 
understood in context.280   
 
Format:  As we saw, Belgian IGAs bearing the title of “cooperation agreement”, 
referring explicitly to section 92bis, including recital of constitutional provisions and signed by 
Ministers, carry a strong presumption of juridicity.  The more an agreement moves away from 
traditional form, however, the more likely its content is to play a determinative role in the 
qualification of the instrument.281  In the absence of a typical format in Canada, presentation 
is largely irrelevant. 
  
Domestic formalities: The failure to submit an IGA to cabinet for approval, or to 
obtain a legally required signature may deprive an IGA of validity in the legal order in which it 
was required.  It is not obvious that it would deny legally binding character to the IGAs inter 
partes.282 This being said, failure to comply with a prescribed formality may be evidence of 
the absence of intention to conclude a binding agreement.  Of course, the good faith of a 
government that concludes an agreement, then fails to follow the proper procedure for   
ensuring its validity, would be called into question.  Were the IGA held not to be binding, 
courts may nevertheless circumvent the problem by resorting to other legal doctrines such as 
estoppel, legitimate expectation, good faith or federal loyalty.283  In Belgium, failure to obtain 
legislative assent regarding agreements that impose financial obligations, bind third parties 
or deal with matters reserved to the legislative branch could not be characterised as legal 
instruments, even inter partes. 
 
                                                
279 For instance, in the Alberta-Canada agreement of 1973, the verb “will” was interpreted as 
compulsory: supra, 4.1.3.   By contrast, in Secunda Marine Services Ltd v. Canada, 2003 NSSC 2 
(canlii), par. 24, the verb "shall" was interpreted indicative of an intention of policy. 
280 Hence, the Federal Court carefully avoided characterising an unsigned IGA but still made rulings 
on its constitutionality: the Contravention case: supra, 4.1.3. 
281 GAUTIER (1993,  356) makes a similar argument with regards to international agreements.  
282 A parallel could potentially be drawn with art.46 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 
although, of course, federal partners have never expressly endorsed such a rule.  In fact, some 
provisions in provincial Acts regarding authority to conclude would suggest the opposite: supra, 
4.1.2.1. 
283 Infra, section 4.4. 
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External formalities:  The binding character of an IGA may depend on some 
external factor or formality over which parties have no control.  In this case, the IGA could be 
understood as legal in character, but under a suspensive condition.  If, however, the parties 
can exert some influence over the realisation of that external condition, it is arguable that an 
IGA would lack legal character until they take necessary steps to ensure its realisation.284  
 
  Publication:  There are no legal requirements concerning the publication of IGAs in 
either federation.285  While publicity is essential to bind third parties, it is not a factor 
determining  legal character inter partes.  Inclusion in registries would not appear to be 
either, although in Belgium protocols are not listed in the central registry.286  In Canada, 
inclusion in the federal registry is not indicative of legal status, since it is informal, and 
grounded on policy concerns rather than legal ones.287  In Québec, there is a legal obligation 
to keep IGAs to which the province is party, but since this applies to every type of IGA, the 
inclusion is also of little assistance.    
 
4.3.3.3 The parties’ behaviour   
 
The Parties’ behaviour prior or following the conclusion of an IGA is another indicator 
of legal character.  This would be the case, for instance, if the parties treated or referred to 
the IGA as binding in their subsequent dealings, or in relation to third parties.288  A party’s 
actual reliance on an IGA may have distinct legal effects.  It may call for the application of the 
doctrines of estoppel or legitimate expectation, which give some remedy without actually 
characterising an IGA as a legal instrument.289  In other cases, reliance by one party could tilt 
the balance in favour of legal characterisation of an instrument of otherwise doubtful status.  
 
  
4.3.3.4 Dispute resolution provisions  
 
Another indicator of the parties’ intentions to bind themselves in law - or not - is the 
express provision of dispute resolution mechanisms (DRM).  These take a number of forms, 
and raise distinct problems in the two federations.  The Canadian case will be examined first.  
 
                                                
284 NS-NF Arbitration: since any agreement concerning a boundary would have required federal 
approval, failure to submit an alleged IGA to federal authorities indicated a lack of intention to 
conclude a final and binding IGA.      
285 Supra, 2.2.1.5 and 2.2.2.5. 
286 Those with financial implications are annexed to Acts regarding budget approval, however.  
287 I would argue the same applies to the Québec registry. 
288 NS-NF Arbitration, par. 6.1-6.9. 
289 Infra: 4.4.  Detrimental reliance does not, per se, modify the status of an IGA, although, in the 
common law, it tends to be analysed as part of the law of contracts since it can, however, lead to 
remedies similar to those awarded for breach of contract: WADDAMS (1999) 141-149.     
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In a significant number of agreements, parties undertake to resolve their disputes 
through negotiation, by submitting them to a joint committee or to a political body or meeting 
(Ministers, for example).  Hence, of the 880 IGAs available in full-text in the federal registry, 
240 contain explicit “dispute resolution” clauses, the vast majority of which refer to 
management committees or other non-judicial organs.  This does not necessarily exclude 
eventual recourse to a court of law, though it may do so.  Sometimes “alternative” dispute 
resolution mechanisms simply take precedence over judicial solutions.  Sometimes they oust 
them.290  The precise drafting of the clauses must be analysed in light of all the other indicia.   
 
Some agreements specifically envisage the creation of arbitration tribunals for dispute 
resolution.   Of the 240 explicit DRM clauses, 84 specifically provide expressly for resolution 
of disputes by the Federal Court.291  A lesser number refer to provincial Superior Courts.292  
These two solutions have a potentially distinct impact on the need to clarify the legal 
character of IGAs. 
 
Indeed, as a rule, the Federal Court does not have jurisdiction over the provinces and 
it could normally not entertain a dispute concerning a federal-provincial IGA.293   By exception 
to this rule, section 19 of the Federal Court Act provides that provincial consent – through 
legislation- can confer the Trial Division jurisdiction to resolve “controversies” between 
Canada and that province, or even between two provinces.294  This is an attempt to palliate 
the largely dual nature of the Canadian judicial system in which federal and provincial orders 
have their own judicial institutions.  In this quality, the Federal Court acts as a sort of inter-
federal arbitration tribunal.295  It thus acts as some sort of equivalent to Belgian cooperation 
tribunals. 
 
                                                
290 In Ontario (Chicken Producer’s Marketing Board) v. Canada (Chicken Marketing Agency), [1993] 1 
FC 116 (FCTD), holding governments could not exclude the FC's jurisdiction through an IGA (this was 
jurisdiction in judicial review, however, not regarding a dispute inter partes). See also: Secunda case, 
in which the Court ruled that an IGA including clauses concerning courts of competent jurisdiction was 
simply a "statement of policy", therefore common rules of jurisdiction apply. 
291 Camp Hill Transfer Agreement, 08.05.1978, am. 21.03.1983 and 31.01.1992 (NS00141), s.36. 
292 The precise number is difficult to assess through a key word search because of the distinct names 
borne by the various provincial courts. 
293 The Federal Court’s jurisdiction is statutory and exceptional, by contrast with the inherent 
jurisdiction of provincial Superior Courts:  SGAYIAS, David et al., Federal Court Practice 
(Toronto/Montréal: Carswell, 2002) 6-16.   
294 Federal Court Act, RSC, 1985, c. F-7, s.19.  There may be doubts concerning the constitutionality 
of that section, since the Federal Court only has attributed jurisdiction, which does not extend to 
provincial matters: HOGG and MONAHAN (2000) 362-363; BLACKMAN (1993) 46; LAJOIE (1984) 
176-181. 
295 Only governments can seize the Court pursuant to that section: Union Oil Co. of Can. Ltd. v. R., 
[1974] 2 FC 452 ; aff., [1976] 1 FC 74 (FCA); aff. [1976] 2 SCR v.; Lubicon Lake Band v. R., [1981] 2 
FC 317 (TD), aff. (1981), 13 DLR (4th) 159 (FCA);  Fairford Band v. Canada (A.G.), [1995] 3 FC 165;  
aff. as Fairford First Nation et al. v. Canada (1996), 205 NR 380 (FCA). 
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A number of decisions concerning IGAs examined earlier were actually rendered by 
the Federal Court pursuant to this section.296  The Court has ruled that “controversies” must 
be resolved through recourse to some legal rule or principle (in other words, it does not act 
as a political organ, or simply render decisions that seem fair in the context).297  It has not, 
however, been rigid concerning the characterisation of instruments that give rise to a 
controversy.298  
 
Similarly, specific provision for arbitration seems to avoid concerns about the legal 
characterisation of an IGA.299  Hence, the arbitrators in the Tax Rental Agreement case did 
not concern themselves with the legal character of the IGA at stake.  That its subject matter 
probably precludes it from being legally binding inter partes was not considered an obstacle 
to the resolution of the dispute. 
 
By contrast, a regular court of law would likely start by characterising the IGA as a 
legal instrument before undertaking to enforce it.  In other words, there would be a 
preliminary stage, at which the court would rule on its own jurisdiction to resolve a dispute 
inter partes concerning the interpretation or implementation of the IGA.  When the court or 
tribunal’ jurisdiction is not at issue, the IGA’s character is less problematic.  Courts or 
analysts in Canada have not noted this distinction.  Interestingly, certain federal-provincial 
IGAs refer disputes to the Federal Court, while others, on the same subject but concluded 
with other provinces, refer them to provincial Superior Courts.300  The later would arguably 
have to proceed with a stricter characterisation process than the former.  
 
The status of IGAs providing for complex dispute resolution mechanisms that 
expressly bar ordinary courts is particularly puzzling.  Hence, the Canadian Internal Trade 
Agreement (ITA) contains a detailed dispute resolution system, which excludes binding legal 
solutions, except with regards to certain constitutional issues or the judicial review of certain 
actions by public officials.301  The status inter partes of such IGAs is particularly difficult to pin 
                                                
296 The 1978 PEI ferry case (which dealt with a constitutionalised IGA); the 1983 decision concerning 
the 1973 Ottawa-Alberta agreement; and three of the pre-war cases: the Precious Metal case, the 
Objibway case and the Interest Rate case: supra, 4.1.3 
297 1910 Objibway case, 109-112; 1978 PEI Ferry case, 558. 
298 For instance, it held that s.19 allows it to consider an agreement which otherwise could be 
considered inchoate: PEI Ferry case 1978, 588. 
299 Unless, of course, the arbitration is aimed at establishing whether such an IGA exists, as in the NF-
NS arbitration sentence. 
300 Most bilateral agreements concerning legal aid for young offenders provide that ultimate dispute 
resolution can be sought before the Federal Court or the Superior Court of the Province.  In the case 
of Québec, only the Superior Court is mentioned. Compare: Agreement Respecting Legal Aid in 
Criminal Law Matters and in Matters Relating to the Young Offenders Act, 01.04.1996 (AB01348) s. 
22(2) and same provision in similar federal-Québec agreement (QC01398).   
301 Ss. 1711-1720 of ITA.  The constitutionality of retaliatory action may be submitted to a court of law: 
s.1710(10).  
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down.302  As in the case of the Federal Court acting pursuant to section 19, or specific 
arbitration tribunals, panels do not require to assess the legal character of the ITA to resolve 
disputes concerning its interpretation or implementation.   The referral to third parties to 
resolve disputes excludes a simplistic “purely political” characterisation.  The fact that the 
panel decisions are not binding excludes a classic “legal” characterisation.   
 
In agreeing to such DRMs, governments form a parallel legal structure, which 
borrows from legal pluralism.  This is striking, since normally, legal pluralism refers to legal 
systems that exist in parallel to the official “state” legal system.303    
 
Similar questions arise in Belgium, given that the majority of optional cooperation 
agreements do not provide for dispute resolution by cooperation tribunals,304 although a large 
number create management committees and some specifically set up panels of civil servants 
to resolve disputes.  Such arrangements do not exclude the possibility that a formal 
cooperation tribunal could eventually be seized of a dispute, if parties so chose, but in the 
meantime, there is a clear desire to maintain dispute resolution as an inter-governmental 
affair.  There are no examples, similar to the Canadian ITA in which governments agree to 
submit to third party arbitrators, apart from formal cooperation tribunals.  There would be no 
need to do so. 
  
Such interrogations raise fundamental issues of legal theory, which are beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  They question the “meaning of law” both in the sense of the definition of 
“legal character” (does it necessarily imply enforceability?) and in the sense of the practical 
interest of the whole exercise of characterisation (what is the relevance of law in this context 
if parties resolve their disputes otherwise?).  To conveniently dodge the first aspect, it can be 
pointed out that public law knows of a number of unenforceable norms that are nevertheless 
of a legal character.305  The second aspect is partly addressed in the Final Conclusions.    
  
 In sum, dispute resolution mechanism is a complex indicia legal character.  Explicit 
provision in an IGA regarding the submission of disputes to external neutral parties is a good 
indicator of legal character.  This is the case, for instance, of references to the Federal Court 
                                                
302 On the impact erga omnes of the ITA: infra, 5.2.2.3 and 5.3.2 (discussion concerning the “Colour of 
Margarine case”).    
303 Legal pluralism “challenge[s] the supposed monopoly of the State as the sole source of 
normativity”: NOREAU, Pierre, ARNAUD, André-Jean, “The Sociology of Law in France: Trends and 
Paradigms”, (1998) 25 Journal of Law and Society 257-283, 274. 
304 It will be recalled that pursuant to s.92bis(5)(6),  these tribunals have jurisidiction over compulsory 
agreements and that ordinary courts would be competent regarding “civil law” clauses contained in 
any form of agreement: supra, 4.1.2.2. 
305  This is the case of constitutional conventions in Canada (infra, 6.3.2.2), the protection of social and 
economic rights pursuant to s.23 of the Belgian Constitution.  The absence of enforceability of legal 
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under section 19 or to arbitration, although these organs may not need to qualify the 
instrument in order to set about to resolve a dispute. The same would be true of express 
submission to ad hoc tribunals in Belgium.  If a Canadian IGA provides for submission to an 
“ordinary court”, the indicator of legal character becomes very strong.306  Finally, submitting 
an IGA to a complex external DRM, that is not a classic judicial or arbitration one suggests a 
mid-way approach: neither purely political, neither classically legal.  Such scenarios are 
probably better understood from the angle of legal pluralism.  While Belgian cooperation 
tribunals are officially courts of law, their arbitration character is undeniable.  Moreover, the 
option enjoyed by governments to circumvent these courts of law altogether, even if an 
agreement met every other indicia of legal character 
 
4.3.4 Thresholds and binding force   
 
The logical consequence of any in concreto analysis of IGA as a contractual 
instrument is that the focus should be on what parties have actually agreed upon, rather than 
on the format in which they framed their undertakings.307  To use the cargo and vehicle 
metaphor developed earlier, what matters in the end is the cargo. 308   
 
Of course, the in concreto characterisation of the vehicle requires an assessment of 
its cargo.  As we saw, the correspondence between the type ofundertakings, notably their 
degree of specificity, and an IGA’s character is probably closer in Canada than in Belgium, 
where the presumption of juridicity attached to formal cooperation agreement arguably 
lowers the “content” requirement. 
 
Conversely, determining whether a particular clause contained in an IGA is legally 
binding would partly depend on the characterisation of the vehicle as a legally-binding 
instrument.  Hence, if a court were to determine that the instrument is “purely political” 
because the parties’ intention is undeniable and ought not to be ignored, no degree of 
specificity of the undertaking would make it legally binding.  Faced with an ambiguous clause 
however, a judge may be more inclined to consider it to be legally binding if it is contained in 
an otherwise clearly binding instrument.  Finally, an instrument characterised as having 
binding contractual value, may nevertheless contain certain clauses lacking  normative force.  
This would notably be the case of “mixed” agreements that contain both legally binding and 
                                                                                                                                                   
norms is the rule in public international law: VERHOEVEN, Joe, Droit international public (Brussels: 
Larcier, 2000) 21-24. 
306 Although in Belgium, this would lead to a recharacterisation as a civil law contract, which, of 
course, is legally binding. 
307 In the Railway Standardisation case, Dixon J. insisted on the need to focus on the actual 
undertakings contained in agreement, rather than to seek to characterise the entire instrument itself 
(at 148).   
308 Supra, 4.2.2. 
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non-legally binding undertakings.309   Arguably, given the presumption of juridicity in Belgium, 
the likelihood that an agreement containing such woolly clauses is nevertheless considered 
to be of legal character may be higher. 
  
This suggests that while setting a threshold and determining on which side a 
particular instrument falls may be essential in positive law, it is not sufficient.  For even when 
the border is traced, through recourse to a number of indicia, the matter of “normative 
content” reappears.  On either side of the threshold there can be degrees of normativity.  Put 
another way, even when the threshold is set (following the on-off metaphor), there can be a 
gradation in the intensity of the obligations (more like a dimmer switch).      
 
This is true on the “non legal” side of the threshold.  Parties could make very specific 
undertakings in IGAs held to be “purely political”.  This is a reflection of the soft law impact of 
“purely political” instruments.   More significantly for our purposes, this gradation exists also 
on the “legal side of the threshold.  Some undertakings are simply more “binding” than 
others.310  In Belgium, those would be on the far end of the legal category, close to the 
threshold.  In Canada, those would probably not even make it into the “legal” category.  
  
4.4 The legal effect of IGAs which do not constitute contractual instruments  
 
Intergovernmental agreements that do not qualify as contractual instruments may 
nevertheless have certain legal “effect”.  For one thing, they can assist judges in their 
interpretation of legal norms adopted to give effect to IGAs.311  Judges clearly consider them 
relevant.  We saw for instance that when the status of an IGA is not the direct object of a 
dispute, courts will generally discuss them without questioning their legal character, to assist 
in the interpretation of other norms.312 
 
 There is another sense, however, in which agreements which do not qualify as 
binding instruments can have legal effect. In every field of law in which thresholds of juridicity 
are meant to distinguish binding from non-binding agreements, legal doctrines have the 
potential of affording some legal protection to parties who relied on the representation made 
through the agreement, or the promises it contains, even if those are embodied in texts 
which do not cross that threshold.  This could be for a number of reasons, some technical 
                                                
309 MOORE (1935) 187 refers to those as “mixed agreements”; VIRALLY Report, Final Resolution, 
4(2) T.II, 289. 
310 As BAXTER (1980) argues is the case of treaties: supra, 4.3.1.    
311 Canada Post v. Smith, ONCA c.24323 (CAO); by analogy, the Supreme Court of Canada has used 
international instruments to assist in the interpretation of domestic legislation: Schavernoch v. Foreign 
Claims Commission, [1982] 1 SCR 1092. 
312 Supra, 4.1.3 and 4.2.4. See also infra: 5.3.    
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(lack of proper authority), others related to the impossibility of ascertaining a common 
intention to create legally binding obligations.    
 
 The common law doctrines of detrimental reliance, estoppel, legitimate expectations 
or restitution, or the continental ones of “reasonable expectations” “good administration”, the 
“parallelism of formalities” or unjust enrichment find their source in private or administrative 
law.  Some have also been applied in the international law context.  It is worth reflecting on 
the possibility that – by analogy – they could give legal effect to IGAs actually deprived of 
legal character.   
 
This simple enumeration illustrates the diversity of those devices and the challenge of 
comparing them.  The first difficulty is one of definition and vocabulary.  Many of these 
doctrines are similar but bear different names.  This is an area replete with “faux amis”.  To 
give a few examples, “reasonable expectations” is a private law doctrine in Belgium,313 its 
administrative equivalent being the principle of “good administration”.314  In the common law, 
the latter is generally described as “legitimate expectations”.315  The common law doctrine of 
estoppel316  would find some equivalent in the “parallelism of formalities”317 and simply good 
faith in Belgium.318  While estoppel in the context of international law generally implies some 
form of prejudice on the part of the person or body that relied of some representation.319  In 
the common law, this could be described as detrimental reliance.320 
 
The scope of this thesis does permit an incursion into the various distinctions 
between all these techniques.  Nor is it possible to review the potentially distinct judicial and 
doctrinal treatment they have received in Canada and in Belgium, in contexts other than 
those relating to IGAs.  For it must be pointed out that, apart from a very particular angle 
                                                
313 DIEUX (1995). 
314 MAST (1989) 40-41 describes it as a general principle of law which incorporates notably legal 
security and the guarantee against arbitrariness. The expression "confiance légitime" is also used, 
alhtough less frequently : ERGEC, Rusen, “Le principe de la légalité à l’épreuve des principes de bonne 
administration”, obs. Cass 04.09.1995 (1998) 52 RCJB 5-25, 20.  For a common law plea for an 
application of this principle: CLAYTON, Richard, “Legitimate Expectations, Policy and the Principle of 
Consistency”, (2003) 62 Cam LJ  93-105, 104. 
315 LE SUEUR, Andrew et al., Principles of Public Law, 2nd ed. (London/Sydney: Cavendish 
Publishings, 1999) 287.    
316 WADDAMS (1999) 141-149; ATIYAH (1995) 145-149. 
317 This Belgian doctrine provides that when a formality was used to adopt a particular act, its repeal 
requires similar formalities.  A version of it implies that the revocation of a particular decision must be 
made by the same authority that made the original one: FLAMME, t.I (1989) 361; FAVRESSE (1993-
94) 144: infra, 6.3.1.1.    
318 Van OMMESLAGHE (1987).   
319 SALMON, Jean (dir.), Dictionnaire de droit international public (Brussels: Bruylant, 2001) 450-451 ; 
Le SUEUR (1999) 290. 
320 WADDAMS (1999) 476-477.  
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from which legitimate expectations was argued in the CAP Reference,321 none of these have 
been litigated in either Belgium or Canada in the context of a dispute inter partes concerning 
the violation of an IGA.322   
  
These doctrines all share a common underlying principle, that the law should require 
public authorities to keep their promises and respect the representation that may have 
induced others to rely on them, even when those are not embodied in a formal legal text.  
The following only suggests elementary reflection on their potential application to disputes 
inter partes regarding an IGA. 
 
The following assertion, made in the context of “ordinary” government contracts, 
illustrates the interrelation between these various doctrines. WADDAMS notes that given the 
governments’ increasing role in social and economic activities: 
 
“(i)t would seem desirable that the government should be bound 
by the ordinary law of contracts, including the law relating to 
estoppel, for the alternative is to allow it to profit by disappointing 
the reasonable expectations of the citizen.”323   
 
This statement thus brings together the notions of unjust enrichment, 
legitimate expectations, estoppel and the law of contract. 
  
Of all these, the least controversial is probably unjust enrichment or its equivalent.324    
If a government has benefited from an IGA that turns out not to be of legal character after all, 
and fails to carry out its part of the deal, a convincing plea could be made that the benefit 
should at least be repaid.  Similarly, detrimental reliance (or some equivalent) could 
compensate for quantifiable loss incurred by a party to a non-binding IGA by reason of it 
having acted on the basis that the other party would abide by their agreement.    
  
Estoppel may provide another judicial solution.325 The term, however, has several 
meanings, as was suggested above.  In his 1982 Report to the Institute of International Law 
                                                
321 This is examined infra, Chapter 6, because the argument was made to preclude legislation that was 
contrary to a complex cooperative scheme involving an IGA.  It is analysed through the prism of the 
hierarchy of norms.  
322 Although, this may have been what some judges of the Australian High Court had in mind in the 
Railway Standardisation case: Dixon at 141 Windeyer J, at 155 and Menzies at 150.  See also NS-NF 
Arbitration (Phase I), par. 6.1 ff.; KENNET (1993) 656. 
323 WADDAMS (1999) 476-477 (emphasis added).  
324 The Québec Court of Appeal rejected the argument of unjust enrichment in the context of invalid 
municipal contracts: Corporation of St-Romuald v. S.A.F. Construction, [1974] CA 411 (CAQ) severely 
criticised by GARANT (1996) 544-546.  As for the equivalent in common law restitution:  GRANTHAM, 
R.B., RICKETT, C.E.F., “Disgorgement for Unjust Enrichement”, (2003) 62:1 Cam LJ 159-180, 159. 
325 Its application against public authorities is not entirely resolved in Canada: Mount Sinaï v. Québec, 
[2001] 2 SCR 281; GARANT (1996) 84.  ARROWSMITH (1988) 257 ff., writing about government 
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on international texts having legal “reach” or “import” and those which do not,326 VIRALLY 
used the term in a relatively non-technical manner to argue that parties may be precluded 
from acting in a way which is contrary to an undertaking, despite the fact that the latter lacks 
legally binding character.327    
  
The doctrine of legitimate expectations, and its corresponding principle of “bonne 
administration” could also be invoked as a means of stopping a government from going back 
on its word.  It basically provides some legal protection in cases where a promise or a 
representation had created a legitimate (generally understood as “reasonable”) expectation 
in some other party, even if those are not embodied in formally binding texts (contracts, or 
regulations, for instance).328  The expectation (or reliance, or “confiance”) can arise from an 
express promise or from the conduct of a decision-maker.  What is “legitimate” or reasonable 
is of course subject to substantial debate.  While it may not be reasonable to expect a 
vaguely termed “memoradum of understanding” never to be unilaterally depart from, the 
same may not be true of a detailed arrangement, on the basis on which specific action is 
taken, and that is applied for a number of years.    
 
In the CAP Reference,329 the Supreme Court of Canada denied that the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations could prevent an executive party to an IGA from filing into Parliament 
a legislative bill that had the effect of derogating from the IGA.330  As we shall see, the Court 
ruled that the doctrine of legitimate expectations could never be used to curb Parliamentary 
sovereignty, and that precluding the executive from introducing legislation amounted to 
“paralysing” Parliament.331  The Court did not, however, entirely reject the potential 
application of the doctrine when governments do not act as a conduit in the legislative 
process but in their purely executive or administrative function.  Interpreted a contrario, the 
CAP Reference actually suggests that in the absence of legislative intervention, which the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty cannot restrict, the agreement could have given rise to 
arguments in legitimate expectations.   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
contracts in general, argues that estoppel should particularly be considered when a public authority 
has not followed appropriate procedures 
326 The translation of the more elegant French title obviously proved difficult, both “reach” and “import” 
being used, neither being common English expressions.  The French original was “portée juridique”: 
Compare original Resolution and final one (T.II, pp. 139 and 285).  
327  See also: MÜNCH (1983) 326; SCHACTER 299-301; EISEMANN (1979) 346-347; DAILLET and 
PELLET (2002) 391.  
328 The potential application of these doctrines to protect third party interests is explored infra, 5.4.    
329 Supra, 4.1.3. 
330 In fact, the CAP Reference does not even go that far, since the bill was meant to amend federal 
legislation, not the IGA itself. But it is obvious that the bill had the effect of altering a cooperative 
scheme in which IGAs played a central part. 
331 This is particularly true since pursuant to s.54, Constitution Act, 1867, bills relating to public 
spending may only be introduced by the executive: CAP Reference, 559. 
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In the common law, the doctrine of legitimate expectations has given rise to 
substantial judicial and doctrinal analysis, which cannot be detailed here.332  Of significance, 
is the question whether a government which legitimately relied on a non-binding IGA would 
be entitled to the actual content (“substance”) of the IGA, or whether, it should be entitled to 
some form of explanation, justification, even perhaps negotiations, before the other one can 
depart from it.333  Taken to its logical conclusions, the first solution arguably amounts to a 
round-about-way of enforcing a non-legally binding IGA.  In fact, in the CAP Reference, and 
in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has rejected the substantive branch of 
the doctrine.334   
 
Interestingly, architects of the devolution process in the United Kingdom explicitly 
envisaged that the doctrine of legitimate expectations could apply to curb the freedom of 
executives party to what are undeniably non-legally binding “concordats”.335  Canadian courts 
have been more reluctant to provide an extensive reading of the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations, than their British counterparts.336  It is nevertheless worth considering whether 
the potential influence of that doctrine in the UK in the context of intergovernmental 
agreements could eventually lead to a reconsideration of the issue in Canada.            
 
 In Belgium, these doctrines have apparently not been invoked in the context of 
disputes between federal partners.337  There is certainly no application to cooperation 
agreements.  Analogies, however, are worth considering.  Hence, the administrative section 
of the Council of State has ruled that although internal directives are not formally binding, 
public authorities wishing to derogate from them must provide some reasonable explanation. 
This rests of requirements of “coherent management, equality of treatment and legal 
                                                
332 CRAIG, Paul, “Substantive Legitimate Expectation in Domestic and Community Law”, [1996] 55 
Cam LJ 289-312; FORSYTH, Christopher, “The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate 
Expectations”, (1988) CLJ 238; CLAYTON (2003).  See dissenting judgement in Mount Sinaï v. 
Québec, [2001] 2 SCR 281.   
333 These are respectively known as the subtantive and procedural branches of the doctrine. 
334 In the CAP Reference, the Supreme Court rejected substantive legitimate expectations.  It has 
reiterated that position since:  Baker v. Canada (Min. of Citizenship and Immigration), [1990] 2 SCR 
817, par. 26-29.  Some members of the Court seem to be edging towards some form of substantive 
remedies, but this apparently remains a minority position: Mount Sinaï v. Québec, [2001] 2 SCR 281.  
British Courts, by contrast, are more open to the argument, with a number of nuances: Coughlan; 
CRAIG (1996) 290; Le SUEUR (1999) 287 ff.; CLAYTON (2003).    
335 POIRIER, Concordats. 
336 MULLAN, David, “CAP -Denying Legitimate Expectation a Fair Start ?” (1993) 7 Adm LR  2d, 269-
292.   
337 It is risky to be affirmative on this, since these doctrines go under different names, and the 
reasoning in some case law if often extremely laconic.  The literature does not invoke any such 
doctrines in the context of cooperation agreements, except for UYTTENDAELE who uses it to buttress  
his argument that agreements are located above unilateral norms in the hierarchy of norms: infra, 
6.3.1.1.       
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security” which all partake of the general principle of “good administration”.338  This 
apparently corresponds to the procedural branch of the doctrine of legitimate expectations. 
  
There may be a “communicating vessels” phenomenon between the test for 
determining the legally binding character of an agreement on the one hand, and resort to 
other doctrines which give non binding agreements some legal effect, on the other.  Put 
another way, it is arguable that when it is harder to cross the threshold of juridicity (notably 
because of the presumption against legal status), courts may be more inclined to resort to 
alternative solutions to avoid results that strike as unfair.  Conversely, the presumption of 
legal character in Belgium may facilitate the legal characterisation of an instrument which, in 
Canada, would not cross the legal threshold of juridicity.  In this context, there may be a 
lesser need to resort to alternative solutions. 
 
Regardless of their technical differences, all these doctrines are grounded on similar 
considerations of fairness and good faith, taken in their non-technical, ordinary sense.  In 
some cases, it simply seems unfair to allow a party to renege on its word, on the basis that 
an agreement is invalid, that formalities have not been properly complied with, or even that 
there has been a change in policy.  They are means of softening the potential impact of a 
finding that an agreement falls, for a number of reasons, on the non-legal side of the 
threshold of juridicity.   
  
The foregoing does not imply that any one of these doctrines is necessarily available 
whenever an IGA remains on the “non-legal” side of the threshold.  A priori, they cannot 
serve to circumvent public law restrictions to the binding character of IGAs.339  Hence, if an 
IGA is held to contain undertakings of such a “governmental” nature that it violates the rule 
against fettering of discretion in the Canadian context, resorting to the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations to preclude one party from departing from these undertaking may have exactly 
the same effect.340 
 
Similarly, obtaining redress for non-compliance with a Belgian cooperation agreement 
that violates the distribution of competences, or fails to receive legislative assent when this is 
required may be problematic.  The entire context would have to be considered.  It may be 
that a party’s good faith could be called into question if it failed to submit the IGA to its 
                                                
338 CSAC 24.467 (20.06.1984) (Beheyt); CSAS 63.063 (14.11.1996) (Tasse); CSAS 83.144 
(26.20.1999) (Clareboets no.1).  
339 It is unclear, for instance, that the doctrine should be available in case of lack of budgetary 
appropriation.  Note that in Commauté française v. Trine, the Court of Cass. denied any value to a 
ministerial circular applied for years, but that contradicted formal regulations.  The argument of "bonne 
administration" was not argued: ERGEC (1998). 
340 Recently, an Ontario Court held that a decision of “high policy” excluded any claim in legitimate 
expectations: Black v. Chrétien, (2001-05-10) ONCA c33387 (canlii).   
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assembly.  In such a case, the IGA could not be legally binding, but a court may very well 
seek to provide some remedy to the other party, and to send a message to the defaulting 
executive.   Again, this would amount to a judicial call for the executive to explain or justify its 
actions.   
 
Finally, it must be emphasised that in neither in Canada nor in Belgium can these 
various doctrines counteract the effect of legislative provisions.341  Whether other legal 
doctrines can have the effect of curbing the freedom of the legislative branch to adopt norms 
contradicting IGAs is explored in Chapter 6, as these would have the effect of tempering with 
the hierarchy of norms.342 
 
Detrimental reliance, estoppel or legitimate expectations are unlikely to be used 
indiscriminately to render irrelevant the setting of thresholds between regulatory and 
administrative IGAs on the one hand, or between political and legally-binding contractual 
instruments, on the other.  Reasons why an IGA is held not to cross that threshold would 
have to be examined before an alternative legal remedy is granted.343  These various 
doctrines nevertheless represent judicial means of bringing parties to keep to their words, or 
at least not to cause damages to other governments (or third parties, who relied on those 
words).  They are invoked here to dispel the conclusion that the failure to characterise an 
IGA as a binding instrument implies the ousting of law altogether.    
  
Conclusions 
  
 Intergovernmental agreements have the potential of binding federal partners at law in 
both Belgium and in Canada.  This capacity flows from the inherent power of the executive to 
contract in Canada.  While in Belgium, it is unclear whether federal partners could have 
bound themselves through IGAs prior to the insertion of s.92bis in the 1980 DMA in 1988-89, 
this capacity is now undeniable.  The characterisation of IGAs as binding contractual 
instruments faces a number of hurdles, however.  Assuming those who conclude the 
agreement are duly authorised, certain “public law impediments” could nevertheless interfere 
with any intention to create legal relations.  Some of these impediments are common to both 
federations, others are specific to each.    
                                                
341 Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 SCR 199, 263; TOWNSEND (1991) 293-324; Hogan; MAST 
(1989) 43. 
342 Those include federal loyalty, constitutional conventions and principles of federalism.  Those 
principles are invoked to curb the power of the legislative branch to legislate in contradiction to IGAs, 
as opposed to providing remedies for a dispute between executives.  The connection between the 
doctrines explored in the present section and those is undeniable, however. 
343 While it is not possible to examine the issue of remedies here, there would likely be differences in 
what a party can obtain through an action for breach of an IGA, and what it could obtain through an 
application in detrimental reliance, estoppel or legitimate expectations. 
 155 
 
 Hence, neither in Belgium nor in Canada can executives contract to exchange or 
cede constitutional competences, or to legislate in a particular manner.344  In both 
federations, agreements that closely resemble private contracts will likely pass muster as 
legal instruments.345  It is fair to say that Canadian courts have not been too concerned with 
the way in which governments fetter their discretion through IGAs, when the question does 
not arise directly.  But it appears that the “rule against fettering of discretion” could still find 
judicial resonance should a government itself raise it to challenge the characterisation of an 
IGA as a binding contract.   In Belgium, the adoption of s.92bis in 1988-89 has apparently 
removed any potential application of the corresponding legal impediment, so that federal 
partners can bind themselves with regards to “government” functions, in a way that would be 
invalid were a similar agreement entered into with a private party.     
 
This greater facility to conclude binding agreements is, however, largely limited by the   
explicit requirement that Belgian cooperation agreements involving public funds, binding third 
parties, or trespassing on the domain reserved to the legislative branch, require legislative 
assent.  These conditions, found in a quasi-constitutional Act preclude the legal 
characterisation – even inter partes – of agreements of this nature which do not obtain this 
assent.  There is no equivalent rule in Canada, apart from the general requirement that 
public spending receive parliamentary approval, which is normally granted for wide ranges of 
programmes and not with regards to specific IGAs.  Hence, while in theory Belgian 
executives can tie themselves with regards to government functions, a large chunk of 
governing, notably the commitment of funds, requires the explicit case-by-case concurrence 
of the legislative branch.346 
 
   In the end, the legal status of IGAs inter partes does not differ as radically between 
the two federal regimes as I had originally surmised.  The difference is more a matter of 
presumptions concerning legal character than of widely divergent status.  I have argued that 
in both federal regimes, the determination that an IGA constitutes as a binding instrument 
inter partes requires an assessment in concreto, taking into consideration relevant rules of 
public law which preclude the conclusion of binding agreements, as well as a number of 
other indicia of legal character, outlined in the third section of this Chapter. These indicia may 
serve to confirm the presumption that IGAs constitute legally-binding instruments (in 
Belgium) or to overturn what appears to be the opposite presumption (in Canada).  Only this 
                                                
344 As we shall see in Chapter 5, however, IGAs constitute a recognised form of bi- or multilateral law 
making.  The action must be taken together, however, and not result from a contractual undertaking to 
alter one’s own legal order.  
345 This could, however, lead to their recharacterisation as civil contracts in Belgium, over which 
ordinary courts, rather than cooperation tribunals, would have jurisdiction. 
346 The other two conditions are more relevant to the characterisation of IGAs as instruments erga 
omnes: infra Chapter 5.  
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characterisation exercise can justify the conclusion that a particular agreement, which 
necessarily has political foundations, crosses the threshold of juridicity.  These indicia include 
elements of content, form and of the parties’ behaviour.  
 
This being said, when executives submit the resolution of a dispute concerning an 
IGA to a proper court or arbitration tribunal, the latter is likely to get on with the job of 
resolving the dispute, rather than seeking to (re)characterise the instrument it is asked to 
interpret and apply.347 
 
Finally, even agreements that remain on the “purely political” side of the threshold 
may have legal effect.   A number of interrelated doctrines could potentially be invoked to 
afford some legal protection to a government party that reasonably relied upon the word of 
another one, even if this word is embodied in a text which, for whatever reason, cannot be 
characterised as a contractual instrument.  These include unjust enrichment, detrimental 
reliance, the principle of good administration and legitimate expectations.  Hence even when 
the legal system cannot directly embrace a political instrument, it may still extend its reach to 
offer it some protection. 
  
 
 
                                                
347 The situation may admittedly be different were a Belgian agreement to include civil law clauses or 
clearly be unconstitutional. A cooperation tribunal could potentially decline to exercise its jurisdiction.   
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CHAPTER 5: IGAs AS NORMATIVE INSTRUMENTS    
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of the present chapter is to examine IGAs as devices for introducing 
legal norms of general application, by contrast to mere government-to-governmental 
undertakings.  The focus is on whether and how instruments that have contractual 
foundations can be a source of law erga omnes.  It must be recalled that the “erga omnes” 
qualifier refers to the persons subject to the legal order of each signatory to an IGA (“les 
administrés”), and not to every third party, such as orders of government that are not party to 
a particular agreement.   
  
 As we saw, in Canada, IGAs are essentially examined through the prism of 
government contracts.1   Despite this dominant contractual conception, it is admitted that 
IGAs can obtain additional normative force if they are somehow incorporated into a 
traditional – unilateral – norm.   In this case, the agreement   may – or may not – bind the 
parties as a contract.  This would depend on the indicia of contractual legal character 
examined in Chapter 4.  But the imprimatur of external unilateral norms, superimposed on 
IGAs, can transform them into normative instruments erga omnes.  This is consistent with the 
classic dual conception of the Canadian federation in which each federal partner is endowed 
with independent legislative and executive powers.  Apart from constitutional rules that apply 
to every component of the federation, there is no sense that law-making could be a joint 
enterprise.  There may be schemes pursuant to which unilateral norms are coordinated,   
but, in law, these norms remain unilateral.  This, at least, is the orthodoxy.  We shall see that 
the delegation of regulatory power to joint organs somewhat defies this conventional 
conception of parallel sources of unilateral legal rules.     
 
By contrast, we saw that from the start, the main interest of inserting a specific 
provision regarding Belgian cooperation agreements in the 1980 DMA was not per se to 
secure their contractual character (although this was a partial by-product of this insertion).  
The objective was to facilitate and simplify concerted action or the creation of joint bodies.2  
Before the adoption of s.92bis, executives adopted a number of complex schemes with 
                                                
1  Analogies between contractual and more traditional legal norms is not frequent in Anglo-saxon legal 
literature: WHITTAKER, Simon, “Public and Private Law-Making: Subordinate Legislation, Contracts 
and the Status of “Student Rules”, (2001) 21: 1 Oxford JLS 103-128, 106 (talking of English lawyers, 
but the statement has wider application). 
2 Supra, Chapter 4, section on pre-1988 case law 
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parallel legislation, much as Canadian authorities do today.3  This was deemed neither 
effective, nor conducive to cooperation.4  Moreover, by contrast to the benevolence of 
Canadian courts to intertwined cooperative arrangements that often blur the borders of 
constitutional competences,5 the legislative section of the Council of State’s staunch 
protection of the principle of autonomy, embodied in the exclusivity of competences, led it to 
reject as unconstitutional some of these pre-1988 cooperative schemes.6   Alternatives were 
therefore sought, to allow for concerted action.    
 
 Wilfrid MARTENS, who was federal Prime Minister of Belgium when s.92bis was 
adopted in 1988-89, distinguished agreements concluded between executives prior to that 
institutional innovation: 
 
 “These protocols only had political value and in this resides the 
major difference with cooperation agreements introduced by the 
1988 reform.  While previously, the result of protocols had to be 
transposed in normative provisions applicable within each legal 
order, it is now possible to conclude cooperation agreements that 
are directly applicable.”7 
 
Hence, if the foundations of cooperation agreements adopted under the umbrella of 
s.92bis are undeniably consensual, they have a normative value erga omnes that contracts 
cannot have.  In other words, while in Canada normative instruments erga omnes (legislation 
or regulation) are always considered unilateral, even when intertwined in a web of some 
intergovernmental construction, in Belgium, s.92bis has apparently introduced a new bi- or 
multi-lateral norm erga omnes, alongside the traditional unilateral ones.   
 
The remainder of this chapter analyses whether and how IGAs can be characterised 
as having a normative force erga omnes that is comparable to more traditional norms of 
public law, such as the Constitution (5.1), legislation (5.2) and regulatory instruments (5.3).     
 
First, however, further precisions on the terminology used throughout this chapter are 
in order.  Hence, as has been the case so far, the expressions “legislative instrument”, 
“legislation” “Act” and “statute” are used interchangeably.8  They refer to formal norms 
adopted by legislative assemblies.    
                                                
3 Infra, 5.3.2.    
4 ALEN and PEETERS (1989) 351; de WILDE (1990) 92 ff.  
5 For instance: Milk Board v. Grisnich, [1995] 2 SCR 895.   
6 CSLS 23.02.1987 (MB 16.04.1987); CSLS 16.444/9 02.12.85, unpublished, on file with author. 
7 MARTENS, Wilfrid, "Discours inaugural", in ALEN, André and al (eds.), Les conflits d'intérêts; quelle 
solution pour la Belgique de demain? (Namur: La Charte, 1990) 5-12, 10 (my translation, emphasis 
added). 
8 This circumvents the complex terminology in Belgium, where the legislative instruments adopted by 
federal and federated authorities do not bear the same name, although they are of equivalent 
normative force.  Supra, "Preliminary remarks on terminology" in General Introduction.  
 159 
The expression “regulatory instrument” is a compromise, which requires some 
explanation.  In both Canada and Belgium, there is a wide category of instruments taken by 
the executive, or administrative bodies, pursuant to specific legislative authorisation.  In 
Canada these are called “statutory instruments” or “textes réglementaires.9  In Belgium, 
those are described as “règlements”.10   A particular class of such instruments corresponds 
to delegated or subsidiary legislation. These are not solely acts taken in execution of a 
statute, but are truly legislative texts taken by the executive, under the explicit authorisation 
of the legislative assembly.  Once adopted following a specific procedure (normally formal 
governmental approval, publication and so on), these have the same legal force as 
legislation.  In Canada, those are described as “regulations” or “règlements”, while the 
Belgian term is “arrêté” “arrêté royal” or “arrêté réglementaire”.11    
  
An additional source of confusion lies in the fact that in French, the term  “régulation” 
has been coined to convey the wide array of regulating techniques used (including 
“règlement”).  “Régulation” is thus wider than “réglementation”.  In North American literature, 
the word “regulation” is sometimes used in the same way,12 while in England, “regulation” is 
still used in its narrow sense to describe delegated legislation.13 
 
This field is thus filled with “faux amis”.  In an attempt to navigate through this lexical 
labyrinth, I will use the term “regulation” to mean subsidiary legislation (that is “arrêté” in the 
Belgian or “règlement” in the Canadian sense).  “Regulatory instrument” will be used to refer 
to the wider category of devices used by the executive to introduce legal rules (that is, the 
equivalent to the particularly confusing “statutory instruments” in English Canada, and “textes 
réglementaires” in Belgium and Québec).  
 
5.1 “Constitutionalised agreements” 
 
5.1.1 “Constitutionalised agreements” in Canada 
   
As we saw in Chapter 4, “constitutionalised” agreements refer to historical 
agreements which have been entrenched and can therefore only be modified through formal 
constitutional amendment.  As constitutional norms, they are undeniably binding on third 
parties.  In this sense, their legal character erga omnes is easily established.   These 
agreements pose a particular challenge, however, when rights which third parties may derive 
from them, are considered (as opposed to obligations).  
                                                
9 Statutory Instruments Act, RSC (1985) ch. S-22, s.2.  
10 LEROY (2000) 172-173; UYTTENDAELE (2001) 425. 
11 "Arrêté royal" is used to qualify those taken by federal authorities. The expression "acte 
réglementaire" is a synonym: MAST (1989) 25.    
12 Although not, as we saw, in legislation, which sticks to the formal and strict meaning of "regulation".  
13 MOCKLE  (2002) 152-154. 
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The difficulty originates from the context in which these agreements were concluded 
and the mixed nature of their content.  On the one hand, Terms of Entry profoundly altered 
the status of joining provinces: they lost their colonial status, and became federated entities.     
In this sense, the instruments are thus plainly “constitutional”.  On the other hand, the 
bargaining that led to their adoption explains a number of prosaic and eccentric clauses.  For 
instance, the 1949 Newfoundland Terms of Entry contain (what was then) an exceptional 
authorisation to produce margarine!14   We have seen that the PEI and BC Terms of Entry 
contained specific undertakings concerning transport infrastructure.  Such clauses can pose 
particular difficulties decades later, in the face of vastly different economic and mostly 
technological conditions.  As we saw, the interpretation of the scope of the governments’ 
respective responsibilities pursuant to these clauses has given rise to a number of disputes 
(can a 19th century promise to maintain ferry service be interpreted as allowing its 
replacement by a bridge, a hundred years later?).15  
 
With regards to the erga omnes impact of constitutionalised agreements, these 
difficulties are compounded not only by the passage of time, but also because the normative 
force of these odd instruments with regards to non-government parties was unclear from the 
start.  They were not negotiated as constitutions (although they partially play that function), 
but as contractual instruments.  They were then enshrined in statutes (even though 
Westminster statutes had constitutional value).  As we saw in the previous chapter, this led 
to a range of characterisation of the same instrument: from a political deal to a treaty.  A 
complete exploration of what this meant for non-government parties is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.16  At this stage, I will limit myself to identifying a few established base rules and 
remaining zones of doubt.      
  
First, citizens can certainly challenge the constitutionality of legislative or regulatory 
measures that contradict a constitutionalised agreement.17  Similarly, when constitutionalised 
agreements restrict the powers of a particular government, third parties sued pursuant to an 
Act taken in contradiction of these agreements can always raise them in defence.18  For 
instance, one of the main purposes of the 1930 Natural Resource Transfer Agreements 
(NRTAs) was to ensure that provinces respect arrangements previously made by the federal 
government, notably with oil and gas companies, and with First Nations.19    Hence, Prairie 
Provinces undertook to respect certain aboriginal hunting rights. This implies that certain 
                                                
14 Newfoundland Act, 1949, Scheduled to Constitution Act, 1982; reproduced in TREMBLAY (1999) 
377-398. 
15 Supra, Chapter 4.  
16 On this: BANKES (1992). 
17 Hogan v. A.G. Newfoundland, (2000) 183 DLR 4th 225 (NFCA), 255 [Hogan]. 
18 Jack v. R., [1980] 1 SCR294; BANKES (1992) 537- 545. 
19 BANKES (1992) 542 and cases cited. 
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provincial statutes which curb this practice are unconstitutional.20  Oddly, the NRTAs which 
transferred natural resources to provinces imposed conditions on them.  They did not impose 
conditions on federal authorities.  Hence, a severely divided Supreme Court held that the 
NRTAs are protected against contrary provincial21 but not against… federal legislation.22  
How this is supposed to protect acquired rights is a puzzle.23 
 
Constitutionalised agreements not only curb government powers.   As we saw, they 
also impose specific obligations on them: that of building a railroad, for instance.  The 
characterisation of such undertakings with regards to third parties is particularly muddled.       
  
For instance, it will be recalled that in the PEI Ferry case, the Federal Court ruled that 
the federal government had an obligation to provide continuous ferry service between the 
Island and the mainland.  The Court found a statutory breach on the part of Ottawa when the 
service was interrupted, due to a national strike, and ordered the payment of damages.24 The 
Court opined, obiter, that citizens could not have claimed damages for the violation of the 
Terms of Entry by Ottawa.25  For Le Dain J., the undertaking was only made in favour of the 
province, not of its population.  The underlying contractual conception is obvious.  In partial 
dissent, Pratte J. admitted that it was the population, rather than the government that actually 
suffered from the strike.  Logically, it should be entitled to reparation.  Fearing the 
consequences of his own conclusion, however, he quickly added “[b]ut this, I would find 
unacceptable”.26  As BANKES reflects: “[h]aving peered around the floodgate doors, he 
quickly slammed them shut”.27  In other words, these constitutionalised agreements could not 
generate rights erga omnes.28    
 
  Since 1982, these duties have acquired a clear “constitutional” label.   It is certainly 
arguable that the full-fledged constitutionalisation of those agreements has lessened their 
contractual or statutory character and that they must henceforth be interpreted as 
constitutional norms.  The impact on obligations between governments is probably not 
                                                
20 Jack v. R., [1980] 1 SCR 294. 
21 R. v. Sutherland, [1980] 2 SCR 451. 
22 Daniels v. White and the Queen, [1968] SCR 517.  
23 The scheduling of these instruments to the Constitution Act, 1982, confirms the constitutional 
character of these instruments.  Modification to their terms implies a formal amendment process.  
However, this scheduling has not had the effect of imposing new obligations on federal authorities.     
The discrepancy apparently subsists. 
24 Until 1982, the Terms of Entry could not be modified unilaterally, but were still only incorporated in 
parallel federal, provincial and Westminster statutes.  Hence, the characterisation of a violation as 
"statutory". 
25 PEI  v. Canada, [1978] 1 FC 533 (FCA) [the PEI Ferry case]. 
It is peculiar that breach of statutory duties gave rise to damages.   
26 The PEI Ferry case, 576 per Pratte J.A., diss. in part. 
27 BANKES (1992) 539. 
28 See also Samson v. R., [1957] SCR832 in which the Court denied a Newfoundland employee the 
benefits of a particular clause of the province’s Terms of Entry. 
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significant.  However, one would expect a “constitutional duty” to be owed to all.   Admittedly, 
the consequences of finding a truly erga omnes constitutional right to a ferry service in PEI, a 
particular railway line on Vancouver Island, or to produce margarine in Newfoundland could  
be problematic.   The solution is to secure constitutional amendments.  In the meantime, 
however, it is unclear whether faced with a third party action to enforce the content of a 
constitutionalised undertaking, courts would interpret them in a generous and teleological 
manner, as a constitution, or would still attempt to impose limits on the scope of rights erga 
omnes, because of the particular origins of the instruments.29 
  
5.1.2 Agreements of a constitutional force in Belgium  
  
As we saw in Chapter 2, there are no equivalent to “constitutionalised” agreements in 
Belgium, although certain transfers of competences between federated entities could be 
analysed through this prism.30  Once this is accomplished following the proper procedure, the 
arrangement has the same effect as a constitutional amendment: it amounts to the transfer 
of legislative authority, opposable to all.    The Canadian peculiarity in which third parties may 
be bound, but have somewhat curtailed rights, simply would not arise.   
 
 5.2  IGAs having legislative (or supra-legislative) status 
 
In both federations, legislative assemblies can intervene to confer legal force erga 
omnes to IGAs.   The impact of that intervention is not identical in the two federations, 
however. 
 
5.2.1 Parliamentary involvement and the status of IGAs in Belgium 
 
Since 1993, s.92bis explicitly provides that legislative assemblies must give their 
assent to all cooperation agreements which: 31 
 
1) have financial implications for the public authorities; 
2) create obligations for individuals; or  
3) deal with matters reserved to the legislative branch. 
  
                                                
29 In Hogan, the NFCA denied particular protection to third parties who lost privileges following a 
constitutional amendment to the Terms of Entry (in this case, Catholics challenged the abolition of the 
publicly funded confessional school system that had grounding in the Terms of Entry).  
30 Supra, Chapters 3 and 4.  
31 In fact, the 1993 amendment made more explicit the 1988-89 text of s.92bis, which more cryptically 
stated that legislative assent should be obtained “when required”  (“le cas échéant”): le HARDY (1990) 
124.    
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 It will be recalled that the adoption of s.92bis was meant to address three sets of 
problems.  One was the hurdle to joint action generated by the strict interpretation of the 
exclusivity of constitutional competences by the legislative section of the Council of State in 
the context of pre-1988 protocols.32  This obstacle has only been partially removed. Indeed, 
both the CSLS and the Court of Arbitration maintain that cooperation agreements may only 
be constitutionally concluded if every party is thereby exercising one of its own competences. 
This is so even if legislative assent is secured.33  In other words, an agreement cannot be 
used to allow some interference by an order of government into a matter which falls within 
the competences of another, even it is to finance a particular project.34  In brief, s.92bis has 
removed a bar on joint action, but this joint action must rest on some form of constitutional 
competence on the part of each signatory.    
 
Secondly, s.92bis was meant to obviate the complexity of cooperative schemes that 
again flowed from a very restrictive interpretation of the principle of autonomy by the Council 
of State prior to 1988.  To create a joint programme, provide services to another order of 
government or set up an intergovernmental body, parties had to conclude some sort of 
political agreement, and then adopt separate legislative and interlocking instruments to give it 
effect, hoping assemblies would not actually alter the content of the agreement.35  As we 
shall see, this is still essentially the way in which cooperative schemes are still set up in 
Canada today.  Belgian authorities sought means of simplifying the process.36    
 
Thirdly, s.92bis was seen as means of enabling executives to jointly draft a text 
which, within their respective legal order, could only be adopted through a statute.37  They 
can then submit it their respective legislative assemblies for wholesale approval or rejection.  
While prior to s.92bis, it was understood that assemblies should be allowed to consider the 
"transformation" legislation article by article, with the new procedure, the only clause on 
which parliamentarians are formally asked to pronounce simply gives assent to the IGA. 
While there is no text to this effect, it has been understood that the adoption of s.92bis has 
radically altered the role of the legislative branch with regards to executive assemblies.  
Legal rules with impact erga omnes may not be introduced without assent, but this seems to 
amount to an a posteriori authorisation given to the respective executives to adopt rules, 
which, were they acting alone, would require formal legislative instruments. 
 
                                                
32 Supra, Chapter 4.  
33 CA17/94. 
34 Supra, 4.2.3.2. 
35 De WILDE (1990) 91. 
36 A third difficulty which may have been resolved by the adoption of s.92bis was the risk that having to 
proceed through interlocking legislation, a party unilaterally pulled out through a contrary act.   
Whether such an eventuality has actually been set aside is addressed in Chapter 6.   
37 VELAERS (1999) 877. 
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  A typical example is the conclusion of agreements meant to harmonise the 
transposition of European Union directives into the Belgian legal order, when their subject 
matter falls within the sphere of competence of federated entities (or both federal and 
federated orders).  In the absence of s.92bis, each federal partner would have to adapt its 
own legislation to ensure consistency with EU norms.38  To avoid discrepancies, executives 
can elaborate a common text transposing the directive, eventually even creating joint organs 
in charge of implementation, and then submit it to their respective legislative assemblies.  
The legislative acts merely provide that the agreement is to “be given effect2, “is assented 
to”, or “approved”.39 Parliamentarians are not asked to vote on specific provisions, nor can 
they propose amendments.40 
 
Similarly, the joint creation of an organ with legal personality requires legislative 
assent.41  To give an example, an inter-regional agreement was concluded to harmonise the 
introduction in the domestic legal order of a European directive on waste management.  This 
agreement creates a Commission that can notably impose fines on retailers and industries 
for violating certain norms contained in an IGA, or even penal sanctions for those who refuse 
access to investigators.42  The imposition of such sanctions requires legislative action.  Here, 
the legislative action is limited to approving a joint text. 
 
This quasi-constitutional requirement of parliamentary approval gives rise to three 
different scenarios.  Hence, the legal status of agreements which obtain proper assent, as 
well as the status of those which require it, but fail to obtain it, are examined in the rest of this 
sub-section.  The status of those which apparently do not require such approval is explored 
in section 5.3.1, under the heading “IGAs having regulatory status”. 
 
5.2.1.1  The status of agreements which have received 
parliamentary assent 
 
Pursuant to s.92bis, agreements of a legislative nature only produce their “legal 
effect” after they have received what is officially described as “legislative assent”.   Assent 
may not be given “by anticipation”, that is, parliamentarians must vote on the final text,43 
                                                
38 MOERENHOUT (2001, 617) estimates that the majority of agreements published in the MB between 
1996 and 2000 were adopted in order to implement European law in matters of transportation, 
environment and agriculture.   
39 The term used in s.92bis is  “assent”, and this is the term the Council of State generally insists on. 
There are derogations, however, and the terms used to not have any bearing on the status of the 
agreement (by contrast to the Canadian situation: infra, 5.2.2). 
40 Supra, 2.2.1.4. 
41 COENRAETS (1998) 96. 
42 AC sur la prévention et la gestion des déchets d’emballages (3R), 30.05.96 (05.03.97). 
43 CSLS 24.479, Doc CRW, 1995/96, 162.  By contrast, international treaties may receive 
“anticipatory” legislative approval: CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, Rapport public pour l’année judiciaire 1995-
1996 (1999) 12 Chron. Droit public 1-2.      
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which cannot have retroactive effect.44  If implementing agreements are anticipated, they 
must also be submitted to legislatures.45  Once it has been assented to, a cooperation 
agreement has, at a minimum, the same normative force as a statute within the legal order of 
the approving legislature.46  Through this assent, rights and obligations contained in the 
agreement become “directly applicable”, in the sense that if framed with sufficient specificity, 
they do not require further action by the orders of government party to the agreement.47  
They are thus binding on third parties, who may rely on them in a court of law, as if they were 
a statute.    
 
 For example, the inter-regional agreement on waste management mentioned above 
contains obligations concerning the disposal of waste that apply equally to industries and 
retailed located in every Region.48  Once legislative assent was given to the agreement, 
these obligations became directly applicable in all three federated entities, without further 
legislative or regulatory action.49  Having received this assent, the IGAs in question are truly 
normative instruments erga omnes. 
 
 Legislative assent is rarely obtained simultaneously in the various orders party to an 
agreement.50  Presumably, once the legislative assemblies of two parties to a multilateral 
agreement have given assent to it, it becomes binding.  The lack of coordination is 
particularly problematic in the case of “compulsory” agreements, since, as we saw, the 
constitutional status quo ante is maintained until their formal coming into force.  What is the 
actual distribution of powers, when the agreement is in force in the legal order of one or 
several components of a federation, and not in others?  While this lack of coordination has 
occurred in the past,51 the anomalous legal situation has not given rise to any litigation and 
has not been discussed in the literature.    
 
                                                
44 CSLS 22.794/8, Doc Vl R, 1993-1994, 485/1, 131 and 23.822/8, Doc Vl R, 1994-1995, 719/1, both 
discussed in ibid, 2.      
45 CSLS 30.037-2, Doc Parl, 95 CCF,1999/2000. 
46 There is a certain controversy concerning the characterisation of the norm of assent. For some, it is 
a purely formal act of control by the legislative branch over the executive, as are Acts giving assent to 
international treaties. They would not have normative force as such (de WILDE (1989) 437): infra, 
Chapter 6.    
47 This direct applicability depends, of course, on the tenor of the agreement itself.   
48 AC sur la prévention et la gestion des déchets d’emballages (3R), 30.05.96 (05.03.97). 
49 COENRAETS (1998). 
50 When this occurs, the Secretariat to the Concertation Committee is of the opinion that “the 
cooperation agreement does not enter into force on the same day in the different legal orders” :  
Circulaire relative à l’entrée en vigueur et au suivi des accords de coopération (05.11.2003) II(2)(b)(2).       
51  For instance, a 2002 agreement relative to the creation of the External Trade Agency was 
submitted by the Walloon government to the Walloon assembly after it had been published in the MB, 
while the BCR proceeded to give assent and publish before the other two Regions.  In the meantime, 
the status of the staff which was to be transferred to the Agency was shrouded in uncertainty.    
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5.2.1.2  The status of agreements requiring parliamentary 
assent, which fail to receive it    
 
Acting jointly through cooperation agreements, executives can in effect enter the 
domain of the legislative assemblies.  S.92 bis provides that this should not be done without 
the latter’s concurrence.   In Switzerland and in Spain, where a similar distinction between 
agreements of a legislative and of an administrative character also exists, a trend towards a 
characterisation de minimis, has developed.  That is, whenever possible, executives will 
attempt to demonstrate that the agreement does not tread on legislative ground.  This has 
the advantage - from the executives’ perspective  - of restricting parliamentary control, public 
scrutiny, and in the case of Switzerland, of seeing an agreement rejected by referendum.52   
 
Whether such a trend is also developing in Belgium is uncertain.  What is obvious, 
however, is that a number of IGAs which should be submitted to legislative assemblies are 
not. This is the case, for instance, of a number of federal-regional agreements on 
employment policy, in which the former makes specific financial undertakings.53  The 
agreements were published, but never submitted to assemblies.  Surprisingly, the Cour des 
comptes, which oversees the validity of public spending, does not seem to have questioned 
the practice.54  Some maintain that it is difficult to conceive of any IGA which does not have 
at least an indirect impact on public finances or third parties, so that they should all be 
submitted to legislators.55  This position may be somewhat exaggerated and it is arguable 
that certain procedural agreements (setting up information sharing processes, for instance), 
probably do not meet the criteria for legislative assent.56 
  
Means of ensuring respect for this parliamentary approval are limited.  For one thing, 
the determination that a particular agreement requires legislative assent lies with the 
executives.  Parliamentarians can ask parliamentary questions, but do not have any power to 
force the executive to submit an agreement to a vote.57    
 
The Legislative section of the Council of State (CSLS) has held that until this assent 
is given, an agreement does not have legal effect with regards to third parties, and between 
                                                
52 On this: POIRIER, Report, 2001. 
53  AC concernant la convention de premier emploi (FED + RBC), 25.10.00 (18.12.01, 2e ed.) ; 2nd IGA, 
01.08.02 (19.11.02).  See also the 1993 Agreement on the promotion of Brussels and its 8 codicils, 
which are a major source of financing for Brussels, but were never submitted to assemblies: POIRIER, 
Solidarité; MOERENHOUT (2001) 618.   
54 See also AC pour le transfert […] du personnel et des biens […] de la province de Brabant  (FED + 
3R + FL C + Fr C), 30.05.94 (17.06.94), which clearly affected employees who were transferred.  The 
agreement was never approved by legislatures. 
55 Interviews conducted. 
56 For ex: AC pour une politique de drogues globale et intégrée (FED + 3C + COCOF + COCON + 
COCOM + 3R), 11.05.2003 (02.06.2003). 
57 Supra, 2.2.1.4.   
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executives.58  Were it not the case, rules set out in the 1980 DMA for parliamentary control of 
IGAs involving public expenditures, or which trench on the domain of the legislative branch, 
could simply be by-passed.   In theory, therefore, agreements requiring legislative assent but 
which fail to secure it, cannot be considered to have normative force erga omnes. 
 
One of the difficulties is that judicial control of such invalidity is restricted.  If 
executives choose not to submit an agreement to their legislature, the Council of State would 
not proceed with an a priori control of the validity and constitutionality of the legislative 
instrument meant to approve the agreement.   In the absence of a legislative instrument, the 
Court of Arbitration would not have jurisdiction to intervene a posteriori either.   
 
In a number of judicial review cases, the administrative section of the Council of State 
(CSAS) seemed to have taken for granted the validity of an IGA which was never submitted 
to assemblies but which clearly bound third parties (it notably regulated the transfer of staff 
from the old Province of Brabant to a number of succeeding institutions).59  The agreement's 
potential invalidity was simply not argued.  Whether the CSAS could actually have annulled it 
remains unclear.60  What it can do, however, is simply to treat what is considered to be an 
invalid agreement as “inexistent”.  It did so, for instance, with a “protocol” through which 
federal and Community governments agreed not to increase the number of beds in seniors’ 
homes.61  The protocol was invoked by the Walloon Region to justify its refusal to authorise 
the extension of a particular institution.  The CSAS first re-characterised the protocol as a 
cooperation agreement.  It then noted that given the impact on third parties, legislative 
assent was required, failing which the protocol was without effect. The Court then annulled 
the decision refusing the authorisation.    
 
A similar means of judicial control of such agreements – still untested – could arise in 
the context of a civil or criminal trial.  If a party were to rely on an IGA that should have 
received legislative assent but did not get it, an ordinary court could simply refuse to apply it.  
It could not actually invalidate the IGA, but would also treat it as non-existent.62    
 
                                                
58 CSLS 30.316 (26.09.2000) Doc Parl, CCF, 2000-2001, no.128/1 ; ANDERSON, Robert, NIHOUL, 
Pierre, “Le Conseil d’État : chronique de jurisprudence 2000“, (2002)1 RBDC 17-133, 112. 
59 CSAS 81.996 (05.08.1999) (Coppoy). 
60 The CSAS can annul invalid regulatory and administrative instruments (s.14 CACS).  Whether the 
Council of State has direct jurisdiction over bi- or multi-lateral administrative acts, as opposed to 
unilateral ones is unresolved: infra: 5.3.1 and 6.1.1.1 (notably discussion of CRASC case: CSAS 
79.517 (25.03.1999). 
61 The Walloon legislation required that the executive take into account federal norms in granting 
autorisations.  The CSAS ruled that this invalid agreement did not satisfy this requirement : CSAS 
117.483 (25.03.2003) (Résidence Harmonie). 
62 S. 159, Constitution.  In the absence of a statute, ordinary courts could not, in this context, ask a 
"question préjudielle" to the Court of Arbitration: 1989 DMA on the CA, s.26.   
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To summarise, in positive law, an agreement that meets the criteria for required 
legislative assent (and arguably, most do), but fails to secure it, is invalid. It does not have 
normative force erga omnes.  It is undeniable, however, that a number of significant ones are 
in this category and enjoy a substantial degree of “para-legal” effectivity.63 
 
5.2.2 Parliamentary involvement and the status of IGAs in Canada 
 
While in Canada, executives can bind themselves through IGAs without specific 
authorisation,64 they may not bind third parties except through legislation.  This is similar to 
the rule imposed in Belgium through s.92bis.   A significant difference is the actual statutory 
language that is required for that purpose. The range of formulae that have been used by 
legislative assemblies to give various sorts of effect to contracts in general, and to IGAs in 
particular, is mystifying.65  In the absence of a codification of drafting rules concerning 
parliamentary intervention, these must be gleaned from scattered, incomplete and 
occasionally inconsistent case law. 66  Drafting guidelines basically develop through trial and 
error.  It is remarkable that the precise legal effect of the numerous legislative drafting 
techniques remains so elusive.   
  
 A good illustration of this uncertainty is provided by a number of judicial rulings 
rendered in the 1970s concerning vertical IGAs through which provinces adopted Anti-
Inflation measures outlined in federal legislation.  Unions in various provinces challenged the 
application of anti-inflation measures which, in some cases, modified collective agreements.  
They all argued that the IGA did not bind them.  Following the terms used in this chapter, the 
they challenged that the IGA had normative force erga omnes.    
 
At least four different techniques were used to give effect to those IGAs in the 
provincial legal orders.  In all cases, conclusion of the IGA was authorised by federal and 
provincial orders-in-council.  The executives thus had undeniable authority (if additional 
confirmation was needed) to conclude them.  The difference concerned the a posteriori 
means of approval.  In Ontario, there was no statutory basis for the conclusion of the IGA, 
only the order-in-council authorised the conclusion of the agreement.  The Ontario 
government argued that given the executive’s inherent common law capacity to make 
agreements, no legislative authorisation was actually required.  A majority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada disagreed: 
                                                
63 Infra: General Conclusions.     
64 Supra, 4.1.2.1.  
65 Parliamentary endorsement of IGAs has a long history.  The technique was adapted from the 19th 
century practice of endorsement of private contracts in the United Kingdom, and it was even used in 
the case of “constitutionalised” agreements: BANKES (1991) 811-813; BLACKMAN (1993) 50. 
66 BANKES (1991) 813-833 has proposed a fourfold classification of the impact of various 
parliamentary techniques used with respect to IGAs. In Australia, WARNICK (1982). 
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 “The fact that the Crown can contract carries the matter no farther 
than that the contract may be binding upon it or that it may sue the 
other contracting party on the contract.  What we have here is not 
a contract in this sense at all, but an agreement to have certain 
[federal] legislative enactments become operative as provincial 
law. […]   
 
It is one thing for the Crown in right of a Province to contract for 
itself, it is a completely different thing for it to contract for the 
application to its inhabitants, and to labour organizations in the 
Province, of laws to govern their operations and relations without 
statutory authority to that end.  This would be, in effect, to legislate 
in the guise of a contract.”67 
 
What kind of statutory authority was then required to make the IGA binding on third 
parties and thus to transform it into a norm erga omnes?  Manitoba relied on a general 
provision pursuant to which the government could authorize a minister to conclude IGAs, “for 
any benefit or purposes of the residents of Manitoba […]”.68  Another slim majority of the 
Supreme Court also considered this general authorisation insufficient to alter the laws of 
Manitoba.  For the Court: 
 
[…] s. 16 does no more than authorize the making of agreements 
[but does not imply that ] such agreements once entered into will 
be effective to suspend the operation of other provincial legislation 
or constitute legislation binding on employees in the public sector. 
[…] If the section is to be read as giving legislative force to all 
agreements entered into [this would appear] to constitute a 
delegation of legislative power amounting to an abdication by the 
Legislature of its ultimate authority to pass laws, “for the benefit or 
purposes of the residents of Manitoba”.69 
 
 British Columbia used a more complex route.  A statute authorised the Minister, with 
approval of cabinet, to conclude an IGA concerning the application to the province of the 
federal Anti-inflation Act, regulations and guidelines, and “the manner and extent to which 
[they] shall apply to the […] Provincial public sector.”70  For the British Columbia Supreme 
Court, these precisions were sufficient to bind the latter.71 Finally, the statutory instrument 
used by Prince Edward Island seemed more satisfactory.  Specific authorisation was granted 
to conclude the agreement and provided that the IGA was “binding upon the provincial 
                                                
67 Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 SCR 373, 433 and 435 [Anti-Inflation Reference]. 
68Executive Government Organization Act, SM, 1970, ch. 17, s.16.   
69 Re Manitoba Government Employees Assoc. v. Manitoba, [1978] 1 SCR 1123, 1143.    
70 Anti-Inflation Measures Act, SBC, 1976, ch.1, s.5. 
71 The BCSC's decision was largely founded on a dicta by Ritchie J. in the Manitoba Anti-Inflation 
Reference, which is not particularly convincing either: BANKES (1991) 824 and 833.  BANKES 
challenges this ruling, noting that nowhere did the statute specify that third parties would actually be 
bound 
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sector” and “has the force and effect of an Act of the Legislature”.72  This did not give rise to 
court action.   
 
 The foregoing saga suggests the following guidelines for assessing the effect of 
various types of formulae used by legislative assemblies with regards to IGAs. 
 
5.2.2.1 Parliamentary authorisation to conclude   
 
While the executive does not require specific legislative authorisation to conclude 
IGAs, most statutes concerning particular Departments will explicitly authorise the Minister in 
charge to conclude them.73  These remove any lingering doubt concerning the authority of 
signatories to conclude the agreement, but they do not predetermine the legal character of 
IGAs erga omnes.74 
 
 5.2.2.2 Parliamentary approval and ratification   
 
 The statutory approval of an IGA - often scheduled to an Act - constitutes essentially 
the retrospective equivalent of statutory authorisation to conclude.  It clarifies the authority to 
sign the agreement, but does not affect its status.  In other words, an IGA that is “approved” 
does not normally thereby obtain the normative force of a statute.  Governments do not incur 
statutory duties and the IGA is not binding on third parties.   A recent Canadian decision even 
held that such language does not have the effect of altering existing regulations.75    
 
5.2.2.3  Parliamentary incorporation 
 
 In the Ontario Anti-Inflation Reference, Laskin C.J. drew a parallel between the 
requirement that international treaties be properly incorporated into domestic law to carry 
their effect in the Canadian legal order and the way in which an agreement had to be 
properly ratified by legislation in order to modify the legal order of the parties to that 
agreement.76  As we shall see in Chapter 6, while the intersection between the Belgian 
domestic legal order and international law is a hybrid between monism and dualism, the 
Canadian approach is classically dualist.77  What this implies is that international treaties – 
however specific their undertakings – will only be applicable in the Canadian legal order once 
they have been “incorporated” into the domestic legal order.   
 
                                                
72 Cited in BANKES (1991) 828, fn 172. 
73 Supra, 4.1.2.1.     
74 Ontario Anti-Inflation Reference and Manitoba Anti-Inflation Reference. See also Lamer J., diss. On 
other issues, in 1994 BC Railway case, par. 23.    
75 Unilever Canada Inc. v. A.G. Québec, [1999] RJQ 1720 (SC) [the “Colour of Margarine case”]. 
76 Anti-Inflation Reference, 433.   
77 Infra, 6.2.2.1.  
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Several techniques are used to give full effect, in the Canadian legal order, to 
international treaties.78   One is simply to “translate” the content of the treaty into “regular” 
legislative provisions, which then become the formal legal source.   Another is to provide that 
a treaty “is approved and has force of law”, or “has the force of law as if enacted in the 
present Act”.   The treaty is then scheduled to the Act.  A third consists in “incorporating” only 
a specific number of clauses from that international instrument.  Only the incorporation of a 
treaty (or specific provisions of that treaty) through formulas such as “as if enacted” or “given 
force of law” will confer legally binding status to the content of the treaty.79    
 
Similar guidelines apparently apply to IGAs.  It seems undeniable that only proper 
incorporation can alter the “domestic” legal order of any federal partner, so as to confer rights 
or impose obligations on third parties.80   The difficulty is in identifying the proper terms that 
convey this incorporation.  In other words, the major problem is technical: in the absence of 
clear guidelines, drafters have used all types of formulas that give rise, often decades later, 
to a variety of potential interpretations.  The resulting uncertainty is bewildering, given the 
impact on the public law of members of the federation.   
 
 The 1994 BC Railway case examined in Chapter 4 is a good illustration.  After 
denying that the 1883 federal-provincial IGA and the companion federal/railway company 
agreements were of a constitutionalised character, the Supreme Court examined whether the 
latter had statutory value.81  The agreement had been “ratified and adopted” and was not 
specifically given force of law.  
 
The majority of the Supreme Court denied that a magic formula determined whether 
an agreement was given statutory force.  Statutory rules of interpretation had to be used to 
ascertain the meaning of the legislative wording.82  The majority concluded, however, that in 
the absence of evidence that the parties intended to incorporate an agreement, expressions 
such as “ratified and confirmed” were likely to be insufficient.83  The Court noted, for instance, 
that several clauses from the companion agreement had been replicated into the ratifying 
Act.  For the majority, such repetition was inexplicable if the Agreement was to have statutory 
                                                
78 Entreprises de rebuts Sanipan v. Québec, [1995] RJQ 821 (CS) 844-847. 
79 LOUNGNARATH, Vilaysoun, "Quelques réflexions d’ordre juridique sur la clause d’adhésion de 
l’ALÉNA", (1995) 40 McGill L.J. 1-54, 16-17. 
80 LOUNGNARATH, Vilaysoun, " Le role du pouvoir judiciaire dans la structuration politico-juridique de 
la fédération canadienne", (1997) 57 R. du B. 1003-1045, 1034. 
81 The focus was on the federal-private contract because this is where the undertaking to operate the 
railway line "continuously" was located.  If that agreement had statutory status, the federal government 
could not have abolished the line without special legislation by virtue of the wording of the Railway Act.  
82 For a case in which statutory ratification was held to have an incorporating force: Cree Regional  
Authority v. Canada (Federal Administrator), [1991] 3 FC 533 (FCA).  
83 In so ruling, the Court dismissed what it described a "passing remark" by Lord Haldane, who had 
described the agreement has having "statutory authority": Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway v. Treat, 
[1919] 3 WWR 356 (PC):  BC Railway decision, par. 171. 
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value as such.  The Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that given the 
constitutional significance of the arrangement, it seemed reasonable to infer that Parliament 
had had the intention of – at least – conferring statutory value to the agreement, despite the 
language used.   
 
The analogy between the dualist character of the Canadian legal system with regards 
to international agreements and the status of IGAs was reiterated recently in a case 
concerning the Internal Trade Agreement (ITA).84  While that case dealt with a contradiction 
between an IGA and a Québec regulation,  the Court’s reasoning is apposite here.    
 
In the Colour of Margarine case, a margarine producer argued that a Québec 
regulation prohibiting the sale of margarine that has the colour of butter violated both North 
American Free Trade Agreement and the ITA.  Both were merely “approved” by every 
Canadian legislative assembly.85  The Superior Court of Québec ruled that neither had the 
effect of altering the Québec legal order.  The judge noted the absence of any express 
provision in the ITA stipulating that it had precedence over existing regulation or legislation, 
or even current administrative practice.  He concluded that the Act approving the ITA did not 
take precedence over the Act pursuant to which the regulations on margarine had been 
approved.86    
  
To sum things up, statutory incorporation undoubtedly confers statutory force upon an 
IGA.  Doubt persists, however, on the precise terms required to effect such an incorporation.  
The phrases “as if enacted in this Act” or “the agreement is hereby given the force of law” 
almost unquestionably indicate this result.  The expressions “is approved” “is accepted” or “is 
ratified” create a strong presumption that the IGA is validated by the assembly, but not 
incorporated.  This presumption is rebuttable, although the Supreme Court’s approach in the 
1994 Railway case suggests this would not be easily accomplished.  This rebuttable 
presumption maintains, however, a degree of uncertainty regarding the effect of particular   
statutory language on the status of IGAs.87 
  
                                                
84 The Colour of margarine case. 
85 An Act Implementing the Internal Trade Agreement, SC 1993, ch. 44; An Act Respecting the 
Implementation of the Agreement on Internal Trade, SQ 35.1.1.    
86 Had the ITA been properly incorporated, rules of statutory interpretation could have been required to 
resolve the contradiction between the two legal texts. As it was, one was not deemed part of Québec 
law. 
87 No doubt the Court wanted to leave open the possibility that the “approving” or “ratifying” language 
could in some circumstances imply an incorporation.  In the absence of any clear drafting guidelines, 
and in view of the old history of such parliamentary endorsement, too rigid a rule of interpretation 
could have unanticipated effect on long-standing arrangements.  Unfortunately, the Court's prudence 
brings its share of uncertainty. For example where mere approval of IGAs was held not to "breathe life 
into" an IGA: Segunda case. 
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5.2.2.4  Parliamentary appropriation 
 
 These various methods of parliamentary intervention must be distinguished from the 
constitutional principle pursuant to which expenditure of public funds by the executive must 
be authorised by legislation.  As we saw, in Canada, this is a necessary condition for 
spending public funds, but it is not determinative of the legal character of an IGA inter 
partes.88  Similarly, the approval of spending incurred through an IGA does not have the 
effect of conferring any legal character erga omnes unto it.     
 
As we saw, in Belgium also public expenditures must be approved by the relevant 
legislature. This is done through general budgetary appropriation.  What s.92bis adds is an 
obligation to specifically submit cooperation agreements that have financial implications to 
the relevant assemblies.  In other words, IGAs with financial implications require some form 
of parliamentary action in both countries.  The difference, however, is in the degree of 
specificity.  In Belgium, the agreement itself must be submitted to legislative assemblies.  In 
Canada, appropriation can be made in very general terms and parliamentarians generally 
ignore the details of IGAs when they vote the necessary credits.    
 
*** 
 
In conclusion, statutory prior authorisation, approval/ratification, and incorporation 
through the “as enacted” formula all have the effect of removing any doubt as to the authority 
of a signatory to bind the order of government party to an IGA.   Only the “as if enacted” or 
“given the force of law” formulations have the undeniable effect of transforming IGAs into 
norms capable of binding third parties.      
 
5.3 IGAs having regulatory status 
  
When agreements are “constitutionalised” or properly approved by legislation, they 
inherit a specific legal value from those constitutional or statutory norms.  In neither Belgium 
nor Canada are there clear constitutional or even statutory directions concerning the status 
of IGAs that are not given constitutional or statutory value in such a way.  The foregoing 
would suggest that without proper assent or incorporation, such IGAs are simply devoid of 
legal character erga omnes. 
 
Indeed, neither the Canadian case law nor the doctrine suggest that  IGAs which are 
not given force of law by statutory incorporation could nevertheless be characterised as 
regulatory instruments: the Colour of Margarine case discussed above actually stands for the 
                                                
88 Supra, 4.1.2.3.      
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contrary.89  While the analysis on this front is very sketchy in Belgium, a few authors affirm 
that IGAs that do not obtain legislative assent have the normative force of regulatory 
instruments.90  I find these assertions, which are never explained, quite mystifying.  One may 
well question the interest of characterising an agreement as having regulatory force, if they 
cannot bind third parties. 
 
It appears that these analysts’ main concern is not to establish the legal force of such 
IGAs, but rather to place them above unilateral normative instruments in the hierarchy of 
norms.91  For instance, UYTTENDAELE posits that IGAs that do not require legislative 
assent must have some sort of “supra-regulatory” status, so as not to be vulnerable to 
contrary regulatory instruments.92  He does not address the character of the agreements per 
se.  In other words, the characterisation is teleological (and ideological): since IGAs should 
be protected from contrary executive acts, they must have some form of legal force.  They 
must at least be equivalent to the first rung in the ladder of legal norms, which are regulatory 
instruments.  
  
 Over and beyond this instrumental characterisation, it is worth reflecting on whether 
IGAs could have some legal force erga omnes, even when they cannot bind third parties, per 
se.  For while third parties are not formally bound by such IGAs, they could eventually derive 
some benefit from them.  Similarly, it may be that an IGA that is characterised as a regulatory 
instrument could become a legal benchmark to assess the validity of administrative action.    
It may very well be easier to challenge a refusal to recognise one’s diploma through 
administrative law process - when an IGA guarantees that recognition - than to argue that the 
IGA as a contract between two governments contains a “stipulation pour autrui” to that effect.   
 
 Finally, and this takes us somewhat outside the realm of positive law, this 
characterisation may be a better account of what a number of IGAs actually do.  Just as 
governments seek to impose rules without going through the procedural hoops of adopting 
formal regulations, notably through the adoption of circulars or directives, it appears that they 
can jointly conclude IGAs that, while incapable of officially binding third parties, play an 
undeniable normative function.  In this sense, while they do not officially have the force of 
statute, they seem to play a similar role to regulatory instruments. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
89 Supra, 5.2.2.3. 
90 COENRAETS (1992) 168 and (1998) 92; de WILDE (1990) 112. 
91 Infra, 6.1.2. 
92 UYTTENDAELE (2001) 871. 
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5.3.1   IGAs of a regulatory status in Belgium 
  
In Belgium, s.92bis of the 1980 DMA only specifies which cooperation agreements 
require legislative assent.  It does not actually define or describe the remaining ones.  In 
Parliamentary debates, the Minister in charge of institutional reform described them as 
“agreements with an administrative or regulatory content”, without further clarification.93  In 
1988-89, the main concern was with the potential impact of compulsory agreements on the 
hard-won autonomy of federated entities and on dispute resolution mechanisms, rather than 
on the character of the agreements per se.94  
 
Today, federal authorities apparently still share the hesitation or prudence expressed 
in 1988 by the federal Minister concerning the status of those instruments.  For instance, in 
federal Acts approving annual budgets, spending related to cooperation agreements is not 
included in the list of legal or regulatory sources of spending, but in the nondescript “other” 
category.95  MOERENHOUT argues that the terms “administrative” or "regulatory" are 
meaningless in this context, and cautiously avoids defining the residual category of 
agreements that do not require legislative assent.96  In his treatise on “le contentieux 
administratif”, LEROY does not even consider whether cooperation agreements could be 
characterised as regulatory instruments (“règlement”) so as to act as a standard for the 
validity of administrative action.      
 
As we saw above, certain authors, notably UYTTENDAELE, qualify IGAs which do 
not require legislative assent as “règlementaires”. This is essentially done, however, to 
protect them against unilateral regulations, and not as a result of an analysis of the actual 
normative force of such IGAs.97  GARCIA MORALES also contends that agreements that do 
not receive legislative assent have the same normative force as regulatory instruments.98  
Her reasoning seems to be that since they are (ex hypothesi) legal instruments, they are 
necessarily obligatory.  Consequently, they must have similar legal force as other obligatory 
non-legislative instruments of general application, that is, “règlements”.  Since regulatory 
instruments require some statutory foundation, this would presumably be s.92bis itself.  
 
In fact, the whole construction rests on the premise that all cooperation agreements 
are – necessarily - of a legal character.  In Belgium, there are strong political and ideological 
groundings for seeking a legal characterisation of the instrument,99 even when they are quite 
                                                
93 Doc Parl Senate, SE 1988, 405/2, 47.     
94 ALEN and PEETERS (1989) 366-367. 
95 Exposé general du budget 2004, 31.10.03, Doc Parl, Ch 0323-001, 438. 
96 Interview with author. 
97 UYTTENDAELE (2001) 871. 
98 GARCIA MORALES (1998) 144.  
99 Infra, General conclusions. 
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distinct from “normal” regulatory instruments.  In other words, the reasoning is not “let’s see if 
these political agreements can qualify as legal ones”, but rather “since they are legal 
instruments, and cannot have the value of statutes, they must be regulatory instruments”.100  
  
Assuming that the characterisation of IGAs as regulatory instruments is possible, they 
should not – in theory – bind third parties.101  They could only have legal force between 
governments, or create rights for third parties. This is admittedly a strange twist on a 
characterisation of an IGA as a normative instrument erga omnes, but perhaps defensible.   
 
As mentioned above, the advantage which third parties could derive from the 
characterisation of an IGA as a regulatory instrument is twofold.   First, it would allow them to 
invoke it, as a source of law, before any court.  Secondly, it would reinforce the judicial 
review of administrative action taken in pursuance or in contradiction to such IGAs.  In the 
absence of any relevant case law, let us take a hypothetical scenario concerning an existing 
agreement between the German-speaking and the French Communities.  It provides for the 
placement of youth from one order of government in institutions falling within the jurisdiction 
of the other.102  This is in derogation to the strict application of territorial limitations, and the 
agreement was not submitted to legislatures.103  Arguably, a Community’s social services 
could seize the Council of State of the refusal by the other Community to admit a particular 
youth in need of services on grounds that this violates the agreement.  If the latter is 
considered a "regulatory instrument", it is by definition a legal source, and its violation 
justifies the annulation of the administrative decision.104 As the following discussion shows, 
this potential judicial avenue is not without difficulties. 
 
If cooperation agreements can be characterised as a form of regulatory instrument, 
the diversity of their content does not, in my view, support the conclusion that they should all 
be.  This would require a characterisation in concreto, using administrative law criteria for the 
existence of such instruments.  As in the case of the indicia-test applicable to the 
                                                
100 No one suggests that they are formally “arrêtés” (that is subordinate legislation).  They clearly do 
not meet the required format or procedure for this, and would have to be submitted to the CSLS, which 
they are not (unless they are introduced by a legislative instrument, but that takes us away from the 
present hypothesis).  The vaguer qualifier of “réglementaire” is chosen. There does not seem to be a 
difference in legal force, however, between “actes règlementaires” and “arrêtés”.  For the distinction: 
supra, introduction to this Chapter.    
101 See however, CSAS 81.996 (05.08.1999) (Coppoy) concerning the agreement on the transfer of 
competences from the Brabant province. 
102 Accord sectoriel en matière d’aide à la jeunesse (Fr C + GC), 27.04.01 (21.09.01).    
103 Since citizens are entitled to services by their “own” government, could a youth being placed in an 
institution under the responsibility of another Community challenge the placement, on grounds that 
s/he is not bound by the agreement in the absence of legislative assent?   
104 This could be a way of circumventing the exclusion of IGAs as "formalités substantielles" in s.14bis 
CACS.  In other words, while there is an explicit exclusion of one ground of judicial review, this leaves 
open the even wider "violation de la loi" ground of review. 
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characterisation of IGAs as contractual instruments, some would pass muster, others would 
not.   
 
Voluminous academic and judicial analysis has been devoted to the distinction 
between regulatory instruments and non-legally binding texts that emanate from 
governmental authorities.105  Schematically, the content of a regulatory instrument must be 
general and impersonal, in the sense that it is susceptible of applying to an unlimited number 
of situations.106  This is likely the case of most cooperation agreements.107 It must also be 
obligatory, that is, its application must not be discretionary.  Clauses which leave a very wide 
degree of discretion to the parties in the way in which the agreement is to be implemented 
may not qualify.  There is no reason why protocols drafted in sufficiently normative terms 
could not also be recharacterised as regulatory instruments.  This re-qualification would be 
similar to the characterisation of certain ministerial circulars as regulations.108  The terms 
used by drafters to designate such an instrument are not considered determinative to its 
legal characterisation.109  
 
An additional difficulty lies in the fact that, as a rule, regulatory instruments must be 
submitted to the legislative section of the Council of State prior to their coming into force.  
IGAs never are, unless they are introduced through a legislative instrument, which is of 
course, not the situation considered here.  It may be that an IGA could cross the threshold 
and be considered a regulatory instrument, only to be declared invalid for not having been 
sumitted to the a priori scrutiny of the Council of State.  It is arguable that this requirement 
does not apply to cooperation agreements, which are not explicitly included in the list of 
norms over which the CSLS has jurisdicition.110   This is another unresolved issue.  Of 
course, having an IGA characterised as a regulatory instrument, which would immediately be 
held invalid would be cold comfort for the party that relied on it as a source of law.  The 
impact would essentially be political or pedagocial: such judicial pronouncements signal that 
                                                
105  MAST (1989) 36; QUERTAINMONT (2000); De ROY (2002); ERGEC (1998). 
106 LEROY (2000) 172. 
107 However, an IGA that is simply used to designate specific members to a board, could be 
considered an individual decision, rather than an “acte réglementaire”: for exemple, the 2001 
amendement to a 1990 agreement: AC portant création, composition et règlement de la Commission 
intercommunautaire de contrôle des films (3C), 21.12.89, 27.12.90 (20.03.90, 20.04.91) ; 03.10.01 
(07.12.01).        
108 Circular of 09.10.1997 recharacterised as regulatory: BLÉRO, Bernard, “A propos de quelques 
circulaires du Ministre de l’Intérieur en droit des étrangers: nature et valeur du procédé” (1998) 99 
Revue du droit des étrangers 297-316, 313.  Also: LEROY (2000) 188. 
109 BLÉRO (1998) 298.  
110 S.3 of the Coordinated Act on the Council of State talks of "arrêtés".   A parallel could be drawn 
with the position of the CSLS that until legislative acts adopted by the COCOF were explicitly included 
in that provision, the Council of State did not have the jurisdiction over them, while it did concerning 
the legislative instruments of every other order of government: CSLS 22.977/9, Doc Ass COCOF 
1993-1994, no. 62/1. 
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the executives attempted to use an illegal instrument to introduce legal rules.  In States 
founded on the rule of law, the statement has, arguably some value. 
  
 Assuming that an IGA has a sufficiently normative content to be considered a 
regulatory instrument, yet is not invalid for violating s.92bis, or for failing to be submitted to 
the CSLS, the obstacle course is not yet over.  Another procedural hurdle to its use as a 
benchmark for judicial review arises.  It relates, this time, not to the jurisdiction of the CSLS, 
but of its administrative counterpart, the CSAS, acting a posteriori.   
  
S.14bis of the Council's organic legislation explicitly excludes agreements as 
"substantial formalities", the violation of which normally leads to the invalidity of an 
administrative act.  This means that IGAs cannot serve as "norm of control" to test the validity 
of unilateral administrative decisions or act, at least from that particular angle.111  It may be 
however, that by recharacterising an agreement as a regulatory instrument, another ground 
of review, the wider “violation de la loi" would be available.112  As the expression indicates, 
this ground of review implies that a public authority acts in contradiction to a legal rule, which 
an IGA qua regulatory instrument would be.    
 
This would require a clarification of the CSAS's jurisdiction over an instrument of a bi- 
or multi-lateral source, by contrast to its classic jurisdiction over unilateral ones.  This is not 
impossible: the CSAS has extended its jurisdiction over contract-type instruments by 
recasting them as regulatory ones, when a functional test revealed their regulatory 
function.113  However, the CSAS's jurisdiction over cooperation agreements is not entirely 
resolved.  Without clarifying its own jurisdiction directly, in a number of cases, the CSAS has 
assessed the legality of administrative decisions taken pursuant to IGAs.114  Worthy of note is 
the fact that in several of these cases, the IGA in question should have received legislative 
assent, but had not.115  In one of rare cases in which the Council’s jurisdiction was directly 
                                                
111 CSAS 94.766 (19.04.2001) (Société anonyme Sablière). An application to have regulation limiting 
heavy traffic in the WR annulled on grounds that given its impact in Flanders it should have been the 
object of a cooperation agreement was rejected.  This was not truly an action in judicial review using 
an IGA as a benchmark, since there was none. But, to my knowledge, it is the only direct 
pronouncement of the CSAS on its own jurisdiction concerning IGAs, and this pronouncement is not 
definitive since only one ground of review was considered. 
112 "Loi" in this case includes any rule of law, and thus includes regulatory instruments: LEROY (2000) 
363-367.    
113 This was the case of collective agreements.   An Act was then adopted to explicitly deprive the 
CSAS of this jurisdiction: LEROY (2000) 190-91.  An Act also specifically provides that so-called 
"contrats de gestion" do not constitute regulatory instruments, thus depriving the CS of a jurisdiction 
which it might otherwise have found for itself: in DE ROY (2002) 396.  In France, such instruments 
have been characterised as regulation: QUERTAINMONT (2000) 46-47.   
114 The question of the Council’s jurisdiction was apparently not argued.   
115 In my view, this lack of assent should have rendered those agreements invalid, since third parties 
were clearly bound. See: CSAS 54.013 (23.06.1995) (Vereecken); CSAS 81.996 (05.08.1999) 
(Coppoy) and CSAS 114.610 (17.01.2003) (Société coopérative du logement) concerning the transfer 
of staff from the Brabant province.  See also CSAS 62.607 (17.10.1996) (Boonen) regarding the 
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raised, it deftly avoided the issue. The application for judicial review was directed at an 
Annex to a cooperation agreement.  The Council ruled that the Annex, which authorised a 
number of associations to monitor sexual offenders, was a unilateral instrument by the 
federal Minister of Justice, who had simply joined it to the agreement for informative 
purposes.116  Hence, the Council's jurisdiction was established in “traditional” form and the 
Council’s jurisdiction over the agreement circumvented.117    
 
Interestingly, there may be an interest for government parties to seek to have an IGA 
characterised as a regulatory instrument. This flows from the optional dispute resolution 
mechanism applicable to optional agreements.  Assuming a dispute arises concerning some 
decision taken by an executive that runs counter to an IGA, other parties could seize a 
cooperation tribunal, assuming one is created.  If this is not the case, an aggrieved 
government could seek to have the decision annulled by the CSAS.  Of course, all of the 
above hurdles would apply, mutatis mutandis to this scenario as well.   
 
The obstacle course is arguably very heavy for potentially very little result.  To qualify 
as a regulatory instrument, an agreement would first have to be of a general and abstract 
character, have normative content, yet neither involve public funds or bind third parties 
(otherwise, it would violate s.92bis).   The validity of such a recharacterised agreement would 
depend on a conclusion that – by derogation to other forms of regulatory instruments – it 
does not require an opinion by the CSLS.  Then, assuming it is invoked before the CSAS to 
challenge a unilateral decision taken in contradiction with it, the CSAS would have to provide 
a generous interpretation of its own jurisdiction. 
 
To summarise, the main advantage flowing from the recharacterisation of IGAs which 
do not require legislative assent as regulatory instruments lies in the judicial review to which 
administrative action that runs counter to an IGA could be subjected.  This is true inter 
                                                                                                                                                   
refusal of a permit to built: the 1993 Brussels agreement was not truly the norm of control, but is 
clearly "in the background".  The absence of assent goes unnoticed.  
116 The Annex contained a list of associations selected to monitor sexual offenders.  The designation 
was challenged by an association that was not retained. 
117 CSAS 79.517 (25.03.1999) (CRASC).  Even more complicated in this case was the fact that the 
agreement in question was to be submitted to legislative assent.  As soon as this was obtained, the 
CSAS would in any event lose jurisdiction to the benefit of the Court of Arbitration, since a legislative 
instrument would be involved: infra, 6.1.1.1.  In my view, had the CSAS sought to review not the 
Annex but the agreement itself, it would have had either to decline jurisdiction, or to note that the 
agreement was without legal effect, until assent was given.  In fact, after the agreement received 
assent, its constitutionality was challenged before the Court of Arbitration, which also held that the 
Annex was not part of the agreement, that it had therefore not been the object of assent, and that the 
Court did not, therefore, have jurisdiction over it!  In other words, by treating it as distinct from the 
agreement, the CSAS established its jurisdiction over it, while the Court of Arbitration declined its own 
jurisdiction.  A more compelling analysis of the CSAS’s jurisdiction is provided in 81.996 (05.08.1999) 
(Coppoy) in which the Council treated as "inexistent" an administrative decision that countered an 
agreement which never received legislative assent.  The case contains no direct discussion regarding 
the Council's own jurisdiction. 
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partes, if a cooperation tribunal is not set up to resolve a dispute. But it is probably even 
more significant for third parties.  Hurdles are numerous though, and the end-result still 
unclear.  One cannot assert with certainty that IGAs can never be characterised as 
regulatory instruments, any more than one can assert that every IGA which does not require 
legislative assent necessarily has this status.    
  
 5.3.2   IGAs having regulatory status in Canada 
 
According to the positive law orthodoxy exposed earlier, Canadian IGAs can only 
alter the domestic legal order of any federal partner if they are expressly granted the force of 
law through some form of statutory incorporation.118  In this context, any potential 
recharacterisation of IGAs as regulatory instruments appears superfluous.  Once more, what 
could possibly be the advantage of considering as regulatory an instrument which does not 
bind third parties?  Yet, the possibility that IGAs could constitute some form of regulatory 
instruments, when they are not so incorporated, also deserves some attention. 
 
On a preliminary note, it does not appear that IGAs could constitute formal 
regulations (Canadian “règlements”) any more than Belgian cooperation agreements could 
constitute formal regulations (“arrêtés”). It is more likely that, if they are recharacterised, it 
would be along the lines of directives or circulars, which Canadian courts have occasionally 
treated as regulatory instruments.119  The analysis proceeds in concreto, essentially by 
examining the text’s normative content.   The difference between regulations and other types 
of regulatory instruments is largely a matter of procedure and authority to adopt.120  Both, 
however, require some statutory foundation, and once adopted, they have the same 
normative force, that is, they are (normally) legally binding on their “addressees”.    
 
For executives, the interest of adopting apparently “informal” rules – such as 
directives or IGAs that do not qualify as legal instruments erga omnes - is double.  It limits 
entitlements that come with instruments of a legal character, and judicial review concerning 
their validity.121  Conversely, the interest for third parties should be to consolidate such 
entitlements, and to be able to challenge administrative decisions taken in contradiction with 
an agreement. The question is obviously whether bi- or multilateral agreements can be 
characterised as regulatory instruments, which are traditionally unilateral law-making 
devices.  The problem is even more crucial given the absence of any provision equivalent to 
                                                
118 Supra, 5.2.2.3.     
119 For these, the Court used the concept of quasi-regulatory instruments: of the Old Man River v. 
Canada, [1992] 1 SCR 3, 36; ISSALYS and LEMIEUX (1997) 489-520; HOULE (2001) 13-109. 
120 Statutory Instruments Act, RSC (1985) ch. S-22. 
121 MOCKLE (2002) 149. 
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s.92bis which can at least provide some legal starting point for the argument that 
governments can regulate jointly. 
 
In the Colour of margarine case examined above, the Québec Court of Appeal 
expressly denied that an agreement that had been approved by statute, but not incorporated, 
could provide a benefit unto third parties.122  A company had notably argued that a Québec 
regulation contravened the Internal Trade Agreement.  The Court disagreed.  Applying the 
analogy with the intersection between the domestic and international legal orders, it gave a 
classic dualist reading of the impact of IGAs.  Without statutory incorporation, neither an 
international agreement nor an IGA can alter the domestic legal order. This implies that such 
an IGA may not impose obligations on third parties,123 but also that it cannot be the source of 
rights for parties other than the governments who concluded the agreement (and this, 
through the contractual prism).  In other words, only traditional unilateral norms can generate 
rights for third parties, or impose obligations on them. 124     
 
If this analysis is correct – and it is certainly consistent with the classic understanding 
of law-making in Canada - the only remaining interest that the recharacterisation of IGAs as 
statutory instruments could have for third parties would be in terms of judicial review of 
administrative decisions contravening such IGAs.  As in the Belgian context, voluminous 
administrative law analysis is devoted to identifying criteria pursuant to which instruments 
which are not formally “règlements” can nevertheless be considered to be of a legal 
character, and thus cross the threshold of juridicity erga omnes.125  Those criteria are very 
similar to those applicable in Belgian public law: they must have some statutory grounding, 
be obligatory and susceptible of regulating an indeterminate number of situations. Classically 
– and unsurprisingly – they are also understood to be “unilateral”.126  
 
Assuming this “unilateral” criteria could be lifted and that some IGAs met criteria for 
re-characterisation as regulatory instruments, judicial review of administrative action taken in 
contradiction with such IGAs would face a major procedural hurdle flowing from the dual 
character of the Canadian judicial system.    
 
                                                
122 The Colour of Margarine case: supra, 5.2.2.3.   Also: Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. V. R., [1979] 1 SCR 
101, 117. 
123 In the Anti-Inflation Reference, the Supreme Court had held that IGAs could not generate 
obligations for third parties unless there were incorporated.  It did not address the issue of rights. 
124 See also: Re Lofstrom and Murphy et al., (1971) 22 DLR (3d) 120 (SKCA); supra 4.1.3.  Oddly, in 
the last of the Finlay cases, the Supreme Court reviewed the conformity of Manitoba’s policy of 
recouping overpayments from social assistance benefits recipients with own legislation as well as the 
federal-provincial Agreement in the Canada Assistance Plan. However, it does not provides any 
analysis of that agreement’s status.  In the end, the Court found no violation.  The minority did, but still 
failed to characterise the agreement: Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1993] 1 SCR 1080. 
125 GARANT (1996) 395-401; ISSALYS and LEMIEUX (1997) 489-520; HOULE (2001) 13-109. 
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As was briefly explained in Chapter 1, the actions of federal officials are reviewable 
by the Federal Court, while the actions of provincial officials are reviewable by provincial 
Superior Courts.127  While s.19 of the Federal Court Act provides a forum for resolving 
intergovernmental "controversies",128 it is not open to third parties. There is no equivalent 
judicial organ for challenging joint decisions by governments, or decisions made by bodies 
created through IGAs.129  Judicial review of actions taken pursuant to IGAs must be 
rattached, somehow, to one order of government.  Applications for judicial review of such 
decisions are regularly dismissed for having been filed in the wrong Court.130  In fact, even 
when Courts do conclude that they have jurisdiction, the degree of uncertainty generated for 
affected members of the public in this regard is astonishing.131    
 
As between parties, it may be that the recharacterisation of an IGA as a regulatory 
instrument presents even less interest in Canada than it does in Belgium.  This is because if 
a Canadian IGA constitutes a contractual instrument inter partes, there will necessarily be a 
court of competent jurisdiction to deal with a dispute involving its interpretation or violation.132  
As we saw, this is not necessarily the case in Belgium, since parties to an optional 
cooperation agreement may disagree on the creation of a cooperation tribunal.  In that case, 
a finding that an agreement constitutes a "regulatory instrument" could ground the jurisdiction 
of the Council of State to intervene. 
     
In the end, the characterisation of IGAs as regulatory instruments seems as unlikely 
to succeed in Canada as it does in Belgium.133  As the following will show, this is in sharp 
contrast with the strong impression one gets from reading administrative law decisions in 
which IGAs are conceived as an integral part of complex regulatory schemes.    
 
  Given the absence of an equivalent provision to s.92bis, federal partners in Canada 
cannot adopt erga omnes legal rules that are “directly applicable”.  Instead, they construct 
                                                                                                                                                   
126 Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1992] 1 SCR 212; HOULE (2001) 16 ff. 
127 Supra, 1.2.3.  Note, however, that when a provincial body acts on behalf of the federal government, 
in principle, judicial review proceeds before provincial judicial organs: s.2(1) Federal Court Act, RSC 
(1985) ch. F-7 ; See comments and cases cited in SGAYIAS, David et al., Federal Court Practice, 
(Toronto/Montréal: Carswell, 2002), under s.2. 
128 Supra, Chapter 4.  
129 For similar conclusion regarding Australia: SAUNDERS, Cheryl, “Administrative Law and Relations 
between Governments : Australia and Europe Compared”, (2000) 28 Fed LR 263-290. 
130 Eg: Canadian Restaurant and Food Services Association v. Canadian Dairy Commission, [2001] 3 
FC 20 (FCTD) [the Restaurant case]. 
131 Eg: Secunda case in which the federal government challenged the Nova Scotia Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction on the basis of a clause contained in an IGA. 
132 Despite difficulties involving inter-jurisdictional immunities: POIRIER, Cross-roads. 
133 Another issue which would need to be canvassed relates to the authority of signatories to IGA to 
adopt regulatory instruments. In many cases, Ministers are expressly authorised to adopt such norms 
as well as to conclude IGAs, so that the recharacterisation would not be problematic from that 
perspective.  The problem of authority would arise in cases of IGAs concluded by civil servants, for 
instance.  On authority of Ministers: LORDON et al. (1992) 21-25. 
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cooperative arrangements through parallel and complementary Acts and regulations and 
delegate administrative and regulatory powers to one another. The fulcrum between those 
intertwinned unilateral instruments is frequently an IGA, or even a series of IGAs. It is often 
difficult to sustain that the source of formal normativity lies only in those regulations or Acts: 
IGAs are clearly part of the normative apparatus.  The result is often a tangle of legal 
sources, which courts do not necessarily insist on disentangling.  For instance, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has held that when officials derive their authority from both federal and 
provincial sources, they do not need to expressly identify the source of this authority.  The 
Court justified a lower degree of accountability on grounds of efficiency.134    
  
One illustration of the interwoven legal sources, in which IGAs are an integral part, 
will suffice.  The fact pattern is undescribably convoluted, and the following is an 
oversimplification.  In Canada, federal authorities are responsible for the international and 
interprovincial aspects of trade, while provinces are competent over the intra-provincial facet.  
To articulate these interconnected competences, federal and provincial authorities resort to 
circuitous arrangements replete with interdelegation.135  This is notably the case of the trade 
and marketing of dairy products.  This has given rise to a web of criss-crossing federal and 
provincial legislation, regulations, formal IGAs, complemented by Memorandum of 
Understandings and Addenda.136  A number of interprovincial and federal-provincial bodies 
are instituted, as well as federal and provincial boards which can delegate functions to one 
another.  IGAs stand at every corner of this labyrynth.137   
  
One of the numerous intergovernmental bodies set up through an IGA, is in charge of 
setting pan-Canadian policies and quotas regarding certain dairy product.  A company was 
repeatedly refused a permit to purchase a certain type of cheese.  Given the enterprise’s 
pan-Canadian activities, seeking redress before a single provincial court seemed 
problematic. It thus seized the Federal Court, which, in an undescribably labirynthine 
decision, ended up concluding that the body derived no power from federal legislation or 
regulations, despite the fact that its decisions partly fell within federal jurisdiction.  In fact, the 
Committee had been granted powers by provincial milk boards which had themselves been 
delegated powers from a federal body.   For the Court, this round-about game of 
authorisation and delegation was clearly insufficient to assert federal filiation and it declined 
                                                
134 BC (Milk Board) v. Grisnich, [1995] 2 SCR 895.  The Court added, somewhat more convincingly, 
that requiring that the source of authority be identified would only lead to detailed references to every 
possible source of power, which would not actually improve accountability. 
135 Supra, 1.2.4.4.  
136 The Restaurant case.  For other examples of the "fiction" of unilateral action in the context of joint 
acition: Moresby Explorers Ltd v. Canada, [2001] 4 FC 591(FCTD). 
137 I counted at least six of them. 
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jurisdiction on grounds that the body had been "created by contract", not under a federal 
statute.138   
 
The Court did not characterise the decisions made by the Committee in question.  It 
simply ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over it.139  Yet, the Court’s assertion that the 
whole intergovernmental scheme was meant to "regulate [dairy products] in a seamless way" 
is revealing.140  The Committee, presumably created "by contract" clearly played regulatory 
functions.  There is no doubt that the decisions made by this "contractual body" bound the 
entire dairy industry, including the affected company. Denying that this is regulatory is 
counter-intuitive. If such decisions do not bind third parties, the entire scheme falls apart: the 
very imposition of quotas and the permit system flows from these IGAs.141  This certainly 
strikes as "regulating by contract".   
 
In fact, it is difficult to identify a pattern in administrative law decisions involving IGAs.  
On the one hand, when they have to resolve procedural issues, notably regarding their own 
jurisdiction, Canadian judges tend to revert back to the fiction that sources of normativity are 
unilateral (even if parallel or complementary), since this is the only way in which their 
jurisdiction can be established.142  Similarly, when there is a direct challenge between a 
unilateral instrument and the content of an IGA, the former will normally be given 
precedence.143       
  
On the other hand, Courts tend to show a great deal of deference to cooperative 
schemes. While this is never asserted point-blank, it is difficult to understand a number of 
rulings unless one admits that IGAs are treated as normative instruments.  The following 
decision is a good illustration.  The Nova Scotia Supreme Court ruled that an entire "joint 
regulatory scheme" concerning offshore resources and safety (again, made up of a maze of 
legal sources, including several IGAs) superceded provisions of the Federal Court Act.  The 
crucial provisions which purported to establish this precedence were contained in an IGA.  
                                                
138 That is, the Court understood its jurisdiction to require that the body be directly created by a federal 
statute.   
139 Cryptically, in the second to last paragraph, the Court simply states that the question of whether it 
derived valid powers from provincial sources was not before it.    
140 The Restaurant case, par. 4 
141 For similar findings: Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Monette, 505-05-
002793-963 (20.02.1997) (SCQ); Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, 705-
05-004614-007 (01.11.2001) (SCQ).  By analogy: Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat, [1980] 2 RCS 735: 
depending on terms of statute creating an administrative agency, it can have powers that are 
legislative in nature.      
142 At least with regards to the Federal Court, which only has attributed jurisdiction. 
143 BC Egg Marketing Board v. Sprucewood Farms Ltd, BCSC A902400 (canlii), 11; Martinoff v. 
Canada, [1994] 3 FC 33 (FCA); In Ontario (Chicken Producer’s Marketing Board) v. Canada (Chicken 
Marketing Agency), [1993] 1 FC 116, in which the FCTD held that an intergovernmental board could 
not impose penalties on governments, unless it was clearly authorised by legislation or regulation to 
do so.   
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Oddly, the Court considered that this IGA was devoid of legal character both inter partes (for 
lack of specificity) or erga omnes (finding that the approving  “statutes do not breath life into 
it").   Yet, the Court could not have reached its conclusion on jurisdiction without the IGA.  In 
this context, denying that the IGA has normative force – even in positive law – is like visiting 
Alice in Wonderland. 
  
In this regard, Canadian positive law rests on an untenable binary alternative: 
agreements are formally given the force of law through incorporation, or they are devoid of 
legal force.  The reality – including the reality which looms just under the surface of 
substantial case law – denies this black and white approach, in which 99% of IGAs would 
amount to mere statements of policy, with no binding force erga omnes.  The source of legal 
rules can only be unilateral, yet they are often so intertwined and dependent on IGAs, that 
Courts themselves decline to unravel them. The exception is when they have to rule on their 
jurisdiction, which requires a degree of certain clarification.144  This issue may present the 
widest rift between theory and practice concerning the legal status of IGAs, and would 
certainly justify greater academic scrutiny.145 
 
5.4 The legal effect of IGAs which do not constitute norms erga omnes 
 
At the end of Chapter 4, a number of legal doctrines were considered, that could 
potentially give some legal effect to IGAs that do not cross the threshold of juridicity inter 
partes.  A similar enquiry is warranted regarding the status of IGAs erga omnes.  In fact, 
these doctrines may be even more relevant to third parties affected by IGAs which clearly 
govern the behaviour of public authorities, and yet fail to meet criteria to be formally 
characterised as normative instruments erga omnes.  While governments can always resort 
to political strategies to bring another one to reconsider its decision to depart from an IGA,146 
third parties cannot – by definition – seek the renegotiation of an agreement to which they 
are not party.147  These doctrines could therefore be particularly significant in Canada, given 
that so few IGAs are subject to the only undeniable method for giving them force of law, that 
is, statutory incorporation.   Given the uncertainty relating to the possibility of re-
characterising IGAs as regulatory instruments, alternative legal safeguards may be useful. 
                                                
144 With the exception of federal agent acting for provinces whose actions can be challenged before 
provincial Superior Court. Even this, however, gives rise to judicial controversies: Secunda case, par. 
25. 
145 This would likely require detailed case studies of specific cooperative schemes, which the survey of 
a large number of IGAs undertaken in the present thesis did not allow.    
146 Obviously, with varying degrees of success, depending on power relations and bargaining chips.    
147 Note that the NFCA rejected the argument that governments were estopped from amending the NF 
Terms of Entry without negotiating with certain groups whose rights were being affected.  This, of 
course, does not relate to a non-legally binding IGA, but to a constitutionalised one.  It is mentioned, 
however, in order to illustrate how private law doctrines are adapted and argued in the context of 
IGAs: Hogan, 261-262. 
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The purpose of the present section is to point out that while the characterization of an 
IGA as a legal instrument is likely the most effective way of guaranteeing legal protection to 
third parties, the lack of such characterization does not oust legal solutions altogether.  
Again, the scope of this thesis does not allow for a detailed consideration of every ground of 
judicial review that could potentially be invoked in each federation.  I will focus on the 
corresponding doctrines of legitimate expectations in Canada and the principle of “good 
administration” in Belgium.148   
  
Whether the dispute is inter partes, or involves an aggrieved third party, the basic 
idea is the same: these doctrines provide that it is reasonable to expect governments to keep 
to their word, even when this word is contained in instruments devoid of legal character.  Just 
as public authorities may be forced to comply with a departmental circular, they could, I 
would argue, be forced to abide by the terms of an IGA which has created legitimate 
expectations in a third party.  This could typically arise with regards to IGAs having  “mere 
administrative” value.   
 
In the Belgian context, let us imagine a business that invested in a particular site, 
knowing that the surroundings were to be restored pursuant to the 1993 federal-regional 
agreement on Brussels.  While largely publicised (this is a politically visible arrangement), 
neither the 1993 original nor its 8 addenda have been submitted to legislatures.  Let us then 
imagine that the announced restoration project is abandoned.  Could the business launch an 
administrative law action to have that decision annulled, even if the 1993 agreement does 
not constitute a legal norm, per se, on grounds that its revocation violates the principle of 
“bonne administration”?    
 
Similarly, it is arguable that a Canadian egg producer who made business decisions 
on the basis of quotas established through officially non-binding IGAs, has a legitimate 
expectation that its provincial government would not arbitrarily detract from this system.  S/he 
could potentially challenge a decision that departs from it.149 
     
The corresponding administrative law doctrines of legitimate expectations and “bonne 
administration” could  grant some legal protection to third parties who relied on IGAs that 
never cross the threshold into the domain of binding public law norms.  Again, the nature of 
                                                
148 Authorities cited in Section 4.4 are largely applicable in the present context as well. See notably 
ERGEC (1998). 
149 This could be supported by the assertion by McLaughlin J., diss. in Finlay (1993), 1117, who 
concluded that a Manitoba policy of recuperating overpayments from social assistance beneficiaries, 
violated its own legislation and the Canada Assistance Plan (which was authorised, but neither 
approved nor incorporated, and could not, therefore, have statutory force.  This suggests that the legal 
foundation for the consistency envisaged could not be the legal character, erga omnes, of the 
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the remedies that could be granted would depend on the circumstances, and clearly on the 
specifics of each administrative law system.  Whether, to put it in common law terms, the 
“substance” of the IGA could be guaranteed is unclear.150  At a minimum, however, the 
doctrines would impose on governments an obligation to provide a reasonable explanation 
for their departure from an IGA, even if the latter remained on the “purely” political side of the 
threshold and did not constitute a formal legal source.151 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Setting aside the particular phenomenon of Canadian constitutionalised agreements, 
which has no direct equivalent in Belgium, the fundamental rule in both federations is that 
executives may not legislate by contract.  In other words, the characterization of IGAs as 
contractual instruments inter partes, does not entail a modification of the parties’ respective 
legal orders, unless the legislative branch is involved.   The major difference between the two 
federations lies in the nature and frequency of this parliamentary involvement. 
 
 Officially, in Canada, IGAs will only create rights and obligations for third parties if 
they are not merely “approved” or “ratified” by statutes, but actually incorporated, that is, 
given explicit force of law. This rarely occurs, with the result that a very large proportion of 
IGAs are technically devoid of legal force erga omnes.152  This is consistent with the classic 
dual character of the Canadian federal architecture, in which each order is endowed with 
autonomous legislative, executive and to a lesser extent judicial branches of government.  In 
this vision, law of general application is necessarily of a unilateral character.  The practice of 
IGAs vividly illustrates the inadequacy of this theory to account for the interlocking practice of 
federalism in Canada.  Not only is this practice largely situated on the margins on the formal 
legal system, but even when confronted with non-incorporated IGAs, courts waver between a 
strict adherence to the dual vision – which considers that the only sources of law of general 
application must be unilateral – and deference to cooperative schemes, in which the same 
cannot be asserted with as much certainty.  
 
 The situation is apparently clearer in Belgium, given the explicit quasi-constitutional 
requirement that agreements which “bind Belgians individually” require legislative assent.153  
Nearly two-thirds of cooperation agreements are submitted to legislative assemblies. The 
                                                                                                                                                   
agreement.   In the case, she would only have granted a declaration to that effect (without specifying 
grounds other than the “violation”). 
150 In Canada, it is almost certainly not possible, given the Supreme Court's rejection of the 
substantive branch of the doctrine: supra, 4.4.    
151 BLÉRO (1998) 107-108; see also cases cited supra, 4.4.   
152 Without any record, and the variety of manners in which IGAs can be incorporated, this proportion 
is difficult to assess with precision. But I would guess between well over 90%.    
153 S.92bis, 1980 DMA. 
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discrepancy between the practice (which undeniably affects third parties) and the theory (that 
they cannot be bound save through legislative action) is thus less significant in Belgium than 
in Canada.  This nevertheless leaves open the characterisation of those IGAs which do not 
receive legislative assent.   
 
Some constitutionalists assert that they have, at a minimum, regulatory value.  In my 
view, in the absence of a formal method for conferring regulatory status to IGAs (equivalent 
to legislative assent), this wholesale characterization is exaggerated.  IGAs that do not 
require legislative assent may have the legal force of regulations, but only if they meet 
administrative law criteria relating to “regulatory instruments”, notably functional 
considerations (what do IGAs actually do? Are they considered obligatory by public officials? 
Are they susceptible to govern an indefinite number of situations?).   Some IGAs pass the 
test, others would not.  Such a recharacterisation would enable third parties to invoke 
“regulatory” IGAs as legal sources of rights (even though they could not be a source of 
obligations) before any court of law.154  Moreover, “regulatory” IGAs could serve as a 
benchmark to assess the legality of administrative action taken in pursuance or in 
contradiction of such agreements.   
 
In Belgium, s.92bis enables executives of different orders of government to agree on 
a common text and then simply to submit it to their respective assemblies.  Theoretically, a 
similar result could obtain in Canada if the legislature of every party to an IGA were to 
incorporate it as is.  What is striking is how rarely this is done.  A functional equivalent of joint 
norm-making in Canada lies in the delegation of regulatory power to a joint body, or a body 
created by another order of government.155  IGAs constitute essential links between 
legislation and regulations, in what is often an incredibly maze of legal sources.  In this 
regard, the Canadian situation is exactly the one which Belgian sought to avoid with the 
adoption of s.92bis in 1988-89.  While Belgian constitutional law is often convoluted, in this 
case, the Canadian situation is far less transparent. 
 
Pondering the fate of Belgian agreements which do not receive legislative assent, 
spurred a reflection on the regulatory function of Canadian IGAs, both as indispensable 
elements of complex interlocking intergovernmental schemes, in which they articulate 
unilateral legal sources, and also when they clearly regulate the behaviour of public officials, 
without formally qualifying as legal sources.  While this question remains exploratory, it is 
worth reflecting on the potential for the recasting of some IGAs as legal instruments, in the 
same way as courts have recast internal directives as normative instruments. While 
                                                
154 S.92bis, only conditions the “binding” of individuals on legislative assent. 
155 Supra, 1.2.4.4. 
 189 
Canadian courts have suggested that IGAs may not be a source of rights for third parties156 
(an issue still open in Belgium), such recharacterisation could at least facilitate judicial review 
of administrative action that counters or implements IGAs.157 
 
In the absence of such recharacterisation, the legal system of both federations can 
still potentially offer some legal protection to third parties who rely on agreements between 
federal partners.  Those include legitimate expectations and the principle of “bonne 
administration” which, at a minimum, require governments to justify their departure from 
public representation or constant practice.  This way, IGAs which are officially devoid of legal 
character erga omnes, can nevertheless have some legal effect.    
 
                                                
156 The Colour of Margarine case: supra, 5.2.2.3 and 5.3.2. 
157 It bears pointing out, however, that re-characterisation of IGAs as regulatory instruments in either 
Belgium or Canada could raise problems of validity, if proper procedures are not followed.  In other 
words, such IGAs could cross the border into the sphere of legal instruments, but lack validity in 
positive law.  Of concerns are submissions to the legislative section of the Council of State in Belgium, 
or to parliamentary committee overseeing regulatory instruments in Canada.  Note that the validity of 
regulatory instruments does not actually depend on publication, although third parties cannot be 
bound unless they are published.  This is not relevant here, since by law, third parties could never be 
bound by such instruments.   
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CHAPTER 6: THE PLACE OF IGAS IN THE HIERARCHY OF NORMS  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Classical public law theory rests on the paradigm of a hierarchy between constitutional, 
statutory and regulatory norms. The concept of hierarchy of norms ensures that subordinate 
rules are consistent with other types of rules of a “superior” kind, e.g. that legislation is 
consistent with the constitution.  It consequently also determines which rule can “trump” 
another.  The expression “hierarchy of norms” is not commonly used in common law systems.1  
Nevertheless, the process of determination of the constitutionality of statutory and regulatory 
instruments, as well as the judicial review of administrative action relies on a conception of law 
as a hierarchical system.    
 
The present chapter discusses the position IGAs occupy in the hierarchy of norms in 
positive law.  The issue of the hierarchy of norms is obviously very closely related to the 
question of the status of agreements inter partes and erga omnes.  It is not co-extensive with 
these questions however, since an agreement can be legally binding, but still be subject to 
implicit or explicit modification or annulment by a norm located at a “superior” echelon in the 
hierarchy.   
 
The place occupied by cooperation agreements in the hierarchy of norms is unsettled in 
Belgian positive law.  Some authors underline the difficulty, yet decline to offer a solution.2 
Others have sought to fill the lacunae through analogies with the relationship between the 
domestic and the international legal orders.  This is addressed in section 6.1.  By contrast, in 
Canada, courts have made quite definite pronouncement regarding conflicts between IGAs and 
contrary unilateral instruments.  While not explicitly framed in these terms, the resolution of such 
disputes rests on a hierarchical conception of norms of public law.  The principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty has received an extensive interpretation, even in the context of inter-
federal cooperation, so as to underline and emphasise the superiority of unilateral legislative 
norms over IGAs.  In this respect Canadian courts have also invoked parallels with the 
relationship that exists between the domestic and the international legal order under Canadian 
law.  The Canadian position is examined in section 6.2. 
 
This chapter will involve incursions into the separation of powers between the executive 
and the legislative branches of government as well as the intersection between domestic and 
international law.   Other types of arguments have also been invoked in both countries to 
                                                
1 Québec authors are more likely to use it: GARANT (1996) 365 ff.   
2 MORENHOUT (2001) 617; SCHOLSEM  (1991) 282.    
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attempt to consolidate agreements in the face of competing norms of public law – with various 
degrees of success.  While, once more, the vocabulary and the angle of approach   differ at first 
sight, the Belgian doctrines of “parallelism of forms” and “federal loyalty” find echoes in the 
invocation of “legitimate expectations” and “unwritten principles of constitutional law” or 
“constitutional conventions” in Canada.  They are all grounded on the belief that federal partners 
should – in principle and as a matter of good faith – keep their word. Those various doctrines 
are explored in section 6.3. 
  
6.1 Cooperation agreements and the hierarchy of norms in Belgium 
 
In a succinct way which summarises doctrinal thinking on the issue, CRAENEN notes 
that cooperation agreements 
 
“[...] are not made unilaterally and therefore cannot be amended or 
abolished unilaterally by a government or a legislator.  The agreements 
must respect the formal and the material Constitution, but it is not yet 
clear how they fit into the hierarchy of legal norms.”3 
 
 Indeed, neither the Constitution nor the quasi-constitutional legislation which creates 
cooperative agreements, nor the ordinary legislation which organises the cooperative 
tribunals meant to enforce them, indicate what their legal status is, or where they fit in the 
Belgian legal order. Again, the “inventors” of this institution chose – or were forced - to 
maintain a certain ambiguity concerning the status of these agreements and their relationship 
with other norms of public law.   
   
In 1988, when cooperative agreements were formally introduced in the Belgian legal 
order, the Minister responsible for institutional reforms mysteriously declared that “the absence 
of a hierarchy of norms” would be respected.  More precisely, he stated that: 
 
“It is true that the government’s intention is to make the conclusion of 
certain agreements obligatory, but only in a very limited number of 
cases, when this appears absolutely necessary and without calling into 
question the general principle of autonomy and the absence of a 
hierarchy of norms”.4 
 
The very suggestion that there is a “principle” of an “absence of hierarchy of norms” is extremely 
odd, since the entire Belgian public law system is based on a hierarchy between constitutional 
norms, statutes, regulatory instruments and administrative acts and decisions.   
 
                                                
3 CRAENEN (1996) 38. 
4 Senate, SE 1988, 405/2, 48 (Formal motivation for legislation: "Exposé des motifs"),  my translation. 
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To complicate things further, the government’s formal motivation for the proposed 
introduction of cooperative agreements into the 1980 DMA in 1988-89 provided that agreements 
would be subject to “ordinary judicial controls”.5   Judicial review requires – at a minimum – that 
the judge be in a position to determine the legal force of a particular instrument and its relation 
to the benchmark norm against which it is being reviewed.  The absence of consensus on the 
precise legal status of the new institution, “invented” in the context of constitutional reforms, thus 
gave rise to two contradictory statements: that the agreements would not be subject to a 
hierarchy of norms and that they would be subject to regular judicial review. 
 
It appears that some of the key negotiators rejected the possibility that these 
agreements could take precedence over the law of each of the signatories, as is the case in 
Switzerland, for instance.  Similarly, concerns were expressed regarding the potential 
transposition of the superiority of international law over domestic law to the sphere of inter-
federal relations.   Others took for granted that the new agreements would have greater value 
than the political agreements which members of the “pre-federal” state could conclude until 
then, and that this implied not only some legal character but protection against unilateral 
repudiation through ordinary regulatory or statutory instruments of one party.  Parliamentary 
documents contain references to all these hypotheses.6  As is often the case, a “Belgian 
compromise” was reached, and a solution was designed, veiled in ambiguity but with the 
potential of temporarily satisfying everyone.  The result is indeed profoundly ambiguous.  A new 
legal norm is introduced, but serious doubts remain concerning its relationship with other norms 
of public law.  
 
This denial that IGAs would be subject to a hierarchy of norms has been reiterated – and 
criticised – over the last 15 years.  It has been observed that this position was untenable from a 
legal perspective.7   If cooperation agreements are legally binding, positive law requires that 
they be positioned in relation to other norms of public law.   In fact, it is possible to interpret the 
Minister’s statement concerning the absence of a hierarchy of norms in a radically different 
manner from the one offered so far by Belgian constitutionalists. 
  
Reading the statement in context, it appears that the federal Minister was responding to 
fears that agreements would be used by the federal government to impose rules upon the 
constitutive units, at the same time as constitutional powers were officially transferred to them.  
To give just one example of the kind of statements which generated such apprehensions in the 
early days of the federalisation process, the Report of the Parliamentary Commission charged 
                                                
5 "Sanctions juridiques normales": Exposé des motifs relatif à l’art. 61 de la loi spéciale du 16.01.1989, 
introduisant les par. 5 et 6 de l’article 92bis, Doc Parl, Ch, SO 1988-89, 635/1, 48. 
6 Doc Parl, Ch, SO 1988-89, 635. 
7 Le HARDY DE BEAULIEU (1990) 123, 130; COENRAETS and UYTTENDAELE (1991) 10-12 ; 
KLEIN (1990) 23-24.      
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with evaluating the 1988-89 reform noted that “in case of violation of an agreement, it would be 
logical for the central authorities to act as an arbitrator, as is the case in all federal regimes [sic]: 
a hierarchy of norms is inevitable.”8  In other words, given the invention of “compulsory 
agreements”, autonomists were wary of the risk that what was given by one hand by federal 
negotiators would be taken by the other through the inclusion of compulsory agreements in the 
1980 DMA.   
 
Read in this light, the Minister’s words, reproduced above, take another meaning.  He 
was not denying that cooperation agreements, as legal norms, would stand outside the 
hierarchy of norms – which he denied existed in the first place.  He was stating that there would 
not be any hierarchy between federal and federated entities’ normative instruments.  This is in 
contrast to the situation in Germany or Switzerland, where federal law “trumps” the law of 
federated entities.9  At a time when the foundations of the Belgian federal system were being 
consolidated, it is highly likely that it was this kind of hierarchy the Minister was rejecting, and 
not the classic hierarchy of norms between various types of legal instruments.  Indeed, in 
Belgium, the law of federal and federated orders of government are on a par, and neither has 
primacy over the other.  In that sense, a commitment that agreements would not violate the 
principle of the absence of a hierarchy of norms would only mean that they would not be used a 
instruments of re-centralisation and of restriction of the autonomy of Communities and Regions.    
 
From the perspective of positive law, nothing precludes the possibility that agreements 
be located in a hierarchy of norms. On the contrary: if they are legal instruments, this is 
essential.  The challenge is simply that the 1980 DMA is silent on the subject and that the 
parliamentary debates are inconclusive.  This surely reflects the lack of consensus on the 
question and the essentially political character of the debate.  It is also partly due to the speed at 
which constitutional negotiations can take place in Belgium.  Moreover, as the experience of 
other federal systems demonstrate, this question is one of the most taxing in the legal analysis 
of intergovernmental agreements.10 
                                                
8 Doc Parl, Ch 1988-89, Report, 635/17, 131.  My emphasis. 
9 Of course, it must be recalled that in these regimes of federalism of participation, federated entities 
participate in the elaboration of federal law through the Second Chamber (directly in the case of 
Germany, in a less direct manner in the case of Switzerland).  Federated entities do not play a similar 
role in Belgium (at least until further reforms) or in Canada; supra: General Introduction.    
10  If the response is relatively clear in federations founded on the English conception of parliamentary 
sovereignty (on Canada: infra, 6.2.2.2), the issue of the place of intergovernmental agreements in the 
hierarchy of norms raises complex doctrinal debates in Spain or even Switzerland. In the latter case, 
intercantonal agreements have precedence over the unilateral law of cantons, while federal law would 
take precedence over them.  The fate of federal-cantonal agreements (a relatively recent 
phenomenon) is unresolved: see POIRIER, Report, 66.   
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6.1.1 Cooperation agreements and constitutional norms 
 
6.1.1.1  Cooperation agreements, the Constitution and 
constitutional statutes 
   
As discussed in the first Part of this thesis, cooperation agreements play a number of 
para-constitutional functions in Belgium, as they do in other federal regimes.11  From the 
perspective of positive law, however, federal partners cannot resort to agreements to alter the 
formal distribution of powers.  While the subordination of cooperation to the Constitution per se 
is hardly questionable, it was not so obvious that the rules concerning the formal distribution of 
competences, essentially contained in the 1980 Double Majority Act, would take precedence 
over agreements concluded pursuant to a provision of that same Act, that is, section 92bis.  
This question was settled early on and the subordination of agreements to the distribution of 
competences is now well established, at least in theory.  Consequently, the components of the 
federation may not – through essentially contractual means – officially transfer, trade, cede or 
accept competences that are set by the Constitution or the 1980 DMA.12       
 
The legislative section of the Council of State (CSLS) takes the most orthodox 
position in its analysis of the conformity of cooperation agreements to the formal distribution 
of powers.  It will be recalled that the CSLS gives non-binding opinions regarding every 
proposed statutory instruments, whether they emanate from federal or federated authorities.  
In the context of cooperative agreements, a ruling by the CSLS can send the parties back to 
the drafting board.13    Parties do not, however, always follow this advice. 
 
To take an example discussed earlier, the CSLS condemned the agreement 
concluded between the Walloon Region and the French Community to finance the purchase 
of computers for schools, located in the former, which were under the constitutional 
responsibility of the latter.14  It held the agreement  – which in the Canadian context would be 
a typical instrument of the spending power - unconstitutional because it allowed a regional 
intrusion into the sphere of Community competences.  In response, the parties simply altered 
the title of the agreement, and proceeded to adopt it anyhow.15  How the Court of Arbitration 
would handle an a posteriori constitutional challenge to the arrangement is open to 
                                                
11 Supra, Chapter 3. 
12  CSLS  26.248-1: Doc Parl  CCF 95 (1999-2000)/1,  28.06.2000; CA 94/17.    
13 This occurred in the context of the 2001 institutional reforms, with regards to the proposed 
cooperative agreements negotiated alongside amemdments to the 1989 DMA on the financing of 
Regions and Communities: POIRIER, Lambermont, 101-103. 
14 CSLS 30.037-2, Doc Parl, CCF, SO, 1999/2000, no. 95-1 (28.06. 2000) 17; supra: 3.2.1.1.           
15 Another recent example of an agreement concluded despite harsh criticism by the CSLS introduced 
the possibility for Regions to finance railways, an exclusive federal matter: CSLS 32.367, Doc Parl Vl 
R (2001-2002) 269, no.1, 30.10.2001.   
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speculation.16  Judges called upon to assess the constitutionality of cooperative schemes 
already established show greater deference than does the CSLS, acting in its preventive and 
advisory function. 
 
Normally, the administrative section of the Council of State (CSAS) has jurisdiction 
over the a posteriori control of constitutionality and legality of regulations and other 
administrative acts.  Whether this power extends to bi/multilateral instruments, including 
cooperation agreements which have not received legislative assent, is uncertain.17    
  
By contrast, the jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration to control the constitutionality of 
agreements requiring legislative assent is clearly established.  Technically it only has 
jurisdiction over the norm of assent – as does the CSLS in its preventive action - although 
they have both held that a “rational” exercise of their jurisdiction required that they analyse 
the agreement itself.18  So far, the Court of Arbitration has never annulled a legislative 
instrumentgiving assent to a cooperation agreement for violating constitutional or quasi-
constitutional norms.  In its attempt to avoid this result, it has continued to show a great deal 
of creativity.   
 
 The seminal judgement of the Court of Arbitration on the subordination of cooperation 
agreements to the distribution of competences on an exclusive basis was rendered in 1994.19  
The French Community and the Walloon Region jointly set up an organ with legal personality 
(L’Établissement) through a cooperation agreement that received the required legislative 
assents.  This organ was granted a number of missions, notably that of overseeing decisions 
made by social services centres which were then under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Community.  An employee of one of those centres was dismissed.  L’Établissement 
overturned the dismissal.  The social service centre initiated a judicial review challenge 
against that decision before the administrative section of the Council of State (CSAS).  It 
argued, notably, that this Community-Regional organ exercised exclusive competences of 
the French Community in violation of the exclusive distribution of powers.  The CSAD 
addressed a “question préjudicielle” to the Court of Arbitration on the constitutionality of 
legislative instruments giving assent to the cooperation agreement.   
                                                
16 It is unclear who could have demonstrated a sufficient interest to challenge this legislative 
instrument (a school from the French Community in Brussels, which did not benefit from the deal 
restricted to Walloon schools?). 
17 COENRATS defends this position (1992) 177.  D’HOOGHE (1996) 116 disagrees.  LEROY is silent 
on the issue.  In the “travaux parlementaires”, the government stated that the Council of State would - 
alongside the Court of Arbitration - be able to annul agreements violating the distribution of powers “ 
Exposé des motifs”, 16.01.1989 DMA, s. 61, Doc Parl, Ch, S0, 1988-89, 635/1, 48.  As we saw in 
earlier (5.3.1), the CSAS has never directly addressed the question of its jurisdiction over cooperation 
agreements, although a limited number of judicial review cases involve such agreements.  The CSAS 
has not yet been seized of an a posteriori challenge to the constitutionality of a agreement.   
18 CA17/94.  The CSAS had previously reasoned in similar terms: Doc Parl CWR, 1989-90, 126.     
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The Court held that the legislative instruments were constitutional, on the basis that 
l’Établissement only made individual administrative decisions, leaving the general normative 
power exclusively to the French Community.   It also accepted the argument that the Walloon 
Region was indirectly affected by decisions concerning public law centres, because the 
municipalities that finance public assistance centres fall under the constitutional responsibility 
of Regions.20  In other words, with this cooperation agreement, the Walloon Region was not 
trespassing on Community competences.  L’Établissement’s decision to annul the dismissal 
could therefore be maintained.    
 
The Court showed similar ingenuity in its interpretation of the agreement concerning the 
monitoring and counseling of sexual offenders’s discussed in Chapter 3.21  When the CSAS 
annuled the designation of organisations by the federal Minister of Justice, the agreements had 
not yet received legislative assent.  Once this was obtained, only the Court of Arbitration could 
have jurisdiction (since statutes were involved).  The affected association turned to the Court to 
challenge the constitutionality of the agreements.  It notably contended that the federal 
government had abdicated its exclusive competence over criminal law, and more specifically, 
sentencing and parole, by subjecting the designation of organisations involved in the monitoring 
of offenders to a cooperative scheme.22   
 
The Court of Arbitration reiterated its classic position that IGAs are subject to 
constitutional and quasi-constitutional norms.  It then also ruled that  - exceptionally - the 
appendix did not form part of the agreement, and had therefore not received legislative assent.  
This deprived the Court of jurisdiction, which, as we saw, requires that some legislative 
instrument be involved.  In other words, by excluding the appendix, the Court did not have to 
rule on the constitutionality of an agreement that was potentially problematic.  While the 
Council of State had found an ingenious way of controlling the legality of the Minister’s 
decision by characterising it as a unilateral act, the Court of Arbitration used similar 
reasoning to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the designation.23  In so doing, the Court 
paid lip service to the formal hierarchy of norms, but was very sensitive to the cooperative 
scheme elaborated by federal partners, who had been subject to strong criticism for their lack 
of cohesion and coherence in the context of the Dutroux scandal.24 
                                                                                                                                                   
19 CA17/94, on a prejudicial question from the CS, no. 42.238, 10.3.1993 (L’Établissement).   
20 At the time, municipalities were under the administrative control of Regions.  Since 2001, the whole 
normative apparatus regarding municipalities has been regionalised.  
21 CA101/2001 (31.07.2001) (CRASC). 
22 In Canada, this could have been framed as a fettering of executive action issue: supra: 4.1.2.2.     
23 The case also dealt with the complex distribution of competences between the Walloon Region and 
the French Community in this matter, following the1994 transfer.  This is irrelevant for the present 
purposes.   
24 This refers to a political crisis following the capture of a famous paedophile.  The case illustrated 
notably the lack of communication between various police forces and political authorities: “Enquête 
 197 
Technically, the Court does not have jurisdiction over the agreement itself and could 
therefore not invalidate it, were it to find it unconstitutional.25  In practice, invalidating the 
instrument that gives it legal effect would reach the same result. LEURQUIN-de VISSHER 
suggests that in such a situation, the agreement would “survive” in the legal order, but would 
be deprived of legal effect.26  The actual meaning of this very formalistic solution is unclear.  
Possibly, it would imply that the agreement could be “revived” if the annulled legislation 
approving it were re-enacted.  This would make sense if the Court of Arbitration had 
jurisdiction over issues such as the capacity of parties to conclude agreements,  respect for 
formalities and so on.  But the Court does not have this jurisdiction.  If  the Court of 
Arbitration were to annul an Act approving an agreement on the grounds that the agreement 
violates the distribution of powers, or fundamental rights, it is difficult to imagine how the 
agreements could “survive in the legal order”.       
   
To summarise, the Court of Arbitration grants significant latitude to federal partners to 
organise their affairs through cooperation agreements.  It will not rule them unconstitutional 
to the extent that parties can demonstrate some connection with their respective 
competences, even if, in reality, the matter only relates to the competences of one of them 
(L’Établissement).  It has also downplayed the cooperative nature of a ministerial act 
annexed to a cooperation agreement, when this also protected the agreement from severe 
judicial scrutiny (CRASC).   Due respect is officially shown to the hierarchy of norms, but 
imaginative interpretations ensures that this hierarchy is no hindrance to intergovernmental 
arrangements.     
 
6.1.1.2  Cooperation agreements and the “constitutions” of 
federated units 
 
 Belgian federated entities – with the notable exception of the Brussels Region – have 
explicitly been granted what is generally described as “constitutive” or “organic” autonomy”.27  
This implies that within limited parameters they are entitled to structure their public 
institutions.  They essentially must do so through the adoption of statutes adopted by special 
majorities, but under the authority of a federal DMA.  Assuming that these organic statutes 
(relative to the composition of legislative assemblies, or executives, for instance) could be 
called Constitutions, they would be “subordinated” to the federal Constitution, and to federal 
                                                                                                                                                   
parlementaire sur la manière dont l’enquête, sans ses volets policiers et judiciaires, a été menée dans 
“l’affaire Dutroux-Nihoul et consorts”, Doc Parl, Ch, SO 1996-1997, 713. 
25 Early on, some argued for an extended jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration, so that it could annul 
the agreement as well: amendments rejected: Doc Parl, Ch SO 1988-89, 635/15; COENRATS (1992) 
176, ALEN and PEETERS (1989) 369; de WILDE (1990) 113. 
26 LEURQUIN-DE VISSCHER (1994) 222. 
27 DELPÉRÉE (2000) 564-567; UYTTENDAELE (2001) 714-728. 
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DMAs.28  For the time-being, federated entities could adopt rules concerning cooperation 
agreements that would differ from those contained in s.92bis.   In other words, a federated 
entity could not decide – at this stage, anyhow – that every cooperation agreement to which 
it is party must henceforth be approved by the assembly.  Hence both a federated 
“Constitution” and cooperation agreements are placed below federal DMAs in the hierarchy 
of norms.   
 
This does not resolve an eventual conflict between such a “Constitution” and a 
particular cooperation agreement.  This issue has not been addressed in the literature.  To 
the extent that “constitutive” autonomy is essentially limited to issues of composition of 
institutions, it seems obvious that such rules would apply to cooperation agreements.  In 
other words, an agreement could not derogate from those organic rules.29    Cooperation 
agreements are thus located below the “Constitutions” of federated entities. 
  
6.1.2 Cooperation  agreements and ordinary statutory instruments 
 
So far no court has had to rule on a contradiction between a cooperation agreement 
and a regular statute.  While in theory – if not in practice – the hierarchy between 
constitutional norms and agreements is not controversial, the respective place of agreements 
and legislative instruments is more problematic.   
 
The hypothesis is the following: an agreement receives the legislative assent of every 
party.   Some time later, under the likely impetus of the executive that controls it, one of these 
assemblies chooses to revoke its assent or to legislate in a manner which clearly contradicts the 
content of the agreement.  What can prevent the assembly from so acting?   As we shall see, 
this scenario, which analysts, civil servants and politicians in Belgium consider untenable, 
occurred in Canada, where by contrast, the courts have confirmed the legislation’s pre-
eminence over IGAs.30   
 
To my knowledge, no Belgian constitutionalist explicitly posits that statutes take 
precedence over IGAs.  Those who doubt, simply assert that the issue has not been 
resolved.31  Several constitutionalists maintain, however, that the “logic” of the system 
requires that agreements be placed above statutes in the hierarchy of norms, so as to protect 
                                                
28 A Flemish Constitution was drafted – as an academic exercise – a few years ago, but never 
adopted: BRASSINE, Jacques, “La Constitution flamande: essai de constitution pour la Flandres“, 
CRISP no. 1569-70, Brussels, 1997.  The vast majority of institutional issues are governed by DMA, 
and that the degree of “constitutive” autonomy in this regard is limited.    
29 Such a possibility is, in any event, highly remote. 
30 Infra, 6.2.2.2.  
31 SCHOLSEM (1991) 282; MOERENHOUT (2001) 617, citing ALEN, André, Compendium van het 
Belgisch Staatrecht, T.I (Diegem: Kluwer, 2000) 329. 
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them from unilateral modification or denunciation.32 As the quotation by CRAENEN 
reproduced at the beginning of this section illustrates, Belgian analysts often simply assert 
that cooperative agreements are consensual and thus cannot be revoked unilaterally, 
including by a legislative assembly.    This is asserted as self-evident, as is in a way which is 
reminiscent of the presumption that all cooperation agreements are necessarily legally 
binding.33 
 
Hence, writing soon after the formal introduction of cooperative agreements in 1989, 
HARDY de BEAULIEU observed that to grant cooperative agreements legal status inferior to 
(ordinary) legislation would render them vulnerable to unilateral modification or repudiation 
by the legislative assembly of one of the parties.34  Placing agreements on a par with statutory 
instruments would have a similar destabilising effect.  They would then amount to political 
agreements, and as such, would be, in his view, of limited interest.  This line of reasoning 
finds echoes in current writing on the subject.35 
 
Three distinct lines of argument can be distinguished in support of this position.  The 
first consists in an analogy with the hierarchy that exists in Belgian law between international 
treaties and domestic law.  It is addressed in the rest of this section.  Arguments based on 
the administrative law doctrine of the “parallelism of forms” and on the constitutional doctrine 
of  “federal loyalty”, are examined in the third part of this chapter, alongside comparable 
Canadian doctrines, also invoked as an attempt to protect IGAs from unilateral contrary 
action, and thus to locate IGAs as high as possible in the hierarchy of norms.    
 
6.1.2.1  An analogy with the intersection between the domestic 
and the international legal orders:   
 a principally monist conception regarding cooperation 
agreements 
 
The parallel between the dominant conception of the hierarchy that exists between 
cooperative agreements and statutory instruments and the dominant conception of the 
hierarchy between directly applicable norms of public international law and domestic 
legislation is striking.  Monist with regards to customary international law, the Belgian legal 
system is a hybrid with regards to the relationship between domestic law and international 
treaties.36  Treaties will only have effect in the domestic legal order to the extent that they 
                                                
32 COENRAETS (1992) 162-167; CRAENEN, (1996) 38; UYTTENDAELE (2001) 868-873.   
33 A presumption which I argued was rebuttable: supra, Chapter 5. 
34 Le HARDY (1990) 126-131. 
35 UYTTENDAELE (2001) 870-873.    
36 On monism and dualism, see DAILLET and PELLET (2002) 92-97; BROWNLIE, Ian, Principles of 
Public International Law, 5th ed., (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998) 31-57.  Some have argued that the priority 
given to international law lies in a principle of domestic constitutional law.  Consequently, in the 
domestic legal order, the Belgian Constitution would take precedence over public international law.  As 
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have received the assent of the proper legislative assembly.37  It bears pointing out that this 
primacy of treaties over domestic law, once they have received proper assent, only applies to 
agreements which contain sufficiently particularised undertakings, and are therefore “directly 
applicable” or “self-executing”.38  In other words, a treaty which invites parties to alter their 
legal order, but does not itself give rise to concrete rights or obligations, would not take 
precedence over the domestic legal order.  
 
These two caveats bring Belgium much closer to a dualist regime than Belgian 
internationalists and constitutionalists appear willing to admit.  This being said, some notable 
differences with the “pure” dualist system in place in Canada and the often ambiguous 
position in Belgium are worth examining, as they seem to have some bearing on the 
understanding of place which IGAs occupy – or should occupy – in the hierarchy of norms in 
the two federations.     
 
The hierarchy of norms between cooperative agreements and legislative instruments 
raises two distinct scenarios: first, the explicit revocation of the Act giving assent to a 
cooperative agreement; second, the adoption of an Act which explicitly contradicts the 
content of such agreement.  Only the second has been considered in the literature.  In light 
of the situation in Canada, however, the first scenario should also be examined.    
 
6.1.2.2 The revocation of a legislative instrument giving assent 
to a cooperation agreement 
 
In the course of interviews, I raised the possibility of the legislative revocation of 
statute giving assent to a cooperative agreement.  My Belgian interlocutors were 
unanimously puzzled or even shocked by it.  While such a revocation is highly improbable 
from a political point of view, no one seemed able to explain why it would be legally 
inadmissible.  Since, as we shall see in the next section, this possibility is undeniable in 
Canada, I sought to understand why it was so far-fetched in the Belgian context.  Given the 
analogy with public international law which is developed by some analysts with regards to 
contrary subsequent statutes – and which is examined in the next sub-section – it seemed 
                                                                                                                                                   
mentioned above, the three highest Belgian Courts (Court of Cassation, Court of Arbitration and 
Conseil d’État) are divided on the issue: JAMART (1999) 131 and cases cited. 
37 S.167(2), Constitution.  Given the correspondence between domestic competences and external 
competences, the order of government competent for a particular matter will sign and ratify a treaty 
and its legislative assembly will give assent to it.  
38 In the international law literature, the expressions “directly applicable” and “self-executing”, tend to 
be used interchangeably to refer, ambiguously, to two distinct issues.  First, they designate 
instruments which do not require further implementation on the part of contracting parties (because of 
the character of their content).   Secondly, they refer to the fact that in some countries, treaties which 
are “self-executing” in that first sense, constitute a source of domestic law without being “transformed” 
into a domestic source.  They can therefore be directly applied by domestic courts: BROWNLIE (1998) 
 201 
useful to examine the respective roles of the legislative and executive branches of 
government with regards to international treaties.  My thesis here is the following: the limited 
role of parliaments with regards to international treaties is implicitly transposed in the context 
of cooperative agreements.       
 
 In Belgium, an international treaty will only have effect in the domestic legal order 
once it has received parliamentary assent.  Until 1993, the precise parliamentary instrument 
required for treaties concluded by federal authorities was not specified in the Constitution.39  
In practice, however, this assent was always provided by statute.  According to the Court of 
Cassation, the truly normative instrument remains the treaty, not the statute giving assent to 
it.40  In other words, the legislative instrument is essential from a procedural point of view, but 
the treaty is directly applicable in the legal order, once this procedural hurdle is passed.41    
 
This hybrid approach distinguishes Belgium from “pure” dualist Anglo-Saxon 
countries such as Canada, where a treaty must be incorporated into domestic law through an 
act that has the status of a regular statutory instrument.  While the distinction may appear 
cosmetic, it has consequences in terms of the power of the legislative assembly to change its 
mind.  Indeed, as the section on the hierarchy of norms relative to IGAs in Canada will show, 
in a British-style parliamentary system, the legislator can always revoke an act, including one 
that incorporates an international treaty in the domestic legal order.  Doing so may place the 
country in violation of its international obligations, but the subsequent statute would 
undeniably be valid in the domestic legal order.      
 
In Belgium, a legislative instrument giving assent to a treaty does not constitute an 
ordinary statutory instrument, even when it takes the form of a statute.42   It is considered to 
be an “acte de haute tutelle” through which the legislative branch exercises a degree of 
control over the executive branch.  And here is the key: once this legislative assent is given, 
the legislature loses its jurisdiction. It may no longer revoke this assent.  The assembly could 
invite the executive to denounce the treaty, through a motion, for instance. But the act of 
denunciation lies exclusively with the executive.  The latter does not even require the 
consent of the assembly to denounce a treaty that had received parliamentary assent.  In 
other words, while legislative assent is essential for the treaty to have an effect in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
50; VERHOEVEN, Joe, Droit international public (Brussels: Larcier, 2000) 451-452.  In the present 
context, I use the expression in the first sense. 
39 Except in the case of treaties dealing with the cession of territory which explicitly requires a statute: 
s.167, Constitution.  Since 1993, see ss. 75 and 77, Constitution. 
40 SALMON and DAVID (2001) 89 ff. ; Cass. (19.03.1981), Aff. Pacific Employers Insurance Co. c.  
Régie des Postes et Pan American Airways, Pas., I, 779.     
41 This, again, only applies to self-executing instruments. 
42 “[C]e n’est pas un acte matériellement législatif” VERHOEVEN (2000) 460.  
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domestic legal order, the legislative branch has limited powers with regards to treaties.43  It 
can refuse or grant its assent.  Once granted, it cannot “undo” what it has done.  The 
legislative instrument that introduces a treaty into the domestic legal order thus has a “ratchet 
effect”.44 
 
Requiring legislative assent makes sense given the executive’s exclusive power to 
conclude and ratify international agreements, and given the primacy of directly applicable 
international agreements over domestic law.  What is surprising, from the perspective of 
democratic governance, is the “one-way” nature of this parliamentary control.  This, however, 
is now unanimously admitted in Belgium.  While the supremacy of international law over 
domestic law was subject to intense debate prior to 1971, when the Court of Cassation 
clearly confirmed it, it is now seen as self-evident.45 
 
 While the 1971 Court of Cassation’s decision that introduced this primacy dealt with 
a contradiction between domestic legislation and a European Community regulation, its 
reasoning was explicitly extended to every type of international norm.  The supremacy of 
international law is derived from the desire to avoid a situation in which Belgium could be 
found to violate its international obligations by reason of domestic legislation which precludes 
it from properly implementing a treaty to which it is a party.46  Withdrawal of legislative assent 
to international treaties could also lead to a finding of violation of international obligations at 
the international level.  Fundamentally, this now unquestioned admission that directly 
applicable international instruments take precedence over domestic law reflects an 
unquestioned belief that public international law is somehow “intrinsically superior” to 
domestic law.47   
 
This approach finds an echo in the doctrine concerning cooperation agreements.  
Indeed, the analogy between the role played by legislative assemblies with regards to 
international treaties and with regards to cooperation agreements would likely carry some 
weight, were a proposed bill revoking assent to be filed before an assembly.  This being said, 
                                                
43 By contrast, in Canada, the legislative branch does not even need to give its approval for the 
ratification of a treaty (except in part in Québec: An Act respecting the Ministère des Relations 
internationales and other legislative provisions, RSQ, ch. M-25.1.1, s.2.2).  Of course, the refusal by a 
legislative assembly to incorporate treaty which the executive has ratified would have a similar effect.     
44 Similarly, legislative instruments endorsing “management contracts” (“contrats de gestion”) with a 
state corporation are also considered distinct from regular statutes: Cass. 21.12.2000 (2001) 
Jurisprudence Liège-Mons-Bruxelles 848 (RTBF).    
45 Cass. 27.05.1971, Pas., I, 887 (Le Ski) On positions prior to 1971: MASQUELIN (1980) 410-431. 
46 Such risk is admitted in dualist system, in which domestic law is interpreted so as to be consistent 
with a State’s international obligations, as far as possible.  In case of a clear contradiction, however, 
domestic law takes precedence.  
47 Interestingly, this conviction, which has natural law connotations, is shared by internationalists 
clearly associated with the positivist school, such as Jean SALMON or Eric DAVID. On the 
jusnaturalist foundation of the Le Ski decision: DIEUX (1995) 67-75.         
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the parallel between the two situations is not perfect.  Three arguments could be raised 
against the transposition of the intersection between the domestic and international legal 
order and IGAs and the legal orders of parties to them.  
  
First, while legislative assent to treaties may be given prior to the conclusion of that 
treaty,48 the legislative section of the Council of State (CSLS) has held that legislative assent 
to a cooperation agreement could only be granted after they have been signed by every 
party, and the final content is therefore known.49  In the same opinion, the CSLS stated that a 
distinct legislative assent is necessary for each agreement implementing a framework 
agreement, to the extent that it also qualifies as an agreement of a legislative nature.   
Multiple assents are not necessary in the case of international treaties.  For the CSLS this 
reflects a fundamental difference between the two types of instruments:   
 
“While [assent to a treaty] does not modify the nature of the 
approved norms, assent  [to agreements] has the effect of 
conferring the force of a statute unto every provision of the 
agreement.  This difference is an obstacle to the transposition of 
the reasoning regarding assent to treaties, to assent to 
agreement.”50 
  
Finally, pursuant to section 92bis, legislative assent is notably required when a 
cooperation agreement enters the domain reserved to the legislative branch.51  Through a 
cooperation agreement, two or more executives can jointly adopt norms that, within their 
respective legal orders, could only be introduced through legislation. They can do so on 
condition of obtaining legislative “assent” in the form of a statute.  In a way, this statute  
“ratifies” the exercise of legislative powers by executives.  It is certainly arguable that such a 
delegation should be revocable.   
 
The trouble with this objection is that it could also be raised with regards to 
international treaties.  Since directly applicable international instruments take precedence 
over domestic law once they have received legislative assent, democratic concerns could 
                                                
48 Cass. 19.03.1981, Pas., I, 779. 
49 CSLS 24.479, discussed in “Conseil d’État: Rapport public pour l’année judiciaire 1995-1996”, 
(1999) Chroniques de droit public 1-2.  It is noteworthy that in the 60s, the CSLS has also held that 
parliamentary assent could only be granted after the treaty was concluded. This position was not 
followed by the Court of Cassation in the early 1980, which accepted prior authorisation, to the extent 
that the treaty did not have the effect of modifying statute law: Cass. 19.03.1981, Aff. Pacific 
Employers Insurance Co. V. Régie des postes, Pas. 1981, I, 779, JT 1982, 565, note Verhoeven).     
There is thus a noteworthy parallel between the approaches developed by the CSLS in the 70s with 
regards to treaties (but disregarded by the Court of Cassation) and twenty years later with regards to 
cooperative agreements.   
50 “Conseil d’État: Rapport public pour l’année judiciaire 1995-1996”, (1999) Chroniques de droit public 
1-2, fn 2 (re CSLS 24.479). 
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lead to a conclusion that this assent should not be a “one way street”.  Yet, as we saw, such 
objections are now totally absent from the analysis of the respective places occupied by 
international law and ordinary statutes in the hierarchy of norms.   In fact, in the previous 
citation, the distinction made by the CSLS between the assent to treaties and to agreements 
is weak since assent to a treaty does not give it the force of a statute, it actually gives it 
supra-legislative force.  Once assented to, a treaty clearly has supremacy over legislative 
norms in the domestic legal order and has – as we just saw – a “ratchet effect”.    
 
  At this stage, no clear rule of positive law precludes a legislative assembly from 
revoking its assent to a cooperative agreement.  Not only has the situation not arisen yet, the 
very possibility that it could occur has not even been contemplated by relevant actors.  While 
the analogy with the restrictions imposed on legislative assemblies regarding international 
treaties is not perfect, it would be forcefully argued to deny legal effect to a statute purporting 
to revoke an assent previously granted by a legislative assembly. In other words, while the 
hierarchy of norms between an agreement that has received legislative assent and a 
subsequent statute withdrawing this assent is not totally free from doubt, it is likely that courts 
would give priority to the former.  Concerns with the stability of intra-state relations would no 
doubt be equated with concerns for legal stability in the international legal order.    
 
6.1.2.3 The subsequent adoption of legislative instruments 
contradicting a cooperation agreement   
 
The explicit revocation of an instrument assenting to a cooperation agreement is unlikely 
to arise in practice.  Less improbable would be the adoption of a legislative instrument which 
either implicitly or explicitly contradicts a cooperative agreement currently in force.  To give a 
concrete example: two Regions conclude an agreement in the field of environment 
protection.  Without expressly withdrawing its assent to this agreement (for political reasons, 
or because the case law would by then have ruled that this is not legally feasible), one of 
those Regions subsequently legislates in contradiction with the cooperative agreement.52   
Which, of the agreement and of the subsequent contrary statutory instrument, should take 
precedence? 
  
This potential contradiction between a legislative instrument and a cooperation 
agreement is one of the main concerns of Belgian analysts.53   In this context, they have drawn 
express parallels between the intersection of the domestic and the international legal orders and 
                                                                                                                                                   
51 The distinction between legislative and executive domains is a complex one.  In theory, a legislative 
act should set guiding principles, and regulations should implement.  In practice, the border between 
the two is much harder to set: MAST (1989) 28-29.             
52 This is, in fact, the parallel fact pattern to the Le Ski decision of 1971 in which the Court of 
Cassation confirmed the primacy of public international law over domestic legislation.  
53 Supra, 4.2. 
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the intersection between legislative instruments of federal partners and cooperation agreements 
to which they are party.  Such a parallel is not unprecedented.  Courts in Switzerland explicitly 
endorse it.54  However, the government did not suggest this form of correspondence when 
cooperation agreements were introduced in the Belgian legal order in 1988-89.   This would 
have required a clarification of the place of agreements in the hierarchy of norms, which, as 
we saw, negotiators could not agree upon.  Moreover, as we saw, the CSLS warned against 
this parallel, for reasons, which were not, however, wholly convincing.   
 
So far, the analogy has only been summoned in academic analysis.  For instance, 
MOERENHOUT and SMETS explicitly described cooperation agreements as “domestic 
treaties”.55  Along the same lines, already in 1989, ALEN and PEETERS tentatively 
suggested that with the adoption of section 92bis, the Belgian legal order may have gone 
from a dualist system (with legally permissible revocation and contrary legislation) to a 
monist system (which would exclude those possibilities).56 
 
The analogy entails that a cooperation agreement that has received legislative assent 
is located at a higher echelon than unilateral legislation of each party to the agreement, 
whether anterior or subsequent to the agreement.   Hence, UYTTENDAELE proposes the 
following hierarchy57: 
  
*  [Directly applicable] public international law  
*  Constitution  
*  Double majority Acts   
*  Ordinary statutes of a constitutional nature58 
*  [Constitution of federated units?]59 
* Cooperation agreements having received legislative assent  
                                                
54 POIRIER, Report, 71.  Courts in the USA resort to international law to resolve disputes regarding 
interstate compacts, while in Germany, the analogy has been rejected, but arguably partly replaced by 
the significance of the Bundestreue: ERGEC (1987) 337-340.      
55 MOERENHOUT and SMETS (1994) 146. DELPÉRÉE (2000, 626, fn 8) suggests this analysis may 
be “somewhat abusive” (“peut-être quelque peu abusive”), without, however, taking a position on the 
question. 
56 ALEN and PEETERS (1989) 365. 
57 UYTTENDAELE (2001) 121.  In his previous editions (eg. 1997, 981), this author used to distinguish 
between cooperation agreements that received legislative assent, and those which did not. The former 
were placed, as here, above ordinary legislation, the latter just below. Now, his position seems to be 
that even agreements which do not require – and obtain – legislative approval are located above 
legislative instruments.     
58 For instance, the Ordinary Act concerning the German-speaking Community. It is unclear why such 
a constitutional statute did not require a double-majority Act.  We can only surmise that at the time it 
was voted, no one thought it required a clear majority support in each of the two major linguistic 
groups. In other words, constitutional arrangements involving francophones and Flemish are often 
conceived as zero-sum games which require the undeniable support of each group.  Arrangements 
concerning the German-speaking Community were not seen, until recently, as particularly problematic 
from that perspective.  This could change, however, with increasing demands by the German-
speakers to obtain their own Region as well as their Community.    
59 These are not considered either in the literature: supra, 6.1.1.2.    
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* Ordinary federal, regional or Community statutes (“Laws”, “decrees” and 
“ordinances”)   
*  Cooperative agreements which have not received legislative assent   
*  Regulatory instruments of the federal or the federated orders of government   
 
According to the proposed analogy, just as a directly applicable treaty is located at a 
higher level in the hierarchy of norms once it has received the proper parliamentary approval, 
a cooperation agreement similarly approved would be located between constitutional statutes 
and ordinary legislation.  Just as legislative assemblies may not legislate in contradiction with 
directly applicable norms of public international law, they may not adopt norms that contradict 
a cooperative agreement.   
  
By analysing cooperative agreements by analogy with international treaties, 
constitutionalists are seeking a way of giving them a legal stability and protection against 
unilateral action that the positive law has not explicitly provided.  The parallel drawn is 
intellectually attractive and understandable from a political perspective. However, some 
counter-arguments could be raised.  Three were invoked in the previous sub-section, in 
connection with the potential differences between the admitted incapacity of legislative 
assemblies to withdraw their assent to treaties once they have given it, and the role of the 
same assemblies with regards to cooperation agreements.60 
 
 More compelling perhaps than those four objections are the restrictions imposed on 
the Court of Arbitration regarding cooperation agreements.  As we saw above, the 
constitutionality of a legislative instrument giving assent to an agreement (and indirectly of 
the agreement itself) is subject to review by the Court of Arbitration.61  The latter has 
jurisdiction to review the conformity of legislative acts with rules governing the distribution of 
powers, as well as with a limited number of constitutional rights.62  Cooperation agreements 
are thus “normes contrôlées”, that is, their constitutionality is subject to review.    
 
In 1988, the Court of Arbitration was granted the express jurisdiction to control the 
conformity of legislative instruments with a number of compulsory cooperative mechanisms 
(consultation, association and so on).63   This power was expressly excluded with regard to 
cooperation agreements.  Thus cooperation agreements are not “normes de contrôle”: they 
cannot serve as constitutional benchmarks to assess the constitutionality or the validity of 
                                                
60 Supra, 6.1.2.2. 
61 CA94/17.  
62 Ss. 10, 11, and 24, Constitution (equality and education rights); s.1, 1989 DMA on the Court of 
Arbitration. 
63 S.124bis 1989 DMA on the CA.  A number of rulings have been rendered concerning alleged 
violations of such compulsory “non-contractual” techniques:  MOERENHOUT (2001) 606-607 and 
cases cited.  
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legislative instruments.64  In other words, even if UYTTENDAELE’s model were accepted, the 
Court of Arbitration could not invalidate a statute that contradicts a cooperation agreement.  
This does not necessarily imply that cooperation agreements are “inferior” to ordinary 
statutes, since the Court of Arbitration only has limited attributed jurisdiction.  It does, 
however, restrict the practical interest of the hierarchy proposed.   
 
The situation could be different in the case of compulsory agreements, whose 
conclusion is provided for in a quasi-constitutional statute, the 1980 DMA.  Were legislation 
introduced in contradiction with such a compulsory agreement, SCHAUS argues that the 
Court of Arbitration could assess its constitutionality, not against the benchmark of the 
agreement per se but against the provision of the DMA concerning the obligation to agree.65  
This ingenious solution would certainly give a basis for the Court of Arbitration to at least 
consider the issue, and perhaps make an appeal to “federal loyalty”.66   
 
The Court has been known to provide an extensive interpretation of its own 
jurisdiction. For instance, it considered the argument that a federal statute was 
unconstitutional because it dealt with matters which required a cooperation agreement, 
pursuant to section 92bis.67  The Court did not actually annul the statute.  Neither did it 
assess its constitutionality against the benchmark of a cooperation agreement (which did not 
exist) but against the absence of such an agreement.  This suggests that the Court could 
eventually extend its jurisdiction to some extent so as to control – albeit indirectly – the 
conformity of a legislative instrument with a cooperation agreement of a legislative nature.   
 
Obviously, the DMA on the Court of Arbitration could also be amended to allow 
explicitly for this control, by treating cooperation agreements as other forms of legislated 
cooperative measures.  But there does not appear to be any political desire expressly to 
grant this extended jurisdiction to the Court.  As it stands, the Court of Arbitration’s 
jurisdiction to annul a statute that violates a cooperation agreement is – at best – uncertain.    
  
 The potential contradiction between a legislative instrument giving assent to a 
cooperation agreement and a regular statute could also arise in the course of an “ordinary” 
civil or criminal case.  An ordinary court may not refuse to apply a legislative instrument.68   
Assuming no conciliatory interpretation of the two texts can be given, the court would have to 
give priority to one of the legislative instruments and thus resolve the hierarchy of norms 
                                                
64 Also s.124bis, 1989 DMA on the CA: UYTTENDAELE (2001) 869.      
65 SCHAUS (2001), vol. I, 155-157. 
66 Infra: 6.3.1.2.  
67 CA56/96.  
68 S.159, Constitution. 
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conundrum.69   Would it use regular rules of statutory interpretation (priority to the later 
instrument or to the more specific instrument, for instance)?  Or would it attempt to give 
priority to the instrument giving assent to the cooperation agreement, through an analogy 
with the supremacy on international instruments properly assented to, as provided by 
UYTTENDAELE’s model?  
 
  Sitting in final appeal over the “ordinary courts”, the Court of Cassation could then 
eventually be called upon to resolve the issue of the supremacy between cooperation 
agreements and unilateral statutes, as it had to do in 1971 with regards to statutes and 
international treaties.  As it stands, the respective places of cooperation agreements that 
have received legislative assent and regular statutes in the hierarchy of norms remains 
unresolved in Belgian positive law, despite strong doctrinal calls for giving precedence to the 
former. 
 
6.1.3 Cooperation agreements not requiring legislative assent and 
regulations 
 
If the foregoing account of the position of ratified cooperation agreements seemed 
uncertain, the place occupied by cooperation agreements not submitted to legislative 
assemblies is not necessarily simpler.  Fortunately, three aspects of the question are 
established.  The first relates to cooperation agreements requiring legislative assent but which 
do not obtain it.  They are invalid and have no place in the hierarchy of legal norms.70  The 
second is that agreements that do not require legislative assent must respect constitutional and 
legislative norms.   Hence, ordinary courts could simply ignore a cooperation agreement that 
contravenes legislative or constitutional provisions as if it did not exist.71  Third, in the 
eventuality of a contradiction between a regular (unilateral) regulation and an agreement not 
requiring legislative assent, the former will clearly take precedence.  The hierarchy would then 
oppose a regulation with an administrative instrument lacking in legal character.   This is unless 
the agreement can be characterised as a regulatory instrument. 
 
In that case, a typical dilemma of hierarchy between two regulatory instruments would 
arise: a unilateral one and a bi/multilateral one. The hypothesis is the following:  a government 
party to a cooperation agreement which did not require legislative assent adopts a regulation 
that contradicts the agreement in some way.   Alternatively, an agreement is concluded and its 
content contravenes the content of a regulation already in place in the legal order of one of the 
parties.  These scenarios correspond to the contradiction between an agreement having 
received legislative assent and a regular statute, examined in the previous sub-section.   
                                                
69 LEURQUIN-DE VISSCHER (1994) 223-224. 
70 Supra, 5.2.1.2. 
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Such a conflict of norms could surface in the course of an ordinary (civil, criminal or 
commercial) legal action.  An “ordinary” court would then have to choose between traditional 
rules of interpretation (prior adoption, greater specificity, etc.) and priority to the negotiated 
instrument over the unilateral one.  In UYTTENDAELE’s model reproduced above, agreements 
take precedence over regulations.72  For the time being, it is unclear whether this is de lege 
ferenda, or de lege lata.   
 
   The relative place of agreements not requiring legislative assent and of regulations is 
further complicated by the remaining doubts concerning the administrative section of the 
Council of State’s jurisdiction regarding cooperation agreements. As with the Court of 
Arbitration, the CSAS’s capacity to use cooperation agreements as “norms of control” is 
partly curbed.  In other words, even if we admit that bilateral “regulatory instruments” (if 
agreements could be so qualified) are situated above regular regulations in the hierarchy of 
norms, it is unclear that the CSAS whose function is normally to review regulations that 
contravene “higher norms” (such as legislation and the Constitution) could actually do so.73   
  
6.1.4 Cooperation agreements and administrative decisions   
 
Obviously, the administrative section of the Council of State (CSAS) can annul a 
unilateral administrative decision or act taken in contradiction with a cooperation agreement 
that has received legislative assent. This is a simple application of administrative law 
principles, pursuant to which decisions or acts of the administration must conform to 
legislative instruments.   
 
However, the CSAS’s jurisdiction to assess the conformity of an administrative 
decision with a cooperation agreement that has not received legislative assent, is not entirely 
clear.74  On the one hand, the use of cooperation agreements as “norms of control” was 
explicitly restricted, in parallel with the restrictions imposed on the Court of Arbitration regarding 
norms of assent.  Oddly, however, only one ground of judicial review was explicitly excluded 
in the case of the CSAS, which leaves open the possibility that it could annul administrative 
action on other grounds.75   The case law does not provide a clear response and the 
literature is surprisingly discreet on the topic.76 
                                                                                                                                                   
71 S.159, Constitution, ordinary courts must refuse to apply orders or regulations violating legislative 
provisions. They cannot annul them, however. 
72 See the hierarchy proposed in the previous sub-section.  It will be recalled that UYTTENDAELE 
seems to assume that all agreements concluded pursuant to section 92bis have – at a minimum – the 
normative force of regulations: supra, 5.3.1. 
73 We saw that the CSAS has avoided ruling on its own jurisdiction regarding cooperation agreements 
but has not declined jurisdiction in cases when this could have been justified: supra, 5.3.1. 
74 S.14bis, CACS; supra: 5.3.1. 
75 Review is explicitly excluded on grounds of violation of “substantial formality” (which is the ground 
pursuant to which administrative or regulatory instruments that violate other types of compulsory 
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A partial solution could be provided by the doctrine of “divisible acts” (“actes 
détachables”).  This distinguishes between an administrative contract, which is governed by 
ordinary civil law and can be enforced by ordinary courts, and the decision to contract or the 
choice of contracting party, which is subject to judicial review by the Council of State.77  By 
analogy, it could be argued that even if the Council of State has no direct jurisdiction 
regarding bi/multilateral instruments, it can nonetheless review the legality of a unilateral 
decision to conclude such an agreement, and thus, indirectly, its conformity with legislative or 
regulatory provisions.78  
   
6.1.5 Cooperation agreements as contractual instruments and the 
hierarchy of norms 
 
As the entire second Part of this thesis has demonstrated, cooperation agreements in 
Belgium are essentially conceived as a type of norm erga omnes, rather than as contractual 
instruments. The preceding discussion on the place of agreements in the hierarchy of norms 
rests on this dominant conception: do agreements have legislative, supra-legislative, 
regulatory or supra-regulatoryy force?  The task is to determine how these original normative 
instruments mesh with classic types of norms. 
 
As I sought to demonstrate in Chapter 5, however, the contractual dimension of 
agreements cannot be ignored, even in Belgium.  What is the place of IGAs conceived as 
contractual instruments, as opposed to normative instruments erga omnes in the hierarchy of 
norms?  Obviously, IGAs which do not cross the threshold of juridicity as contracts, and are 
characterised as “purely political” protocols, would not be protected against unilateral 
contrary action by a party, whether this action takes the form of legislative or regulatory 
instrument.  The situation is, predicably, more complicated in the case of cooperation 
agreements that do qualify as contractual instruments inter partes. 
 
Interestingly, there does not seem to be any example of legislation taken to put an 
end to a regular government contract.79 This could partly be explained by the fact that public 
                                                                                                                                                   
cooperation can be annulled).  This leaves the possibility of review on grounds of “excès de pouvoir” 
or “violation de la loi” for instance (equivalent to ultra vires).     
76 LEROY (2000) avoids this issue in his treatise, is both an administrative law professor and 
Counciller on the Council of State.  See discussion on the regulatory value of IGAs: supra, 5.3.1.   
77 CSAS 82.990 (20.10.1999) (Versteegen): by analogy since no decision has yet applied the “acte 
détachable” doctrine to cooperation agreements, except, perhaps implicitly, the CRASC decision, 
CSAS 79.517 (25.03.1999): supra, 5.3.1.   
78 The annulment of an “acte détachable”, such as a decision to contract, has no impact on the 
existence of the administrative contract itself, over which ordinary courts retain jurisdiction:  LEROY 
(2000) 211.      
79 While the act of legislating can give rise to extra-contractual liability, liability for breach of contract is 
not directly addressed in the literature: MAHIEU, Michel, van DROOGHENBROEK, Sébastien, “La 
responsabilité de l’État législateur” (1998) JT 825-846; PAQUES, Michel, De l’acte unilatéral au 
contrat dans l’action administrative, (Brussels: Story-Scientia, 1991) 317-323.   
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authorities enjoy a limited degree of capacity to alter the terms of a contract, subject to 
compensation.  Or it may simply be unthinkable.  As one interlocutor told me “legislation 
cannot be retroactive, it cannot alter a duly formed contract”.80  In other words, contracts are 
in general subject to legislation (the Civil Code, to start with), but it is not clearly established 
that the legislative branch can put an end to an existing contract concluded by the executive 
branch.      
 
As we shall see, in Canada, it has long been admitted that legislators can undo acts 
of the executives.81  The same is simply not as evident in Belgium.  In this context, the 
consideration that assemblies cannot legislate in contradiction to cooperation agreements 
with the status of contracts is far less surprising.  For some authors, this is simply 
inconceivable.  If contracts in general are not subject to legislative repudiation,82 this is a 
fortiori the case of “contracts” that can only be violated at the cost of a serious political crisis.    
 
Were it to occur, it is arguable that the adoption of a contrary legislative or regulatory 
instrument could be analysed as a potential breach of a contractual undertakings (assuming 
the agreement crosses the threshold of juridicity).  The injured party could then submit the 
conflict to a cooperation tribunal.83  In the circumstances, the tribunal would likely find that the 
unilateral norms violate the agreement.  In other words, the act of legislating or regulating 
would amount to a breach of contract (or, in civil law parlance, to a contractual fault).  The 
tribunal could even order the payment of damages, which are directly enforceable.  The 
tribunal would not, however, have the power of annulling the contrary unilateral normative 
act. 84 
 
This would in a sense, introduce a process of inter-federal responsibility, for breaches 
of cooperation agreements, without necessarily altering the domestic legal order of each 
party.  Paradoxically, despite the strong analogy drawn by authors with the superiority of 
directly applicable international law over the domestic legal order, this solution rests on a 
“dualist” conception of the relations between federal partners.  
 
                                                
80 Jean Michel FAVRESSE.  
81 Infra, 6.2.2.2. 
82 An issue which, I must insist, is not clearly resolved, but which is not even contemplated, since it 
seems so far-fetched. 
83 Assuming parties have agreed to its creation in the case of an optional one: supra, 4.2.2.2. 
84 This is the prerogative of the Court of Arbitration and the Council of State, when there is no 
exclusion to their jurisdiction, which, as the foregoing illustrated, is particularly contentious in the 
context of IGAs.  The situaton is the converse of the one that results when the decision to tender is 
annuled by the Council of State. This does not have any automatic effect on the contract: GOFFAUX 
and LUCAS (1998).    
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6.1.6 IGAs and the hierarchy of norms in Belgium: a summary 
  
The foregoing leaves a strong impression that the place of cooperation agreements in 
the hierarchy of norms is a labyrinth of controversies.  This is not quite true.  In positive law, 
a number of issues are established.  First, cooperation agreements, regardless of 
characterisation or mode of adoption, are subordinate to constitutional and quasi-
constitutional rules.  Secondly, cooperation agreements that do not require legislative assent 
are situated below legislation in the hierarchy of norms.85  Thirdly, ordinary unilateral 
administrative action must respect agreements that have received legislative assent as well 
as those which meet criteria to qualify as regulatory instruments.86 
 
 The only truly unresolved issue lies in the respective places of cooperation 
agreements that have received legislative assent and “ordinary” legislation, on the one hand, 
and of agreements that can be characterised as regulatory instruments and “ordinary” 
regulations, on the other.  Analogies with the supremacy of international over domestic law 
have been invoked to consolidate the superiority of negotiated instruments over traditional 
unilateral norms.  Despite the ideological appeal of this solution, which recognises the 
importance of the given word and of cooperation in the federal regime, a number of 
objections have been raised against such transposition.   
 
Given the numerous uncertainties concerning the place which cooperation 
agreements occupy in the hierarchy of norms, authors have conjured other legal arguments 
in their search for precluding contrary unilateral action by a party to an agreement.  Those 
include the “parallelism of forms” and “federal loyalty”.  They are assessed in the third part of 
this chapter, alongside comparable doctrines invoked in the Canadian context.   
  
6.2 Intergovernmental agreements in the hierarchy of norms in Canada 
  
By contrast with the absence of judicial ruling on the issue in Belgium, some 
Canadian cases have laid down some ground rules on the place of IGAs in the hierarchy of 
norms, although this expression is never used.  Whereas the approach in the previous 
section was deductive, the approach taken here is largely inductive.  Judicial decisions are 
analysed so as to identify the principles that have guided courts to rank agreements in 
relation to classic norms of public law.  However, in the absence of case law on some 
fundamental issues, the approach must also be deductive to a degree.  
 
                                                
85 Except in the hierarchy suggested by ERGEC (1998) 17 who does not explain his locating IGAs   
above DMAs.   As we saw, in his last edition, UYTTENDAELE (2001) 121 no longer distinguishes the 
two types of agreements in his hierarchy of norms. 
86 Assuming, of course, these are otherwise valid. 
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6.2.1 IGAs, quasi-constitutional and constitutional norms 
 
6.2.1.1 IGAs, the Constitution and quasi-constitutional statutes 
  
The subordination of IGAs to the Constitution in the Canadian system must be 
examined from three distinct angles.  First, “constitutionalised” agreements are an integral 
part of the Constitution.87  Their content is thus not subject to review on the basis of other 
constitutional norms.88  Secondly, the relation between IGAs and entrenched fundamental 
rights does not raise particular difficulties.  Indeed, IGAs must respect constitutional rules 
relative to fundamental rights, notably the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and 
this, regardless of their legal characterisation.89  If governments cannot institute 
discriminatory policies by themselves, they cannot do so together.    
 
Along the same lines, the Federal Court ruled that IGAs could not abridge “quasi-
constitutional” rights.90   It will be recalled that in the Contravention case examined earlier, 
the federal government delegated to consenting provinces the emission of contravention and 
the prosecution of violation of certain federal statutes.91  Groups defending the rights of 
Franco-Ontarians initiated proceedings to ensure these services, which were until then 
subject to the federal Official Languages Act (OLA) would still be available in French after a 
transfer of this “administrative” responsibility to Ontario.92  The OLA does not bind 
provinces.93  However, within the federal legal order, it enjoys “quasi-constitutional” status.94  
The Court ruled that no cooperative scheme pursuant to which the federal government 
delegates responsibilities to provinces can have the effect of abridging such “quasi-
constitutional” rights.95   
                                                
87 Supra, 4.1 (introduction) and 5.1.1. 
88 Although amendments to the Terms of Entry could be subject to the Charter of Rights: Hogan v. AG 
Newfoundland, (2000) 183 DLR 4th 225 (NFCA) 272 [Hogan]. 
89 Pineview Poultry Products Ltd. V. Canada, [1994] 3 FC 475 (FCTD).  Also, by analogy Operation 
Dismantle  v. R., [1985] 1 SCR 441 (Charter applies to cabinet decisions, that is, clearly political acts).       
90 The Contravention case, supra, 4.2.3.2.  
91 Supra, 3.1.1.4, 3.2.1.1 and 4.1.3.  
92 The concern was exacerbated by the fact that Ontario delegates certain prosecutorial powers to 
municipalities, which are not bound by the same language requirements as the provincial prosecutorial 
authorities.  This (sub)delegation was also to apply to the prosecution delegated by the federal 
government to the province.   
93 Official Languages Act, RSC 1985, ch. 31 (4th suppl.) ss.2-3.  Provinces have their own – and often 
very different - linguistic regime, a mixture of constitutional obligations and legislative provisions:  
MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE, Nouvelles perspectives canadiennes : lois linguistiques du Canada 
annotées, Ottawa, 1998. 
94 R. v. Beaulac [1999] 1 SCR 768, 788-789.   
95 It bears pointing out, however, that the Contravention case dealt with the delegation to a province of 
the administration of an exclusive federal matter.  When the federal government withdraws from an 
area in which it was previously involved through the spending power, the OLA does not apply.  
Provincial legal regimes would henceforth apply.  In many cases, those provide less protection that the 
federal one: OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES: Government 
Transformation: the Impact on Canada’s Official Languages Program (Minister of Public Works and 
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In sum, IGAs are clearly located below quasi-constitutional instruments in the 
hierarchy of norms.  This would extend, for instance, to provincial Human Rights Codes, 
which are technically “ordinary statutes” but to which other provincial law must conform.96   
  
  The third aspect of the relation between IGAs and constitutional norms relates to the 
subordination of the former to the official distribution of competences. Logically, if IGAs 
cannot violate entrenched rights, their violation of other constitutional provisions should 
render them invalid as well.  Yet, as we saw in the discussion concerning the ratione 
materiae limitations to legally binding IGAs and the case law on the legal character of IGAs in 
Canada, the issue is not so simple.97    
 
Officially, of course, IGAs cannot alter the distribution of powers.  We saw, however, 
that apart from precluding a direct transfer of legislative power from one order to another, 
courts show considerable tolerance regarding cooperative schemes that have undeniable 
para-constitutional effect.  While this occurs in the context of IGAs meant to outline 
respective responsibilities in fields of concurrent or shared constitutional competences, 
courts have also shown deference regarding the use of IGAs in the context of the spending 
power, through which one order of government intervenes in the exclusive sphere of 
competence of another order.  This can have the undeniable effect of blurring constitutional 
boundaries.98    
 
 We saw that Belgian judges insist on the subjection of cooperation agreements to the 
formal distribution of powers.  This is notably the case of the legislative section of the Council 
of State in its preventive function.  Once a cooperation agreement has been implemented, 
however, the Court of Arbitration in its a posteriori control of constitutionality, will still reiterate 
the supremacy of constitutional norms, yet find ingenious ways of denying any violations of 
those norms.  In Canada, there is no judicial rhetoric concerning the supremacy of the 
federal structure over IGAs.  This creates an impression of judicial tolerance for the blurring 
of constitutional boundaries that is officially denounced in Belgium (although arguably 
admitted in practice).   
 
The consequences in terms of positive law, is that only the supremacy of fundamental 
or “quasi-constitutional” rights affecting citizens directly can be affirmed with the same 
                                                                                                                                                   
Government Services Canada, no. SF31-35/1998) 17-25, 41; Lavigne v. Human Ressource 
Development, 2001 FCT 1365. 
96 SWINTON, Katherine, “The Enforcement of Intergovernmental Accords” in INSTITUTE OF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, Accessing Access: Towards a New Social Union, (Kingston: 
IIGR, 1997) 23. 
97 Supra, 4.1.2.2. 
98 Despite numerous opportunities, the Supreme Court of Canada has never definitely ruled on the 
constitutionality of the spending power: supra, 4.1.2.2. 
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degree of certainty in Canada as in Belgium.  The supremacy of the formal distribution of 
competences over IGAs remains somewhat – and arguably in spite of basic logic - uncertain.  
 
6.2.1.2 IGAs and provincial constitutions 
 
The exact status of provincial constitutions is unclear in Canada, notably because the 
rules governing their adoption and amendments were altered with the adoption of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.  Certain parts of provincial constitutions may be modified by ordinary 
provincial statute.99  Others require formal constitutional amendment, with the concurrence of 
federal authorities.100  In any event, within the provincial legal order, provincial constitutions 
have, at a minimum, “supra-legislative” (or “quasi-constitutional”) force.  That is, even when 
they can be modified by ordinary statute, they take precedence over ordinary acts, much like 
the “quasi-constitutional” Official Languages Act,101 or provincial Human Rights Codes (which 
are arguably part of provincial constitutions, anyhow). 
 
The consequence of the mixture of constitutional and “supra-legislative” status of 
provincial constitutions is that they should necessarily be situated above any IGA, even one 
that is “incorporated” through legislation.  The same would obtain, a fortiori, if it does not 
enjoy legislative value.  This also suggests that were a province to insert rules regarding 
IGAS in its own constitution, agreements would have to be consistent with those rules to be 
effective in the provincial legal order.102  These could provide, for instance, that all IGAs 
meeting certain criteria be submitted to the legislative branch.103   
 
If, however, the fact that aspects of provincial constitutions can be altered through 
regular statute implies that they only have legislative status, then rules concerning the 
respective place of IGAs and regular statutes, as described in the next subsection, would 
apply mutatis mutandis to the relation between IGAs and provincial constitutions.  Basically, 
this would suggest that any clear contradiction between a provincial constitution and an IGA, 
would be resolved in favour of the former.  In other words, regardless of the characterisation 
of provincial constitutions, they would take precedence over IGAs. 
 
                                                
99 TREMBLAY (2000) 48.     
100 When their Constitution is comprised in the Constitution Act, 1867 as is the case of the constitution 
of the original provinces, or those governed by Terms of Entry: ss.41 and 45 of the Constitution Act, 
1982; TREMBLAY (2000) 48. 
101 Supra, 6.2.1.1. 
102 Whether such rules would be considered “manner and form” limitations, or “quasi-constitutional” is 
unclear, but the result is similar.  On “manner and form” limits to legislative freedom, see: ELLIOT 
(1991); R. v. Mercure, [1988] 1 SCR 234. 
103 As is the case in Belgium, of course: s.92bis. 
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6.2.2 IGAs and legislative instruments 
 
6.2.2.1  An analogy with the intersection between the domestic 
and the international legal orders:  a clearly dualist 
conception regarding IGAs 
 
While the Belgian system is an ambiguous hybrid with regards to the intersection 
between the domestic and the international legal orders, the Canadian system is indubitably 
dualist.104  As we saw, with a few exceptions, international treaties do not alter the domestic 
legal order, unless and until, they have been properly incorporated through legislative 
instruments.105  This is true whether or not the content of the treaty could otherwise be 
qualified as “self-executing”.106  This required incorporation counterbalances the executive’s 
exclusive competence to conclude and ratify treaties.     
 
The statutes used to incorporate (or transform) norms of public international law into 
domestic legal norms are regular statutes, and not, as in Belgium, “actes de haute tutelle”, 
that is formal legislative acts with no direct normative value.107  In Canada, such Acts are 
considered on par with other statutes.  Hence, in view of the principle of parliamentary 
supremacy, a federal or provincial Act that incorporates an international treaty may also be 
abrogated, or supplanted by another Act that revokes this incorporation.  As a result of such 
subsequent legislative action, Canada could be in violations of its international obligations, 
but in the domestic legal order, the Act would unquestionably be valid.  In other words, the 
hierarchy of norms between international norms and legislation is clear.   In case of a patent 
conflict, the latter will take precedence in the domestic legal order.108   
 
We saw that Canadian Courts have explicitly endorsed the analogy between this 
dualist conception regarding the intersection of the domestic and international legal orders 
and the relation between IGAs and ordinary statutes.109  Unilateral legislative or regulatory 
norms remain “superior” to IGAs, unless the latter receive proper statutory incorporation.  
Once incorporated by proper statutory language (which is rare), an IGA will have the force of 
statute, nothing more.  The assembly that proceeded with the incorporation can always 
                                                
104  There is a presumption that domestic law is consistent with customary international law. However, 
in case of express conflict between the two, the former has precedence: Gordon v. R., 1980 5 WWR 
668 (BCSC); Entreprise de rebuts Sanipan v. Québec, [1995] RJQ 821 (CS).   
105 Supra, 5.2.2.3. 
106 That is creating rights and obligations that are sufficiently particularised to be directly applicable in 
a monist regime, for instance.  On this, supra: 6.1.2.1 (and footnotes). 
107 Supra: 6.1.2.1.  
108 Although, of course, courts will attempt to provide a compatible interpretation: Re Tax on Foreign 
Legations, [1943] SCR 208; HOGG, Peter, Constitutional Law of Canada, Loose-leaf ed., vol. I 
(Toronto: Carswell, to date March 2003) 11-6.  
109 Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 SCR 373; Unilever Canada Inc. v. A.G. Québec, [1999] RJQ 1720 
(S.C.) [the “Colour of Margarine case”]; supra, 5.2.2.3.  
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withdraw it, or legislate in contradiction with the IGA to which it has previously given force of 
law.  This is further explored in the following sub-section. 
    
6.2.2.2 Parliamentary sovereignty and IGAs 
  
This endorsement of dualism flows from the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.  
The Canadian Constitution explicitly provides that it is “similar in Principle to that of the 
United Kingdom”,110 a pillar of which is parliamentary sovereignty.111  In its absolute form, the 
principle signifies that there are no legal bars (as opposed to political constraints or 
traditions) to the supremacy of the legislative branch of government.  A legislative assembly 
may legislate over any matter, and to any effect.  Courts must apply duly adopted legislation, 
irrespective of its content.  Even in the United Kingdom, however, the principle has been 
curbed by constitutional conventions,112 and the primacy recognised to European Community 
law.113  As we shall see, in the context of IGAs, the Supreme Court of Canada has defended 
an even stricter reading of parliamentary sovereignty than present day Britain.  
    
Obviously, transposed in a federal system, the supremacy of Parliament is distributed 
between the various legislative assemblies.114  In the Canadian system, courts may review 
the conformity of federal or provincial legislative measures to the formal distribution of 
competences.115  Since the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights in 1982, courts 
have also conceded that parliamentary sovereignty is now constrained by the protection of 
fundamental rights.  Yet, in the 1991 CAP Reference, to which we now turn, the Supreme 
Court of Canada defended a very classic, almost Diceyan, conception of parliamentary 
sovereignty.  While admitting that the principle is curbed by the formal distribution of 
competences and fundamental rights, it rejected any suggestion that adjustment were also 
imposed by the imperatives of cooperative federalism.   
  
                                                
110 Preamble, Constitution Act, 1867. 
111 For a traditional conception: WADE, William, “Sovereignty - Revolution or Evolution?”, (1997) 112 
LQR 568-575.  For a more flexible approach: ALLAN, Trevor, “Parliamentary Sovereignty: Law, 
Politics and Revolution” (1997) 112 LQR 443-452. 
112 JENNING, Ivor, The Law and the Constitution, 5th, (London: U. of London Press, 1959); On 
constitutional conventions in Canada: infra, 6.3.  On the potential recognition of limits to parliamentary 
sovereignty through non-binding concordats: POIRIER, Concordats 153-154.  
113 R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame, [1991] AC 603.  Opinions are divided on 
the attitudes British Courts would take if an Act of the Westminster Parliament were to expressly 
contradict an European norm: CRAIG, Paul, Administrative Law, 4th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
1999) 300 ff.   
114 TREMBLAY (2000) 133-135.   In fact, Dicey himself recognised that the sacrosanct principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty was ill-adapted to the federal context:  DICEY, Albert Venn, Introduction to 
the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., (London/NY, Macmillan, 1959) 138-181.    
115 While Superior Courts have this jurisdiction over any statute (provincial or federal), the jurisdiction 
of the federal Court to review the constitutionality of statutes is more complex:  SGAYIAS, David et al., 
Federal Court Practice, (Toronto/Montréal: Carswell, 2002) 8-16. 
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• The Canada Assistance Plan Reference 
 
The CAP Reference is the key decision concerning the status of IGAs in Canada, and 
is often the only one referred to in the literature.116  The Reference raised a number of legal 
issues relating to IGAs, some of which are examined in later sections of the present chapter.  
 
 In 1967, a federal Act authorised the executive to conclude IGAs with provinces 
concerning the federal contribution to provincial social assistance and welfare programmes.  
The Act - the Canada Assistance Plan - provided that federal contributions would cover half 
of the provincial costs of certain approved programmes.  It placed conditions on some 
expenditures, but generally left provinces free to establish programming and spending.  It 
also provided that the agreements would remain in place as long as the relevant provincial 
implementing legislation was in force.  Finally, it stipulated that the agreements could be 
terminated by mutual consent, or after a minimum one-year notice by one of the parties.117  
The Act did not address the rules governing its own amendment but it subjected the 
modification of federal regulations to provincial consent. 
 
Within one year, bilateral agreements had been concluded between the federal 
government and all ten provinces.  Amongst other things, the IGAs dealt with the timing and 
methods of payment.  The denunciation clause found in the federal legislation was replicated 
in the agreements.  The formula for calculating the federal contribution was not, however, 
reproduced in the IGAs: it remained solely in the federal Act. 
 
 With half of their costs covered by the federal Treasury, wealthy provinces instituted 
costly social services.  In 1990, wishing to limit this form of “consumer federalism”, the 
federal government introduced a Bill into Parliament which set a ceiling (thus the expression 
“Cap on CAP” coined at the time) on its contribution to the three richest provinces.118  The 
federal government unilaterally modified the arrangement by changing the contribution 
formula contained in the federal Act.119  It did not actually repudiate the IGAs, but it is clear 
                                                
116 The case was also briefly examined in the discussion on the contractual character of IGAs, since 
without pronouncing on the status of an IGA per se, the Supreme Court denied that cost-sharing 
arrangements were “ordinary contracts”: supra, 4.1.3.  Unless otherwise noted, references are to the 
Supreme Court’s opinion. 
117 S.8(d) in fine.  Sopinka J. seems to have given an erroneous interpretation of this article, by 
suggesting that any party could terminate the agreement “at will”: CAP Reference, 554.  In fact, 
legislation was required to end without respecting notice period.    
118 Defined as the provinces which did not receive equalisation payments.  The CAP implied that 
further increases in federal contribution to Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario would henceforth be 
limited to 5% per year.  In other words, if Ontario were to increase its social spending by 20%, the 
federal government would no longer cover half of this increase.    
119 Until then, the federal legislation had never been amended, although regulations were: CAP 
Reference, 533.  The Act provided that federal regulations would not be adopted or modified without 
provincial consent, which was apparently obtained.   
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that the whole system was altered without provincial consent, and the changes were made 
without regard to the notice of termination clauses included both in the Act and in the 
agreement.     
  
British Columbia - one of the affected provinces - attempted to stop this federal 
unilateral action through a Reference procedure before its Court of Appeal.  Aboriginal 
groups and several provinces intervened to support B.C.’s position, including some that were 
not affected by the measure.  Ottawa’s unilateral action had clearly generated disarray within 
the federation.  Summarising the position of several provinces and interveners, Lambert J.A. 
of the BC Court of Appeal declared: 
 
“If Canada were to have intentionally broken a solemn undertaking 
incorporated in a formal agreement, then not only would the whole 
basis of cooperative federalism collapse, but the fabric of the 
relationship between Canadians and their own national 
government would be undermined.  So would Canada’s 
international relationships and treaties.  If Canada is willing to 
breach its agreements by passing legislation to authorize, or even 
require the breach, then Canada cannot expect to conclude 
agreements with contractors to build airports, nor to settle native 
land claims by agreement. […]  I expect that the overwhelming 
majority of Canadians would say that this country must be as good 
as its word.”120 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed.  It emphasised that most of the wording of 
the federal Act was replicated in the various IGAs, with the notable exception of the formula 
setting the federal contribution, which was only inserted in the federal statute.121  For the 
Court, parties had to know that this made them subject to unilateral legislative amendment 
and:   
 
“[i]n lieu of relying on mutually binding reciprocal undertakings 
which promote the observance of ordinary contractual obligations, 
these parties were content to rely on the perceived political price to 
be paid for non-performance”.122 
  
 This is not quite true.  The IGAs provided that parties could not denounce them 
except through mutual consent or with a one-year notice.  It is the legislative assemblies, 
which are NOT party to the agreements, which can act unilaterally, at least according to the 
Court’s interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty.  By contrast, an executive cannot adopt 
                                                
120 Re Canada Assistance Plan, (1990) 46 BCLR (2d) 273, 294. 
121 CAP Reference, 546-554.  The Court added that the arrangement recognised the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty embodied in s. 42 of the federal Interpretation Act pursuant to which “Every 
Act shall be so construed as to reserve to Parliament the power of repealing or amending it [...]”.  In 
any event, for the Court, the principle would apply even in the absence of the Interpretation Act.    
122 CAP Reference, 554. 
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regulations to put an end to its own contractual obligations unless it has express legislative 
authority to do so.123  In other words, executives may be bound by an agreement.  However, 
they can always use the legislative assembly - which they nearly always control - to put an 
end to their obligations.  In other words, the Court tended to conflate the potential legal 
character of IGAs with their place in the hierarchy of norms. 
 
 In fact, the provinces conceded that the federal government could not have 
prevented Parliament from amending the contribution formula contained in the federal Act.  
They argued that the government should not introduce legislation into Parliament that 
unilaterally modified a compact that had been in place for over two decades.  They did so 
through a clever recourse to the doctrine of legitimate expectations.  The Supreme Court 
rejected this dichotomy between the executive and legislative branches.  The parliamentary 
system would be “paralysed” if the doctrine were used to prevent the executive from 
introducing legislation.  In this context, a “restraint on the executive in the introduction of 
legislation is a fetter on the sovereignty of Parliament itself”.124        
  
The Supreme Court affirmed that the CAP arrangement also recognised the 
sovereignty of provincial legislatures, since the agreements were to remain in force as long 
as the relevant provincial legislation was in place.  In other words, while the IGA itself could 
only be modified or terminated by mutual consent or with a one-year notice, Parliament and 
the provincial legislatures enjoyed an equal power to denounce them.  In practice, of course, 
this equality translated into very different results.  While federal authorities could unilaterally 
alter their contribution through legislation, the only “privilege” of unilateral provincial 
legislative withdrawal from the scheme would be to lose the federal contribution altogether.     
In other words, provincial legislatures could hardly take advantage of their sovereignty.     
 
In sum, for the Supreme Court, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is only 
restricted by two elements: the official distribution of legislative powers and the Charter of 
rights.  Consequently, a legislative assembly can always unilaterally denounce an IGA, or 
legislate in terms that contradict the content of the IGA, provided it does so in clear and 
explicit terms.  This does not mean that the agreement does not bind governments.  It means 
that nothing precludes a legislative assembly from acting in violation of this agreement, even 
if it has authorised its conclusion, approved or even incorporated it.    
 
 The irony is that in the Canadian parliamentary system, the executive nearly always 
carries  a majority in the legislative assembly, and can therefore use the latter to free itself 
                                                
123 Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 SCR 199 [Wells, discussed infra]; Cité d’Outremont v. 
Commission de Transport de Montréal, [1955] QB 753; ISSALYS and LEMIEUX (1997) 527.   
124 Particularly since bills relative to public spending may only be introduced into Parliament by the 
executive (ie not by private members): s.54, Constitution Act, 1867. CAP Reference, 559. 
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from prior commitments, even legally binding ones.125  In the CAP Reference, Parliament 
was clearly an instrument of the executive, and its sovereignty, an effective cover for 
executive action.  The Supreme Court was much more critical of this trick in the hand of the 
executive in the following decision. 
  
• The Wells decision 
 
Indeed, the capacity of an Executive to introduce legislation in order to dodge 
contractual obligations was recently criticised by Supreme Court.  The case did not involve 
an IGA, but an employment contract between a public official and a provincial government.  
Some of the findings are, however, apposite in the present context.     
 
The Newfoundland legislature restructured a Public Utilities Board, leading to the 
abolition of a Commissioner’s position.  Unsurprisingly, this was considered admissible 
legislative action.  For the Supreme Court, however, what was inadmissible was for the 
executive, which basically sets the legislative agenda, to argue that it could not honour 
labour contracts on the grounds that the law had changed. In this case, Newfoundland’s 
argument seemed particularly cynical since it could have re-appointed the dismissed 
Commissioner to the newly created Board, but chose not to.  The Court recognised that the 
separation of powers is an essential feature of the Canadian constitutional system. However, 
 
“[t]he government cannot [...] rely on this formal separation to 
avoid the consequences of its own actions.  While the legislature 
retains the power to expressly terminate a contract without 
compensation, it is disingenuous for the executive to assert that 
the legislative enactment of its own agenda constitutes a 
frustrating act beyond its control”.126  
  
In fact, the government had issued a directive pursuant to which Mr. Wells would not 
receive compensation for the termination of his contract.  True to its extensive interpretation 
of parliamentary sovereignty, the Supreme Court held that a legislature has the 
“extraordinary power”, through clear and explicit language, of legislating to deny 
compensation for the breach of a government contract.  But the government party to that 
contract could not do so, especially not through a directive.  For the Court: 
 
“[t]here is a crucial distinction, however, between the Crown 
legislatively avoiding a contract, and altogether escaping the legal 
consequences of doing so [...] In a nation governed by the rule of 
                                                
125 In this context, the legislative assembly may act as an “elected dictatorship”: Lord HAILSHAM, 
quoted in BARENDT, Eric “Is There a UK Constitution?”, (1997) Oxford JLS 137-146, 138.   Or, in the 
words of Elazar: cabinet is the “tail that wags the parliamentary dog”: ELAZAR, Daniel J., “Contrasting 
Unitary and Federal Systems”, (1997) 18: 3 Int’l Political Science Review 237-251, 246. 
126 Wells, 220. 
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law, we assume that the government will honour its obligations 
unless it explicitly exercises its power not to.[...]  To argue the 
opposite is to say that the government is bound only by its whim, 
not its word.  In Canada, this is unacceptable, and does not accord 
with the nation’s understanding of the relationship between the 
state and its citizens”.127 
 
  In the CAP Reference, the Court had considered the Executive as an integral part of 
the legislative branch of government.  In Wells, this vision of the separation of powers was 
turned on its head:  the Court reasoned that since it controls the legislature, the executive’s 
actions must be controlled so as to avoid an abusive result.  The Court did not actually 
overturn its previous case law.  On the contrary: it repeated that the legislature “retains the 
power to expressly terminate a contract without compensation“.  Nevertheless, the Court 
severely criticised the government’s duplicity in arguing that it could not comply with its 
contractual obligations while at the same time being the source of the impossibility of 
execution.   It issued a strong call for an application of good faith in contractual and 
governmental action. 
 
If this is correct, then I see no reason why the Court’s concern with the rule of law 
should not extend to legally binding IGAs.  This does not imply a modification of the hierarchy 
of norms: parties to an IGA could always legislate to counter an IGA.  They may, however, 
be liable for damages if they do so without express legislative language to that effect.  
Hence, the potential impact of the Wells decision on IGAs could be both to reinforce the 
supremacy of legislation over IGAs (given the reiterated power of parliamentary sovereignty), 
and the binding character of IGAs inter partes, when executives stop short of resorting to 
explicit legislation.   
 
• The Churchill Falls Reference 
 
While the Wells decision does not alter the traditional conception of parliamentary 
sovereignty, the Churchill Falls Reference has the effect of curbing the power of provincial 
legislatures to repudiate IGAs unilaterally.128  It is discussed here despite the fact that it was 
rendered ten years before the CAP Reference, because its potential impact is better 
understood against the impact of the latter.  At issue in the Churchill Falls Reference was a 
contract between two Crown Corporations.  The dispute nevertheless directly involved the 
governments of Québec and of Newfoundland.  Moreover, the intervention of the 
Newfoundland legislature raised relevant questions in the context of the place of IGAs in the 
hierarchy of norms. 
                                                
127 Wells, 216 and 218. 
128 Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp. Ltd. v. A.G. Newfoundland, [1984] 1 SCR 297 [further references 
are to paragraphs of the electronic version].    
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In 1961, Newfoundland granted a lease to the Churchill Falls Corporation to develop 
a hydroelectric project.  The lease was ratified by a statute.  In 1969, the company concluded 
a contract with Hydro-Québec, which would provide major investments in exchange for most 
of the electricity generated by the project for a period of up to 65 years.  The contract was 
governed by the law of Québec and any dispute was to be submitted to Québec courts.129 
 
In the mid-70s, Newfoundland used different strategies to recuperate some of the 
electricity produced at Churchill Falls.  In 1980, the legislature adopted an Act repealing the 
Churchill Falls Corporation’s lease and expropriating its assets, thus rendering it incapable of 
fulfilling its contractual obligations to Hydro-Québec.  The Act stipulated the compensation to 
which the company was entitled.  A few months later, the government of Newfoundland, 
facing legal action in Québec, submitted the constitutionality of its statute to its Court of 
Appeal through a reference procedure.  The Court ruled the statute constitutional.   As in the 
CAP Reference, the Supreme Court disagreed. 
 
First, the Court rejected the submission that the1980 statute merely repealed the one 
that ratified the lease in 1961.  For the Court, the subsequent statute constituted a 
“colourable attempt to do indirectly what it could not do directly”.130  In other words, if 
Newfoundland could not have put an end to the contract (to which it was not even party), it 
could not do so through legislation.  Secondly, the statute exceeded provincial powers 
because in its “pith and substance”, it altered civil rights (the contract) situated outside the 
province’s territory.131  Put another way, the statute had extra-territorial effect and thus 
exceeded provincial competences.132   
 
In the CAP Reference, Manitoba invoked the Churchill Falls Reference in support of 
its argument that federal partners cannot legislate to terminate contractual obligations that 
exceed their exclusive constitutional competences, taken in a broader (what I would call 
“material”) sense.133  It submitted that once properly made, an IGA is no longer within the 
exclusive competence of one particular party.  This is particularly so when the IGA is used as 
an instrument of the spending power and relates to exclusive provincial matters (such as 
health and social assistance).   Consequently, rescinding such an IGA requires the consent 
of other parties to it, and cannot proceed through unilateral legislative action. The Supreme 
                                                
129 Churchill Falls Reference, par. 10. 
130 CAP Reference, 567. 
131 Churchill Falls Reference, par. 44-60. The Newfoundland Court of Appeal had found that the 
expropriation related to rights and property located within Newfoundland. 
132 Territorial limits to provincial powers are inferred from the terms “in the province” in ss. 92(13) and 
92(16), Constitution Act, 1867. 
133 CAP Reference, 565. 
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Court dismissed the argument, insisting that the Churchill Falls Reference had turned on the 
“territorial” limits of provincial powers.134     
 
 This clarification of the situation by the Supreme Court in the CAP Reference has 
some potentially far-reaching consequences.  It suggests that a province party to a legally 
binding IGA may not legislate to put an end to its undertakings if the seat of the IGA is 
outside the province.135  For instance, a Québec-Ontario IGA that designates the law of 
Ontario as the applicable law, or that was signed in Toronto, could potentially be denounced 
by the Ontario legislature.  It could not, however, be repudiated through a Québec statute, 
which would have extra-territorial effect. 
 
 Furthermore, while provincial legislatures face territorial limitations, this is not the 
case of the federal Parliament.  Hence, a second potential consequence of the ruling is that a 
federal Act denouncing a vertical IGA could be constitutional, while a provincial Act seeking 
to do the same may not be.  In other words, parliamentary sovereignty would have a greater 
disruptive power in the case of vertical IGAs (and then again, only in the hands of federal 
authorities) than in the case of horizontal IGAs.136   
 
A solution, which is clearly endorsed in certain cases, is to subject IGAs to the law 
and the courts of the provincial party to a vertical agreement.137  Assuming this is sufficient to 
situate the IGA within that province (as it was in Churchill Falls), this would guarantee the 
sovereign capacity of each party to legislate to put an end to the IGA.  This leaves the 
problem of multilateral IGAs, which can be governed by the law of one particular province, 
which can then be in a better position to rescind its obligations through legislation than other 
provinces.138  
 
In the CAP Reference, the Supreme Court contended that parliamentary sovereignty 
benefited federal and provincial orders equally.  Yet, by insisting that the unconstitutionality 
of the Newfoundland Act in the Churchill Falls Reference was based on the territorial – as 
opposed to material – limitations to provincial competences; it implied that federal and 
                                                
134 Again, the Supreme Court refused to directly denounce – or endorse – the constitutionality of the 
spending power: CAP Reference, 566-567. 
135 The determination of the seat of government contracts proceeds through the application of private 
international law analysis.  I see no reason why the same would not apply to IGA. 
136 If the IGA were “situated” in Ottawa, this would arguably give an advantage to Ontario over other 
provinces. 
137 Agreement Regarding Delivery of Health Care and Treatment Services to Veterans, 08.06.1990 
(BC00545), s.19 (BC law applicable); Entente concernant le recours aux services des inspecteurs de 
la sécurité ferroviaire du Ministère des transports du Canada, 4/27.05.1998 (SAIC 1998-015) s.14 (QC 
law governs and QC courts have jurisdiction). 
138 In the absence of federal common law (with some inapplicable exceptions) in Canada, government 
contracts are always governed by provincial law: Laurentide Motel v. Ville de Beauport, [1989] 1 SCR 
705, 722 and 737; Just v. BC, [1989] 2 SCR 1228. 
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provincial legislative assemblies may not be on an equal footing with regards to IGAs.  While 
territorial limitations to provincial powers logically flow from the territorial nature of the 
Canadian federal regime, this differential impact in the case of intergovernmental relations is 
a kink to the theory of equality of federal partners.      
 
*** 
  
 At the outset of my research, the only certainty I had regarding the status of IGAs in 
Canada was that – in positive law - they were susceptible to unilateral repudiation through 
legislative action.  This is almost universally admitted, and is certainly the clear message 
conveyed by the Supreme Court in the CAP Reference.  But even this certainty requires 
some nuance.    
 
First, while the Wells decision confirms that in the end, a statute will always take 
precedence over an IGA (or a contract, or a treaty) if it contradicts it in clear and express 
terms, it summons the executive to act in good faith when introducing legislation.  I see no 
reason why this invitation to act in good faith should not extend to executives in relation to 
IGAs.  Secondly, despite claims that provincial and federal authorities can equally use the 
sword of parliamentary sovereignty to free themselves from binding IGAs in the CAP 
Reference, the likely unintended consequences of the Churchill Falls Reference is that 
provinces may see their access to the sword somehow more restricted than federal 
authorities.     
 
As will be apparent in the concluding chapter of this thesis, it is not the limitations to 
the freedom to act in contradiction to promises between governments that I regret.  Nor, a 
fortiori, appeals to government to act in good faith.  It is the differential impact on the freedom 
of action of federal partners that is problematic in terms of federal theory. 
 
6.2.3 IGAs and regulations   
 
Despite these nuances, the supremacy of unilateral legislative instruments over IGAs 
is established in Canada.  What is the respective place of IGAs and regulations in the 
hierarchy of norms?   
 
If an IGA is incorporated by statute, it should normally take precedence over 
regulations.  In this case, the hierarchy is classically between a statute and subordinate 
legislation.  This issue was central to the Colour of Margarine case, where the Superior Court 
of Québec rejected the argument that the order-in-council approving the Internal Trade 
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Agreement had the effect of implicitly abrogating provincial regulations.139  This order-in-
council authorised the Premier (and the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs) to sign the 
agreement, but it did not have the effect of altering domestic law.  Moreover, legislative 
approval did not have the effect of setting aside existing existing regulations.  For the Court, 
the Internal Trade Agreement is an:  
 
“agreement between governments who are sovereign in their 
respective spheres of legislative competence […]  The assertion 
that the ITA allows the government of one province to obtain a 
judicial order to force another provincial government to abrogate 
its regulations is erroneous.”140 
 
It bears pointing out that Québec government had undertaken - in writing - to modify 
its margarine regulation, but had failed to do so.  It had even published a proposed new 
regulation which would have allowed the sale of butter-yellow margarine but did not 
promulgate it.141  In these circumstances, the Court denied that the legislative approval of the 
ITA could have had the effect of implicitly abrogating the regulation.  This leaves open the 
possibility that in other circumstances, an argument could be made that the statutory 
approval of an IGA has the effect of implicitly modifying existing regulations.  The safest 
conclusion at this stage, however, is that IGAs that are not incorporated remain subordinate 
to unilateral regulations in the domestic legal order of each party.142    
 
6.2.4 IGAs and administrative acts or decisions   
  
Are administrative acts and decisions located below IGAs in the hierarchy of norms? 
In other words, could a court grant administrative law remedies against an administrative act 
or decision that violates an IGA?  Administrative acts and decisions must obviously respect 
constitutional, legislative and regulatory norms.  They would therefore be subject to IGAs that 
have constitutional, legislative and (assuming this were possible) regulatory status.143   The 
question is more complex with regards to IGAs which do not have such normative value in 
positive law.    
  
In the Finlay judicial saga, a recipient of social assistance launched administrative law 
proceedings against Manitoba authorities and federal authorities for failure to respect the 
conditions set out in the Canada Assistance Plan.  The Manitoba authorities had decided to 
                                                
139 Unilever Canada Inc. v. A.G. Québec, [1999] RJQ 1720 (SCQ) [the “Colour of Margarine case”] 
p.30 of electronic version. 
140 Colour of Margarine case, p.34 of electronic version. 
141 Possibly so as not to alienate milk producers, prior to provincial elections. 
142 See also BC Egg Marketing Board v. Sprucewood Farms Ltd, BCSC A902400 (canlii) and Re 
Lofstrom and Murphy et al., (1971) 22 DLR (3d) 120 (SKCA). 
143 Supra, 5.2.2 and 5.3.2. 
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to recover overpayments received by Mr. Finlay by reducing his monthly allowance by 5%.     
Manitoba received conditional grants from Ottawa under the CAP. One of the conditions was 
that the level of assistance should cover “basic requirements”.  Mr. Finlay went to court and 
argued that with the cost-recovery his basic needs were certainly not met.  His legal odyssey 
lasted a couple of decades. First, he launched a judicial review process before the Manitoba 
courts to challenge the legality of the Manitoba decision.144  Having lost, he turned to the 
Federal Court, where he argued that federal Ministers’ approval of transfers to Manitoba was 
illegal because the federal legislation authorising the payment referred to conditions 
contained in the IGA, which Manitoba was allegedly violating.   In the end, he also lost this 
battle on the merits.145 
  
In the last of the string of Finlay decisions, McLaughlin J., dissenting on other issues, 
stated that government policy cannot violate an IGA.146  The context does not specify what 
kind of IGA she had in mind, although the agreement at issue in Finlay had been authorised, 
but neither approved nor incorporated by legislation.  In other words, it did not have the force 
of statute.  There is no indication that it had regulatory force either. This makes the 
foundations for requiring that public policy respect an IGA somewhat unclear.   In fact, as we 
saw in Chapter 5, such third party administrative law challenges are rarely directed at the 
IGA itself, or alone.  For instance, without qualifying the Manitoba-Ottawa agreement in the 
CAP, the Supreme Court framed the question as whether the federal legislation “and the 
agreement made pursuant to it” required the province to provide a minimum level of social 
assistance.147  Some attempt is always made to tie an obligation to some unilateral legal 
source.  But it was difficult to argue some violation of federal or provincial unilateral 
instruments only.  The IGA was truly central to the source of obligation.148 
 
As was canvassed in Chapter 5, the complex web of federal and provincial Acts,  
regulations and IGAs is sometimes so tightly woven that it is nearly impossible to unravel. 
The precise source of legal obligation becomes elusive.149  For example, producers have 
challenged the application of quotas by provinces, when these quotas are set through 
intergovernmental schemes.  In such cases, the actions of provincial officials are clearly 
conditioned by an (unincorporated) IGA, but also by other source of provincial law.  In those 
                                                
144 It was in this context that the Supreme Court granted him “public interest standing: Finlay v. 
Canada (Minister of Finance), [1986] 2 SCR 607, supra, 4.1.3. 
145 Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1993] 1 SCR 1080 [Finlay, 1993].  The case is a telling 
illustration of the difficulties which the dual judicial system generates for the review of multi-level 
administrative action.  
146 Finlay, 1993, 1117 (McLaughlin J., diss.)   
147 Finlay, 1993, 1088. 
148 BLACKMAN (1993) 72 notes that at a minimum the case stands for the proposition that 
governments must conform with their own legislative requirements in implementing IGAs. 
149 The “network” paradigm may therefore better account for this reality than the hierarchical paradigm:  
infra, General Conclusions.   
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cases, courts will typically mention the IGA, sometimes explain that it is binding on the 
province (without further enquiry) and then confirm the validity of the quota or grant an 
injunction to force the producer to respect quotas.150  As we saw in Chapter 5, however, such 
deference for cooperative scheme is not systematic, and when there is a clear conflict 
between the content of an IGA and a unilateral norm, the latter will generally be given 
precedence.151 
 
The muddle concerning the normative foundations for administrative action is 
compounded by problems of interjurisdictional immunities which result from the largely dual 
nature of the Canadian judicial system.152  We saw that Belgian courts are not split along 
federal lines, but are divided pursuant to arcane ratione materiae criteria.  The result requires 
a watch-maker’s precision to characterise instruments, identify norms and determine the 
nature of legal disputes.153  This is not essential in the Canadian context, since (with certain 
exceptions), provincial Superior Courts can rule on constitutional, contractual or 
administrative issues.  The major exception – which is relevant here – relates to the judicial 
review of acts and decisions of federal officials, over which the Federal Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
 
This creates a dilemma when an official of one order is charged with missions by 
another order, or when it is actually difficult to determine the legal source of authority of an 
official, who acts in partial implementation of an IGA.  Mr. Finlay had to challenge provincial 
decisions before Manitoba courts, then federal decisions before the Federal Court.  The fact 
that the Supreme Court sits on final appeal in each case may help resolve legal 
inconsistencies, but it does not simplify the procedural hurdles faced by citizens challenging 
adminstrative decisions.  Mr. Finlay paid a couple of visits to the Supreme Court. 
 
In the Canadian Enrivonmental Law Association case,154 the Federal Court, which 
seemed to doubt its jurisdiction to rule on the validity of an IGA (given that it cannot be 
analysed as the sole act of a federal official), chose a solution that is reminiscent of the 
                                                
150 Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, 705-05-004614-007 (01.11.2001) 
(SCQ);  Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Monette, 505-05-002793-963 
(20.02.1997) (SCQ). 
151 BC Egg Marketing Board v. Sprucewood Farms Ltd, BCSC A902400 (canlii), 11; Martinoff v. 
Canada, [1994] 3 FC 33 (FCA); Ontario (Chicken Producer’s Marketing Board) v. Canada (Chicken 
Marketing Agency), [1993] 1 FC 116 (FCTD); supra, 5.3.2. 
152 Supra, 1.2.3. 
153 SAUNDERS asserts that the unicity of the court system in European federations facilitates the 
judicial control of intergovernmental mechanisms in comparison with the essentially dual character of 
the Australian one.  She does not address this particular problem (nor does she discuss the Belgian 
case):  SAUNDERS, Cheryl, “Constitutional and Legal Aspects”, in GALLIGAN, Brian, et al., eds.,  
Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991) 39-56. 
154 Canadian Environmental Law Association v. Minister of the Environment, FCTD, T-337-98 [the 
CELA decision]; supra, 4.1.3. 
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“actes détachables” doctrine in Belgium.155  Rather than question whether an IGA 
contravened federal law, the Court considered whether the Minister’s decision to conclude 
the agreement did so.  In other words, it sought to hook its jurisdiction on some unilateral act.    
The case did not relate to an administrative decision pursuant to an IGA per se. It illustrates 
both the inadequacy of the judicial structure given the intergovernmental character of major 
portions of public administration, and the creativity which can be shown, in Canada as in 
Belgium, to attempt to palliate these difficulties.156  Faced with obstacles flowing from 
cooperative action, in positive law, this creativity can only go so far, however.    
  
6.2.5 IGAs as contractual instruments and the hierarchy of norms 
 
 Givent the predominant conception of IGAs as contractual instruments in Canada, the 
foregoing discussion clearly established that IGAs qua contracts are located below the 
Constitution, legislation and regulation in the hierarchy of norms.  They only escape this 
formal subordination when they obtain constitutional or legislative status through some 
external formality. 
 
 The foregoing also established that an IGA meeting the required indicia of legal status 
binds governments party to them.  Absent legislation repudiating the IGA (or regulations 
clearly authorising such repudiation) and express provisions denying compensation, the 
other party could be entitled to contractual remedies.  In other words, as the Wells case 
decided, contrary legislation can constitute a contractual breach.  In view of the extensive 
interpretation given to parliamentary sovereignty by the Supreme Court, even in the context 
of intergovernmental relations, it appears that in positive law, one order of government could 
legislate to expressly deny compensation to another order party to an IGA which is 
unilaterally repudiated.  The best – and likely most effective – solution in such case could be 
an action in declaratory judgement to have the breach judicially acknowledged.157 
 
6.2.6 IGAs and the hierarchy of norms in Canada: a  summary  
 
 UYTTENDAELE proposed a template to defend his thesis regarding the place 
occupied by cooperation agreements in the hierarchy of norms in the Belgian context.158  The 
following is an attempt to do the same for Canadian IGAs.  The exercise illustrates a number 
of unresolved issues (uncertainties are left in bold). 
  
                                                
155 Supra, 6.1.4. 
156 For a similar solution in Belgium: CSAS 79.517 (25.03.1999) (CRASC): supra, 5.3.1.   
157 Declarations are nearly always honoured:  Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1993] 1 SCR 
1080, 1117 (per McLaughlin, J., diss.). 
158 Supra, 6.1.2. 
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• Constitution –  “constitutionalised” agreements159   
• Provincial constitutions 
• Legislation of either order of government  - IGAS that have the force of law 
(incorporated) 
• IGAs approved by statute which explicitly provides that an IGA is to supersede 
existing regulations or other statutes160 
• Regulation of either order of government 
• IGAs that are authorised or approved by legislation (absent the “superseding” 
clause mentioned above)  – IGAs that are approved or authorised by order-in-
council – administrative acts and decisions 
• IGAs that are not approved by order-in-council, when such approval is required 
by legislation – administrative acts and decisions 161  
 
In sum, apart from “constitutionalised” IGAs, agreements between governments in 
Canada are subordinate to the domestic law of each party, unless they have been 
incorporated by legislation.  This is the case of a tiny minority of agreements.  While clearly a 
major determinant in public administration, IGAs are situated at the very bottom of the formal 
hierarchy of norms.  As in the Belgian case, the lower part of the hierarchy is much murkier 
than the top one.  The relevance of the hierarchical model in this context is questioned in the 
concluding chapter.  
 
6.3 Protecting IGAs from unilateral action: a range of legal doctrines 
 
  In both federations, various legal doctrines have been invoked to preclude unilateral 
action that runs counter to an IGA, even when this action is - a priori - valid pursuant to the 
formal hierarchy of norms.162  While these are closely connected to the doctrines of estoppel, 
detrimental reliance and legitimate expectations which were examined in Chapters 4 and 5, 
they do not have identical objectives.163   In those chapters, these doctrines were examined 
for their potential to provide legal remedies to affected third parties or parties to an IGA, 
when the latter does not cross the threshold of juridicity, whether as normative instrument 
erga omnes, or as contractual instrument.  In other words, the idea was to give legal effect to 
IGAs deprived of formal legal character.   
 
The legal doctrines examined below are also grounded on the fundamental premise 
that governments should – somehow – be held to their word.  They do not constitute 
                                                
159 Despite the fact that third parties may not always derive the benefits of such agreements: supra, 
5.1.1.    
160 The Colour of Margarine case.    
161 Because in such cases, the IGA would be invalid.  In jurisdiction where such approval is not 
required, IGAs that are not approved by order-in-council would (apparently) be located at the same 
place in the hierarchy of norms as those that are approved.     
162 Given the uncertainty surrounding the place of cooperation agreements in the hiearchy of norms in 
Belgium, these constitute additional arguments in support to the thesis that agreements are, by their 
very character, protected from contrary unilateral action.   
163 Supra, 4.4 and 5.4. 
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paliatives to non-legally binding IGAs, however.  They are conceived as means of preventing 
a public authority from doing what it is normally authorised to do: legislate or regulate in 
contradiction of an IGA which can otherwise be legally binding.  They are thus tools for 
tempering with the harshness of a formal hierarchy of norms.  The concluding chapter 
questions the adequacy of the hierarchical (or “pyramidal”) paradigm to federal regimes.     
At this stage, however, I am still concerned with legal doctrines which – in positive law – 
have been invoked to better integrate the federal dimension in the classic paradigm of the 
“pyramid”.   
 
6.3.1 Protecting IGAs from unilateral action in Belgium 
 
We have seen that the case for the supremacy of cooperation agreements over 
(unilateral) legislation and regulations has been defended in the literature through an analogy 
with the supremacy of international law over domestic law within the Belgian legal order.  We 
also saw that certain objections could be raised to counter such an analogy.  The literature 
has then also invoked two other legal doctrines to support the assertion that the logic of the 
institution of IGAs is that they should take priority over unilateral norms: the “parallelism of 
forms” and “federal loyalty”.   In the absence of any contradiction between a unilateral norm 
and an IGA so far, neither of these doctrines has been tested in court.   
 
 6.3.1.1 The doctrine of parallelism of forms 
  
A doctrine that can potentially restrict the powers of the various legislative assemblies 
or executives to adopt norms that contravene cooperation agreements is known as the 
“parallelism of forms”.  It provides that an administrative act can only supersede a previous 
one if it is adopted through a similar type of instrument, and with due respect for the same 
formalities as surrounded the initial act.164  Consequently, if an act requires the consent of 
another party, an act purporting to replace it will also formally require that consent.  
UYTTENDAELE has invoked the theory in the context of cooperative agreements to argue 
that a component of the federation “could never implicitly and unilaterally undo what 
originates in a meeting of wills between itself and several other ones”.165    
 
 It must be underlined, however, that the doctrine of the parallelism of forms normally 
only applies to the extent that no legislative or regulatory provision specifically provides for 
formalities concerning the subsequent act.166  Put another way, a statute or a regulation may 
                                                
164 CSAS 82.990 (20.10.1999)  (Versteegen); CSAS 83.144 (26.20.1999) (Clareboets no.1) and  
103.011 (26.20.1999) (Clareboets no. 2). 
165 UYTTENDAELE (2001) 872 (my translation, and my emphasis). 
166 FAVRESSE (1993-94) 144; FLAMME (1989) T.I, 361. 
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authorise a contrary act that would not follow the procedure used to adopt its predecessor, to 
the extent that this is done explicitly.    
 
 This is the heart of the problem.  UYTTENDAELE underlines that a subsequent 
legislative instrument may not implicitly revoke a cooperative agreement.  He does not 
address the possibility that a legislative or regulatory instrument could do so explicitly.  The 
doctrine of “parallelism of forms” would not appear to preclude an express unilateral 
denunciation of an agreement, or even the adoption of an instrument which would explicitly 
contradict the content of an earlier one, which was assented to by the same legislative 
assembly.  More significantly, it is not obvious that the doctrine of parallelism of forms – 
which is an administrative law doctrine aimed at controlling the legality of regulatory 
instruments and administrative decisions – can or should be transposed to the legislative 
context.167   
 
The logic that underlies the doctrine of “parallelism of forms” seems implacable at 
first: a bilateral or multilateral act may not be offset by a unilateral initiative.  In positive law, 
however, it seems unlikely that it could have the effect of placing IGAs above legislation in 
the hierarchy of norms.  It may have a greater chance of consolidating an IGA against 
contrary regulations, to the extent that there is no express mention that the regulation 
contradicts the agreement.    
 
 6.3.1.2 The doctrine of federal loyalty 
   
The second doctrine which could be mustered to preclude the unilateral denunciation 
of an agreement through the adoption of explicitly contrary unilateral instruments is the 
principle of “federal loyalty”.   While it was entrenched in 1993, it is not defined in the 
Constitution.168   Parliamentary debates indicate that authors of the reform did not (or could 
not) give it a precise meaning or specify its legal effect.  It is generally understood as a 
means of avoiding conflicts of a political nature that may arise in the course of the lawful 
exercise of constitutional powers.  The notion implies that in exercising their constitutional 
powers, the different orders of governments “should not disturb the equilibrium of the whole 
                                                
167 CSAS 91.389 (06.12.2000) (Vrancken); CSAS 119.737 (22.05.2003) (Dufour). In CSAS 18.900 & 
18.901 (14.04.1978) (Barri), the Council added that the principle does not defeat a regulatory 
instrument with force of law. 
168 S.143, Constitution.  On the notion of federal loyalty: VERHOEVEN, Joe, La loyauté: mélanges 
offerts à Étienne Cerexhe (Brussels: Larcier, 1997); LAGASSE (1999) 341; DELPÉRÉE (2000) 657; 
ERK, Can, GAGNON, Alain-G., "Constitutional Ambiguity and Federal Trust : Codification of 
Federalism in Canada, Spain and Belgium”, (2000) 10 RFS 92-111. 
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construction”.169   While not actually enforceable, the notion has been used as a principle of 
interpretation in constitutional cases.170   
 
The notion of “federal loyalty” finds echo in the obligation of good faith inherent to the 
civil law of obligations, and was clearly inspired by the principle of Bundestreue defined by 
the German Federal Constitutional Court.171  This principle, of praetorian origin, imposes on 
other parties the legal obligation to consider the interests of other parties, even in the context of 
the exercise of an exclusive competence.  The Constitutional Court has invoked the doctrine 
of federal loyalty to restrict the freedom of action of executives to act in contradiction with an 
intergovernmental agreement.172   
 
On the other hand, Germany is a dualist system both with regards to the relationship 
between the domestic and the public international legal order, and apparently, with regards 
to the relationship between the internal legal order of each component of the federation and 
agreements between them.173  This implies that subsequent contrary legislation should have 
primacy over previous agreements, as is the case in Canada.  While the Constitutional Court 
has never used the principle to invalidate a law (by opposition to an executive act), it has 
incidentally noted that legislative assemblies must consider the interests of other members of 
the federation.174  Their sovereignty is thus restricted, but in an imprecise manner, by the 
Bundestreue.  Put another way, it is unclear that the principle could be used to invalidate a 
legislative instrument that explicitly derogates from an existing IGA.  Federal loyalty is a strong 
tool of interpretation, it has been used to counter executive action, but its power to alter the 
hierarchy of norms so as to protect inter-federal agreements against contrary legislative action is 
not entirely resolved.  
 
                                                
169 “Ne pas porter atteinte à l’équilibre de la construction de l’ensemble”: Parl Doc, Senate, SE 1991-
1992, 100-29/2, 20.  
170 Hence, in its key ruling on the 2001 constitutional reforms, the Court of Arbitration both asserted its 
lack of jurisdiction to enforce s.143 and the fact that none of the arguments pursuant to which certain 
aspects of the reform violated federal loyalty differed in substance from arguments grounded in other 
provisions.  In other words, despite its lack of jurisdiction, it still considered the arguments: 
CA35/2003, par. 19.3 and 19.9. 
171 BLAIR, Philip, CULLEN, Peter, “Federalism, Legalism and Political Reality : the Record of the 
Federal Constitutional Court”, in JEFFERY, Charlie, ed., Recasting German Federalism : the Legacies 
of Unification, (London/New York: Pinter, 1999) 119-154.  133-141.  Without formally usind the 
expression “federal loyalty”, the 1999 Swiss Constitution provides that public institutions must act in 
“good faith” and owe each other “respect”: ss.5(3) or 44(2).    
172 Although this was in the context of the execution of international obligations contracted by the 
Bund, but in matters falling within the legislative competence of the Länder.   Federal loyalty was thus 
intimately linked with issues of distribution of competences: SCHAUS (2001) vol. I, 108-114 and 143 
ff.; GARCIA MORALES (1998) 157-158. 
173 Although Germany has been characterised as “[the] most international law-friendly variant of 
dualism”: YOUNG, Katherine “The Implementation of International Law in the Domestic Laws of 
Germany and Australia: Federal and Parliamentary Comparisons”, (1999) 21 Adel LR 177-208, 189. 
174 GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS, Jean-François, “On Federal Loyalty”, 2003, paper on file with author. 
 234 
Interestingly, the Belgian literature does not underline the potential limits to the reach 
of Bundestreue that flow from the dualist character of the German legal system.175  
Admittedly, these limits are not clear.  In other words, there is no equivalent to the CAP 
Reference in Germany, in which the Constitutional Court would have affirmed the supremacy 
of legislation over IGAs, or vice versa.  This being said, it does not appear to be clearly 
established that the Bundestreue has the effect on the hierarchy of norms that Belgian 
authors wish it has, and wish to see transposed into the Belgian context.  The focus is clearly 
on the “moral” dimension of the principle (good faith, respecting other partners) and on the 
malleability of the notion, in the hands of judges. 
 
 This last aspect is relevant because despite entrenchment in the Belgian 
Constitution, the principle of federal loyalty is not directly justiciable, in the sense that no 
direct legal sanction is provided in cases of violations.176   The Court of Arbitration has 
invoked it in a number of cases (none of them relating to IGAs).   It constitutes a rule of 
interpretation, but no final ruling has ever rested on the principle.  While the doctrine does not 
clearly translate into concrete and precise obligations, it nevertheless allows for a degree of 
judiciarisation of the manner in which inter-federal relations must be exercised.   
 
It is unclear how the Court of Arbitration could use “federal loyalty” to actually annul an 
Act which  explicitly contradicts a cooperative agreement, or how the administrative section of 
the Council of State would refer to it to annul a regulation with the same effect.177   Yet, some 
judges have privately admitted that they would use the doctrine  – one way or another – to 
preclude one order of government from going back on its word.   In brief, one cannot affirm 
that federal loyalty can alter the hierarchy of norms, placing cooperation agreements above 
unilateral legislation or regulations.  Given the creativity of judges, however, and the 
dependance on some degree of legal certainty for the very survival of the federation, the 
principle does have that potential.   
 
6.3.2 Protecting IGAs from unilateral action in Canada 
 
In the CAP Reference, provinces and aboriginal groups submitted a number of 
arguments in their hope to curb unilateral action by the federal government.  The case was 
discussed at length earlier and there is no need to revisit it in detail.  The Court dismissed 
every one of the submissions.  In some cases, it did so in a cursory manner, on grounds that 
they were not properly framed in the original question the Court was asked to answer.  But 
the Court did answer with a certain amount of detail to certain submissions which were not 
                                                
175 Dualism is used here in the sense of the co-existence of distinct legal orders. 
176 CSLS 25.093/9, Doc Parl, Ch., SO, 1995-96, 577/1. 
177 Assuming the CSAS has the jurisdiction to use an IGA as a “norm of control”. On this: supra, 
6.1.1.1.  
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part of the original question either.178 This selectivity leaves a strong impression that the 
Court analysed the argument it could relatively easily have set aside, while it preferred to 
avoid those which raised more fundamental questions regarding relations between orders of 
government in a federal regime.    
 
Given the particular fact pattern that gave rise to the CAP Reference, and the 
evolution of the Court’s case law over the last ten years, it is nevertheless worth revisiting 
some of the doctrines the Court set aside.  I will consider three: the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations, constitutional conventions and the “principles of federalism”.179 
 
 6.3.2.1 The doctrine of legitimate expectations  
  
In Chapter 4, we saw that the doctrine of legitimate expectations could conceivably be 
invoked to protect the interests of parties to an IGA that is not formally legally binding.  In that 
context, it is somewhat akin to the doctrine of estoppel in public international law.   Similarly, 
the doctrine was invoked in Chapter 5 as a means of protecting some third party interests 
when they may have relied on an IGA which in the end cannot be formally characterised as a 
normative instrument erga omnes.  In both cases, the doctrine would, at a minimum, impose 
an obligation of justification on the executive seeking to depart from an IGA, even one that 
does not cross the threshold of juridicity, whether inter partes or erga omnes.     
 
In the CAP Reference, British Columbia had admitted that the doctrine could not 
preclude a legislature from legislating.  It argued, however, that the executive party to the 
agreement could not introduce legislation that has the effect of countering an inter-
government scheme that had been in place for over a quarter of a century.  The fact that the 
deal had never been modified unilaterally, including the funding formula contained in the 
federal Act and not reproduced in the IGA, had generated a “legitimate expectation” that the 
arrangement would not be denounced unilaterally.180  As we saw, the Supreme Court 
disagreed, holding that the parliamentary system would be “paralysed” if the doctrine were 
used to prevent the executive from introducing legislation. In this context, restraining the 
executive amounts to a “a fetter on the sovereignty of Parliament itself”.181        
 
                                                
178 The issues of “manner and form” (raised by aboriginal groups) and of the federal legislative 
competence (raised by Manitoba): CAP Reference, 561-567. 
179 The Court also dismissed the “manner and form” argument, holding that the federal Act authorising 
the CAP arrangement did not contain any deliberate limitations on Parliament.  “Manner and form” 
refers to legislative drafting techniques meant to subject subsequent legislation to particular 
procedures: ELLIOT (1991).   
180 CAP Reference, 554. 
181 CAP Reference, 559. 
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 In the CAP Reference, the Court rejected the substantive branch of the legitimate 
expectations doctrine.  It has reiterated that position since.182  Even in its procedural 
incarnation, the doctrine of legitimate expectations would not succeed if a government chose 
to use the legislative assembly for these ends.  Given the unambiguous answer rejection of 
the doctrine by the Court, the doctrine of legitimate expectations cannot have the effect of 
altering the hierarchy of norms, so as to put IGAs above unilateral legislation.   
 
 6.3.2.2 Constitutional conventions  
 
  In the CAP Reference, Ontario contended that with regards “to cost-sharing 
agreements a constitutional convention existed that neither Parliament nor the legislatures 
[would] use their legislative authority unilaterally to alter their obligations”.183   The Court 
replied that the issue of constitutional conventions had not been properly raised and declared 
rather abruptly, that “[t]he existence of a convention, therefore is irrelevant and need not be 
considered further”.184  The Court did not actually deny the existence of such a convention: it 
simply refused to consider the issue.185  The possibility that the existence of a convention 
with the effect of curbing parliamentary sovereignty in the context of IGAs could be revisited 
in a different context is therefore not entirely excluded. 
 
 Conventions are peculiar norms in Canadian constitutional law.186  These “rules of 
constitutional ethics and of political morality which impose obligations and indicate how the 
powers of the State are to be exercised”  are not directly enforceable.187  Courts, however, 
can recognise their existence, notably in the context of a declaratory judgment or a 
reference.  In the Patriation Reference of 1981, the Supreme Court outlined three conditions 
for the existence of a constitutional convention.188   There must be precedents for the rule, 
actors have to believe the rule to be binding, and there has to be a reason for this rule.   
Conventions can also arise through consent.189   
                                                
182 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817,  with perhaps a 
slight movement in favour by some members of the Court: Mount Sinaï v. Québec, [2001] 2 SCR 281. 
183 CAP Reference, 561.    
184 CAP Reference, 561. 
185 The Court’s reluctance could be explained by the fact that only ten years earlier, it had rendered 
two controversial decisions involving constitutional conventions that had plunged the country in a 
major political crisis.  Avoiding an issue which was not raised directly may have appeared more 
prudent: Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753 [Patriation Reference] and Re 
Objection by Québec to Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 SCR 793 [Québec Veto 
Reference]. 
186 HEARD, Andrew, Canadian Constitutional Conventions: the Marriage of Law and Politics, (Toronto: 
Oxford UP, 1991). 
187 TREMBLAY (2000) 20 (my translation); Patriation Reference.  Sanctions for their violations are 
political, or even moral TREMBLAY (2000) 20, fn 74 and 27, fn 118. 
188 Patriation Reference, 880-84 endorsing JENNING (1959) 90.  
189 MARSHALL, Geoffrey, Constitutional Conventions : The Rules and Forms of Political 
Accountability, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 217 ; POIRIER, Concordats, 153-154. 
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Stability in inter-governmental relations constitutes a good reason for the existence of 
a convention.  Hence, if the issue were to be reconsidered, either the existence of a 
precedent or of consent not to act in a manner that contradicts an IGA, notably by legislating, 
would have to be demonstrated.  Given that IGAs are very largely respected, the existence of 
precedent could probably be established.  The problem lies with the second condition: that 
actors must believe the precedent to be binding politically and morally.190  This condition is 
the crucial one.191  Federal partners respect IGAs for all sorts of reasons, including political 
self-interest.  Moreover, the impact of the CAP Reference has been to propagate the idea 
that it is legitimate for IGAs to be subject to unilateral repudiation.192  Establishing that parties 
feel bound by a rule pretending to prevent them from legislating in contradiction with an IGA 
would therefore represent a considerable challenge.   
 
Alternatively, it could be argued that in certain cases, federal partners have by 
consent deliberately adopted a convention not to legislate in contradiction with a particular 
IGA.  In the CAP Reference, Ottawa admitted that conventions could arise through certain 
types of momentous agreements.193  It denied, however, that this could be the effect of 
consent embodied in IGAs dealing with funding measures.  Given the general belief 
concerning the status of IGAs in Canada today, proving the existence of such consent would 
undeniably require very clear and explicit language.  
 
To contravene a convention is unconstitutional, although the only legal sanction 
would be a judicial statement that the convention exists and that it has not been respected. 
No legislative instrument may be declared ultra vires for violating a convention.  Assuming a 
convention not to legislate against a particular IGA could be proven, would it actually alter the 
formal hierarchy of norms?  Would it have the effect of placing the IGA above unilateral 
legislation? In practice, yes.  For, conventions are widely respected by Canadian 
governments.194  Had the Supreme Court recognised a convention in the CAP Reference, 
there is no doubt that this would have carried immense weight in intergovernmental 
                                                
190 WOEHRLING, José, “La Cour Suprême et les conventions constitutionnelles: les renvois relatifs au 
‘rapatriement’ de la Constitution canadienne”, (1984) 14 RDUS 391, 420-425.  
191 It was on this ground that the Supreme Court concluded Québec did not have a veto on 
constitutional amendments that affected its legislative powers in the Québec Veto Reference: 
TREMBLAY (2000) 22.  
192 In fact, as we saw, this belief has even lead to a certain understanding in some circles that IGAs 
are not legal instruments at all: for ex.: Ontario (Chicken Producer’s Marketing Board) v. Canada 
(Chicken Marketing Agency), [1993] 1 FC 116 (FCTD), par. 27.   
193 Such as the Imperial Conference through which it was agreed that the UK Parliament would not 
longer legislate for Canada, later embodied in the Statute of Westminster, 1931: CAP Reference, 
Factum for Canada, par. 73 (on file with author).    
194 The federal government complied with the finding of a convention that prior to 1982, amending the 
Constitution required a substantial degree of provincial consent, and sought this provincial support 
(Patriation Reference).  Had the Court found a similar convention regarding Québec, it is likely that 
Ottawa would not have “patriated” the Constitution without the latters’ agreement, as it did in 1982 
(Québec Veto Reference).    
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negotiations and it might very well have been decisive.  In “hard” positive law, however, the 
answer is “no”.  For a court could not invalidate a federal or provincial Act that contradicted or 
repudiated the IGA subject to a convention.  
 
 6.3.2.3 The “unwritten” principle of federalism    
 
    In the CAP Reference, Manitoba submitted that an “overriding principle of federalism” 
precluded unilateral federal legislative action.195  The argument went as follows.  One they 
have decided to fund programmes which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of provinces, 
federal authorities may not unilaterally revoke their support without provincial consent 
because of the disruption caused in this sphere of exclusive provincial competences.  The 
Court rejected this argument in a summary fashion, noting that it could not control the use of 
the spending power.  It refused to delve any further into the role which “federal principles” 
may have played in the matter.196  Again, this summary dismissal by the Supreme Court in 
the CAP Reference does not imply that it would never find such principles of federalism in 
other contexts.   
 
In fact, the unwritten “principle of federalism” played a prominent role in the 
Secession Reference rendered in 1998, although it was not clearly defined.197   In that 
advisory opinion, the Supreme Court held that an Act of the Quebec National Assembly 
purporting to effect secession from Canada would be unconstitutional. Three main 
interrelated principles were said to prevent this unilateral action: democracy, 
constitutionalism/rule of law and federalism.  This is possibly the first time that the Supreme 
Court has recognised that federal principles (as opposed to distribution of powers or Charter 
rights) could curb Westminster style parliamentary sovereignty.   
 
Interestingly, parliamentary sovereignty does not figure amongst the fundamental 
unwritten principles of the Canadian constitution identified by the Court.  In fact, the same 
year as the Secession Reference (1998) the Court affirmed that parliamentary sovereignty is 
not an end in itself, but a means to citizen participation, and thus to democracy.198  The 
following year, in Wells, the Supreme Court attempted to harness the freedom of action of 
the executive, even when the latter is using the legislative assembly to obtain what it 
                                                
195 CAP Reference, 567. 
196 CAP Reference, 565.  
197 Re the Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 [the Secession Reference], par. 55-60. 
198 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493, par. 174, citing with approval BLACK, William, “Vriend, Rights 
and Democracy”, (1996) 7 Constitutional Forum 126 at 128. Vriend was a “Charter case”, but the 
tempering with the sovereignty of the Alberta legislature was patent since the Supreme Court read-in a 
prohibited ground of discrimination that the Alberta legislature had deliberately left out.  In other words, 
the court did not invalidate an Act, it completed it, despite the wishes of the elected representatives.  
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wants.199  Are we witnessing a new - more flexible, more teleological - interpretation of 
parliamentary sovereignty than the one offered in the CAP Reference? 
 
It is worth noting that in the Secession Reference, the Supreme Court also 
recognised that federalism (as well as constitutionalism and democracy) may in some 
circumstances give rise to a legal duty to negotiate, even in the absence of a legal sanction 
for failing to do so.200  By analogy, could one argue that the federalism principle can create a 
legal duty not to unilaterally denounce an IGA to which one is party, even if there are no legal 
sanctions for failing to do so?201 
 
Appeal to the principles of federalism in this context could be compounded with 
arguments founded on the “unwritten” principle of the rule of law.  In fact, in a biting criticism 
of the use of legislative assemblies by governments who seek to avoid their contractual 
responsibilities, MONAHAN, argued that the rule of law may act as a proper limit on 
parliamentary sovereignty in the context of a unilateral repudiation of a contract by a 
government.202     
 
On the other hand, however, if the “principle of federalism” could be read as a damper 
on parliamentary sovereignty, the unwritten principle of democracy may come to the rescue 
of the supremacy of the legislative branch.  After all, citizens, and their representatives, are 
entitled to change their minds.203  The question is if they can do so with impunity when their 
actions affect other components of the federation.  Put another way, the three unwritten 
principles grounding the Canadian constitution would have to be balanced against one 
another were the case for the protection of IGAs in general (or of a particular one) to be 
made again. 
 
GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS has noted the lack of normative conception of federalism 
in Canada.204  It is true that the very expression “principles of federalism” remains 
ambiguous.  A priori, it would seem to find an echo in the principle of “federal loyalty” 
examined in the Belgian context.205  However, while the latter refers to good faith, in the 
Canadian context, “federalism” has generally been understood as the protection for the 
                                                
199 Supra, 6.2.2.2.  
200 The Secession Reference, par. 97-102. 
201 This would be different from a convention, since this would not require a demonstration that the 
parties felt bound by the rule. 
202 Patrick MONAHAN argues that the rule of law may act as a proper limit on parliamentary 
sovereignty in this context: “Is the Pearson Airport legislation unconstitutional?: The rule of law as a 
limit on contract repudiation by government”, (1995) 33 Osgoode HLJ 411-452. 
203 MOORE (1935) 184; LAJOIE (1984) 165. 
204 GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS, “The Canadian Federal Experiment, or Legalism without Federalism? 
Towards a Legal Theory of Federalism”, forthcoming [GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS, Normative]. 
205 On the principle of federalism: TREMBLAY (2000) 23.   
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federal structure of the country, rather than as a reference to the spirit which should inhabit it.  
The focus has largely been on the imperative of the protection of the autonomy of federated 
entities.  While this is open to debate, the “principle of federalism” invoked by the Supreme 
Court in the Secession Reference was much closer to this traditional reading.    
 
The closest equivalent to the principle of federal loyalty in the Canadian context may 
be the principle of federal “comity” (“courtoisie”).  Only a few months before the CAP 
Reference, the Court had found that rules of “ comity” between provinces went beyond those 
applicable between states in international law.206  There should logically be some 
connections between these enhanced rules of comity and principles of federalism, which the 
Supreme Court conveniently avoided in its discussion in the CAP Reference.207 
 
More recently, in the Colour of Margarine case,208 the Superior Court of Québec 
rejected an argument that Québec’s refusal to abrogate a regulation violated the “spirit of 
federalism”.  The Court actually focused on the federal structure of the country, insisting on 
provincial competences in the matter.  To the extent that regulations do not discriminate 
between a local enterprise and an out-of-province one, there is no violation of federalism.  
The Court admitted the tension between the search for an economic union and the 
“balkanisation” of such measures, but did not find them contrary to Canadian federalism.209  It 
never approached the question from the angle of “federal loyalty”, but rather concentrated on 
a classic positivist reading of Canadian constitutional law.  
 
 The distinction between the concepts of federal loyalty, as understood in Belgium, 
and the dominant principle of federalism in Canada reflects a distinct emphasis given to the 
values of cooperation and of democracy in the two federal regimes.   Fundamental principles 
have given rise to an industry of academic writing over the last few years.210  While the 
Supreme Court’s case law shows greater finesse than was evidenced in the CAP Reference, 
                                                
206 Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077; Hunt v. T&N PLC, [1993] 4 SCR 
289.    
207 Recently, the Québec Court of Appeal denied that imposing higher University fees for out of 
province students violated rules of “comity” (“courtoisie”): Ruel v. Marois (CAQ) (500-09-006303-986) 
30.10.2001 (REJB 2001-27081). 
208  The Colour of Margarine case: supra, 5.2.2.3 and 6.2.3. 
209 Citing Egg Marketing Commission v. Richardson, [1998] 3 SCR 157, 237 (structure of the 
Canadian constitution represents a historical compromise between local interests and the visions of an 
economic union).  
210 COUSINEAU, Marc, “L’Affaire Montfort: confirmation de la valeur des principes fondamentaux de la 
Constitution”, (2002) 13 NJCL 485-511; OLIVER, Peter, “Canada’s Two Solitudes: Constitutional and 
International Law in Reference re Secession of Québec” (1999) Int’l Journal of Minority and Group 
Rights 65-95; CAMERON, Jamie, “The written word and the Constitution‘s vital unstated 
assumptions”  in  THIBAULT, Pierre, PELLETIER, Benoît, PERRET, Louis, Les Mélanges Gérald-A 
Beaudoin: Les défis du constitutionnalisme (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 2002) 89-113; NEWMAN, 
Warren, “Réflexions sur la portée véritable des principes constitutionnels dans l’interprétation et 
l’application de la Constitution du Canada“ (2001) 13 NJCL 117-164. 
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it is still too early to see whether the classic principle of federalism is moving closer to the 
principle of Bundestreue, or at least incorporating, a conception of good faith, which could 
temper with “hard” powers to legislate for instance.211 
 
 Would the Supreme Court (re)consider the impact of unwritten constitutional 
principles, and primarily the principle of federalism, in the context of a dispute relating to an 
IGA? Its case law has evolved significantly along those lines since 1991.  It may be that the 
CAP Reference simply came at the wrong time, and with bad facts.  A battle about money 
between federal authorities and the three richest provinces may not have been the best 
context in which to argue that parliamentary sovereignty ought to be somewhat curbed in 
recognition of the cooperative nature of the Canadian federal regime.212 
 
It bears pointing out that unlike constitutional conventions, and the principle of federal 
loyalty in Belgium, unwritten constitutional principles are apparently enforceable in Canada. 
That is, an Act contravening one of these principles could apparently be invalidated by a 
Canadian court.213  In theory, therefore, the principle of federalism could potentially alter the 
respective places occupied by IGAs and unilateral legislation in the hierarchy of norms.  At 
this stage, this possibility is not totally de lege ferenda, but it is de lege incognita.    
 
Conclusions 
 
 Public law in both Canada and Belgium rests on a hierarchical paradigm.  The 
Constitution sits at the apex, with legislative instruments on the rung just below, followed by 
regulations.  The legality of norms, and of administrative action, is premised on this 
pyramidal configuration.  Inserting negotiated instruments in this structure poses a challenge, 
which leaves a number of unresolved questions and controversies in both federations.   
 
In Belgium, there is no doubt that cooperation agreements are subordinate to 
constitutional norms. This implies that they cannot violate fundamental rights, but, more 
relevant for our purposes, that they cannot be used to circumvent the formal distribution of 
competences that is provided by quasi-constitutional legislation.  Canadian executives 
cannot use IGAs to curb fundamental rights either.  However, the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s tolerance for the spending power, of which IGAs are a prime channel, raises 
doubts as to the subordination of IGAs to the formal distribution of competences, even in 
positive law.    
                                                
211 GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS  wonders whether federal loyalty does not actually stem from the very 
nature of federalism and therefore should underlie any federal structure: (Normative, 34) 
212 An “unwritten” principle cannot override an explicit text but could arguably alter the interpretation of 
another unwritten structural principle: Hogan, 275. 
213 COUSINEAU (2002) 492-496.   
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In brief, the subordination of IGAs to constitutional norms is clearly established in 
Belgium, even if respect for this ordering occasionally leads to creative constitutional 
interpretation.  Canadian courts show less concern for this hierarchy, and the subordination 
of IGAs to the Constitution, which should go without saying, cannot be asserted with the 
same degree of certainty.      
 
The Canadian position is far less ambiguous regarding the respective places of IGAs 
and legislation.  In the 1991 CAP Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada provided a 
classic reading of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which enables federal and 
provincial assemblies to legislate in contradiction to an IGA, or even to withdraw a statutory 
incorporation that gave a particular IGA the normative force of a statute.   As was noted 
above, notable judicial and doctrinal interest has developed concerning unwritten 
constitutional principles, including the “principle of federalism”.  Whether and how this could 
affect the classic understanding of parliamentary sovereignty in the context of inter-federal 
relations is unclear.  At this juncture, the subordination of IGAs to unilateral legislation seems 
undeniable in Canadian public law.    
 
By contrast, the issue of the respective positions of IGAs and “ordinary” legislative 
instruments remains partly unresolved in Belgium.  Agreements that do not receive 
legislative assent are clearly subordinate to legislation.  If this assent is not required, the 
agreement cannot pretend to have the force of statute.  If such assent is required, but has 
not (yet) been granted, the IGA is simply without any legal effect. Either way, such IGAs 
cannot compete with statutes in the battle for formal normativity in positive law.  The main 
controversy thus relates to IGAs that have received proper legislative approval and contrary 
unilateral legislative instruments.   
 
 In the absence of any clarification by the special legislator, or of any case law, some 
analysts simply refuse to make a prognostic.  Others vigorously argue that the “logic” or the 
“spirit” of s.92bis implies that when federal partners conclude a deal, they cannot denounce it 
unilaterally.  Parallels are drawn with the supremacy of directly applicable international law in 
the domestic legal order, and appeals are made to doctrines of “parallelism of forms” and 
“federal loyalty” in support of this position.  The underlying value of democracy which 
grounds the Canadian position that legislatures should always be entitled to “change their 
mind”, is simply never invoked.  Given the political earthquake unilateral action taken in 
contradiction of an agreement would cause in this relatively unstable federation, it is likely 
that judicial institutions would muster every argument to consolidate the supremacy of 
negotiated norms over unilateral ones.  At this stage, the issue is still unresolved, however.    
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Assuming IGAs could be re-characterised as regulatory instruments in Belgium,214 
this debate is simply transposed to the next rung of the hierarchy.  Some authors maintain 
that IGAs that do not require legislative assent are nevertheless protected against contrary 
unilateral contrary regulations.  The foundation is, again, largely ideological, and given the 
lack of case law directly on this issue, the place of these IGAs and of other regulatory 
instruments in the hierarchy of norms is also uncertain.   
 
Even if IGAs could be recast as regulatory instruments in Canada, any suggestion 
that they would thereby supplant “ordinary” regulations is very unlikely to succeed.  Courts 
are very tolerant of cooperative schemes, and there is little doubt that IGAs govern the 
behaviour of public officials. Yet, when the respective normative force of IGAs and of 
unilateral norms is raised directly, the latter tend to hold sway.215    
 
A number of doctrines and principles canvassed in this section have been invoked 
either in the literature (in Belgium) or in courts (in Canada) as means of softening the hard 
edge of the autonomy recognised to federal partners to renege on their word.  The 
underlying principle common to the “parallelism of forms”, legitimate expectations, 
constitutional conventions, federal loyalty and principles of federalism is that federal partners 
should keep their promises to one another, and the representation they jointly make to their 
populations, and that this can imply legal limits to their autonomy.   
 
None of these doctrines has yet succeeded to alter or consolidate IGAs in the 
hierarchy of norms, so as to protect them from unilateral action.  They simply have not had 
the opportunity in Belgium, where no contradiction between cooperation agreements and 
unilateral norms has reached the courts.  Some of these were ardently argued in the CAP 
Reference in 1991, but not given serious consideration by the Supreme Court of Canada.  
Given recent jurisprudential evolution, a more nuanced reading could potentially be provided, 
so that the balance between parliamentary sovereignty and the stability of inter-federal 
relations could be revisited.  
 
At this stage, however, IGAs are officially subordinate to just about every norm of 
positive law in Canada except, perhaps (and astoundingly) to some parts of the 
Constitution.216  Their place in the hierarchy is uncertain in Belgium, despite recurring 
appeals to the supremacy of negotiated instruments over classic unilateral legal norms.   
 
                                                
214 Supra, 5.3.1. 
215 Although as we saw, the case law is not consistent on this matter: supra, 5.3.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4.  
216 Particularly given judicial tolerance to their use as instruments of the spending power: supra, 
4.1.2.2.  
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In the meantime, the best way of guaranteeing IGAs in both federations a higher 
place in the hierarchy of norms, would be to do so explicitly.  In Belgium, this would imply an 
amendment to section 92bis of the 1980 DMA, or even better, to the Constitution.  In 
Canada, this could be accomplished through certain legislative techniques,217 although the 
most effective way would be to “constitutionalise” IGAs.  Since the permanency of the 19th 
century “constitutionalised” agreements is problematic, several suggestions have been made 
to allow for “à la carte” constitutionalisation with a sun-set clause.218  That is, for a period of 
say five years, an IGA adopted through a procedure that would be outlined in the 
Constitution, would gain supra-legislative status.  This would provide a temporary alteration 
of the hierarchy of norms, which may offer the best compromise between stability in inter-
federal relations, and democracy.219 
 
                                                
217 Mostly “manner and form” limitations, which allow a legislature to bind itself as to procedure, rather 
than content.  Of course, these limitations can be revoked through legislation, but only following the 
agreed upon procedure. For instance: Maritime Economic Cooperation Act, RSNB, ch. M-1.11, ss.7-9, 
pursuant to which the “province agrees not to adopt measures that are contrary to the purpose, 
principles and strategic goals of this Act“ and stating that “it is the declared intention that this Act […] 
shall remain in force until repealed by one or more of the legislatures of the Maritime Provinces and a 
legislature intending to repeal this act […] shall give at least one year’s notice […]”.  In the CAP 
Reference, the Supreme Court rejected the manner and form argument, not in principle, but on the 
facts of the case.      
218 This was part of the constitutional reforms proposed in the Charlottetown Accord, s. 126: 
PELLETIER, Benoît, “Le partage constitutionnel des pouvoirs, selon l’entente de Charlottetown” in 
Référendum 26 octobre 1992: Les objections de 20 spécialistes aux offres fédérales (Montréal: 
Éditions Saint-Martin, 1992) 77-85, 78; HOGG, Peter W., “Division of Powers in the Charlottetown 
Accord” in McROBERTS, Kenneth, MONAHAN, Patrick, (eds.), The Charlottetown Accord, the 
Referendum and the Future of Canada (Toronto-Buffalo-London: U of T Press, 1992) 85-92, 88-90; 
FRIEDLANDER (1993). 
219 It must be pointed out, however, that such “temporary entrenchment” would not resolve the 
uncertainty concerning the subordination of IGAs to the formal distribution of competences: supra, 
6.2.1.1 and 6.2.6.  
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CONCLUSIONS TO PART II 
 
 
  As noted in the Introduction, my original hypothesis was that despite a convergence 
of functions played by intergovernmental agreements, their legal status varied greatly in 
different federal regimes.  Belgium and Canada were chosen as case studies to illustrate a 
federation in which IGAs are primarily conceived as legal instruments and one in which they 
are understood as essentially political arrangements.  While the convergence of functions is 
clear enough, I have argued that  – as is often the case – such dichotomous thinking does 
not stand up to reality.  In truth, IGAs enjoy a spectrum of legal status in both federations. 
 
 The attempt to capture the status of IGAs in Belgian and Canadian positive law has 
revealed two major differences.  The first, and most obvious, lies in the existence of an 
explicit legislative framework concerning cooperation agreements in Belgium.  S.92bis was 
added to the main quasi-constitutional statute governing the distribution of competences in 
the course of the third round of the “federalisation process” in 1988-89.1 The 
institutionalisation of cooperative techniques even preceded the official designation of 
Belgium as a federation in 1993.  This is consistent with the legicentrist tradition in Belgium.  
Institutions that may remain entirely in the sphere of politics elsewhere tend to be “legislated” 
into life in this complex federal regime.2   
 
By contrast, over the years, Canadian governments have concluded hundreds of 
IGAs in the near absence of any legislative framework.3  The practice is both rich and 
haphazard and subject to very few explicit legal rules.  The one exception is the historical 
phenomenon of “constitutionalised agreements”, concluded as new provinces joined the 
federation, or to alter their status, and which are now constitutionally entrenched.4 
 
The second major difference lies in the distinct dominant conceptions of the 
instrument.  In Canada, IGAs are envisaged as a peculiar class of contracts to which both 
parties are public authorities, with similar privileges and bound by similar public law 
constraints.  Paradoxically, given the traditional lack of distinction between private and public 
law contracts in common law systems, the implication has been that unless IGAs can 
somehow be assimilated to private arrangements, they are likely to remain on the “purely” 
political side of the threshold, at least according to conventional wisdom.  While hardly any 
Canadian case law deals with the matter of the status of IGAs per se, there is enough 
indirect acknowledgement of their normative force to suggest that unless government parties 
                                                
1 Similar authorisations are found in the 1989 DMA on Brussels and the 1983 OC concerning the GC. 
2 On legicentrism: supra, 1.1.4.3. 
3 Apart from provisions concerning the authority of specific Ministers to conclude them: supra, 4.1.2.1. 
4 And even, then, their status erga omnes is not entirely clear: supra, 5.1.1. 
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themselves argue their lack of binding character, courts tend to treat them as binding 
instruments.  But this is not always the case and some recent dicta suggest a growing 
underlying discomfort with this contractual conception, although no alternative is provided 
apart from their description as significant political instruments or “policy statements”.  In other 
words, courts may be uncomfortable with the contractual status, but do not really abandon 
the threshold paradigm. They just hesitate to allow IGAs to cross it. 
 
By contrast, in Belgium, the focus is essentially on the normative character of IGAs. 
They are seen as a means for orders of government of acting together and even as means of 
jointly adopting norms that become “directly applicable” in their respective legal orders.    
Cooperation agreements are thus understood as a new – if elusive – type of concerted norm 
erga omnes.  This being said, the consensual origins of the institution are undeniable.  
Moreover the creation, by statute, of special cooperation tribunals charged exclusively with 
the interpretation and implementation of IGAs, and only open to government parties, also 
signals a contractual dimension.  The fact that no dispute has yet been submitted to these ad 
hoc institutions may explain the limited  interest in the characterisation of IGAs as contractual 
instruments.5   
 
 Consequently, despite these different conceptions, IGAs gain from being examined 
as both contractual and normative instruments in both systems. This exercise reveals a 
number of similarities and differences in terms of the status of IGAs.   
 
While there is a greater presumption of legal character in Belgium, which notably 
arises from the existence of a specific legislative framework, the characterisation of IGAs as 
contractual instruments must pass a two-stage test in both federations.  First, a number of 
“public law impediments” to their legal character, germane to each system, must be taken 
into consideration.  Those include issues of capacity/authority to conclude, eventually the 
parliamentary approval for the spending of public funds as well as a number of ratione 
materiae limitations.  Hence neither in Canada nor in Belgium can governments conclude 
agreements to exchange or cede constitutional competences, or to legislate in a particular 
manner.  In Canada, the rule precluding executives from fettering their “discretion” with 
regards to governmental functions may constitute such an impediment, although it has not 
been applied consistently.  In Belgium, IGAs may not allow an intrusion by one order of 
government into the sphere of competence of another.  This officially precludes the 
conclusion of binding IGAs as instruments of the spending power. 
 
The second stage implies the analysis of the IGA through a series of “indicia of legal 
status”.  These include such matters as content, form, wording, formalities, behaviour and 
                                                
5 Supra, 4.2.2.2. 
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provisions for dispute resolution.  For a number of reasons, form is a weaker indicator of 
legal character in Canada, than in Belgium.  This implies IGA with a low normative content 
(framework agreement, hortatory languages, etc.) could cross the threshold of juridicity in 
Belgium, and not in Canada.  The actual normative force of such an IGA inter partes would 
not differ greatly between the two situations, and a Belgian cooperation tribunal may find it 
difficult to find a violation of such an agreement, even if it is formally characterised as legally 
binding.    
  
 Fundamentally, it is suggested that the rule concerning the normative character erga 
omnes of IGAs is the same in Belgium and in Canada.  In neither federation can 
governments legislate by contract. They can only bind third parties if they obtain the 
concurrence of the legislative assemblies.  The major difference in this context lies in the 
manner and mostly in the frequency with which this transformation of a consensual 
instrument into a formally normative one takes place.   While the majority of IGAs receive 
proper parliamentary approval in Belgium, statutory incorporation is a very rare occurrence in 
Canada. Consequently, the vast majority of the dozens of IGAs concluded each year in 
Canada are officially devoid of any legal force erga omnes.   From this perspective, the legal 
character of IGAs is clearly better established in Belgium than in Canada. 
   
The general presumption that IGAs constitute legal instruments, has also led to a 
suggestion that IGAs which do not receive legislative assent must nonetheless be 
understood as regulatory instruments.  This conclusion is subject, however, to two caveats.  
First, this can only relate to IGAs that do not require legislative assent pursuant to s.92bis.  
Otherwise rules of public law meant to ensure parliamentary scrutiny over executive action 
would be violated.  Secondly, the mere description of an agreement as a “cooperation 
agreement” with reference to s.92bis in its preamble does not automatically give it  regulatory 
force.  This also requires a process of characterisation in concreto, using administrative law 
criteria for the determination of the regulatory character of instruments which are not formally 
regulations, such as directives or circulars.    
 
 The potential characterisation of IGAs as regulatory instruments could  be  compelling 
even in Canada, since so few IGAs are ever formally incorporated, and therefore officially 
constitute normative instruments erga omnes.   While Canadian courts have recharacterised 
certain unilateral “informal” instruments, such as directives, this has not been applied to 
IGAs.  Officially, in Canada, law-making can only be unilateral. There is no equivalent to 
s.92bis to act as a stepping-stone for challenging this dominant  conception.     
  
Agreements that do not cross the threshold of juridicity either inter partes or erga 
omnes, may nevertheless be given some form of legal effect, through doctrines such as 
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legitimate expectations or the principle of “bonne administration”.   In some circumstances, 
the legal system may provide legal protection to governments or third parties who reasonably 
relied on a government’s given word, even if that word is contained in a text that is ultimately 
deprived of actual legal force 
 
Finally, the status of IGAs was also explored from the perspective of their place in the 
hierarchy of norms.  In positive law, there is no question that Belgian cooperation 
agreements must respect the formal distribution of competences.  Officially, they cannot be 
used as channels for intruding in the sphere of competence of another order of government, 
including as instruments of the spending power.  There are derogations in practice, but the 
official discourse is clear.  By contrast, Canadian courts have shown deference for the use of 
IGAs as means for conditionally channelling funds from one order of government to another.  
Consequently, one cannot assert with certainty that IGAs are subordinated to every part of 
the Constitution. This is particularly paradoxical since IGAs are considered subordinate to 
just about every other unilateral norm of public law in Canada, and notably to statutes.  In the 
absence of case law, the question is unresolved.  However, vigorous, if not always 
compelling, arguments have been raised to suggest that IGAs which have received 
legislative assent should be located above unilateral instruments in the hierarchy of norms in 
Belgium.   
  
Again, a number of legal doctrines can be canvassed for their potential impact on the 
official hierarchy of norms.  Here, the object is not to provide protection when a government 
disregards an IGA that is formally devoid of legal character, but to preclude unilateral action 
that counters an IGA even when its status at law is well established.  While no Belgian case 
law has yet used federal loyalty or the “parallelism of forms” to preclude unilateral action that 
counters negotiated instruments (the issue has not yet arisen), these doctrines have been 
forcefully invoked by constitutionalists to consolidate the superiority of IGAs over unilateral 
law making.  In Canada, by contrast, the Supreme Court has clearly asserted the 
precedence of legislation over IGAs, and has dismissed without much consideration 
arguments that would have curbed parliamentary sovereignty for the sake of stable 
intergovernmental relations.  Whether renewed interest in the unwritten principle of 
federalism could alter this strict adherence to unilateral action by elected officials remains 
unclear.       
 
To summarise, IGAs do enjoy distinct legal status in the Belgian and Canadian 
federal regimes.  This does not translate into a sharp dichotomy, however.  It is largely a 
matter of gradation which reflect distinct concerns and conceptual frameworks.  These are 
addressed in the final conclusions.   
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
1.  A summary of findings 
 
IGAs are an integral part of the federal phenomenon.  Federal regimes rest on a 
distribution of competences between a number of actors. In many cases, effective public 
policy requires some form of coordinated action to offset this fragmentation of 
responsibilities.  Cooperation in general, and intergovernmental agreements in particular, 
work as a sort of counter-balance to the autonomy of federal partners.  In this regard, the 
present thesis started with an intuition and a puzzle.  It appeared that, in practice, IGAs 
played a number of similar functions in most federal systems.  Despite this apparent 
convergence of roles, IGAs seemed to be primarily understood as legal instruments, binding 
on signatories and on third parties in certain federations, while in others, they appeared to be 
conceived as political “gentlemen’s agreements” with limited or no legal value and protection.  
I wanted to verify whether IGAs effectively fulfil analogous functions in different federations 
and to test the validity of this apparent dichotomy in legal status.   To test this two-pronged 
hypothesis I examined the roles and status of IGAs in the Belgian and Canadian 
federations.1 
 
It does appear that - with necessary adaptations dictated by particular economic, 
political and legal situations - IGAs do indeed play similar functions in different federal 
systems.2   Those can be divided into two main – non mutually exclusive - categories.  
Explicit functions are those which basically correspond to the content of the agreement.  
Hence, federal partners make use of IGAs to articulate the exercise of exclusive but closely 
connected competences, or to sort out respective responsibilities in the case of shared or 
concurrent ones.  IGAs serve to pool resources, and extend services to the population of 
respective legal orders.  In addition to this “substantive collaboration”, IGAs also frequently 
serve as tools of “procedural cooperation”: they indicate how partners ought to share 
information, consult, meet, and resolve disputes.  IGAs are also used to found joint 
organisations, endowed or not with legal personality and regulatory authority.   
 
Apart from these explicit functions, IGAs also play a number of implicit, and 
sometimes even insidious roles.  Useful instruments of constitutional engineering, they are 
used to circumvent an ineffective or inopportune distribution of powers, to blur constitutional 
boundaries, to complete constitutional reforms, avoid them, or affect reform outside the 
                                                
1 Reasons for selecting these examples are outlined in the General Introduction. 
2 Supra, Chapter 3.  
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regular channels.  IGAs - as other forms of contractual arrangements - rest on a theory of 
equality of partners.  In reality – again as other forms of contract - they can represent devices 
for the articulation of power relations.  Regardless of their actual status under positive law, 
IGAs can induce weaker parties to make concessions, in exchange for resources for 
instance, which they would not consent to were they in a position of effective, and not merely 
theoretical, equality.  In this last case, IGAs end up as instruments of “regulating by contract”, 
even when one government does not have the legal means of imposing its will on another.    
 
Despite variations in degree, explained by historical factors, fiscal arrangements, or 
the distribution of competences, the first branch of my hypothesis was largely confirmed by 
the theoretical and empirical research undertaken: IGAs do play a number of analogous 
functions in the Belgian and the Canadian federal systems.   
 
 The fate of the second branch of the hypothesis was more complex. The initial task 
was to unpack three different facets of the “legal status” of IGAs, which are often conflated.  
Part II of the thesis thus successively examined IGAs as “contractual instruments”, potentially 
binding on the governments who conclude them (Chapter 4) as well as “normative 
instruments”, source of law of general application (Chapter 5).  It then explored the relative 
force of IGAs with regards to more classic norms of public law, that is, their place in the 
hierarchy of norms (Chapter 6). 
 
With regards to the first angle, the distinction between federations which allow  legally 
binding status for IGAs and those which do not, is not as straightforward as I originally 
thought.  There exists, in both types of federal regimes, a spectrum of status, from those 
which create undeniable legally-binding obligations, to those which clearly do not.  The 
distinction between the legal status of IGAs as contractual instruments in the two federations 
is more a matter of contrary presumptions than of a clear-cut dichotomy in legal 
characterisation.        
 
In Belgium, there is a widespread belief that agreements between orders of 
government are legal instruments.  Upon closer analysis, I suggested that this conception 
amounted to a rebuttable presumption.  In Canada, by contrast, many believe that IGAs are 
of political character, at least until proven otherwise.  In both cases, the determination of an 
IGA’s status inter partes implies a two-stage exercise of characterisation.3  In Belgium, the 
process arguably serves to rebut or confirm the presumption of legal character, while in 
Canada it arguably serves to overturn or validate the presumption concerning the lack of 
legal force inter partes.  While there may be a greater predilection for characterising IGAs as 
                                                
3 Supra, Chapter 4. 
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legal instruments in Belgium than in Canada, the distinction is not as stark as the discourse 
surrounding them would suggest.    
 
The legal status of IGAs must also be apprehended from the effect they can have in 
the legal order of each signatory, that is, as a source of law erga omnes.  The second angle 
of approach to the status of IGAs revealed a similar fundamental rule of public law: officially, 
executives cannot alter their respective legal orders, and thus impose obligations on third 
parties, without the proper concurrence of the legislative branch.   
 
In Belgium, this implies obtaining legislative assent.  In Canada, formal statutory 
incorporation is required. Once these procedural formalities have been met, IGAs have, at a 
minimum, the force of statute within each legal order. About two-thirds of cooperation 
agreements receive the required parliamentary approval in Belgium, while formal 
incorporation of IGAs is extremely rare in Canada. This implies that the vast majority of 
Canadian IGAs are devoid of any legal force erga omnes, although it appears that in some 
cases they have some sort of normative force, particularly in complex intergovernmental 
schemes where they are intertwined with a number of unilateral instruments.  This suggests 
that a potential recasting of IGAs as regulatory instruments – possibly along the lines of the 
recharacterisation of directives as legal instruments - should be investigated.4 
  
Assuming IGAs do not cross the threshold of juridicity either as contractual or as 
normative instruments, the legal system has not yet exhausted its potential reach.  In both 
federations, a number of legal doctrines could be canvassed to assess whether agreements 
which are formally devoid of legal character inter partes or erga omnes, may nevertheless 
have some legal effect.  These include a number of interrelated doctrines, such as estoppel, 
detrimental reliance, legitimate expectations or the principle of “bonne administration”. They 
are all grounded on the principle of good faith and on the belief that at a minimum, public 
authorities must provide some rational explanation for departing from a given promise or 
practice.  Hence, even when IGAs remain on the “non-legal” side of the threshold, the law 
may still offer a degree of protection.5 
 
Both the status of IGAs inter partes and erga omnes raise questions concerning the  
place which IGAs occupy in the hierarchy of norms in federal regimes.   Do IGAs enjoy 
supra-legislative status, which would protect them from unilateral repudiation by one of the 
parties through a legislative process?  This solution - inspired by the German and Swiss 
experience - is strongly advocated by a segment of the Belgian doctrine.  It departs sharply 
from the solution of federal systems steeped in the English tradition of parliamentary 
                                                
4 Supra, 5.3. 
5 Supra, 4.4 and 5.4. 
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sovereignty.  In Canada, legislatures can always adopt statutes which contradict IGAs, even 
those that otherwise crossed the threshold of juridicity inter partes, or were previously 
incorporated and thus had the force of statute.  Here, the difference between the two 
federations is not merely a matter of presumption.  It is a difference of political philosophy 
with obvious consequences in positive law.    
 
In brief, the answer to the second branch of the hypothesis pursuant to which 
intergovernmental agreements were understood to be legal instruments in Belgium, while 
they were primarily conceived as political instruments in Canada, raised three sub-questions.  
The first relates to their status inter partes.  Research revealed that the difference between 
the two federations is more one of degree than of kind.  The second regards their status erga 
omnes. Here, the distinction is more significant, and a far greater segment of Belgian IGAs 
are formal normative instruments than is the case in Canada. The third is the protection of 
IGAs against contrary unilateral action, particularly legislation.  Here, the answer is that they 
are more clearly subordinated to constitutional norms in Belgium than in Canada, and clearly 
subordinated to unilateral legislation in Canada, while this question remains open in Belgium.     
 
These differences in legal status reflect different concerns in the two federal regimes.  
In Canada, cooperation in general, and IGAs in particular, have developed in a pragmatic, 
haphazard fashion.  Given the high degree of effectiveness inter partes (to which I return 
below), IGAs have hardly been “theorised” and courts have had very little opportunity to rule 
on their status.  There seems to be a growing discomfort, however, with the limited 
contractual conception of the instrument, in view of their impact on third parties. The 
inadequacy of the dual judicial system to deal with that aspect of the practice of IGAs is 
patent.   
 
Concerns regarding cooperation agreements were different in Belgium.  Given the 
acrimony that gave rise to the federalisation movement, and the fragmentation of a highly 
developed welfare State in a short period of time, constitutional architects sought to formalise 
cooperative techniques.  It was feared that those would likely not arise “spontaneously”, or 
would take too much time to develop, which could create havoc in the management of public 
affairs.  Moreover, a strict interpretation of the distribution of competences effected on an 
exclusive basis precluded a number of cooperation solutions, or rendered them particularly 
complicated (as they are in Canada, in fact).  The specific legislative regime applicable to 
cooperation agreements, introduced in 1988-89, was meant as a response to these 
obstacles.   
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There is an inherent tension between two fundamental values in countries that are 
both democratic and federal.6  In Canada, emphasis has been placed on the possibility for 
every member of the federation of “changing its mind” to reflect alterations in the elected 
officials’ understanding of the public interest they are meant to defend.  In Belgium, for a 
number of historical reasons, greater emphasis is placed on the virtue of collaboration.  In 
this complex society, and now complex federal regime, democracy has always been 
mediated through negotiated solutions.7  Public interest is not understood as being better 
protected by allowing elected officials to change their minds, without restrictions flowing from 
previous undertakings.   
 
In other words, in the hierarchy of values – rather than norms – Belgian 
constitutionalists put cooperation above or on a par with democratic freedom, while their 
Canadian counterparts have traditionally placed the latter above cooperation.  It is arguable 
that with time, a more sophisticated approach could result from the balancing of “unwritten” 
constitutional principles, which includes the rule of law and federalism.  For the time being, 
the dominant conception of federalism that emerges from the Canadian approach is of 
parallel legal orders, equally armed with parliamentary sovereignty.  They collaborate for 
reasons of interest, not because of any normative imperative inherent to the federal edifice 
and understood as a legal constraint.   The Belgian federal construction has made a better 
effort at integrating those various principles and values, even if gaps in theory, as well as 
transgressions in practice, remain. 
 
2.  Shifting paradigms? 
  
In the General Introduction, I explained that this thesis was mainly an exercise in 
comparative positive law, although one informed by the theory of legal cultures.  From the 
foregoing, it should be obvious that the positive law of both federations can hardly account 
for the actual impact of IGAs in federal governance.    To begin with, a number of technical 
issues are unresolved.  Does the fettering rule actually preclude the binding character of 
IGAs inter partes in Canada as a matter of principle?  Are cooperation agreements which 
have received legislative assent necessarily placed on a “superior” echelon in the hierarchy 
of norms in Belgium?  Which court is competent to review decisions rendered by bodies 
created by IGAs in Canada? Does the Belgian Council of State have jurisdiction to annul an 
invalid or unconstitutional cooperation agreement?   The uncertainty regarding a number of 
                                                
6 POIRIER, Confins. 
7 On the consociational tradition of Belgium: SEILER, Daniel-Louis, “Un système consociatif 
exemplaire: la Belgique“ (1997) 4:3 Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée  601-623; LIJPHART 
A., ed., Conflict and Co-existence in Belgium: the Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society (Berkeley: 
Institute for International Studies, 1981); DUMONT, Droit négocié, 461. 
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relatively significant aspects of positive law obviously does not curb the extensive recourse to 
IGAs in both federations. 
 
More profoundly, however, the very exercise undertaken in the present thesis rested 
on two classic paradigms, the relevance of which is constantly challenged in practice.  The 
first is the “threshold of juridicity”.  In the analysis of IGAs as contractual instruments, I 
posited co-existing “purely political” and legal spheres, and sought criteria for determining 
when an IGA, which necessarily has political foundations, moves from one category to the 
other.  This is defensible from a positive law perspective.  An instrument of legal character 
would need to meet a number of criteria in order to cross that border.   
 
As a general rule, however, the effectiveness of IGAs is so high as to call into 
question the significance of this theoretical border.8   Federal partners tend to respect their 
undertakings, regardless of the formal status of the texts in which these are couched.  In fact, 
IGAs which are technically invalid or unconstitutional for violating certain “public law 
impediments”, or Belgian “protocols” meant to circumvent formalities applicable to 
cooperation agreements, do not appear to be any less effective inter partes than agreements 
which can more easily be characterised as contractual instruments.   
 
In other words, from a sociology of law perspective, IGAs seem to have the same 
degree of effectiveness, regardless of their legal status. This is not surprising: the same is 
true of any relational contract.9  Avoidance of judicial dispute resolution is commonplace in 
any long-term contractual relationship, whether it arises in a classic private or commercial 
context or in the domain of international law.  In other words, from a sociological perspective, 
legal constraints may have very little bearing on the respect - or violation - of agreements 
between components of a federal state.10 
 
A threshold of juridicity is also assumed in the analysis of IGAs as normative 
instruments.  Here the exercise of characterisation is in some ways simpler.  If appropriate 
procedures are followed, IGAs obtain a certain legal force, irrespective of their actual 
content.  This is the case of Canadian constitutionalised agreements. It is also the case for 
IGAs that are properly given the force of statute in Belgium (through legislative assent) or in 
                                                
8 On effectiveness: Rocher (1998); OST, François, Van de KERCHOVE, De la pyramide au réseau: 
pour une théorie dialectique du droit  (Brussels: Facultés Universitaires St-Louis, 2002) 328-337. 
9 BELLEY, Jean-Guy, Le contrat entre droit, économie et société (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1998) 65 
ff, 256 ff. and 302 ff.     
10 In the federal context, SIMMONS (2003) has shown that a greater degree of formalism does not 
necessarily yield more effective results in terms of policy.  Her focus is intergovernmental conferences, 
but the diagnostic is arguably transposable to IGAs. 
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Canada (through incorporation).  Those IGAs clearly cross the threshold from the “non-legal” 
sphere to the legal one, through some form of “pedigree test”.11    
 
The situation is murkier, however in the case of IGAs which do not meet those 
procedural hurdles.  In Belgium, there is no doubt that some IGAs that should have been 
submitted to legislative assemblies were not.12  It is also the case that assemblies have 
approved clearly unconstitutional agreements.13  If those are not challenged before the Court 
of Arbitration within six months of their coming into force, they are likely to remain effective 
until federal partners renegotiate them.  Even assuming - for the sake of argument - that the 
use of IGAs as conduits for the spending power is not unconstitutional in Canada,14 federal 
partners constantly bind themselves through IGAs in respect of the exercise of their 
discretionary functions.15  Quotas determined through “non-legal” agreements are imposed 
on farmers.  Federal partners extend services to each others’ population through 
“administrative” arrangements”.  Some IGAs are intertwined with federal and provincial 
statutes and regulations in complex cooperative schemes.  In some cases, the fiction that 
“law” only flows from the unilateral instruments involved in these interlocking schemes is 
difficult to sustain.16   
 
In other words, while the paradigm of the “threshold of juridicity” applies without too 
much difficulty in the case of IGAs that are properly introduced in the various legal orders 
through official procedures, it fails to account for the effectiveness of a significant number of 
IGAs that have not been so introduced.  Denying them any normative force on grounds that 
they do not meet the required procedural criteria exposes the weaknesses of the positive law 
analysis of IGAs.  The threshold paradigm may simply be too stark for what is actually 
happening. 
  
The second paradigm on which this thesis rests is the hierarchy of norms.  Formally, 
both federations’ public law systems are based on a relatively similar pyramidal structure.17  
Locating IGAs within that hierarchy is particularly difficult.18  Even when rules are relatively 
                                                
11 OST and Van de KERCHOVE (2002) 326, referring to DWORKIN. 
12 The 1993 federal-BRC agreement on the promotion of Brussels, or a number of agreements in the 
employment sector: supra, 5.2.1.2. 
13 The agreement concerning the financing of the SNCB, for instance: CSLS 32.367, Doc Parl Vl R 
(2001-2002) 269, no.1, 30.10.2001; AC relatif au plan d’investissement pluriannuel 2001-2012 de la 
SNCB (FED + 3R), 11.10.01 (27.11.02; 26.03.02): supra, 3.2.3. 
14 Supra, 4.1.2.2.   
15 For instance, through agreements on tax collection or through which federal authorities agree not to 
proceed with environmental assessments, in favour of provincial ones: supra, 4.1.3. 
16 Supra, 5.3.2. 
17 The ranking of quasi-constitutional legislation and of the Constitution of federated entities may differ 
slightly. 
18 We have seen that even “constitutionalised” agreements may not have quite the same value erga 
omnes as other constitutional norms: supra, 5.1.1. 
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clear (subordination to the Constitution in Belgium or to unilateral legislation in Canada), the 
effectiveness of IGAs that contravene these rules raises doubts concerning the relevance of 
the paradigm.19    
 
Moreover, the interdependence between IGAs and other norms of positive law is such 
that placing them in a hierarchy stretches reality.  In Belgium, matters which should be 
determined by DMA are relegated to cooperation agreements.20  The implementation of the 
formal distribution of competences is conditioned by the adoption of “compulsory 
agreements”.21  Informal agreements alter formal rules contained in the Constitution as well 
as in formal agreements approved by statutes.22   Some Canadian intergovernmental 
regulatory arrangements involve an extraordinary maze of interlocking federal and provincial 
statutes and regulations, interdelegation of administrative and regulatory powers, joint 
bodies, formal agreements, completed by addenda and memoranda of understanding.   Just 
trying to draw a map of the various sources of authority challenges the very idea of a 
hierarchical paradigm. 
 
It may be that from the perspective of the sociology of law, the very idea of a 
threshold of juridicity is questionable.  Similarly, the "network paradigm"23 or the "concentric 
circles model"24 may better account for the examples just provided than any pretence of a 
hierarchical structure.  Case studies to assess the effectiveness of particular IGAs that are 
devoid of formal legal character either inter partes or erga omnes would indeed be 
instructive.  Such enquiries may reveal how law is produced, and may help assess 
compliance with particular norms, irrespective of the latter's formal status.  This is no doubt 
useful to dispel myths about the impact and significance of positive law.25  I would 
nonetheless underline two reasons for the continued relevance of positive law in the context 
of inter-federal relations in general, and IGAs in particular.   
 
First, even when public officials and courts deviate from positive law orthodoxy, they 
tend to defend those actions and decisions behind the language of positive law, which enjoys 
                                                
19 These constitute telling illustrations of the "para-legality" phenomenon: DUMONT, Droit négocié; 
DUMONT, Hugues, Le pluralisme idéologique et l’autonomie culturelle en droit public belge,  vol. 1, 
(Brussels: Bruylant, 1996) 43-51. 
20 See s.81, Constitution and AC relatif aux modalités de conclusion des traités mixtes (FED + 3C + 
3R), 08.03.94 (17.12.96, 06.03.96, 23.05.96 , 26.06.96, 19.07.96).  On this: DUMONT, Droit négocié, 
483-486. 
21 Supra, 2.2.3.1. 
22 The 10% rule concerning mixed treaties: supra, 3.1.2. 
23  “Network” (“réseau”) has a multiplicity of meanings.  At the core, however, it refers to a structure 
that is relatively open and in which parts are not in a hierarchical relationship: OST and Van de 
KKERCHOVE (2002) 23-24. 
24 MOCKLE (2002) 20-207 proposes a concentric circles model with the Constitution at the centre, 
followed by legislation etc. up to informal rules which nevertheless have some normative impact.    
25 MOCKLE, Daniel, ”Deux variations sur le thème des normes” (1997) 38 C de D  437-459, 437. 
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a wide degree of legitimacy in democratic systems.26  Moreover, as CORTEN argues, the 
network paradigm may be a helpful device for understanding the complexity of law making, 
but it does not exclude the idea of a hierarchy of norms altogether.27  When courts are seized 
of a conflict between a formal legal source and an instrument devoid of formal legal 
character, they will generally lean in favour of the former, or at least seek to legitimise their 
decisions by appealing to positive law. 
 
In other words, different paradigms are concurrently at play.  Positing the absence of 
any border between political and legal instruments, or substituting the paradigm of the 
“network”  or the “concentric circle” for the classic hierarchy of norms will not provide a more 
complete account of what is actually going on.  Positive law remains relevant, even if in 
practice it is often disregarded.   An understanding of positive law is useful for decoding what 
actors – including judges - do and how they justify their actions and decisions. 
 
A second basis of defence for positive law in the context of IGAs is more prescriptive.  
Faced with the inadequacy of the existing legal and judicial systems to deal with the 
complexity of governing in a federal state, one can simply admit that positive law lags behind 
the imperatives of public management.  One can favour the value of efficiency - which more 
flexible ways of interconnected governing is supposed to promote – over transparency.28   
Without denying the importance of efficiency, or the slowness of legal structures to adapt to 
social realities, it is the case that positive law, and adapted judicial structures, play an 
important role in controlling what public authorities do.  The development of democratic 
government over the last two hundred years has implied the submission of the executive 
branch to basic parliamentary and judicial controls.  Those largely rest on the threshold and 
hierarchical paradigms.29   
  
  If regulatory instruments are submitted to parliamentary committees in Canada, or to 
the legislative section of the Council of State in Belgium, why should IGAs that actually 
regulate joint conduct escape equivalent controls?   If interlocking regulating is necessary for 
effective policy-making, should not structures for judicial review be adapted, or at least 
clarified, so that controls of unilateral administrative action which have taken decades to 
evolve are not simply discarded, or rendered opaque, when governments act together?   It 
                                                
26 CORTEN, Olivier,  ”La persistance de l’argument légaliste: éléments pour une typologie 
contemporaine des registres de légitimité dans une société libérale”, (2002) 50 Droit et société 1-24, 
16. 
27 CORTEN, Olivier, ”De la pyramide au réseau?: Autour de F. Ost et M. van de Kerchove" (2002) 
Pyramides 239-250, 250. 
28 BC (Milk Board) v. Grisnich, [1995] 2 SCR 895. 
29 OST and Van de KERCHOVE (2002; 309-383) posit three distinct, but in some ways intersecting 
registers of validity: empirical or factual (effectiveness); axiological (legitimacy) and formal (consistent 
with positive law).   While the first two are often neglected by traditional jurists, I would argue that the 
last one should not be cast aside. 
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may be that legal rules or judicial structures need to be adapted to better account for inter-
federal institutions.  It may be that the “alternative” doctrines, which were examined at the 
end of each chapter in Part II represent a worthy compromise between the traditional models 
and the rejection of the relevance of positive law altogether.30  In any event, positive law is 
relevant to ensure that executives cannot do together, under the guise of cooperation, what 
they cannot do separately.     
 
Finally, no federal structure can subsist without a significant degree of legal control 
over actions by the various federal partners.31  It has traditionally been admitted that some 
external arbitrator is required to protect the distribution of competences which grounds any 
federal regime.  It is no doubt true that orders of governments cannot act in isolation, whether 
this distribution is effected on an exclusive basis (as in Belgium) or is shared to a significant 
degree (in Canada). This does not, however, justify the marginalisation of positive law, 
particularly constitutional norms, for the sake of efficiency.32  If executives cannot legislate by 
contract, allowing them to restructure the federal structure by agreement, under the guise of 
cooperation, is similarly problematic and constitutes a threat to the “federal” rule of law.  The 
“network” and the “no threshold” paradigms may provide helpful insights into the way federal 
partners structure their relations, notably through IGAs.  This does not exclude the relevance 
of more classic rules of positive constitutional law as safeguards for the federal edifice.    
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
30 Supra, 4.4, 5.4 and 6.3. 
31 “Law permeates federalism”: MOORE (1935) 201. 
32 GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS (Normative, 39) argues that government action should be susceptible of 
third party adjudication. This need not imply the enforcement of a particular outcome, but would at 
least require federal partners to justify actions that negatively affect other members of the federation.   
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APPENDIX A:  Persons interviewed* 
 
 
BELGIUM 
 
 
ALEN, André 
Judge, Court of Arbitration     
Professor of Constitutional Law 
University of Leuven 
CARTON, Vincent 
Chief of Staff 
Federal Transport Minister     
CEREXHE, Etienne*  
Former Senator 
Former Judge at the Court of Arbitration 
CIETERS, Herman 
Secretariat to the Concertation Committee 
Federal Chancery   
CLAREBOUT, Gilles 
Attaché  
Cabinet of the Minister-President 
Brussels-Capital Region     
DAUW, Frédéric 
Attaché 
Cabinet of the Minister-President 
Brussels-Capital Region     
DELEEUW, Patrick 
Legislative Editor 
Parliament of the Brussels-Capital Region   
DELGRANGE, Xavier 
Auditeur 
Council of State  
GRUSELIN, Michèle 
Assistant 
Chancery of the Brussels-Capital Region 
 JANS, Théo 
Political Science Professor 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel   
KALBUSCH, Xavier* 
Advisor 
External Relations 
German-speaking Community 
 LAGASSE, Charles-Étienne 
Deputy-Director 
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the French 
Community (CGRI) 
 LECOCQ, Patricia 
Advisor 
Assistance to Victims 
Federal Department of Justice 
 LEROY, Michel 
Member of the Council of State 
Administrative Law Professor 
Université Libre de Bruxelles 
 LETISTE, Béatrice* 
Chancery to the French Community Commission 
of the Brussels-Capital Region 
LEUS, Kaat 
Administrative Law Professor   
Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
Advisor to the Federal Minister in Charge of the 
Civil Service 
MOERENHOUT, Roger 
Référendaire (permanent law clerk) 
Court of Arbitration 
MOLLET, Laurent*  
Communications specialist 
Flemish Government   
NICAISE, Dominique 
Advisor 
Federal Chancery   
PAULET,  Alain* 
Director 
Walloon Chancery 
POOT, Edith* 
Legal advisor 
Common Community Commission of the  
Brussels-Capital Region 
QUERTAINMONT, Philippe 
Administrative Law Professor 
Member of the Council of State 
TOMBEUR, Herbert 
Director of International Relations 
Flemish Government 
TRUFFIN, Claude 
President of the Federal Council for Research 
VANDERMEESCH, Sigurd 
Director of cooperation 
Cabinet of the Flemish Minister responsible for 
Brussels 
VAN HEYL, Damien 
Special advisor to the Minister in charge of 
constitutional reforms (Fr) 
 
 
                                                
* Interviews were conducted in the 2001-2002 academic year.  Titles may have changed 
since then. 
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CANADA 
 
 
 
BARIBEAU, Jean-Pierre 
Contravention Project 
Department of Justice Canada 
   
 
BOURQUE, Clément  
Advisor 
Secrétariat aux affaires intergouvernementales 
canadiennes (SAIC) 
Government of Québec   
CHEVRETTE, François 
Professor of Constitutional Law 
University of Montréal  
COULOMBE, Pierre  
Policy Analyst 
Privy Council 
FRANCOEUR, Michel  
General Counsel and Director 
Legal Services 
Department of Canadian Heritage  
FRASER, Douglas  
Deputy Director 
Treaty Division 
Department of Foreign Affairs of Canada  
FRÉDÉRIC, Michel  
Advisor, SAIC  
Government of Québec   
GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS, Jean-François  
Professor of Constitutional Law 
University of Toronto 
GIROUX, Robert  
Technical specialist 
Responsible for the Federal Registry 
Privy Council Office 
GUAY, Louis 
Federal-Provincial Relations 
Privy Council Office     
GUÉNETTE, Hélène  
General Manager 
Office of the Secretary General 
SAIC 
Government of Québec 
HERTZ, Allen  
Policy Advisor 
Federal-Provincial Relations 
Privy Council  Office  
HILLING, Carol 
Legal Counsel 
Aboriginal and Constitutional Affairs 
Library of Federal Parliament. 
HORTH, Camille 
Under-secretary 
SAIC 
Government of Québec 
HOULE, France 
Professor of Administrative Law  
Law Faculty 
University of Montréal 
LAFLAMME, Pauline  
Legal Counsel 
Legal Affairs Direction 
Department of Industry, Commerce, International 
and Intergovernmental Relations  
Government of Québec 
LAJOIE, Andrée 
Professor of constitutional law 
University of Montréal 
LANGLOIS, Louise  
Technician in charge of the Registry of 
Intergovernmental Agreements 
Government of Québec 
LAZAR, Harvey  
Director 
Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 
Queen’s University 
 LORD, François  
Policy Advisor 
Direction of the Canada-Québec Agreement on 
Labour Market 
Department of Employment 
Government of Québec   
MCFADYEN, Craig  
Director 
Office for Constitutional Affairs and Federal-
Provincial Relations 
Department of Intergovernmental Relations 
Government of Ontario 
MORGAN, Marta  
General Director 
Social Policy towards children 
Department of Human Resources 
NAGLER, Adam  
Policy Advisor 
Department of Intergovernmental Relations 
Government of Ontario 
PELLETIER, Benoît  
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs for Québec 
and Professor of Constitutional Law 
University of Ottawa 
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ROBITAILLE, Claire  
Policy Specialist 
In charge of Implementation of the Labour Market 
Agreement 
Government of Québec     
RENÉ-DE-COTRET , Michèle  
Legal Services 
Department of Natural Resources 
Government of Canada  
RUTT, Sylvie 
Technician in charge of the Registry of 
Intergovernmental Agreements 
Privy Council Office   
SEIDLE, Leslie  
Director of Research 
Privy Council Office 
THÉROUX, Éric  
Director 
Legal Services 
Intergovernmental and International Relations 
Government of Québec   
  
TODD, Robert W. 
Principal Advisor 
Federal-Provincial-Territorial Relations 
Department of Foreign Affairs 
Government of Canada  
TREMBLAY, Marc  
Senior Counsel 
Official Languages Division 
Department of Justice Canada 
TURP, Daniel  
 Member of the Québec National Assembly 
(opposition) 
Official spokesperson on Intergovernmental and 
International Affairs  
VALLERAND, Réjean  
Clerk to the Cabinet  (greffier) 
Department of Executive Council 
Government of Québec   
WATTS, Ronald 
Emeritus Professor 
Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 
Queen’s University   
WHILLAN, David  
Senior Policy Advisor 
Intergovernmental Relations 
Privy Council Office 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A number of persons interviewed in other countries, in the context of another 
research project have also provided extremely useful insights.  I particularly 
want to underline: 
 
 
SPAIN 
 
 
AJA, Eliseo 
Constitutional Law Professor 
Director of the Institute for Public Law 
University of Barcelona   
 
CORRETJA  I  TORRENS, Merce 
Assistant Director  
Legal Services 
Department of Institutional Relations 
Government of Catalonia  
GARCIA MORALES, Maria Jesus 
Constitutional Law Professor 
University (autonoma) of Barcelona 
  
VINTRO i CASTELLS, Joan 
Constitutional Law Professor 
University of Barcelona 
Legal advisor to the Parliament of Catalunia  
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SWIZERLAND 
 
 
ABDERHALDEN, Ursula  
Advisor 
Federal Deparment of Justice 
 
CHÉRIX, François 
Coordinator 
Union for a Switzerland of Regions 
Member of the Constitutive Assembly for the 
Canton of Vaud  
DAFFLON, Bernard  
Economics Professor 
University of Fribourg 
 
FLEINER, Thomas 
Director 
Institute of Federalism 
University of Fribourg  
ISCHI, Nivardo 
General Secretary 
The University Conference of Switzerland   
LUSIER, Christelle 
Member of the Constitutive Assembly for the 
Canton of Vaud    
MALAGUERRA, Danièle  
Advisor 
Federal Relations Service 
Federal Deparment of Justice 
SCHMITT, Nicolas  
Researcher 
Institute of Federalism 
University of Fribourg  
 
 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
 
ALEXANDER, Wendy 
Member of the Scottish Assembly  
Former Minister of Industry and Higher Learning 
BROWN, Alice 
GOVERNANCE OF SCOTLAND FORUM 
University of Edinburgh 
HAZELL, Robert 
The Constitution Unit 
School of Public Policy 
University College London 
OLIVER, Peter 
Senior Lecturer 
King’s College London 
 
RAWLINGS, Richard 
Professeur de droit constitutionnel et administratif 
London School of Economics 
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APPENDIX B 
 
BELGIAN COOPERATION AGREEMENTS 
 
  
Parties: (Parties to agreements are summarised in brackets) 
 
C=   Communities  (3C = every Community) 
COCOF =  French Community Commission of the Region of Brussels Capital 
COCON =  Flemish Community Commission of the Region of Brussels Capital 
COCOM =  Common Community Commission of the Region of Brussels Capital 
FED =  Federal authority 
Fl C =   Flemish Community 
Fl C/R =  Flemish Community & Region 
Fr C =   French Community 
Fl R =   Flemish Region 
GC =   German-speaking Community 
R =   Regions    (3R = every region) 
RBC =  Region of Brussels-Capital 
WR =   Walloon Region 
 
Codes: when a code is provided, it is drawn from the Registry of the Secretariat to the 
Concertation Committee. When no code is provided, the agreement was obtained through 
different means (interviews with Departments, etc.) 
 
Dates:  
The first date refers to the date of signature (or last signature).  The date in brackets is the 
date of publication in the Moniteur belge, when the agreement was published.  In many 
cases, only one or some of the parties to an agreement proceeded with legislative assent 
and publication.  This is NOT noted here. 
 
 
FEDERAL, REGIONS AND COMMUNITIES 
 
 
• Conventions en exécution de l’article 77 de la loi spéciale du 16 janvier 1989 relative au 
financement des Communautés et des Régions (FED + 3R + 3C), 11.04.1989, 09.05.1989, 
18.05.1989, 31.05.1989 
VI – D11.258/1 
• Convention en vue de la gestion de la Trésorerie des Communautés et des Régions par 
l'Administration de la Trésorerie de l'Etat (FED + 3R + 3C), 16.03.90 (31.07.90) 
VI – D11.258/2 
• Accord de coopération sur le financement, le fonctionnement et la gestion de l'Institut d'hygiène 
et d'épidémiologie (Dénomination correcte : Institut scientifique de la Santé publique Louis 
Pasteur) (FED + 3C + 3R), 22.03.90, 18.05.95, 30.03.01 (19.05.90, 06.09.95) 
XI – D11.308/4 
• Accord de coopération visant à assurer une restructuration harmonieuse du Fonds national de 
reclassement social des handicapés (FED + 3C + COCOM), 18.04.91 (24.08.91) 
XI – D11.308/8 
• Protocole relatif à la participation de la Belgique à Eureka (FED + 3C + 3R), sans date (15.05.90) 
IV – D11.238/6 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l'établissement des commissions "Coopération internationale" et 
"Coopération fédérale" de la Conférence interministérielle de la politique scientifique (FED + 3C + 
3R), 01.02.91 (09.02.91) 
IV – D11.238/2 
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• Accord de coopération relatif à l'association des Communautés, des Régions et de la 
Commission communautaire commune aux activités de la Communauté européenne en matière 
de politique scientifique et à l'organisation au plan interne d'activités connexes (FED + 3R + 3C), 
01.02.91 (09.02.91) 
IV – D11.238/3 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la réinsertion des chômeurs de longue durée (FED + 3C + 3R), 
05.06.91 
VIII – D11.278/5 
• Accord de coopération pour la gestion commune de certains éléments du patrimoine de l'Institut 
économique et social des classes moyennes (FED + 3C + 3R), 10.07.91 (20.11.91) 
III - D11.228/16 
• Convention en exécution de l'article 54, §1er, troisième alinéa de la loi spéciale du 16 janvier 
1989 relative au financement des Communautés et Régions (FED + 3C + 3R), 20.09.91 
VI – D11.258/4 
• Accord de coopération portant création d'une base documentaire générale (FED + 3C + 3R + 
COCOM), entrée en vigueur le 01/10/91 
VI – D11.258/13 
• Accord de coopération concernant le Plan d'accompagnement des chômeurs (FED + 3C + 3R), 
22.09.92, 07.04.95, 13.02.96, 29.10.97, 03.05.99 (21.11.92, 04.07.95, 24.04.96, 02.12.97, 
07.09.99) 
VIII – D11.278/9     
• Accord de coopération relatif à la coordination de la politique en matière de réglementation du 
chômage et la politique en matière de formation professionnelle dans un établissement 
d'enseignement (FED + Fr C + GC + WR + RBC), 10.02.93 (28.10.93) 
VIII – D11.278/8 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la représentation du Royaume de Belgique au sein du Conseil des 
Ministres de l'Union européenne (FED + 3C + 3R + COCOM), 08.03.94 (17.11.94) 
V – D11.248/2 
• Accord de coopération relatif aux modalités de conclusion des traités mixtes (FED + 3C + 3R), 
08.03.94 (17.12.96, 06.03.96, 23.05.96 , 26.06.96, 19.07.96) 
V – D11.248/3 
• Accord de coopération relatif aux modalités de conclusion des traités mixtes (FED+ 3C + 3R + 
COCOM), 08.03.94 
V – D11. 248/3 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la représentation du Royaume de Belgique au sein du Conseil des 
Ministres de l'Union européenne. (Application de l'article 146 du Traité sur l'Union européenne) 
(FED + 3R + 3C), 08.03.94 (17.11.94) ; am. 13.02.03 (25.02.03) 
V – D11.248/2 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la coopération entre les communes en matière de politique 
hospitalière (FED + RBC + COCOM), 19.05.94 (27.05.94, 12.10.94, 24.06.95) 
XI – D11.308/10 
• Accord de coopération pour le transfert obligatoire, sans indemnisation, du personnel et des 
biens, droits et obligations de la province de Brabant vers la province du Brabant wallon, la 
province du Brabant flamand, la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, les Commissions communautaires 
visées à l'article 60 de la loi spéciale du 12 janvier 1989 relative aux institutions bruxelloises, et 
vers l'autorité fédérale (FED + 3R + FL C + Fr C), 30.05.94, 28.10.94, 23.12.94, 16.03.95 
(17.06.94, 02.12.94, 05.07.95, 20.05.95) 
VII – D11.268/3 
• Accord-cadre de coopération portant sur la représentation du Royaume de Belgique auprès des 
organisations internationales poursuivant des activités relevant de compétences mixtes (FED + 
3C + 3R), 30.06.94 (19.11.94) 
V – D11.248/4 
• Accord de coopération portant sur la représentation du Royaume de Belgique auprès des 
organisations internationales poursuivant des activités relevant de compétences mixtes (FED + 
3C + 3R + COCOM), 01.07.94 (19.11.94) 
V – D11.248/4 
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• Accord de coopération concernant les modalités suivant lesquelles des actions sont intentées 
devant une juridiction internationale ou supranationale suite à un différend mixte (FED + 3C + 
3R), 11.07.94 (01.12.94) 
V – D11.248/5 
• Protocole réglant l’association des Exécutifs à l’élaboration des règles de police générale et de la 
réglementation relatives aux communications et aux transports, ainsi qu’aux prescriptions 
techniques relatives aux moyens de communication et de transport (FED + 3C + 3R), 10.11.94 
(30.11.94) ; 24.04.01 (19.09.01) 
III – D11.228/24 
• Accord de coopération relatif au statut des représentants des Communautés et des Régions dans 
les postes diplomatiques et consulaires (FED + 3C + 3R), 18.05.95 
V – D11.248/7 
• Accord de coopération relatif aux objectifs budgétaires pour la période 1996 –1999 (FED + 3C + 
3R), 19.07.96 (19.03.97) ; prolongation 2001-2005, 15.12.00 
VI – D11.258/9 
• Accord de coopération relatif au programme de transition professionnelle (Fr C + GC + WR), 
03.07.97 (03.03.98, 05.03.99) ; am. 03.06.98 (05.03.99, 18.11.99) 
VIII – D11.278/14 
• Accord de coopération concernant le mode de répartition des frais des receveurs régionaux et le 
mode de prélèvement de la contribution dans ces frais par les administrations (FED + Fl C + GC 
+ WR), 09.12.97 (26.08.99, 07.12.00, 07.12.00) 
VII – D11.268/4 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la continuité de la politique en matière de pauvreté (FED + 3C + 
3R + COCOM), 05.05.98 (10.07.99, 28.07.99) 
XVIII – D11.378/2 
• Accord de coopération en matière d'assistance aux victimes (FED + Fr C + WR), 14.05.98 
XVIII – D11.378/ 
• Protocole réglant les rapports entre les organismes issus de la restructuration de l'Office national 
de l'emploi (FED + 3C + 3R), 22.12.98 
D11.278/1 
• Accord de coopération entre l'Autorité fédérale, les Communautés et les Régions relatif à la 
participation de la Belgique à l'Exposition universelle de Hanovre en 2000. (FED + 3C + 3R), 
28.04.99 (07.09.99) 
II – D11.218/6 
• Accord de coopération entre l'Etat fédéral, la Communauté française, la Communauté flamande, 
la Communauté germanophone, la Région wallonne, la Région flamande et la Région de 
Bruxelles-capitale relatif aux modalités de désignation des représentants des Communautés et 
des Régions au comité d'orientation et au comité scientifique sur le budget économique 
constitués par les articles 115 et 116 de la loi du 21 décembre 1994 portant des dispositions 
sociales et diverses (FED + 3R + 3C), 26.05.99 (10.03.00) 
II – D11.218/7 
• Protocole réglant les différentes formes de collaboration entre le Gouvernement fédéral et les 
Gouvernements des Communautés et des Régions (FED + 3R + 3C), 27.10.99 (3.5.90, 23.6.92) 
(that is, the last published version dates from 1992, but a new one does exist) 
I - D11.01 
• Accord de coopération concernant l’insertion des demandeurs d’emploi vers la convention de 
premier emploi (FED + 3C + 3R), 30.03.00 (09.12.00) 
VIII - D11.278/17   
• Accord de coopération relatif à l’économie sociale (FED + 3R + GC), 04.07.00 (02.10.01) 
XVIII – D11.378/7 
• Accord de coopération concernant le parcours d’insertion des demandeurs d’emploi vers la 
convention de premier emploi (FED + 3C + 3R), 31.08.01 (27.09.01) 
VIII – D11.278/18 
• Accord de coopération concernant le développement des services et des emplois de proximité 
(FED, 3R , 3C), 07.12.01 (03.05.02, 27.11.02, 05.12.02, 05.02.03) 
VIII – D11.278/20 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la force obligatoire des conventions collectives de travail (FED + 
3C + 3R), 12.12.02 
VIII – D11.278/21 
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• Protocole en matière de clauses sociales dans les marchés publics passés par un organisme 
fédéral (FED + 3R + GC), 18.07.02 
XVIII – D11.378/8 
• Accord de coopération pour une politique de drogues globale et intégrée (FED + 3C + COCOF + 
COCON + COCOM + 3R), 11.05.2003 (02.06.2003) 
XI – D11.308/16 
 
 
FEDERAL AND REGIONS 
 
 
• Convention relative au règlement des dettes du passé et charges s’y rapportant en matière de 
logement social (FED + 3R), 31.03.87 
• Accord de coopération concernant l'estampillage des cartes des travailleurs à temps partiel 
involontaires (FED + 3R), 15.04.89 
VIII – D11.278/2 
• Accord de coopération entre l'Etat belge agissant pour la Régie des voies aériennes et les 
Régions (FED + 3R), 30.11.89 (09.03.90) 
III – D11.228/2 
• Convention relative au règlement des modalités de remboursement des dettes des régions au 
Fonds d'aide au redressement financier des communes (FED + 3R), 18.01.90 
VII – D11.268/1 
• Convention sur l'utilisation future des fonds du "volet des services" du plan textile (FED + Fl R), 
22.01.90 
II – D11.218/2 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la répartition et à la destination de biens immeubles (FED + RBC), 
09.03.90 (17.05.90) 
III – D11.228/10 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la mise en application des règlements des Communautés 
européennes au sujet de l'assainissement structurel dans la navigation intérieure. (FED + 3R), 
23.03.90 ; annexe 1, 12.09.96 ; annexe 2, 12.09.96 
III – D11.228/3 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la réalisation du projet Egmont (FED + RBC), 23.03.90 (23.05.90) 
III – D11.228/9 
• Accord de coopération relatif au fonctionnement de la Direction de la comptabilité du Ministère 
des Travaux Publics (FED + WR + Fl R), 23.03.90 (08.05.90) 
III – D11.228/5 
• Accord de coopération relatif au fonctionnement du Service de topographie et de 
photogrammétrie, de l'imprimerie et la section de photographie de la bibliothèque, la photothèque 
et la cartothèque du Ministère des Travaux Publics (FED + 3R), 01.04.90 (20.06.90) 
III – D11.228/7 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l'autorité hiérarchique du Ministère des Travaux Publics (FED + 
3R), 09.04.90 (20.06.90) 
III – D11.228/8 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la gestion administrative des dossiers litigieux en matière de 
Travaux Publics (FED + 3R), 09.04.90 (20.06.90) 
III – D11.228/6 
• Accord de coopération visant à la protection de la Mer du Nord contre les effets négatifs sur 
l'environnement des déversements de déblais de dragage dans les eaux tombant sous 
l'application de la Convention d'Oslo (FED+ Fl R), 12.06.90 (22.08.90) ; am. 06.09.00 (21.09.00) 
XII – D11.318/3 
• Protocole entre le Gouvernement et l’Exécutif de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, concernant la 
compétence des comités d’acquisition d’immeubles et des bureaux des domaines de l’Etat (FED 
+ RBC), 25.06.90 (02.08.90) 
VI – D11.258/3 
• Arrangement en matière de coordination des activités de commerce extérieur (FED + 3R), 
09.10.90 (17.01.91) 
V – D11.248/1 
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• Accord de coopération en vue d'une meilleure protection de la Mer du nord contre la pollution 
(FED + 3R), 11.11.90 
XII – D11.318/13 
• Convention relative au complexe de bâtiments aux n° 2-4-6 de la Rue Royale et aux n° 10-11 de 
la Place royale (FED + RBC), 11.12.90 (14.01.91) 
III – D11.228/13 
• Accord de coopération concernant le financement des centres collectifs (FED + 3R), 08.03.91 
(15.05.91), 05.08.94 (01.10.94), 05.04.95 (30.05.95)  
(I - D11.238/1) 
• Accord de coopération relatif aux réseaux de télécommunication et de télécontrôle (FED + 3R), 
17.06.91 (11.12.91) 
III – D11.228/4 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l'assurance de la qualité technique dans la construction (FED + 
3R), 17.06.91 (11.12.91) 
III – D11.228/18 
• Accord de coopération en vue de la coordination du programme de recherche en sciences 
marines (FED + Fl R), 05.09.91 (19.11.91) 
IV – D11.238/4 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la cellule de liquidation du Fonds des routes (FED + 3R), 12.11.91 
(15.01.92) ; avenant n°1, 18.07.92 (01.09.92) 
III – D11.228/15 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la coordination des activités liées à l’énergie (FED + Fl R), 
18.12.91 (26.02.92) 
(II – D 11.218/3) 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l’extension des réseaux de radiotéléphonie des services de 
secours et de sécurité aux ouvrages souterrains exploités par la S.T.I.B. (FED + RBC), 04.12.92 
(02.02.93) 
III – D11.228/21 
• Accord de coopération relatif à certaines initiatives destinées à promouvoir le rôle international et 
la fonction de capitale de Bruxelles (FED + RBC), 15.09.93 (30.11.93) ; avenant n°1, 29.07.94 
(11.10.94) ; avenant n°2, 22.05.97 (01.10.97) ; avenant n°3, 29.01.98 (02.07.98) ; avenant n°4, 
02.06.99 (08.10.99) ; avenant n°5, 28.02.00 (21.09.00) ; avenant n°6, 16.01.01 (21.04.01) ; 
avenant n°7, 27.02.02 (12.09.02) ; avenant n°8, 20.02.03 (09.07.03) 
III – D11.228/22 
• Convention relative au règlement des dettes du passé et charges s'y rapportant en matière de 
logement social (FED + 3R), 01.06.94 (02.06.95) 
VI – D11.258/6 
• Accord de coopération relatif aux attachés économiques et commerciaux régionaux et aux 
modalités de promotion des exportations (FED + 3R), 17.06.94 (26.10.94) 
V – D11.248/6 
• Accord de coopération portant exécution de l'article 6bis, §2, point 6, de la loi spéciale du 8 août 
1980 de réformes institutionnelles, inséré par la loi du 8 août 1988 et modifié par la loi du 16 
juillet 1993 (FED + 3R), 12.07.94 (17.06.95) 
IV – D11.238/5 
• Accord de coopération portant coordination de la politique d'importation, d'exportation et de 
transit des déchets (FED + 3R), 26.10.94 (13.12.95) 
XII – D11.318/5 
• Accord de coopération relatif aux investissements étrangers (FED + Fl R), 07.02.95 (29.06.95) 
II – D11.218/4 
• Accord de coopération concernant la mise en oeuvre du règlement (CEE) n° 1836/93 du Conseil 
du  29 juin 1993 permettant la participation volontaire des entreprises du secteur industriel à un 
système communautaire de management environnemental et d'audit (FED + 3R), 30.03.95 
(03.10.95) 
XII – D11.318/9 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la coordination des contrôles concernant l'occupation des 
travailleurs de nationalité étrangère (FED + 3R), 31.03.95 
VIII – D11.278/10 
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• Accord de coopération relatif à la politique internationale de l'environnement (FED + 3R), 
05.04.95 (13.12.95) 
XII – D11.318/8 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l'eurovignette ainsi qu'aux droits d'usage routiers ou redevances 
liées à l'usage des routes et de leurs dépendances (FED + 3R), 06.04.95, 06.02.97 
VI – D11.258/7 
• Accord de coopération relatif au statut des représentants de la Commission communautaire 
commune dans les postes diplomatiques et consulaires (FED + COCOM), 18.05.95 
V – D11. 248/7 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la structuration des données environnementales destinées à 
l'Agence européenne de l'environnement (FED + 3R), 21 .12.95 (14.06.96) 
XII – D11.318/10 
• Contrat-cadre relatif à l’organisation des missions confiées par le Ministère de la Région de 
Bruxelles-Capitale au Ministère fédéral des affaires économiques (FED + RBC), 15.10.96 
II – D11.218/5 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l’aménagement de locaux au profit de services de secours et de 
sécurité oeuvrant dans les infrastructures d’ouvrages souterrains exploités par la Société des 
Transports Intercommunaux de Bruxelles (FED + RBC), 07.11.96 (30.11.96) 
III – D11.228/25 
• Accord de coopération relatif au programme de transition professionnelle (FED + 3R), 04.03.97 
(09.08.97) ; et Accord de coopération modifiant l’accord de coopération du 4 mars 1997 entre 
l’Etat fédéral et les Régions, 15.05.98 (01.08.98, 23.12.98) 
VIII – D11.278/13 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la coordination administrative et scientifique en matière de 
biosécurité (FED + 3R), 25.04.97 (14.07.98) 
XI – D11.308/11 
• Accord de coopération relatif au plan d'appui scientifique à une politique de développement 
durable (FED + 3R), 24.10.97 (04.02.98) 
IV – D11.238/7 
• Accord de coopération  concernant  la guidance et le traitement d'auteurs d'infractions à 
caractère sexuel (FED + WR), 08.10.98 (11.09.99) 
XV – D11.348/2 
• Convention portant objectifs budgétaires pour la période 2001-2005 (FED + 3C + 3R), 15.12.00 
• Accord de coopération concernant l’exercice de la tutelle spécifique instaurée par la loi du 7 
décembre 1998 (M.B. 05.01.99) organisant un service de police intégré, structuré à deux niveaux 
(FED + 3R), 01.04.01 (19.04.02, trad. allemande 05.02.03) 
VII – D11.268/5 
• Accord de coopération concernant la maîtrise des dangers liés aux accidents majeurs impliquant 
des substances dangereuses (FED + 3R), 21.06.99 (12.10.00, 16.06.01) 
XII – D11.318/15 
• Accord de coopération concernant la convention de premier emploi (FED + RBC), 25.10.00 
(18.12.01, 2e ed.) ; 2ème accord, 01.08.02 (19.11.02) 
VIII – D11.278/19   
• Accord de coopération concernant la convention de premier emploi (FED + WR), 25.10.00 
(18.12.01, 2e ed.) ; 2ème accord, 01.08.02 (19.11.02) 
VIII – D11.278/19   
• Accord de coopération relatif à l’exécution et au financement de l’assainissement du sol des 
stations-service (FED + 3R), 22.03.01, 13 .12.02 (26.02.03) 
XII – D11.318/16 
• Protocole réglant l’association des Gouvernements des Régions à l’élaboration des règles de 
police générale et de la réglementation relatives aux communications et aux transports, ainsi 
qu’aux prescriptions techniques relatives aux moyens de communication et de transport, ainsi 
qu’aux règles relatives à l’organisation et la mise en œuvre de la sécurité de la circulation 
aérienne sur les aéroports régionaux et les aérodromes publics (FED + 3R), 24.04.01 (19.09.01) 
III – D11.228/24 
• Accord de coopération relatif au plan d’investissement pluriannuel 2001-2012 de la S.N.C.B. 
(FED + 3R), 11.10.01 (27.11.02 ; 26.03.02) 
III – D11.228/28 
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• Accord de coopération  relatif à l’intervention des pouvoirs publics dans la participation de 
l’industrie belge au programme AIRBUS A380 (FED + 3R), 20.11.01 (12.09.02) 
IV-D11.238/9 
• Accord de coopération  relatif à l’intervention des pouvoirs publics dans la participation de 
l’industrie belge au programme AIRBUS A380 (FED + 3R), 20.11.01 (12.09.02) 
IV – D11.238/9 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l’échange d’informations dans le cadre de l’exercice de leurs 
compétences fiscales, aux procédures de concertation concernant l’applicabilité technique des 
modifications aux impôts régionaux projetées par les Régions et à l’applicabilité technique de 
l’instauration par les Régions de réductions ou d’augmentations générales de l’impôt de 
personnes physiques dû (FED + 3R), 07.12.01 (11.12.02) 
VI – D11.258/14 
• Accord de coopération relatif aux modalités de nomination et de révocation des représentants, 
membres des sociétés régionales de transports siégeant au Comité d’Orientation de la S.N.C.B. 
(FED + 3R), 22.03.02 (07.11.02) 
III – D11.228/29 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la création d’une Agence pour le Commerce extérieur (FED + 3R), 
24.05.02 (18.12.02) 
V – D11.248/12 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la représentation du Royaume de Belgique au sein du Comité de 
coordination instauré par l’article 14 de l’Accord du 9 février 1994 relatif à la perception d’un droit 
d’usage pour l’utilisation de certaines routes par des véhicules utilitaires lourds (Eurovignettte) 
(FED + 3R), 18.07.02 (23.10.02) 
III – D11.228/30 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la gestion des déchets libérés (FED + 3R), 17.10.02 (15.01.03) 
XII – D11.318/17 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la création de l’Agence de l’Information Patrimoniale (FED + 3R), 
24.10.02 
VI – D11.258/15 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l’établissement, l’exécution et le suivi d’un Plan national climat, 
ainsi que l’établissement de rapports, dans le cadre de la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies 
sur les changements climatiques et du Protocole de Kyoto (FED + 3R), 14.11.02 (10.07.03) 
XII – D11.318/18 
• Accord de coopération relatif au quartier Leopold-Schuman (FED + RBC), 17.01.03 
III – D11.228/31 
• Accord de coopération concernant l’exercice des compétences régionalisées dans le domaine de 
l’agriculture et de la  pêche (FED + 3R), 18.06.03 
X – D11.298/3 
• Protocole financier à l’accord de coopération du 05.04.1995 relatif à la politique internationale de 
l’environnement (FED + 3R), 02.10.2003 (16.10.03) 
 
 
FEDERAL AND COMMUNITIES 
 
 
• Protocole entre le Gouvernement national et les autorités visées aux articles 59bis et 59ter de la 
Constitution sur la répartition des compétences concernant la protection de la personne des 
malades mentaux dans l'optique des soins de santé (FED + 3C), 15.06.89 (24.01.90) 
XI – D11.308/1 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la gestion administrative des charges du passé en matière 
d'enseignement (FED + Fr C + Fl C), 07.08.89 (05.10.89) 
XIII – D11.328/1 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la gestion administrative de l'enseignement en Communauté 
germanophone (FED + Fr C + GC), 07.08.89 (05.10.89) 
XIII – D11.328/2 
• Accord de coopération relatif au personnel du Fonds national de garantie des bâtiments scolaires 
(FED + 3C), 07.08.89 (05.10.89) 
XIII – D11.328/3 
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• Accord de coopération concernant l'aide à l'industrie cinématographique (FED + Fr C, Fl C), 
19.01.90 (24.03.90) 
(II – D11.218/1) 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l'intervention de l'Inspection des services d'incendie, créée par la 
loi du 31 décembre 1963 sur la protection civile, dans la procédure d'agrément des structures 
pour personnes âgées (FED + Fl C), 31.07.90 (13.09.90) 
VII – D11.268/2 
• Accord de coopération relatif au respect des obligations de la Belgique envers les écoles 
européennes, et à leur financement (FED + 3C), 30.11.90 (20.02.91) 
XIII – D11.328/4 
• Convention relative aux terrains expropriés en vue de l'aménagement d'un canal de dérivation 
entre le canal Albert et le port d'Anvers (FED + Fl C), 18.01.91 (08.05.91, 08.10.91) 
III – D11.228/23 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l'exécution, restauration pour le compte de la Communauté 
flamande, de travaux de restauration et d'aménagement en vue de l'hébergement de ses 
cabinets ministériels, et à l'aménagement de logements dans les bâtiments situés place des 
Martyrs, à Bruxelles (FED + Fl C), 28.03.91 (01.06.91) 
III – D11.228/14 
• Accord de coopération concernant l'élaboration d'un programme de recherche "SIDA" (FED + 
3C), 29.11.91 (05.02.92) 
XI – D11.308/5 
• Accord de coopération en matière de formation des classes moyennes et d'accès à la profession 
(FED + 3C), 11.12.91 (17.01.92) 
X – D11.298/1 
• Accord de coopération concernant les échanges d’informations relatives aux projets ayant un 
impact transrégional sur l’environnement (FED + Fl C), 22.09.92 
VIII – D11.278/7 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la coordination de la politique en matière de réglementation du 
chômage et la politique en matière de formation professionnelle dans un établissement 
d'enseignement, (FED + C Fl) 22.09.92 (28.10.93, 02.12.93) 
VIII – D11.278/8 
• Accord de coopération portant création d'un Comité consultatif de bioéthique (FED + 3C), 
15.01.93 (15.06.95) 
XI – D11.308/9 
• Protocole conclu entre le Gouvernement fédéral et les autorités visées aux articles 59bis, 59ter et 
108ter de la Constitution concernant la politique de santé à mener (FED + 3C), 28.07.93 
(28.09.93) 
XI – D11.308/2 
• Protocole relatif à la politique de santé à l’endroit des personnes âgée (FED + 3C + COCOF), 
09.06.97 (30.07.97)   
• Accord de coopération relatif à l’aide sociale dispensée aux détenus en vue de leur intégration 
sociale (FED + Fl C), 28.02.94 (18.03.94) ; am. 07.07.98 (10.04.01) 
XVIII – D11.378/1 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l'exécution de l'article 45ter de la loi spéciale du 16 janvier 1989 
relative au financement des Communautés et des Régions et l'article 58 quater de la loi du 
31 décembre 1983 de réformes institutionnelles pour la Communauté germanophone – 
Versement du précompte professionnel (FED + 3C), 13.12.94 (17.01.95) 
VI – D11.258/10 
• Protocole relative à la vaccination contre l’Hépatite B (FED + 3C + COCOF+ COCOM) (22.04.97) 
• Protocole sur l’organisation d’une enquête sur la santé (FED + 3C + COCOF+ COCOM) 
(03.06.97) 
• Protocole relatif à la politique de la santé à l’endroit des personnes âgées (FED+ 3C + COCOF+ 
COCOM) (30.07.97) 
• Accord de coopération en matière d'assistance aux victimes (FED + Fl C), 07.04.98 (13.07.99) 
XVIII – D11.378/4 
• Accord de coopération relatif aux Pôles d’attraction interuniversitaires - Phase IV (FED + 3C), 
07.07.98 (25.11.98) ; Phase V, 26.10.01 (12.09.02) 
IV – D11.238/8 
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• Accord de coopération entre relatif à la guidance et au traitement d'auteurs d'infractions à 
caractère sexuel (FED + Fl C), 08.10.98 (11.09.99) 
XV – D11.348/3 
• Protocole de coopération entre le Ministre de la Justice et les membres du Collège réuni de la 
COCOM chargés de l'aide aux personnes concernant l'aide sociale aux détenus et aux 
personnes faisant l'objet d'une mesure ou d'une peine à exécuter dans la Communauté (FED + 
COCOM) 25.03.99 (10.09.99) 
XVIII – D11.378/5 
• Accord de coopération concernant la guidance et le traitement d'auteurs d'infractions à caractère 
sexuel (FED + COCOM + COCOF), 13.04.99 (26.07.00, 15.11.00, 23.01.01) 
XV – D11.348/4 
• Accord de coopération concernant la convention de premier emploi (FED + Fr C), 25.10.00 
(18.12.01, 2e ed.) 
VIII – D11.278/19 
• Accord de coopération concernant la convention de premier emploi (FED + Fl C), 25.10.00 
(18.12.01, 2e ed.) ; 2ème accord, 01.08.02 (19.11.02) 
VIII – D11.278/19  
• Accord de coopération concernant la construction et l’exploitation d’une e-plate-forme commune 
(FED + COCOM + COCOF + COCON), 09.03.01 (08.08.01) 
III – D11.228/27 
• Accord de coopération concernant les conventions de premier emploi jeunes pour les médiateurs 
interculturels des centres publics d’aide sociale dans le cadre du programme printemps du 
Gouvernement fédéral (FED + COCOM), 17.04.01 (17.05.01) 
XVIII – D11.378/6 
• Accord de coopération relatif au centre fermé pour le placement provisoire de mineurs ayant 
commis un fait qualifié d’infraction (FED + 3C), 30.04.02 
XV – D11.348/5 
• Accord de coopération concernant la convention de premier emploi (FED + GC) 01.08.02 
(19.11.02) 
VIII – D11.278/19   
 
 
REGIONS AND COMMUNITIES 
 
 
• Accord instituant les Comités subrégionaux de l'emploi et la formation (Fr C + WR), 24.11.89 
(17.02.90, 31.03.90) 
VIII – D11.278/3 
• Protocole relatif à l'implantation des cabinets ministériels de l'Exécutif flamand place des Martyrs 
à Bruxelles (Fl C + RBC), 3.10.90 (20.10.90) 
III – D11.228/11 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l’exercice conjoint de compétences par la Communauté française 
et la Région wallonne (Fr C + WR), 17 .11.90 (04.05.91), am. 02.04.92 (03.09.92) 
(I - D11.08/1) 
• Accord de coopération relatif au Fonds budgétaire interdépartemental de promotion de l'emploi 
(Fr C + WR + RBC), 07.01.91, 25.11.92 (16.05.91, 26.06.93, 04.02.92, 23.06.95) 
VIII – D11.278/4 
• Accord de coopération instituant un Comité subrégional de l'emploi et de la formation à Saint-Vith 
(WR + GC), 18.07.91 (28.04.92) 
VIII – D11.278/6 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la formation permanente pour les classes moyennes et les petites 
et moyennes entreprises (WR + Fr C + COCOF), 20.02.95 (13.09.95, 29.03.96, 03.04.97) 
X – D11.298/2 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la prise en charge des frais de placement et d’intégration sociale 
et professionnelle des personnes handicapées (Fl C + WR), 07.04.95 
XI – D11.308/14  
• Accord de coopération relatif à la prise en charge des frais d’intégration sociale et professionnelle 
des personnes handicapées (GC + WR), 10.04.95 (06.11.96) 
XI – D11.308/13 
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• Accord de coopération concernant l’application du “werkervaringsplan” dans la région de 
Bruxelles-Capitale (Fl C + RBC), 30.04.96 
VIII – D11.278/11 
• Accord de coopération portant création du Comité Bruxellois Néerlandophone pour l’Emploi et la 
Formation (Fl C + RBC), 30.04.96 
VIII – D11.278/12 
• Accord de coopération mettant en oeuvre le rapprochement des administrations compétentes en 
matière de relations extérieures (Fr C + WR), 27.01.98 (03.06.98 , 17.12.98) 
V – D11.248/8 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l'implantation d'ordinateurs dans les écoles wallonnes (Fr C + GC 
+ WR), 19.02.98 (11.12.98, 13.07.99) 
XIII – D11.328/5 
• Accord de coopération entre la Région wallonne et la Communauté française relatif au transport 
interne (WR – Fr C), 25.05.98 (04.09.99 ; 23.12.99) 
III – D11.228/26 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la problématique des transports scolaires entre le Gouvernement 
de la Communauté française et le Gouvernement de la Région Wallonne (Fr C + WR), 25.05.98 
(15.07.99) 
XIII – D11.328/6 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l'organisation d'une filière de formation qualifiante en alternance, 
conclu à Namur, le 18 juin 1998, entre le Gouvernement de la Communauté française et le 
Gouvernement wallon (Fr C + WR), 18.06.98 (13.08.99) 
XIII – D11.328/7 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la coordination et à la gestion des aides octroyées par la 
Commission européenne dans le domaine des ressources humaines et à la création de l'Agence 
Fonds social européen (WR + Fr C + COCOF), 02.09.98 (02.06.99, 17.06.99, 06.01.00) 
V – D11.248/10 
• Accord de coopération entre la Communauté flamande et la Région wallonne en matière 
d'intégration des personnes handicapées (Fl C + WR), 20.10.98 (19.06.99) 
XI – D11.308/15  
• Accord de coopération global entre la Région wallonne et la Communauté germanophone (WR + 
GC), 26.11.98 (21.08.99) 
(I – D.11.08/3)  
• Accord de coopération entre la Communauté française, la Région wallonne et la Communauté 
germanophone instituant la "Commission Consultative de l'UNESCO" pour la Communauté 
française, la Région wallonne et la Communauté germanophone de Belgique (WR + Fr C + GC), 
09.06.99 
V – D11.248/11 
• Accord de coopération relatif aux programmes d’immersion linguistique (Fr C + WR), 04.07.00 
(08.12.00) 
VIII – D11.278/16 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la mise à disposition d’équipements pédagogiques en faveur des 
élèves et des enseignants de l’Enseignement secondaire technique et professionnel (Fr C + WR), 
04.07.00 (08.12.00) 
VIII – D11.278/15 
• Accord de coopération « betreffende de bevordering van de algemene samenwerking » (Fl C + Fl 
R + GC), 14.02.01 
(I - D11.08/4) 
• Accord de coopération portant création du comité francophone de coordination des politiques 
d’aide aux personnes et de santé (Fr C + WR + COCOF), date non-reprise au Moniteur 
(10.02.03) 
XI – D11.308/17 
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INTERREGIONAL 
 
 
•  Protocole concernant la gestion des déchets (WR + Fl R), 30.10.89 (12.12.89) 
XII – D11.318/1 
• Protocole concernant la gestion des déchets (RBC + WR), 08.12.89 (20.02.90) 
XII – D11.318/2 
• Accord de coopération concernant les transports réguliers interrégionaux (Fl R + WR), 01.01.91 
(02.04.92) 
III – D11.228/12 
• Accord de coopération concernant le transport régulier, de et vers la Région de Bruxelles-
Capitale (3R), 17.06.91 (31.10.91) 
III – D11.228/17 
• Accord de coopération concernant les routes dépassant les limites d'une Région (3R), 17.06.91 
(09.01.92) 
III – D11.228/19 
• Accord de coopération en matière de gestion et d'exploitation du canal de Bruxelles-Rupel (Fl R + 
RBC), 17.12.91 (07.02.92) 
III – D11.228/20 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l'affectation des écotaxes et à la coordination des politiques 
régionales en cette matière (3R), 30.04.93 (05.10.93, 25.01.95) 
XII – D11.318/4 
• Accord de coopération en matière de surveillance des émissions atmosphériques et de 
structuration des données (3R), 18.05.94 (24.06.94) ; am. 21.12.95 (19.09.96) 
XII – D11.318/6 
• Accord de coopération "betreffende de uitwisseling van informatie over projecten met 
gewestgrensoverschrijdende milieueffecten" (3R), 04.07.94 (11.08.94) 
XII – D11.318/7 
• Accord de coopération en matière de voies hydrauliques (3R), 06.04.95 
XII – D11.318/12 
• Accord de coopération visant à garantir la libre circulation des personnes handicapées (COCOF 
+ WR), 19.04.95, 14.06.96 
XI – D11.308/12 
• Accord de coopération sur la prévention et la gestion des déchets d’emballages (3R), 30.05.96 
(05.03.97) 
XII – D11.318/11 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la nappe du calcaire carbonifère de la Région du Tournaisis (Fl R 
+ WR), 02.06.97 (17.12.97) 
XII – D11.318/14 
• Accord de coopération relatif à l’introduction d’une réduction de la taxe de mise en circulation 
(TMC) sur base de la norme d’émission du moteur (comme visé dans la Directive 98/69/CE du 13 
octobre 1998) ou de la nature du combustible de propulsion, compte tenu de la neutralité fiscale 
et en vue de prévenir la concurrence entre Régions au niveau de l’immatriculation des véhicules 
(3R), 25.04.02 (13.06.02, 12.07.02, 23.07.02)  
• VI – D11.258/16    
• Accord de coopération portant sur l’introduction de l’euro dans l’accord de coopération du 30 mai 
1996 concernant la prévention et la gestion des déchets d’emballages (3R), 23.01.03 
VI – D11.258/17 
 
INTER-COMMUNITIES 
 
 
• Accord de coopération portant création, composition et règlement de la Commission 
intercommunautaire de contrôle des films (3C), 21.12.89, 27.12.90 (20.03.90, 20.04.91) ; 
03.10.01 (07.12.01) 
XV – D11.348/1 
• Accord de coopération concernant la pratique sportive dans le respect des impératifs de santé (Fl 
C + Fr C + GC), 09.11.90, 11.12.91 (07.02.91, 25.04.91, 31.03.92) 
XI – D11.308/6 
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• Accord de coopération concernant la prévention des problèmes d’alcool et de drogues (Fl C + Fr 
C + GC), 18.04.91 (24.08.91) 
XI – D11.308/7 
• Accord de coopération relatif à la gestion administrative de l'enseignement en Communauté 
germanophone (Fr C + GC), 30.10.91 (13.02.92) 
XIII – D11.328/2 
• "Samenwerkingsprotocol voor het verlenen van bijstand bij het beheer van de eigen thesaurie" (Fl 
C + GC), 01.07.92 
VI – D11.258/8 
• Convention relative aux versements de la redevance radio-télévision perçue par l'Etat fédéral 
(3C), 01.06.94 
VI – D11.258/5 
• Accord formel de coopération qui règle les rapports officiels entre les institutions des deux parties 
(Fr C + GC), 12.04.95 (08.09.1999), et Erratum, 12.04.95 (03.02.99) 
(I – D.11.08/2) 
• Accord de coopération concernant la perception de la redevance radio et télévision (3C), 
25.07.97 (21.02.98, 20.06.98) 
VI – D11.258/11 
• Accord de coopération concernant la perception de la redevance radio et télévision sur le 
territoire de la Région bilingue de Bruxelles-Capitale (Fl C + Fr C), 25.07.97 (21.02.98, 20.06.98) 
VI – D11.258/12 
• Accord de coopération relatif aux modalités d'exercice des relations internationales de la 
Commission communautaire française (Fr C + COCOF), 30.04.98 (21.08.98, 02.12.98) 
V – D11.248/9 
• Accord de coopération en matière de pratique du sport dans le respect des impératifs de santé 
(Fl C + Fr C + GC + COCOM), 19.06.01 
XI – D11.308/6 
• Accord sectoriel en matière d’aide à la jeunesse (Fr C + GC), 27.04.01 (21.09.01) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
CANADIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
 
 
 Parties: 
 
FED = Federal authorities 
AB = Alberta 
BC = British Columbia 
MB = Manitoba 
NB = New Brunswick 
NF = Newfoundland 
NS = Nova Scotia 
NT = North West Territories 
NV = Nunavut Territory 
ON = Ontario 
PE = Prince Edward Island 
QC = Québec 
SK = Saskatchewan 
YT = Yukon Territory 
  
Codes:  
Unless otherwise noted, the quotation in brackets refers to code in the Federal Registry.1 
Codes which start with “SAIC” are from the Québec Registry.2 
When there is no code, the text was obtained through other sources (interviews with 
Department officials etc.). 
 
Dates: 
Unless otherwise noted, date provided corresponds to the date of signature or of coming into 
force.  In some cases, no precise date could be found.  A “?” indicates that document is not 
fully dated. 
 
Presentation:  
Unless otherwise indicated, the IGAs listed by provinces are bilateral ones with the Federal 
government. 
Within each category, they are listed in chronological order. 
 
 
 MULTILATERAL IGAs TO WHICH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS A PARTY 
 
• Agreement in Respect of the Revision and Consolidation of the Comprehensive Marketing 
Program for the Purpose of Regulating the Marketing of Eggs, 29.07.1976 (CA0122) 
• Patriation Agreement, 05.11.1981 (FED+ 9 provinces ex QC) (CA00188) 
• Interagency Forest Fire Center Operating Agreement, 14.09.1983 (CA00255) 
• Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices, 01.11.1985 (CAN+AB+CB+SK) (CA00323) 
• Energy Pricing and Taxation Understanding, 01.11.1985 (FED+AB+SK+ BC) (CA00311) 
• Agreement Establishing the Net Income Stabilisation, 07.02.1992 (CA00612) 
• International Forestry Communication Program -Specified Purpose Account Agreement 
1993-1996, 01.09.1993 (CA00892) 
• Protocol for Agreements for Minority-Language Education and Second-Language Instruction, 
30.09.1993 (CA00783) 
• Memorandum of Understanding for Environment Emergencies, 21.12.1993 (CA00595) 
• Framework Agreement for Environmental Cooperation in Atlantic Canada, 31.05.1994 
(FED+NB+NS+PE+NF) (CA1023) 
• Internal Trade Agreement, 01.07.1994 (CA01093; SAIC 1994-029), am. 1998 (SAIC 1998-045) 
                                                
1 Re selection of agreements and descriptions of the Federal and Québec registries: General 
Introduction. 
2 SAIC = Secrétariat aux affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes (Government of Québec). 
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• Agreement Regarding the North-American Agreement on Labour Cooperation, 31.05.1995, impl. 
01.01.1998 (CA01721)   
• Transfer of Parole Jurisdiction Agreement, 01.02.1996, am. 14.04.1997 (FED+ON BC+QC) 
(CA01315)   
• Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Assiniboine River Basin Study, 22.10.1996  
(FED+MB+SK) (CA01510) 
• Protocol for Agreements Between the Government of Canada and the Provincial/Territorial 
Governments for Minority-Language Education and Second-Language Instruction, 30.09.1996 
(CA00783) 
• Atlantic Canada Agreement on Tourism, 01.04.1997 (CA 01634) 
• Transfer of Parole Jurisdiction Agreement, 01.02.1996, am. 14.04.1997 (CAN+BC+ON+QC) 
(CA01315) 
• Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary Waters Master Agreement, 24.07.1997 (FED+AB 
CB+SK+TN+YK) (CA01530) 
• Agreement on All Milk Pooling, 01.08.1997 (PE-MB-NB-NE-ON-QC) (CA01708)  
• Canada-wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization, 29.01.1998 (CA01739) 
• Framework to Improve the Social Union for Canadians 04.02.1999 (CA17087) 
• Protocol for Agreements for Minority-Language Education and Second-Language Instruction 
(1998-1999 to 2002-2003), 23.02.2000 (see CA00783 and CA01968 for previous agreements) 
• Health Care Renewal, 05.02.2003 (no code) 
• Agreement on Proposed Changes to the Canada Pension Plan, 14.02.2003 
(FED+AB+PE+MB+NB+NS+ON+QC+NF) (CA1575) 
• Interprovincial Computerized Examination Management System Agreement, 01.07.1995 (CA 
012221) 
 
     
INTERPROVINCIAL AGREEMENTS 
 
• Entente de réciprocité sur le droit des compagnies de faire des affaires dans l’autre province, 
01.03.1930 (ON-QC) (SAIC 1930-001)  
• Accord concernant le paiement des coûts des personnes hospitalisées dans des sanatoriums, 
29.10.1945 (SAIC 1945-001) 
• Accord de coopération et d’échanges en matière d’éducation et de culture, 18.12.1969 (QC-NB) 
(no code) 
• Accord de coopération et d’échanges en matière d’éducation, de culture et de communications, 
06.19.1969, Protocole Additionnel 20.06.1989 (no code) 
• Agreement creating the Council of Maritime Premiers, 25.05.1971 (NB-NS-PE) (no code) 
• Entente de coopération en matière d’environnement,13.06.1988 (ON-QC) (no code) 
• Accord de facturation réciproque en matière d’assurance-hospitalisation, 02.11.1988 (ON-QC) 
(SAIC 1989-001) 
• Accord de coopération et d’échanges en matière d’éducation et de culture, 19.08.1989 (QC-PE) 
(no code) 
• Protocole d’entente concernant un programme d’échanges et de coopération dans le domaine de 
l’enseignement supérieur, 31.05.1991 (QC-NB) (no code) 
• Agreement on the Opening of Public Procurement, 11.11.1993 (QC-NB) (no code) 
• Accord de libéralisation des marchés publics, 03.11.1993 (QC-NB) (no code) 
• Agreement on the Opening of Public Procurement, 05.03.1994 (QC-ON) (no code) 
• Agreement on the Mutual Recognition of Construction Workers Qualifications, Skills and Work 
Experience, 03.05.1994, am. Dec. 1996 and 15.11.2000 (QC-ON) (SAIC 1997-007 and SAIC 
2000-043  
• Atlantic Procurement Agreement on the Reduction of Interprovincial Trade Barriers Relating to 
Public Procurement,17.04.1996  (NB-NS-NF-PE) (no code) 
• Entente relative à l’échange de renseignements concernant l’imposition des sociétés et l’impôt-
santé des employeurs, 23.09.1997 and 23.03.1998 (QC-ON) (SAIC 1998-008) 
• Agreement on Labour Mobility in the Construction Industry, 24.04.1998  (QC-NF) (no code) 
• Entente entre le gouvernement du Québec et le gouvernement de l’Ontario relativement à 
l’exploitation, à l’entretien et à la réfection d’un pont franchissant la rivière Outaouais et reliant 
Hawkesbury et Grenville, 04.08.1999 (ON-QC) (SAIC 1999-069) 
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• Entente de réciprocité en matière d’assurance-hospitalisation, 04.11.1999 (SAIC 1999 – 031) 
• Memorandum of Understanding of Atlantic Canada Cooperation (15.05.2000) (NB-NS-NF_PE) 
(no code) 
• Vehicle Weight and Dimensions Agreement, impl. 01.01.2001 (ON-QC) (no code) 
 
 
 OTTAWA-ALBERTA 
 
• Memorandum of Agreement Respecting the Native Courtworker Program, 01.04.1987 (AB00395) 
• Firearms Financial Agreement, retroactive to 01.04.1993 (AB00784) 
• Safety Code Funding Agreement, 01.04.1995 (AB 01148) 
• Memorandum of Understanding between the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei and the 
Government of Alberta, 01.04.1996 (AB 01145) 
• The Western Grain Transportation Adjustment Fund, the Canada Agri-Infrastructure Program 
1996-1997, 14.08.1996 (AB 01466) 
• Canada-Alberta Agreement on Labour Market Development, 06.12.1996 (AB01525) 
• Agreement Respecting Legal Aid in Criminal Law Matters and in Matters Relating to the Young 
Offenders Act, 01.04.1996 (AB01348) 
• Agreement on Health Services In French, entry into force 01.04.1997 (AB01619) 
• Hog Industry Development Companion Agreement, 16.04.1997 (AB01667)  
 
 
 OTTAWA- BRITISH COLUMBIA 
 
• Agreement Regarding Delivery of Health Care and Treatment Services to Veterans, 08.06.1990 
(BC00545) 
• Memorandum of Agreement Respecting Federal Contributions to Juvenile Justice Services under 
the Young Offenders Act, impl. 01.04.1996 (BC01351) 
• British Columbia Treaty Commission Operating Costs Agreement, ?.04.1997, retroactive to 
01.09.1996 (BC01469) 
• Protocol for Processing Transfers pursuant to Section 35 of the Indian Act and s. 18 of the 
Highways Act, 01.11.1996 (BC 01512) 
• Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of British Columbia for 
Minority-Language Education and Second-Language Instruction 1993-94 to 1997-98, 27.03.1997 
(BC00789) 
• Tuberculosis Memorandum of Agreement, 01.04.1997 (BC 01622) 
• The Tuberculosis Loan Agreement, 01.04.1997 (BC 01623) 
• Canada-British Columbia Agreement for Environmental Assessment Cooperation, 16.04.1997 
(BC 01670) 
• Subsidiary Framework Agreement for Joint Review Panels under the Canada-B.C. Agreement for 
Environmental Assesment Cooperation, 16.04.1997 (BC 01672) 
• Subsidiary Agreement on Notification Procedures under the Canada-BC Agreement for 
Environmental Assessment Cooperation, 15.05.1997 (BC01694) 
• Subsidiary Framework Agreement for Joint Review Panels under the Canada-British Columbia 
Agreement for Environmental Assessment Cooperation, 15.05.1997 (BC 01693) 
• Canada-British Columbia Agreement on Labour Market Development, 25.04.1997 (BC 01681) 
• Canada-British Columbia Agreement on Asia-Pacific Initiatives, 31.12.1997 (BC 01720) 
• Canada-BC Provisional Arrangements for Minority-Language Education and Second-Language 
Instruction for 1999-2000, 15.07.1999 (no code) 
• Framework Agreement to Negotiate a Treaty between the Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, Canada 
and British Columbia, 25.04.1997 (BC 01682) 
• Agreement Regarding the Funding and Administration of Child Welfare Services to the Nisga'a 
Tribe, 05.05.1997 (BC01687) 
• Agreement Regarding Delivery of Health Care and Treatment Services to Veterans, 08.06.1990 
(BC 00545) 
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   OTTAWA- MANITOBA 
 
• Agreement Concerning Deer Lodge Hospital, impl. 01.05.1983 (MB00210) 
• Immigration Agreement, 22.10.1996 (MB01509) 
• Agreement to Realign Responsibilities for Immigrant Settlement Services, 28.06.1998   (MB1766) 
• Immigration Agreement, Addendum B (Provincial Nominees), 22.10.1996 (MB1785) 
• Agreement on Labour Market Development, 17.04.1997 (MB01664) 
• Agreement on Red River Valley Flood Disaster Assistance, 01.05.1997 (MB1686) 
• General Agreement on the Promotion of Official Languages, 16.02.2001 (no code) 
• Island Lake First Nations Family Services Agreement, 21.04.1997 (MB 01675) 
• Agreement Respecting Legal Aid in Criminal Law Matters and in Matters Relating To The Young 
Offenders Act, 01.04.1996 (MB01358) 
 
 
 OTTAWA- NEW BRUNSWICK 
 
• Highway Improvement Agreement, 29.06.1987 (NB00418) 
• Entente sur les langues officielles dans l’enseignement, 23.10.1988 (no code) 
• Entente auxiliaire relative au Centre international de Common Law en français de l’Université de 
Moncton, 04.11.1989 and 14.09.1995 (no code) 
• Transfer of Title to Lands, Wharves and Related Facilities, 04.03.1997 (NB 01596) 
• Entente spéciale relative à la construction de l’École de droit de l’Université de Moncton, 
21.10.1993 (no code) 
• Entente auxiliaire sur la construction de l’École de génie électrique de l’Université de Moncton, 
20.07.1995 (no code ) 
• Atlantic Freight Transition Program 1995-96 / 1997-98, 18.09.1995 (NB 01158) 
• Agreement on Labour Market Development, 13.12.1996 (NB1527) 
• Agreement to Transfer Lands, Wharves and Related Facilities at the Ports at North Head, on 
Grand Manan Island and Wallace Cove in Blacks Harbour, 19.03.1997 (NB1596) 
• Agreement for Minority-Language and Second-Language Instruction, 27.03.1997 (no code) 
• General Agreement on the Promotion of Official Languages, 18.10.1999 (no code) 
 
 
 OTTAWA- NEWFOUNDLAND 
 
• The Atlantic Accord, 11.02.1985 (NF and Labrador and Canada) (NF 00308)  
• Trans Canada Highway Agreement, 21.06.1988 (NF00450) 
• Regional Trunk Roads Agreement, 07.06.1992 (NF00570) 
• Agreement Respecting Administration of the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 23.11.1992 
(NF1716) 
• Strategic Highway Improvement Programme, 01.04.1994 (NF00985) 
• Atlantic Freight Transition Program 1995-96 / 2000-01, 10.12.1995 (NF01164) 
• Agreement Relating to the Communication of Information Benefits Payable Under The Canada 
Pension Plan and the Assignment of Canada Pension Plan Benefits to the Province of 
Newfoundland, 01.11.1996 (NF1514) 
• Labour Market Development, 24.03.1997 (NF 01602) 
• Agreement concerning the operation of marine freight and passenger services, 28.03.1997 
(NF1611) 
• Special Agreement for the Implementation of Francophone School Governance, 01.04.1997 (NF 
01636) 
• General Agreement on the Promotion of Official Languages, 16.03.1998, am. 24.09.1999 (no 
code) 
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 OTTAWA- NORTH WEST TERRITORIES 
 
• Agreement on a Business Service Center, 17.06.1996 (NT01436) 
• Canada-NWT Agreement on Labour Market Development, 27.02.1998 (NT 01755) 
• Cooperation Agreement concerning French and Aboriginal Languages, 05.01.2000 (no code) 
 
 
 OTTAWA- NOVA SCOTIA 
 
• Camp Hill Transfer Agreement, 08.05.1978, am. 21.03.1983 and 31.01.1992 (NS00141) 
• Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Ressources Accord, 26.08.1986 (NS 00368) 
• Atlantic Freight Transition Program, impl. 01.04.1995 (NS001168)   
• Agreement on a Framework for Strategic Partnerships (Labour market), 24.04.1997 (NS1680) 
• General Agreement on the Promotion of Official Languages, 21.03.2000 (no code) 
 
 
 OTTAWA- Nunavut 
 
• Cooperation Agreement for French and Inuit Languages, 16.11.1999 (no code) 
 
 
 OTTAWA- ONTARIO 
 
• Intergovernmental Agreement concerning the Ontario Aerospace Corp., 09.03.1992 (ON 00639) 
• Framework Agreement between Canada, Ontario Bombardier and de Havilland, 09.03.1992 (ON 
00640) 
• Access to Long-Term Health Care Facilities, 07.03.1994 (PE00971) 
• Transfer of Property of Hospital at Sioux Look-out, 11.04.1997 (ON 01662) 
• General Agreement on the Promotion of Official Languages, 02.12.1999 (no code) 
• Contraventions Act Agreement (Draft), date ? 1996 (unsigned) (no code) 
 
 
 OTTAWA- PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 
 
• Canada - Prince Edward Island Atlantic Freight Transition Programme 1996-97/2000-01, 
25.01.1996 (PE 01392) 
• Agreement Concerning the Collection and Sharing of Information on the Importance of Nature to 
Canadians, 17.03.1997 (PE1600) 
• Contraventions Act Agreement, 27.03.1997 (no code) 
• Canada - Prince Edward Island Agreement on Labour Market Development, 26.04.1997 
(PE01683) 
• General Agreement on the Promotion of Official Languages, 31.03.2000 (no code) 
 
 OTTAWA- QUEBEC 
 
• Memorandum of Agreement Respecting Old Age Assistance, 29.01.1952 (SAIC 1952-001) 
• Entente sur la censure des films, 12.11.1954 (SAIC 1954-001) 
• Memorandum of Agreement Relative to Invalidity Allowances, 28.03.1955 (SAIC 1956-001) 
• Mémorandum de l’Accord Canada-Québec concernant l’assurance-chômage, 01.07.1959 (SAIC 
1959-001) 
• Agreement relating to the Canada Assistance Plan, 21.08.1967 (QC00044)   
• Entente d’échange de services au sujet de l’incarcération de personnes condamnées, 
15.02.1974, am. 21.04.1998 (SAIC 1998-019) 
• Arrêté ministériel concernant le transfert en faveur du gouvernement du Canada de l’usage d’un 
terrain situé dans le canton de Falardeau, 09.06.1977 (SAIC 1997-100) 
• Agreement concerning the Reine-Marie Hospital, impl. 20.04.1978 (QC00148) 
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• Entente de transfert entre la Commission administrative des régimes de retraite et d’assurances, 
12.12.1984 (SAIC 1984-023) 
• Administration and Assignment Agreement, 01.08.1986 (QC 00366) 
• Agreement regarding the issuance of drivers’ licences for Canadians present in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 01.10.1988 (QC00462)  
• Accord administratif concernant le projet petites et moyennes entreprises en Thaïlande, 
18.01.1990, am. 27.04.1995 (QC 00511) 
• Memorandum of Agreement Respecting the Native Courtworker Program, signed 1990, 
retroactive to 01.04.1982) (QC00201) 
• Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens, 05.02.1991 (QC00563) 
• Auxiliary Agreement on Construction Projects under the Terms of the Canada-Québec 
Agreement on Minority-Language Education and Second-Language Instruction, 27.03.1991, am. 
27.03.1996 (no code) 
• Agreement Concerning the Perception of the Goods and Services Tax, 26.04.1991 (SAIC 1991-
15), am. 1997 (SAIC 1997-038)   
• Strategic Highway Improvement Plan, 16.10.93 (QC01753)  
• Entente de remboursement de frais par le Canada au Québec pour la réfection des 
infrastructures d’aqueduc et d’assainissement des eaux de Shefferville, 31.03.1994, am. last time 
30.11.1999 (SAIC 1999 -037) 
• Modalités d’échanges des ressources humaines dans le cadre de St-Laurent Vision 2000, 
01.04.1994 (QC 00995) 
• Canada-Quebec Agreement on the Exchange of Personal Information Arising from the Transfer 
of Reception and Integration Services as Agreed in the Canada-Quebec Accord Relating to 
Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens, 13.07.1995   (QC01239) 
• Harmonization and Co-ordination Agreement Respecting the Conservation, Protection, Clean-Up 
and Restoration of the St. Lawrence River and Priority Tributaries, entitled St. Lawrence Vision 
2000, 18.04.1994 (QC 01002) 
• Agreement Respecting the Application in Quebec of Federal Pulp and Paper Mill Regulations, 
06.05.1994 (QC01007) 
• Entente relative aux informations concernant les sentences, 01.04.1995 (QC1182) 
• Agreement on the Exchange of Information (immigration), 13.07.1995 (QC01239) 
• Amendment to the Auxiliary Agreement on Construction Projects under the Terms of the Canada-
Québec Agreement on Minority-Language Education and Second-Language Instruction, 
27.03.1996 (no code) 
• Agreement on terminological cooperation between Québec’s Office of the French Language and 
the Translation Bureau of the Government of Canada, 15.11.1996 (QC1521) 
• Agreement Respecting Legal Aid in Criminal Law Matters and in Matters Relating to the Young 
Offenders Act, 01.04.1996 (QC01398)  
•  Minority-Language Education and Second-Language Instruction Agreement, 27.03.1997 
(retroactive: coming into force 01.03.1993) (QC00824) 
• Labour market agreement in principle, 21.04.1997 (QC1676) (with two letters concerning 
language rights date 25/28.03.1997) 
• Protocole d’entente entre Listuguj Mi’gmag First Nation Community Social Services Directorate et 
Listuguj Mi’gmag First Nation, Canada et Québec (social services) 21.05.1997 (SAIC 1997-021) 
• Entente sur le système d’information sur la photographie aérienne, 09.11.1997 (SAIC 1997-029) 
• Entente de mise en œuvre relative au marché du travail, 01.12.1997 (no code) 
• Entente administrative concernant le programme canadien de bourses de la francophonie, 
15.01.1998 (SAIC 1997-032) 
• Agreement on Cooperation Regarding the St-Lawrence, 01.04.1998 (QC 01756) 
• Cession de bail entre le Canada et la Compagnie de chemins de fer nationaux relativement à des 
terrains connexes à des chemins de fer situés au Québec [QC being tenant, this is considered an 
IGA by SAIC], 07.04.1998 (SAIC 1998-049) 
• Protocole d’entente concernant l’organisation et les modalités d’application administratives et 
financières relativement au huitième sommet des Chefs d’État et de gouvernement des pays 
ayant le français en partage, 19.05.1998 (SAIC 1998-013) 
• Entente concernant le recours aux services des inspecteurs de la sécurité ferroviaire du Ministère 
des transports du Canada, 4/27.05.1998 (SAIC 1998-015) 
• Entente affectant un représentant du Québec à la mission diplomatique de Beijing, 06.06.1998 
(SAIC 1998-023) 
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• Entente concernant un représentant québécois à la mission de Beijing, 01.08.1998 (QC01780) 
• Accord concernant la collecte et le partage de renseignements de l’enquête sur l’importance de la 
nature pour les Canadiens entre le Ministère de l’environnement et de la faune du Québec et 
Statistique Canada, 13.08.1998 (SAIC 1998-029) 
• Entente spécifique relative au fonds d’aide aux sinistrés crée en vertu de la partie II de la Loi sur 
l’assurance-emploi. 15/24.09.1998, retroactive to 01.04.1998 (SAIC 1998-050) 
• Lettre d’entente concernant la création d’un secrétariat commun sur l’an 2000 dans le secteur de 
la santé, 28.09.1998 (SAIC 1998-033) 
• Entente transitoire sur la réadaptation professionnelle des personnes handicapées pour la 
période 1996-1998, 18.12.1998 (SAIC 1998-044) 
• Entente relative au financement de la mise en œuvre des mesures québécoises de fixation des 
pensions alimentaires pour enfants et de médiation familiale, 30.03.1999 (SAIC 1999-004) 
• Entente-cadre pour la négociation concernant l’autonomie gouvernementale de la nation Micmac 
de Gespec (FED + QC + Nation Micmac de Gespec), 18.05.1999 (SAIC 1999-011) 
• Entente concernant la mise en œuvre d’un programme de prestations de retraite anticipée pour 
les travailleurs du secteur des pêches, 19.05.1999 (SAIC 1999-017) 
• Protocole d’entente relatif à l’alphabétisation, 21.05.1999 (SAIC 1999-005) 
• Mesures provisoires relatives à l’enseignement dans la langue de la minorité et à l’enseignement 
de la langue seconde pour 1999-2000, 01.04.1999 (SAIC 1999-041) 
• Entente administrative relative aux bourses du millénaire, 28.10.1999 (SAIC 2000-001) 
• Accord politique pour l’examen d’une forme de gouvernement au Nunavik par l’institution d’une 
Commission du Nunavik (FED + QC + Nunavik), 05.11.1999 (SAIC 1999-033) 
• Entente relative au financement de la mise en œuvre des mesures québécoises de perception 
automatique des pensions alimentaires, 30.03.2000 (SAIC 2000-005) 
• Agreement to Prorogate an Agreement Pursuant to which Communication Québec Provides 
Information on Federal Services, 30.03.2000 (SAIC 2000) 
• Accord financier relatif à l’administration de la Loi sur les armes à feu, 11.12.2000 (retroactive to 
01.06.1998) (SAIC 2000-045) 
• Accord relatif à la loi sur les contraventions, 31.03.2001 (SAIC 2000-036) 
• Agreement Regarding Hydrometric and Sediment Networks in Quebec, 23.05.1997 (QC01698)  
 
 
 OTTAWA-SASKATCHEWAN 
 
• Global Agreement on Social Housing, 07.07.1986 (SK 00344) 
• Loan Insurance Agreement, 07.07.1986 (SK 00345) 
• Rental-Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program, 07.07.1986 (SK00350) 
• Operating Agreement to Carry into Effect the Principles of the 1986 Global Agreement on Social 
Housing, 07.07.1986 (SK 00354) 
• Assignment Agreement concerning the Wascana Rehabilitation Centre, 23.10.1989 (SK00625) 
• Agreement Relating to the Integration of Payment of Old Age Security and Saskatchewan Income 
Plan benefits, 17.07.1995 (SK1657) 
• Social Housing Agreement, 01.01.1997 (SK 01804) 
• Agreement on Labour Market Development, 06.02.1998 (SK 01757) 
• General Agreement on the Promotion of Official Languages, 31.03.2000 (no code) 
• Trust Agreement between the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation and the 
Saskatchewan Housing Corporation, 07.07.1986 (SK00355) 
 
 
 OTTAWA- YUKON TERRITORY 
 
• Capital Contribution Agreement for the Whitehorse General Hospital, 01.04.1993, am. 30.07.1993 
(YT 00833) 
• Universal Health Program Transfer Agreement, 01.04.1997 (YT 01661) 
• Funding Agreement on the Development, Enhancement and Implementation of French 
Languages Rights and Services 1999-2004, 29.12.1999 (no code) 
 
